STATE OF OREGON, Petitioner on Review, v. ALEX AGUIRRE-RODRIGUEZ, Respondent on Review.
(CC 16CR60858) (CA A165704) (SC S067446)
Supreme Court of Oregon
Argued and submitted September 25, 2020; decision of Court of Appeals reversed, judgment of circuit court affirmed March 4, 2021
367 Or 614 | 482 P.3d 62
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Matthew Blythe, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
Rosalind M. Lee, Eugene, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.
* On appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Rafael Caso, Judge. 301 Or App 42, 455 P3d 997 (2019).
NELSON, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
NELSON, J.
In this criminal case, defendant pleaded guilty to several crimes that resulted in damage to the victim‘s truck. After the state presented evidence of a repair bill paid by the victim‘s insurer, the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution for the full amount of that bill, pursuant to
The relevant facts are uncontested. While intoxicated, defendant drove into the victim‘s pickup truck, damaging the truck and injuring two people who were in the truck at the time of the collision. Defendant did not remain on the scene to exchange insurance information. For that conduct, defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants, two counts of fourth-degree assault, and one count of failing to perform the duties of a driver to injured persons.
After defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced, the state sought restitution for a total of $11,803.50, which included $10,404.80 that the victim‘s insurer had paid to repair the victim‘s truck. To support that latter amount, the state submitted the following evidence: (1) the Kelley Blue Book value of the truck, assuming excellent condition ($9,761.00); (2) photographs of the damage to the truck after the collision; (3) a detailed repair estimate from the autobody shop that performed the repairs ($10,904.80); and (4) evidence that the insurer had paid that full amount, less the victim‘s $500 insurance deductible. The repair estimate provided by the autobody shop prior to the insurance company‘s authorization to perform the repairs was detailed and included (1) a list of parts necessary to complete the repairs ($6,915.50); (2) paint supplies to touch up the damage to the truck ($450.00); and (3) labor costs ($3,539.30). The hourly labor rates were further broken down and ranged from $52 per hour for “body” and “paint” labor, to $75 per hour for “mechanical” labor. The estimate was prepared using (1) a third-party publication, the Motor Crash Estimating Guide, to evaluate the damage and cost of repairs; and (2) CCC One Estimating, a software program that allowed the autobody repair shop to directly order repair parts from local suppliers.
Before the trial court, defendant argued that the state‘s evidence was insufficient to establish that the amount sought for the repairs was reasonable, as required by the restitution statute,
Defendant appealed, challenging the $10,404.80 restitution award for the repair costs paid by the victim‘s insurer. At issue on appeal, and again before this court, was whether the evidence that the victim‘s insurer had paid the bill was sufficient to establish that the cost of repairs was reasonable. The Court of Appeals noted, correctly, that the state bore the burden of presenting affirmative evidence to prove that the cost of repairs was reasonable. Aguirre-Rodriguez, 301 Or App at 45. Pointing to its decision in State v. J. M. E., 299 Or App 483, 487, 451 P3d 1018 (2019), that court then explained that, to establish reasonableness, the state‘s evidence must demonstrate how the paid charges correspond to the relevant market. Aguirre-Rodriguez, 301 Or App at 45. The court then concluded that the state‘s evidence did not “provide any meaningful basis for assessing how those costs correspond to the relevant market” and, accordingly, reversed the trial court‘s judgment. Id. at 46-47.
We allowed the state‘s petition for review, and, because we conclude that the evidence that the state presented, when considered collectively, was sufficient to support the trial court‘s determination that the repair cost was reasonable, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
We begin with a general overview of the requirements of the restitution statute,
As a procedural matter, the restitution statute places the burden of establishing the amount of economic damages on the state. See
On review, neither party disputes that defendant‘s criminal conduct resulted in economic damages to the victim‘s truck; rather, the issue is whether the state‘s evidence was sufficient to support the trial court‘s finding that the costs of repair were reasonable. We address that question—which we have not previously addressed in the context of the restitution statutes—below. First, however, we consider the other contexts in which this court has previously discussed whether evidence of a paid bill, standing alone, reflects the reasonable costs of the product or service.
In Farris v. McCracken, 253 Or 273, 453 P2d 932 (1969), a case dealing with enforcement of a mechanic‘s lien filed after nonpayment of a disputed contractor‘s bill, this court considered whether evidence of the
In this case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that “[t]he fact that a charge is billed, standing alone, says nothing about whether that charge is reasonable” absent “some sense of the relevant market.” Aguirre-Rodriguez, 301 Or App at 44. That court relied on Farris, which, in its view, “made this [same] point.” Id. As explained in greater detail below, however, this case does not present the same facts as in Farris, because, here, the state presented evidence beyond just the paid repair bill that provided an explanation for the basis of the charges made to restore the victim‘s truck. Although the proposition in Farris—that evidence of payment of a charge, on its own and devoid of explanation, does not establish that the amount charged was reasonable—remains the law, it is inapposite in this case where the state presented more than just an insurer-paid bill.
We turn to the appropriate standard of review. As we understand the position of both parties, the issue of whether the cost of the repairs to the victim‘s truck was reasonable is a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. The state contends that evidence of a paid bill is sufficient to support a finding that the amount paid is a reasonable amount for the services provided. Defendant counters that a paid repair bill—standing alone—is never sufficient to establish the reasonableness of repair costs for restitution purposes. We review questions of the sufficiency of the evidence by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, as the party that prevailed in the trial court. See Anderson v. Sturm, 209 Or 190, 191, 303 P2d 509 (1956) (stating that “[w]hen the sufficiency of the evidence is thus challenged, the evidence offered must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff” as the party that had prevailed below). The state bore the burden of proving each of the facts necessary to support the restitution award. See
Before addressing the primary dispute between the parties—whether the state‘s evidence was sufficient to support the trial court‘s determination that the cost to repair the victim‘s truck was reasonable—we reiterate the key components of the restitution statute,
“When a person is convicted of a crime *** that has resulted in economic damages, the district attorney shall investigate and present to the court, at the time of sentencing or within 90 days after entry of the judgment, evidence of the nature and amount of the damages. *** If the court finds from the evidence presented that a victim suffered economic damages, *** the court shall enter a judgment or supplemental judgment requiring that the defendant pay the victim restitution in a specific amount that equals the full amount of the victim‘s economic damages as determined by the court. ***”
When considering whether the state presented sufficient evidence to establish that the cost of repairs was reasonable, we must consider the legal principles that concern the recovery of economic damages in civil cases. See State v. Islam, 359 Or 796, 800, 377 P3d 533 (2016) (stating that “restitution under
Here, the parties dispute the evidence necessary to establish the market value of repair services. The state argues that evidence of a bill paid by a market participant permits a reasonable inference that the total amount paid was at, or even below, market rate and, therefore, reasonable. In the state‘s view, that is true particularly so in a case where the payor is a sophisticated party with knowledge of the relevant market, such as an insurance company. Specifically, the state argues that an insurer is in the business of investigating claims to ensure that necessary repairs are competitively priced, citing State Farm Ins. v. Farmer Ins. Exch., 238 Or 285, 290, 387 P2d 825 (1963) (noting that insurers lack economic incentive to expend efforts that would result in the unnecessary payment of losses). According to the state, when an insurer is the entity that pays a bill, it is especially reasonable for a factfinder to infer that the costs were reasonable because of the insurer‘s particular knowledge of the relevant market and internal incentives to minimize payments.
Defendant does not dispute that the reasonable value of the repairs to the victim‘s truck can be properly calculated by determining the market value of the repairs. Instead, he argues that evidence of payment of a repair bill by an insurance company, on its own, cannot support an inference that the cost of repairs was reasonable. In defendant‘s view, a factfinder cannot infer that a bill paid by an insurer reflects a reasonable repair cost without making unsupported assumptions—as he frames it, “speculating“—about either the contents of the insurance policy between the insurer and the policyholder, or the insurer‘s internal business practices. Defendant contends that the mere fact that an insurance company paid a repair bill provides no basis for assessing how those costs correspond with the relevant market because the payment of the bill says nothing about why the bill was paid.
Defendant is correct that an inference cannot be supported by mere speculation, but, rather, must be reasonable, based on the record. See State v. Jesse, 360 Or 584, 597, 385 P3d 1063 (2016) (stating that facts in issue can be established through reasonable inferences, but not through speculation). A reasonable inference is one that a factfinder could infer from the facts adduced; it is not an inference that a factfinder is required to draw. State v. Hedgpeth, 365 Or 724, 733, 452 P3d 948 (2019). Where the evidence gives rise to multiple reasonable inferences, the choice between those inferences—so long as those inferences are reasonable—is a matter for the factfinder. Id. at 732. On review, this court has an obligation to distinguish between inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence presented at trial and those that are based on
In the end, though, it is not necessary for us to decide in this case exactly when, or even if, evidence of a paid repair bill—standing alone—can support an inference that the costs for repair were reasonable for the purposes of the restitution statute. The repair bill here, paid by the victim‘s insurer, did not stand on its own. Instead, the state presented documentary evidence to accompany the evidence that the victim‘s insurer had paid the bill: the Kelley Blue Book value, a detailed repair estimate that was produced using third-party materials and sourced parts from local suppliers, and photographs of the damage to the victim‘s truck after the collision. We discuss that evidence next.
The detailed repair estimate and the photographs of the damage to the truck after the collision were sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to infer that the repair costs were a reflection of the relevant market rate and, thus, reasonable. More specifically, the repair estimate was prepared using industry-standard materials designed to source prices directly from the local market and to estimate labor rates and the price of replacement parts. That estimate, therefore, provided the factfinder with some knowledge of the market rate. Additionally, the photographs documenting the damage sustained in the collision help confirm the severity of the damage and the necessity of certain repairs. Considered together, the repair estimate, prepared using local market rates, and the photographs of the damage to the victim‘s truck, demonstrate a sufficient nexus to permit the trial court to conclude that the cost of repairs was reasonable.
In light of our determination that the state‘s cumulative evidence was sufficient to support an inference that the costs of repairs to the victim‘s truck were reasonable under
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.