State v. AdamsState v. Adams
In this consolidated appeal, Tabatha Adams seeks review of (1) the district court’s denial of her
Although a lack of factual findings from the district court hinders our ability to review Adams’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude Adams failed to demonstrate that even if she had received effective assistance of counsel, she would have declined to plead guilty and insisted on going to trial. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of her
Factual and Procedural Background
The State charged Adams with aggravated indecent liberties with a child, aggravated criminal sodomy, and sexual exploitation of a child. The State later amended the complaint to add a second count of sexual exploitation of a child. The charges arose when police were given a memoiy card containing 50 photographs depicting an 8-year-old female child and two adults engaged in a variety of sexual acts. Authorities identified the adults as Zach Noble and Adams and the child as Adams’ biological daughter, S.A. Adams acknowledged during questioning by law enforcement that the photographs depicted her, her daughter, and her boyfriend, Noble. She also confessed to police that while the photographs were taken at Noble’s home in Nebraska, she and S.A. had engaged in sexual acts in Dodge City while Noble watched via webcam.
Adams’ appointed counsel, Linda Eckеlman, negotiated a plea agreement in which Adams agreed to plead guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child and agreed to testify against Noble. The agreement also prohibited Adams from filing a departure motion or contacting S.A. until S.A. turns 18. In return, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining three counts.
At the plea hearing, the district court informed Adams that pursuant to her plea she would be sentenced to life imprisonment and required to serve 25 years before being eligible for parole. Adams affirmed she was satisfied with Eckelman’s services, understood the terms of tire plea, and understood tire sentence. Adams pled guilty to aggravated indecеnt liberties with a child, and the
Soon after the plea hearing, Adams sought to have Eckelman removed as counsel based on Adams’ dissatisfaction with Eckel-man’s services. At the attorney status hearing, tire district court informed Adams that even if Eckelman withdrew from the case, Adams would remain bound by the plea agreement. Adams told the district court she wanted to retain Eckelman as her attorney, indicating, “I guess I’ve just been frustrated with the whole process. But, my parents spoke with someone else, and they said under the conditions and stuff, that I was probably getting the best I was gonna get.”
At sentencing, Eсkelman submitted several letters on Adams’ behalf, and Adams’ stepfather testified that Adams was a “model citizen” before she became involved with Noble. Adams also informed tire court that she agreed to the plea to protect her daughter and she lived with guilt every day for what happened to S.A. The district court sentenced Adams to a hard 25 life sentence in accordance with Jessica’s Law,
Adams subsequently filed a pro se
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Adams’
Without making any credibility dеterminations or factual findings regarding Adams’ claims of ineffectiveness, the district court rejected Adams’ claim of prejudice. Specifically, the district court concluded Adams’ guilty plea was motivated by the overwhelming evidence against her, the “near certainty of her conviction,” and Adams’ desire to prevent her daughter from having to testify.
We have jurisdiction over Adams’ consolidated appeal pursuant to
Analysis
Adams asserts that under both the Sixth Amendment to tire United States Constitution and
Adams Has Not Proven that the Sixth Amendment Requires this Court to Allow Withdrawal of Her Guilty Plea
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, with limited exception, a criminal defendant’s right to assistance of counsel. Adams asserts she received ineffective assistance because Eckelman failed to advise her аdequately of the consequences of her plea, including the sentence and its mandatory nature; failed to investigate her potential defenses; failed to inform the judge of a potential jurisdictional defect in the prosecutor’s recitation of facts during the plea hearing; and made statements shaming Adams into tаking the plea.
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents mixed questions of law and fact. When such a claim is brought under
Analysis
In Strickland v. Washington,
In a decision issued the same day as Strickland, the Court in Cronic articulated narrow exceptions to Strickland’s second requirement, holding a defendant is not required to prove prejudice in three situations. One such circumstance is when counsel “entirely fails” to subject the prosecutor s case to meaningful adversarial testing. Cronic,
As noted, although the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, it made no factual findings regarding Adams’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor did it specifically determine whether Eckelman’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Despite this failure, both parties urge this court on appeal to consider whether Eckelman rendered ineffective assistance of counsel to Adams. But because Eckelman and Adams testified inconsistently regarding Eckelman’s performance and this court is not permitted to make credibility findings, the district court’s failure to make factual findings precludes our review of this issue. See State v. Qualls,
Adams’ complained-of errors do not fall into the limited Cronic exception.
Adams argues Eckelman completely abandoned her role as Adams’ counsel by failing to challenge the State’s case and therefore, pursuant to Cronic, this court need not consider whether Adams was prejudiced by her counsel’s deficient performance. Adams argues Eckelman abandoned her adversarial role because: (1) Eck-elman acted as the victim’s advocate when she told Adams she had destroyed her daughter’s life and that if she had any decency she would plead guilty, and (2) Eckelman failed or refused to investigate Adams’ claim that Noble had threatened her and failed to ask for a psychological evaluation.
Errors evaluated under Cronic are rare, and most alleged deficiencies are properly evaluated under Strickland rather than Cronic. See Florida v. Nixon,
But even assuming the deficiencies Adams alleges occurred, Eckelman did not entirely fail to function as Adams’ advocate or fail to subject the State’s case to testing. As the State points out, the record shows Adams hoped to enter a plea and Eckelman’s plea negotiations resulted in the State dismissing three charges, including another Jessica’s Law charge and two severity level 5 felonies. Eckelman also reviewed photographs, S.A.’s interview, and police reports to determine the strength of the State’s' case. These actions demonstrate Eckelman did not entirely fail to represent Adams, and, therefore, this case does not present tire rare situation in which a defendant is not required to prove prejudice.
Adams is not entitled to relief under Strickland because she failed to demonstrate she was prejudiced by any deficiency.
Next, we consider whether Adams is entitled to relief under Strickland. Adams points to three areas in which Eckelman’s rep-reservation fell below an objeсtive standard of reasonableness: (1) Eckelman failed to ensure Adams understood the consequences of pleading guilty, particularly the mandatory nature of the sentence; (2) Eckelman failed to investigate potential defenses; and (3) Eck-elman failed to notify the district court at the plea hearing that Adams believеd the factual basis for the charge was jurisdictionally defective. Assuming Eckelman provided ineffective counsel in each of these areas, we must next determine whether Adams proved that, absent Eckelman’s errors, Adams would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See State v. Szczygiel,
In concluding Adams was not prejudiced by any оf Eckelman’s failures, the district court discussed the strength of the State’s evidence and the reasons for Adams’ plea. Specifically, the district court found Adams’ plea was motivated by the “near certainty of conviction” and her desire to protect her daughter from testifying. Ultimately, the district court rejected Adams’ assertion that had she been effectively represented, she would not have pled guilty.
Based on these factual findings, which are supported by the record, Adams has not proven to a reasonable probability she would have insisted on going to trial absent the errors committed by her counsel. As the district court found, in addition to her desire to protect her daughter, Adams faced overwhelming evidence of guilt, including her own Mirandized confession that she and her daughter engaged in sexual acts in Dodge City, testimony from her daughter, and potential testimony from Noble. Given the weight of this evidence, we conclude it is unlikely Adams would have risked a trial. Additionally, had she proceeded to trial, this evidence likely would have resulted in convictions for additional crimes, including another crime under Jessica’s Law, and a much greater sentence. These facts dispel the possibility that, but for Eckelman’s errors, Adams would have proceeded to trial. See State v. Bricker,
Further, Adams’ own statements call into question whether she would have forgone a plea and proceeded to trial. A few weeks before her plea, Adams sent Eckelman a letter advising Eckelman that she was unhappy that the apparent current plea offer was 25 years, but also indicating: “I had always hoped we would be able to malee a plea because I did not wаnt my daughter dragged through court.” Adams reiterated a similar feeling at sentencing, stating, “I agreed to the plea to keep my daughter out of court. I do know that I put her through a
In support of her claim that had her counsel not been ineffective she would hаve gone to trial, Adams points to a statement she made at the combined hearing on her motion to withdraw her plea and her
“Honestly I would hate to see [S.A.] testify. I would hope that something could be met before that but if it comes down to it I feel like I should fight this time because I did nothing the first time because I was such an emotional wreck and I was worried about my daughter. I’m still worried about my daughter. But my parents have also told me that they have done lots of studies and sometimes it helps lads to testify. So I don’t know. It’s a risk I guess at this point I would be willing to take.”
Significantly, the district cоurt heard Adams’ tepid statement indicating a willingness to risk trial and apparently discounted that statement in finding a lack of prejudice. This rejection is tantamount to a credibility determination—a determination we are not free to reconsider.
To summarize, Adams is burdened with demonstrating that a reasonable probability exists that, but for Eclcelman’s errors, she would have insisted on going to trial. But the weight of the evidence against Adams, her repeated expressed desires to protect her daughter from testifying, and the potential for a much greater sentence all weigh against Adams’ assertions that had she been effectively counseled she would have riskеd a trial. The district court correctly held that Adams failed to meet her burden to demonstrate prejudice.
Adams’ Claim that under
In contending the district court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea under
Affirmed.