105 P. 901 | Or. | 1910
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
1. The motion to strike out was upon the grounds that the parts of the answer to which it was directed were sham, frivolous, and irrelevant. It is claimed by defend
2. On the merits of this motion it is necessary to consider the relationship of the parties. The plaintiff was the owner of the property, which was subject to two mortgages, placed thereon by her predecessors in interest. It is not specifically alleged in the answer that she had personally obligated herself to pay these mortgages, but it is alleged that they were due, and that default had been made by the plaintiff in the payment thereof, and that the conditions of the mortgages had been broken. It will therefore be assumed that this averment amounts to a charge that she was personally bound to pay the debts thereby secured; and she, therefore, stood in the position of a mortgagor in default. The defendant, C. P. Elwert,
3. By the motion to strike from the answer the averments of these mortgage liens and the breach of the terms thereof at the time of the alleged conversion, a questiqn is raised as to who has the right of action to recover the legal damages—whether the plaintiff has that right alone, or the mortgagees, or both, and what the measure of damages is. It is the contention of the defendants that possession, or the right of possession, in the plaintiff at the time of the conversion is essential to the maintenance of the action, and that, as the plaintiff was in default in payment of the mortgages at and prior to the time of the conversion, the right of possession by Section 5636, B. & C. Comp., was cast upon, the mortgagees; that they thereupon became the owner of said property, and could maintain an action to recover the possession thereof, or an action in the nature of trover to recover the value. That they can maintain such an action has been held in Rienstein v. Roberts, 34 Or. 87 (55 Pac. 90: 75 Am. St. Rep. 564), and Backhaus v. Buells, 43 Or. 558 (72 Pac. 976: 73 Pac. 342.) But it is contended that plaintiffs, being out of possession and not entitled to possession, have no right of action in trover for the misappropriation of the property. To support the primary contention reliance is put upon certain decisions from other states, to
4. Because of this general right of property, although
5. In actions for trespass- to personal property the gist of the action is the disturbance of the plaintiff’s possession.
6. In trover the defendant is supposed to be in possession of the goods lawfully by finding, and the gist of the action is an unlawful conversion of them to his own use, while so in his possession. 21 PI. & Pr. 1014. The action may be brought against any person who, having in his possession, by any means whatever, the personal property of another, sells it or uses it without the consent of the owner. Sutherland,. Damages (3 ed.) § 1108. Lord Mansfield thus defined the action: “In form it is a fiction ; in substance it is a remedy to recover the value of personal chattels wrongfully converted by another to his own use. The form supposes that the defendant might have come lawfully by it; and, if he did not, yet by bringing this action the plaintiff waives the trespass. No damages are recoverable for the act of taking; all must be for the act of converting. This is the tort or maleficium, and to entitle the plaintiff to recover two things are necessary : First, property in the plaintiff; secondly, a wrongful conversion by the defendant.” Cooper v. Chitty, 1 Burr, 31.
7. In this State conversion has been defined as a dealing by a person with chattels not belonging to him, in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the true owner. Velsian v. Lewis, 15 Or. 539 (16 Pac. 631: 3 Am. St. Rep. 184) ; Ramsby v. Beezley, 11 Or. 49 (8 Pac. 288.)
8. So either party to the mortgage has a right of action against a third party, who has converted the property, because the act of conversion is inconsistent with the right
9. It has been held that a second mortgagee may maintain an action against a first mortgagee for the conversion by the latter of personal property included in both mortgages, and recover the value of the property converted (not exceeding' the amount due upon his lien), less the amount due upon the first mortgage. Clendening v. Hawk, 8 N. D. 419 (79 N. W. 878.) It would seem, therefore, that although plaintiff has a right of action against the defendants, the averment in the answer of facts constituting concurrent rights of action in the mortgagees to recover of the defendants’ damages, to the extent of the amounts due on the mortgages, would, to the extent of the mortgage liens, be relevant as a plea in bar pro tanto of plaintiff’s right of recovery. The case of Luse v. Jones, 89 N. J. Law, 707, 708, is to the contrary, and is very much in point on this question. The plaintiff was engaged in keeping a boarding house. The defendant wrongfully entered her house, removed the furniture, and sold it as the property of her husband. Plaintiff demanded damages for the value of the goods taken. It was made to appear in the evidence that plaintiff had given a chattel mortgage upon the property to another, and had remained in possession after condition broken. The question was thus presented whether a mortgagor of chattels who, for his own benefit, and with the consent of the mortgagee, retains possession and use after condition broken may recover in trespass the full value of the goods against a stranger, who seizes and converts them. After stating the relative legal right of a chattel mortgagor and mortgagee, Mr. Justice Dixon, at page 712 of the opinion, says: “The principles which regulate the action of trespass for an injury to chattels so owned are stated with precision by Sargeant Sayer under the title just quoted
10. The fact that the Ames Mercantile Agency,. a corporation, claiming to be the assignee and owner of said notes and mortgages, and to be the owner and entitled to the possession of the property,- by virtue of the mortgages, brought an action in claim and delivery against these defendants for the possession of the goods, and that such action resulted adversely to the corporation, is not material to the issue, because, upon an inspection of the findings and judgment therein, copies of which have been attached to the answer, it appears that the corporation’s claim of ownership of the notes and mortgage by assignment was disputed, and the finding was against the
11. Over defendants’ objections plaintiff’s counsel was permitted to interrogate her witnesses as to the value of the furniture for rooming house purposes, and as to its value while located in the rooming house at the time of the alleged conversion. The testimony of her witnesses was confined to the value of the property for the purposes used. The general rule for the measure of damages for the destruction or conversion of personality is the market value of the property at the time and place of the conversion, if it has such value. Prettyman v. O. R. & N. Co., 13 Or. 341 (10 Pac. 634) ; Iler v. Baker, 82 Mich. 226 (46 N. W. 337) ; Luse v. Jones, 39 N. J. Law, 707; Sutherland, Damages (3 ed.)“§ 1109. But if the property has no market value at the time and place of conversion, either because of its limited production, or because it is of such a nature that there can be no general demand for it, and it is more particularly valuable to the owner than any one else, then it may be estimated with reference to its value to him. Sutherland, Damages, § 117; Iler v. Baker, 82 Mich. 226 (46 N. W. 337.) Before resort may be had to such method of establishing value, it must be affirmatively shown that there is no market value.
12. The property in controversy is shown to be only ordinary household goods, as serviceable in private housekeeping as in public rooming houses. Moreover, plaintiff’s lease was terminated by the re-entry of the lessor, because of her default in payment of rent, so that she was not entitled to the continued use of the property in connection with the building, nor is it shown that she was about to, or did, engage in the same business at another location; but, the property being subject to liens for debts then overdue, which plaintiff was not able to pay, it was
13. Plaintiff was asked what was the value of this furniture and equipment in this house at that time for rooming purposes, on the 18th day of September. Over defendants’ objections she was permitted to answer as follows: “Why, for rooming house purposes it is worth $1,500. The day she took it, I had a lady to take it for $1,000 cash, but she [defendant C. M. Elwert] would not transfer the lease.” Defendants promptly moved to strike out the latter part of the answer referring to the offer, on the ground that it was incompetent, not responsive to the question, and not proper evidence of value. The motion was denied. This was error. Assuming, without deciding, that an unconditional, bona fide offer to purchase would be competent evidence of value, yet this was not such an offer. It was burdened with the evident condition that the purchaser was willing to give the amount stated, provided she also received an assignment of the lease, and was permitted to make continued use of the property in the building where previously it had been used by plaintiff. This is not evidence of a market value, but of value for a particular use.
14. The fact that the Elwerts refused to consent to a transfer of the lease cannot alter the case, for they were not bound to do tha/t upon plaintiff’s request, but on the contrary, might refuse without reason. The erroneous admission of this testimony was not cured by giving an instruction to the effect that the market value of this property was not its value for rooming house purposes, where it was located, but that the jury must take into
15. The court instructed the jury to the effect that, if the defendants forcibly, and against plaintiff’s will, took possession of the property under their claim of lien, then they waived their lien, and they cannot offset it, in this case, against plaintiff’s claim for the value of the property. The general rule for the measure of damages, in an action by a mortgagor against a mortgagee for a conversion of mortgaged property, is stated by Mr. Chief Justice Bean in Springer v. Jenkins, 47 Or. 502, 505, (84 Pac. 479), to be the difference between the value of the property at the time of the conversion and the amount of the mortgaged debt, and this rule is supported by an abundance of authority.
16. A more general statement of the rule may be found in an extended note at page 392 (7 ed.) of Sedgwick, Measure of Damages, in part as follows:
“Where the defendant has such a lien on the property or other equitable interest in it, as security for a debt, as would have rightfully entitled him to effect a sale of it in case of the debtor’s default, the measure (of damage) is the residuary value of the chattel after deducting the amount of the debt. Indeed, wherever the defendant, although in the wrong in assuming or retaining possession which rightfully belongs to the plaintiff, has yet a legal or equitable interest in the chattel, the action is now treated on equitable principles, and the recovery limited .to the actual net amount of plaintiff’s claim.”
17. It is contended, however, by plaintiff’s counsel that it was not prejudicial to defendants, because the lien of rent due was not specifically pleaded in mitigation of damages, but as a general defense, and therefore not available. Springer v. Jenkins, 47 Or. 502, 505 (84 Pac. 479, is relied upon as authority for this contention. It is there stated that new matter, in mitigation of damages, is not a general defense, or bar to the action, but is a plea in confession and avoidance, and must be so pleaded to be available. It was assumed, however, without discussion, that, in an action by a mortgagor against a mortgagee for conversion of the chattels mortgaged, the amount of the recovery is the full value of the property, and that, if reduced by the amount due on the mortgage, it was by way of mitigation. We do not consider that to be law; and, as the decision in that case was put upon another ground, we are free to consider it as an open question.
18. The term “mitigation of damages” is properly applied only to actions where the damages are not capable of exact pecuniary measurement; that is, where the amount is, to a certain extent, within the control of the jury, and is used in contradistinction to the term “aggravation of damages.” Where the amount of damages depends upon the effect of the injury on the feelings, then the circumstances of the injury and the position in life of the parties have a bearing on the amount which should be awarded as compensation. So in the case of an injury to liberty, to family relations and social standing, and where exemplary damages are to be given, such circumstances have a
Other errors are assigned; but, as they will not probably recur upon a new triál, they will not be considered.
For the errors noted and considered, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
delivered the following dissenting opinion.
I dissent from the views announced, so far as they hold that the amount of the lien may be shown without pleading it as a partial defense. It is manifest that the matter pleaded in this case was intended as a complete defense. In Webb v. Nickerson, 11 Or. 382, 385 (4 Pac. 1126), Mr. Justice Thayer, speaking for the court, says: “At common law every plea must go to the whole cause of action and be an entire answer thereto on the record. This was a fundamental principle, and it prevails under the Code, except that matter may be set up by way of answer which constitutes only a partial defense, but in the latter case it must be pleaded as a partial defense, and not assume to answer the entire cause of action. Fitzsimmons v. Fire Insurance Co., 18 Wis. 246 (86 Am. Dec. 761.)” It can make no difference whether you call it “a plea in pro tconto,” a partial defense, or a defense in mitigation of damages, the effect is .the same. Nor do I agree with the statement to the effect that the word “mitigation” is only proper in the class of cases enumerated in the majority opinion. This expression appears to be in common use in the class of cases under consideration. It is so employed in 13 Cyc. 68, 69, and in some of the authorities there cited; also in United States v. Ordway (C. C.) 30 Fed. 30, 32, in which Mr. Justice Deady had under consideration this character of defense, where he held such plea necessary, and in Morrison v. Crawford, 7 Or. 472, 476, as well as in Springer v. Jenkins, the case criticised. I regard the effect of the conclusion reached by the majority on this point as inharmonious with Section 73, B. & C. Comp., and in conflict with the rule enunciated on the subject in the case from which the above excerpt is taken, and amounts to the overruling on this point of Case Thresh. Mach. Co. v. Campbell, 14 Or. 460, 469 (13 Pac. 324), and Springer v. Jenkins, 47 Or. 502 (84 Pac. 479.)
It will not do to say that the case of Springer v. Jenkins was determined upon another feature, for it appears to be the second point considered, and one of the two principal questions there before the court, but, in view of the possibility of a new trial another matter was also passed upon. If it may be held to be dicta, which I do not concede, which point determined is entitled to that classification? I think clearly that the declarations upon the subject here involved cannot be classed as dicta, for, as said by the United States Supreme Court in Fla. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Schutte, 103 U. S. 118, 143 (26 L. Ed. 327) in referring to a point decided by the Florida Supreme Court: “The point was directly made by the pleadings and as directly passed on by the court. Although the bill in the case was finally dismissed because it was not proved that any of the state bonds had been sold, the decision was in no just sense dictum. It cannot be said that a case is not authority on one point because, although that point was properly presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the cause, something else was found in the end which disposed of the whole matter. Here the precise question was properly presented, fully argued and elaborately considered in the opinion. The decision on this question was as much a part of the judgment of the court as was that on any other of the several matters on which the case as a whole depended.” See, also, Kirby v. Boyette, 118, N. C. 244, 254 (24 S. E. 18) ; Buchner v. C., M. & N. W. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 264 (19 N. W. 56) ; Kane v. McCown, 55 Mo. 181, 199; Ocean Beach Ass’n v. Brinley, 34 N. J. Eq. 438.
