[¶ 1] Wallace W. Ames III appeals from a judgment of conviction of burglary (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A) (2016), and theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A) (2016), entered in the trial court (Androscoggin County, Mathews, J.) on his conditional guilty plea. Ames argues that the court (L. Walker, J.) erred in denying his motion to suppress statements, made during an interview with police while he was detained in the Andrоscoggin County Jail awaiting a court appearance for a probation violation on an unrelated charge, because he was not given Miranda warnings prior to what he asserts was a custodial interview. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Viewed in the light most favorable to support the suppression court’s decision, the record on the motion to suppress supports the following facts. See State v. Ntim,
[¶ 3] On June 8, 2015, Detective Michaud and Detective Carly Conley, also from the Lewiston Police Department, went to the jail to interview Ames about his involvement in the burglary. The officers were not in uniform and not wearing duty belts, and they left their firearms at a secure location when they entered the jail. Their interview with Ames took place in the visitation room, which is a lаrge, well-lit room with windows. A long table with chairs on both sides was located in the middle of the room. During the interview, Ames sat on one side of the table and the officers sat on the other side; Ames and the officers were a few feet apart at a “normal conversational distance.” The detectives did not sit betweеn Ames and the door, and there were no obstacles between Ames and the door. There was no one else in the room and no guard at the door. The interview was recorded.
[¶ 4] At the outset of the interview, Detective Conley introduced herself and Detective Michaud and confirmed with Ames that he was currently in jail on a probation violation because his urine tested positive for drugs. She told Ames that “what we
[¶ 5] The detectives mentioned that they had talked to Ames’s probation officer and it had seemed like Ames was doing well on probation until he tested positive for drugs. Detective Michaud said that what happens with probation is “not our business right now” and he had “no idea what they’re trying to do,” but he encouraged Ames to “clear the table” and “put this behind us,” so that it doesn’t “come[ ] back up to bite you.” Detective Michaud told Ames that “there’s really no doubt in my mind that you went in and took some money,” and encouraged Ames to сooperate, because otherwise, “we’re going to end up proving it ... and then what will happen is you’ll be back on track with probation and we’re going to have to derail you again instead of just addressing it right now and moving forward.” Ames continued to deny involvement.
[¶ 6] Ames asked what sentence a theft carries. Dеtective Michaud explained that it could be a fíne, and suggested that from his experience, courts consider whether the theft was related to a drug problem. Ames confessed immediately thereafter, saying, “I did it. It was me.” The confession occurred approximately fifteen minutes into the interview. The deteсtives continued to speak with Ames regarding the details of the crime and some wholly unrelated matters for another fifteen minutes.
[¶ 7] On August 4, 2015, Ames was indicted on one count of burglary (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A), and one count of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A). On December 7, 2015, Ames filed a motion to suppress the incriminating statements he made during the intеrview, arguing that he should have been given Miranda warnings because he was in custody at the time of the interview. A hearing on the motion was held on December 30, 2015, at which Detective Michaud testified, and the audio recording of the interview was admitted in evidence. On January 7, 2016, the court denied the motion to suppress.
[¶ 8] On February 10, Ames filеd a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A(d) that the court granted pending resolution of the case at the dispositional conference.
[¶ 9] On February 18, Ames entered a conditional guilty plea to the two charges. He was sentenced to five years’ incarceration, with all but six months suspеnded, with two years of probation on the burglary count and to thirty days in jail, to be served concurrently, on the theft count. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). The plea was preserved for appeal and conditioned on our review of the motion court’s order denying Ames’s motion to suppress. On March 3, 2016, the court entered an order on thе motion to suppress that included findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ames timely appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(A); 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2016).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 10] Ames argues that he was in custody at the time of the interview and therefore should have been given Miranda warnings prior to being questioned. His primary assertion is that his detention in jail at the time of the interview was a circumstance that created an atmosphere of coercion amounting to custody.
[¶ 11] We ordinarily “review the denial of a motion to suppress for clear
[¶ 12] Miranda warnings are necessary only when a defendant is both “in custody” and “subject to interrogation.” Nadeau,
[¶ 13] “An interrogation is custodial if a reasonable person standing in the shoes of [the defendant] would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” State v. Jones,
(1) the locale where the defendant made the statements;
(2) the party who initiated the contact;
(3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent communicated to the defendant);
(4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant, to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
(5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the extent the officer’s response would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
(6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would perceive it);
(7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings;
(8) the number of law enforcement officers present;
(9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and
(10) the duration and character of the interrogation.
State v. Bryant,
[¶ 14] Several factors weigh against a determination that Ames was in custody. The suppression court found that only two law enforcement officers were present during the interview, and that they were un
[¶ 15] Ames argues that the circumstances оf the interview — he was detained in a county jail on a probation violation while awaiting a court appearance — created an atmosphere of restraint and coercion that amounted to a custodial interview. He acknowledges that the detectives advised him that he could stoр the interview and return to his cell at any time.
[¶ 16] We have not yet addressed the discrete issue of whether a defendant who is incarcerated is, by definition, in custody for purposes of interrogation by police. The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue in Howes v. Fields,
[¶ 17] The Supreme Court declined to adopt a categorical rule that imprisonment alоne constitutes custody for the purposes of Miranda. Id. at 508, 512,
[¶ 18] Second, the Court explained that “a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been sentenced to a term of incarceration, is unlikely to be lured into speaking by a longing for prompt release.” Id. The Court explained that while a person arrested and taken to a station house for questioning “may be pressured to speak by the hope
[¶ 19] Third, the Court reasoned that “a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been convicted and sentenced, knows that the law enforcement officers who question him probably lack the authority to affect the duration of his sentence.” Id. at 512,
[¶20] The Court concluded that Fields was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Id. at 514,
[¶ 21] Applying the federal precedent from Howes to this case,
[¶22] Considering all of the relevant factors in their totality, we conclude that the trial court did not err by determining that Ames was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda when he was interviewed by the detectives.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Because Ames does not challenge the court’s findings of fact, our analysis is limited to de novo review of the issue of whether Ames was subjected to a custodial interrogation.
. Ames has made clear that his argument is predicated entirely on federal authority.
. We distinguish the issue of whether Ames was in custody from the issue of the volun-tariness of his confession. For a confession to be admissible, it must be made voluntarily. State v. Kittredge,
Several of the detectives’ statements throughout Ames’s interview suggested that Ames’s cooperation with the investigation could affect the outcome of probation revocation proceedings. While such statements may be considered Under a voluntariness analysis, the issue is not before us and we decline to address it.