State v. AdamsState v. Adams
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Bergeron Judge., Mock, Myers
{¶1} Presenting a counterfeit check can support a conviction for theft by deception when the defendant acts knowingly, as the trial court here found. We accordingly affirm the underlying conviction in this case. But when we shift the focus to the restitution award, the General Assembly has carefully circumscribed who can qualify as a “victim” capable of recovering an award of restitution. On the facts at hand, the third party bank here fails that test, and we accordingly reverse the award of restitution to it.
I.
{¶2} In search of employment, defendant-appellant Troy Adams alleges he reached out to a man known within the neighborhood only as “Brian” in the hopes of retaining work, specifically manual labor (i.e., tearing down drywall, rebuilding parts of homes). Brian obliged, setting up an arrangement by which Brian would pick up Mr. Adams and other individuals and transport them to the work sites, charging them five dollars per trip, and then return the workers to their home at the end of the day. It remained unclear who, exactly, was to pay Mr. Adams for his efforts, but he expected regular payments. After about two weeks, growing concerned about the lack of a check, Mr. Adams asserts he confronted Brian about his tardy paycheck. Shortly thereafter, Brian allegedly paid him by check, issued by RPI Plumbing Inc. (“RPI“) to Troy Adams in the amount of $807.51 and signed by an individual other than Brian. After receiving the check, Mr. Adams proceeded to his own PNC Bank branch (“PNC“) to cash the check.
{¶3} The problem was that RPI had never issued any such check, casting doubt on the accuracy of Mr. Adams‘s entire story. In a subsequent investigation, an RPI employee discovered six checks not issued by the company, but nevertheless drawn on the company‘s
{¶4} At trial, RPI‘s office manager testified that Mr. Adams had never been an employee of RPI, nor had the company issued a check payable to him. Additionally, RPI‘s office manager, as well as a PNC bank fraud investigator, confirmed that the check cashed by Mr. Adams was indeed a counterfeit. The trial court also heard from Vanessa Storer, a PNC bank teller, concerning her interactions with Mr. Adams on the day in question and his odd demeanor when cashing the check.
{¶5} Mr. Adams testified in his own defense, focusing on Brian‘s conduct and laying any blame at his feet. To explain his possession of the check, Mr. Adams repeatedly asserted that he believed the check to be valid, assuming Brian worked as a contractor for a company who then paid his workers with “contract checks.” After receiving the check from Brian, Mr. Adams presumed that RPI was the company Brian worked for as a contractor. Based on this series of assumptions, Mr. Adams cashed the check at PNC.
{¶6} Ultimately, the trial court found Mr. Adams guilty of theft by deception and ordered Mr. Adams pay restitution in the amount of the counterfeit check to PNC. Mr. Adams now appeals, challenging two aspects of the proceeding below. First, he questions both the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence, and second, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Mr. Adams pay restitution to PNC. Although we overrule Mr. Adams‘s first assignment of error, we sustain his second assignment of error relating to the restitution.
II.
We begin with Mr. Adams‘s weight and sufficiency challenges. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, “the question is whether after
{¶7} Mr. Adams maintains that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite mens rea for theft by deception pursuant to
knowingly deceiving another or causing another to be deceived by any false or misleading representation, by withholding information, by preventing another from acquiring information, or by any other conduct, act, or omission that creates, confirms, or perpetuates a false impression in another, including a false impression as to law, value, state of mind, or other objective or subjective fact.
{¶8} In turn, a person acts “knowingly” when “the person is aware that the person‘s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.
{¶9} Although the evidence here was far from overwhelming, the state provided sufficient evidence to support that Mr. Adams acted with the purpose to deceive RPI by his false representations as to the validity of the check. At trial, the RPI office manager confirmed that Mr. Adams had never been an employee at RPI and that the company had not issued a check to him. While Mr. Adams insisted that he received the check as payment for working for a contractor, Brian, the check itself was not signed by Brian (who was nowhere to be found at this point) and was instead issued by RPI. Further, Mr. Adams admitted that, during the time he worked for Brian, he never engaged in any plumbing work (RPI‘s line of work, as apparent from its name), but instead mostly tore down buildings and walls. Additionally, on cross-examination, the state elicited testimony from Mr. Adams concerning the time he initially worked for Brian (about six days, eight hours a day) and his hourly pay ($12) to establish that these hours did not add up to the amount on the check ($807.51), but rather to a completely different figure ($576). The state also provided
{¶10} And, of course, the trial court as trier of fact remained free to disbelieve Mr. Adams‘s story based on its own credibility assessment. Recall that, pursuant to
{¶11} Turning to his weight of the evidence challenge, the trial court did not go astray here. In light of the evidence presented at trial, the court had at its disposal testimony from the RPI office manager, the counterfeit check, testimony from Ms. Storer regarding Mr. Adams‘s conduct on the day in question—not to mention the disconnect between the rate of payment and the check, and Brian‘s elusive nature. While the trial court heard testimony from Mr. Adams disputing the state‘s evidence, the judge, as the trier of fact, could allocate weight to each party‘s testimony as appropriate and did so here, finding
{¶12} Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Adams‘s first assignment of error.
III.
{¶13} But as we turn to the second assignment of error regarding the restitution award, Mr. Adams‘s argument stands on a surer foundation. When reviewing a trial court‘s restitution order in a misdemeanor case, we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Gordon, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170660, 2018-Ohio-3786, ¶ 6, citing State v. Lynn, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150569, 2016-Ohio-2849, ¶ 4.1
{¶14} As provided in
{¶16}
{¶17} Ultimately, we find Thornton dispositive of the restitution issue at hand. Because PNC was not named in the complaint as the victim (rather, it denominated RPI as the victim), the court could not order Mr. Adams to pay restitution to the bank. Under the governing statute, RPI qualifies as the victim of Mr. Adams‘s actions, whereas PNC sits as a mere third party. Accordingly, despite the fact that PNC reimbursed RPI for its loss, PNC is a third party bank that lacks statutory entitlement to recover the reimbursement it chose to make to its customer. Therefore, PNC is not a “victim” for the purposes of
{¶18} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Mr. Adams‘s first assignment of error and affirm his conviction. We sustain his second assignment of error and reverse the trial court‘s order of restitution and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.