STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAURA LOUISE AKINS, Defendant-Respondent.
Docket No. 45347
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
August 6, 2018
Boise, June 2018 Term
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Honorable Richard S. Christensen, District Judge.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent. Jenny C. Swinford argued.
The State appeals from the dismissal of a charge against the defendant for her failure to notify of a death pursuant to
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2015, Kimberly Vezina‘s body was found wrapped in a tarp and a shower curtain in Lake Coeur d‘Alene. Law
Following the discovery of Vezina‘s death, one of the other residents directed Akins and another person who had been at the house, Lacy Drake, to dispose of the body at a lake house owned by Akins‘s relatives in Coeur d‘Alene. This decision reflected that Akins and Drake had less extensive criminal records than the other occupants of the house. That evening, Akins and Drake were provided with a “burner” SUV in which the wrapped body had been placed in the rear cargo area. After briefly stopping at the lake house, Akins and Drake drove to a nearby public boat launch, unloaded the body, carried it to the dock, and dumped it into the water with an attached bag of cement. Three weeks later, the body was discovered by two fishermen who initially noticed the tarp on the surface of the lake and thereafter notified authorities. A subsequent coroner‘s examination confirmed that Vezina had died of combined drug toxicity.
The State charged Akins with one count of failure to notify of a death (
[t]hat the defendant, Laura Louise Akins, on or about the 15th day of October, 2015, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, having had custody of the body of Kimberly Sue Vezina, a human being who died, failed to notify or delayed notification to law enforcement or coroner of said death where the death would be subject to the coroner‘s investigation, with the intent to prevent discovery of the manner of death[.]
Akins moved to dismiss this count, contending that her prosecution under
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when it reviews a trial court‘s decision on a motion to dismiss.” State v. Eversole, 160 Idaho 239, 244, 371 P.3d 293, 298 (2016) (citing State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 184, 45 P.3d 838, 840 (2002)). To determine if a trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether the trial court perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion, acted consistently with the applicable legal standards, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. (citing State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6, 304 P.3d 276, 281 (2013)). Akins‘s motion raised a constitutional challenge. “Constitutional issues are purely questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.” State v. Baeza, 161 Idaho 38, 40, 383 P.3d 1208, 1210 (2016) (quoting Morgan v. New Sweden Irrigation Dist., 160 Idaho 47, 51, 368 P.3d 990, 994 (2016)).
III. ANALYSIS
This appeal presents a question of first impression for this Court. The issue underlying Akins‘s motion was whether enforcement of
(1) Where any death occurs which would be subject to investigation by the coroner under
section 19-4301(1), Idaho Code , the person who finds or has custody of the body shall promptly notify either the coroner, who shall notify the appropriate law enforcement agency, or a law enforcement officer or agency, which shall notify the coroner. Pending arrival of a law enforcement officer, the person finding or having custody of the body shall take reasonable precautions to preserve the body and body fluids and the scene of the event shall not be disturbed by anyone until authorization is given by the law enforcement officer conducting the investigation.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, any person who fails to notify the coroner or law enforcement pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by up to one (1) year in the county jail or by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both such imprisonment and fine.
(3) Any person who, with the intent to prevent discovery of the manner of death, fails to notify or delays notification to the coroner or law enforcement pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not to exceed ten (10) years or by a fine not to exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or by both such fine and imprisonment.
The duty to notify set forth in the first sentence of subsection (1)—i.e., the “reporting requirement“—is triggered when there is a death that is subject to a coroner‘s investigation under
(a) The death occurred as a result of violence, whether apparently by homicide, suicide or by accident;
(b) The death occurred under suspicious or unknown circumstances; or
(c) The death is of a stillborn child or any child if there is a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the death occurred without a known medical disease to account for the stillbirth or child‘s death.
Akins was charged with a felony under subsection (3). Based on the statute‘s language, for the State to enforce subsection (3), it was required to establish that Akins had an obligation to report under subsection (1). In her motion, Akins argued that her compliance with any obligation imposed by the statute would have forced her to provide potentially self-incriminating information. The district court agreed, finding that the State‘s charge would effectively punish Akins for her failure to incriminate herself, and that therefore her claim of privilege provided a full defense from prosecution. The State argues that this decision was incorrect for two reasons: (1)
The State‘s first argument raises a significant threshold question because the statute must require compelled testimony for Akins‘s claim to have merit. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature . . . .” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). “[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused‘s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.” Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988). In the context of
On its face, the statute requires notification of authorities upon discovery or acquisition of custody of a body, and for the notifying person to “take reasonable precautions to preserve the body and body fluids and the scene of the event” until authorized otherwise by those authorities.
The district court did not directly address this issue in its written decision; however, its willingness to analyze the statute beyond this issue implies that it found the reporting requirement under
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
While the language of the reporting requirement in the misprision statute does not expressly necessitate provision of personally identifying information, this statutory silence has not stopped courts from reaching a conclusion that the privilege applied because compliance with the requirement would threaten the defendant with a hazard of self-incrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Jennings, 603 F.2d 650, 652–54 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Kuh, 541 F.2d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. King, 402 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1968); see also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558–59 (1980); id. at 565 & n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d 62, 72 n.7 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Weekley, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1299 (S.D. Ala. 2005); United States v. Graham, 487 F. Supp. 1317, 1319–20 (W.D. Ky. 1980). It can be inferred from these decisions that statutory language requiring the reporting of personally identifying information is not essential for testimonial
To that point, we turn to the State‘s second argument that Akins‘s duty to comply with the reporting requirement under
The Court contrasted these circumstances with those presented in United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), where it had held that a bootlegger could not invoke the Fifth Amendment as a basis for refusing to file an income tax return. Id. at 78–79 (“[I]f the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all.” (quoting 274 U.S. at 263)). Distinguishing Sullivan, the Court in Albertson concluded as follows:
In Sullivan the questions in the income tax return were neutral on their face and directed at the public at large, but here they are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities. Petitioners’ claims are not asserted in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form‘s questions in context might involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of a crime.
Shortly after Albertson, the Court held that the constitutional privilege was properly asserted in a handful of cases. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (prosecution for violations of federal tax statutes requiring payment of wagering taxes, registration as party facilitating wagering activities, and filing of monthly returns to the Internal Revenue Service, and penalizing noncompliance); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (same as Marchetti); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (federal firearms statute requiring registration and penalizing unregistered firearm possession); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (federal marijuana statute requiring registration as transferee of marijuana and payment of occupational taxes, and penalizing unregistered possessors and tax delinquents).
After having stopped, a driver involved in an accident is required by [the statute] to notify the driver of the other vehicle of his name and address. A name, linked with a motor vehicle, is no more incriminating than the tax return, linked with the disclosure of income, in United States v. Sullivan[, 274 U.S. 259]. It identifies but does not by itself implicate anyone in criminal conduct.
Although identity, when made known, may lead to inquiry that in turn leads to arrest and charge, those developments depend on different factors and independent evidence. Here the compelled disclosure of identity could have led to a charge that might not have been made had the driver fled the scene; but this is true only in the same sense that a taxpayer can be charged on the basis of the contents of a tax return or failure to file an income tax form. There is no constitutional right to refuse to file an income tax return or to flee the scene of an accident in order to avoid the possibility of legal involvement.
Id. at 433–34 (footnote omitted).
After Byers, the Court similarly held that other statutes did not implicate the Fifth Amendment because they were part of generally applicable and noncriminal regulatory regimes of the state. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 190–91 (2004) (rejecting privilege claim against state statute requiring any person to identify himself to a police officer after having been detained through a traffic or investigatory stop); Baltimore City Dep‘t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 559 (1990) (rejecting privilege claim against custody order requiring production of a child); see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 255 (1980) (rejecting similar Fifth Amendment argument because monetary penalty imposed by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was a civil penalty and not a criminal sanction).
The statutory schemes at issue in all of these cases follow the same pattern: a requirement to report or otherwise provide information is imposed, and failures to comply with that requirement are penalized. So far, this squares with the provisions of
Specific to the first Albertson criterion, the district court found that Akins‘s charge of violating
When determining the group of persons that a statute applies against for this purpose, the focus must remain solely on the requirement to report. See Byers, 402 U.S. at 429 (“In order to invoke the privilege it is necessary to show that the compelled disclosures will themselves confront the claimant with ‘substantial hazards of self-incrimination.‘” (emphasis added)). The reporting requirement of
Where any death occurs which would be subject to investigation by the coroner under
section 19-4301(1), Idaho Code , the person who finds or has custody of the body shall promptly notify either the coroner, who shall notify the appropriate law enforcement agency, or a law enforcement officer or agency, which shall notify the coroner.
Despite that conclusion, the possibility of clear resolution within the Albertson-Byers spectrum is lost when the second criterion regarding the statute‘s purpose is considered. The State asserts that
To start, there is a fundamental difference between
Any remaining doubt as to the purpose of
Thus, on its face, the statute fits somewhere between Albertson and Byers: it applies against the public at large but carries with it an underlying criminal purpose. Notwithstanding the statute‘s facial posture, Akins moved the district court to consider
In this case, the body was first discovered by persons in a house in Spokane Valley, Washington.
The problem with this prosecution rests in the information that Akins was at that time required to report. The parties agree that at a minimum the language of
Although our analysis of
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court affirms the decision of the district court to grant Akins‘s motion to dismiss.
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices HORTON, BEVAN, and Justice Pro Tem MEDEMA CONCUR.