STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. DANIEL ALMANZAR, Defendant-Respondent.
Docket No. 33,763
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
December 2, 2013
Opinion Number: 2014-NMSC-001
VIGIL, Justice.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI, Neil C. Candelaria, District Judge. Gary K. King, Attorney General, Nicole Beder, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.
OPINION
VIGIL, Justice.
{1} In this case we address whether the phrase “at the scene” in
{2} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court and held that the warrantless arrest was not lawfully made because
I. BACKGROUND
{3} On December 1, 2007, Defendant and Victim were in the parking lot at Tingley Coliseum on the New Mexico State Fair grounds in Albuquerque. Defendant and Victim began quarreling, and he allegedly kicked Victim. After the incident, Victim left the fairgrounds and walked to a Walgreens drug store across the street on the corner of Central Avenue and San Pedro Drive, where she called 911. Defendant also left the fairgrounds, but he walked to a Circle K convenience store across the street on the corner of Central Avenue and Louisiana Boulevard. The Albuquerque Police Department dispatched officers to both locations in response to the 911 call.
{4} The officers identified Defendant when they arrived at the Circle K. As the officers approached Defendant, he put his hands in his pockets and refused to remove them after being asked to do so. The officers escorted Defendant out of the store, handcuffed him, and performed a pat-down search. The officer who performed the search felt a hard object in Defendant‘s pocket and removed a golf-ball-sized mass of cocaine. The officers then put Defendant in the back of a squad car and drove him to the Walgreens where Victim was located.
{5} When they arrived at Walgreens, Victim identified Defendant as the person who had battered her. Once Victim identified Defendant, one of the arresting officers made the initial determination that Defendant would be charged with domestic violence and taken in for booking. However, Defendant was not charged with the domestic violence offense, but instead was charged with and indicted on one count of trafficking a controlled substance in contravention of
{6} Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine evidence. He argued that the search amounted to an illegal pat-down and that it was unlawful because, pursuant to
{7} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court on both grounds. State v. Almanzar, 2012-NMCA-111, ¶ 1, 288 P.3d 238. First, it held that the officer who performed
{8} The State now asks this Court to address the lawfulness of Defendant‘s arrest and reverse the Court of Appeals on this single issue. It argues that the “at the scene” language in
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
{9} The district court‘s denial of Defendant‘s motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of fact and law. See State v. Williams, 2011-NMSC-026, ¶ 8, 149 N.M. 729, 255 P.3d 307. This Court reviews factual matters with deference to the district court‘s findings if substantial evidence exists to support them, and it reviews the district court‘s application of the law de novo. Id. Further, since Defendant‘s appeal centers on our interpretation of
B. The Warrantless Arrest Was Lawful Under Section 31-1-7(A) Because It Was Made in Close Proximity to Where the Incident Took Place
{10} The central issue is whether Defendant was lawfully arrested without a warrant for domestic violence when the arrest took place across the street from where the alleged incident occurred. If Defendant‘s arrest was lawful, then the search incident to the arrest falls within the exception to the constitutional search warrant requirement. See
{11} We begin our analysis by noting the constitutional limitations on the government‘s authority to make an arrest without a warrant and search incident thereto.
{12} One such exception is “the right on the part of the government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested.” Id. ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Warrantless searches “have been considered reasonable because of the practical need to prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence or obtaining access to weapons or instruments of escape, without any requirement of specific probable cause to believe weapons or evidence are present in a particular situation.” Id. Thus, our inquiry is whether Defendant was lawfully arrested so that the officer‘s search of his person falls within this exception.
{13} In order to lawfully arrest an individual for a misdemeanor, a police officer must have a warrant, unless the misdemeanor was committed in the officer‘s presence. See City of Las Cruces v. Sanchez, 2009-NMSC-026, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 315, 210 P.3d 212 (“[I]n New Mexico, an officer may execute a warrantless misdemeanor arrest only if the offense was committed in the officer‘s presence.“).
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, a peace officer may arrest a person and take that person into custody without a warrant when the officer is at the scene of a domestic disturbance and has probable cause to believe that the person has committed an assault or a battery upon a household member.
There is no dispute that the officers had probable cause in this case; rather, the dispute centers on whether the officers were “at the scene” of the disturbance when they made the warrantless arrest. Our task, therefore, is to determine what the Legislature intended by using the phrase “at the scene” in
{14} In interpreting statutory language, “[o]ur main goal . . . is to give effect to the Legislature‘s intent.” State v. Hall, 2013-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 294 P.3d 1235. To discern the Legislature‘s intent, the Court “look[s] first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.” Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm‘n, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” Diamond v. Diamond, 2012-NMSC-022, ¶ 25, 283 P.3d 260 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
{15} If the relevant statutory language is unclear, ambiguous, or reasonably subject to multiple interpretations, then the Court should proceed with further statutory analysis. See State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. (“[W]e exercise caution in applying the plain meaning rule. Its beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute‘s meaning.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We reject a “mechanical statutory construction when the results would be absurd, unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the statute.” Id. ¶ 10. When interpreting a statute, we are also informed by the history, background, and overall structure of the statute, as well as its “function within a comprehensive legislative scheme.” State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 13, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939.
{16} The authority to make an arrest without a warrant for a domestic dispute is contained in
{17} Defendant‘s plain language reading of the statute appears to be that “at the scene” means at the precise place where the domestic violence occurred. The Court of Appeals agreed with this narrow interpretation and held that the ordinary meaning of the word scene is “‘the place of occurrence or action.‘” Almanzar, 2012-NMCA-111, ¶ 25 (quoting Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 2028 (unabridged ed. 2002)). Defendant‘s interpretation of the phrase “at the scene” uses synonyms such as “place,” “location,” or “the place of occurrence or action” which we consider unhelpful because these terms fail to render the statute workable. At oral argument, defense counsel argued that “at the scene” could be defined to be the same physical address or the same ownership or occupancy unit, however, when pressed by the Court, as to whether that meant the fairgrounds was one “scene,” while crossing the street to call the police took you to a different “scene,” defense counsel responded that for large areas it should mean “within sight.” This interpretation is unworkable, and it became obvious with the follow up question of whether stepping behind a visual obstruction removed one from the “scene,” and thereby from the reach of the law.
{18} The State argues that due to the volatile and dangerous nature of domestic disturbances, “at the scene” must be read broadly to enable an officer to make a warrantless arrest within a reasonable time and distance of the incident. The State further asserts that a narrow reading of the statute would lead to absurd results, such as preventing an officer from making an arrest if a victim were forced to cross the street from the incident to call the police and her abuser followed her. Instead, the State argues that the Legislature has recognized the severity of domestic violence, and has created the warrantless arrest exception to combat the gravity of domestic violence situations. In our opinion, the difference in each side‘s interpretation of the phrase “at the scene” illustrates the beguiling simplicity with which the plain meaning rule can literally mask the statute‘s true intention. We agree with the State, however, because its interpretation conforms with precisely what we consider to be the Legislature‘s intent in creating the warrantless arrest exception.
{19} The Family Violence Protection Act (“the Act“),
{20} These measures reflect that the Legislature‘s first priority in addressing domestic disturbances is ensuring a victim‘s safety. With this clear purpose in mind, we conclude that
{21}
{22} In this case, we interpret “at the scene,” as used in
III. CONCLUSION
{23} We hold that the warrantless arrest of Defendant was lawful and valid under
{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.
BARABARA J. VIGIL, Justice
WE CONCUR:
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
Topic Index for State v. Almanzar, No. 33,763
APPEAL AND ERROR
Standard of Review
CRIMINAL LAW
Battery
Controlled Substances
Domestic Violence
Misdemeanor
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Motion to Suppress
Warrantless Arrest
Warrantless Search
STATUTES
Interpretation
Legislative Intent