STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DREQUAN ABDULLAH, Defendant-Appellant.
Case Nos. 19 MA 0011; 19 MA 0012
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MAHONING COUNTY
September 28, 2020
[Cite as State v. Abdullah, 2020-Ohio-4813.]
BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Gene Donofrio, David A. D’Apolito, Judges.
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio Case Nos. 2017 CR 590; 2017 CR 1119
JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part. Reversed in part and Remanded.
Atty. Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecutor and Atty. Ralph M. Rivera, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor, Youngstown, Ohio 44503, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Dated: September 28, 2020
WAITE, P.J.
{¶1} In these consolidated appeals, Appellant Drequan Appellant contests the judgment and sentence of the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court in two separate matters, one which was bound over from juvenile court, and the second which was initiated as an adult criminal proceeding.
{¶2} Appellant argues the trial court failed to invoke reverse bindover pursuant to
Factual and Procedural History
{¶3} These consolidated appeals are based on two separate cases. Because Appellant was seventeen years old when he committed the first offense, 2017CR590 involved a felony bindover from the juvenile court. The second case, 2017CR1119, involved felonies committed shortly thereafter by Appellant, when he was 18 years old. Although there are two different appeals at issue and two different trial court records regarding these matters, the trial court sentenced both matters together at one hearing and issued identical sentencing entries.
Case No. 2017CR590
{¶4} On September 20, 2016, a complaint was filed in the Mahoning County Juvenile Court alleging Appellant, then 17 years of age, committed aggravated robbery with a firearm specification. Appellant was arraigned on October 24, 2016 and detained in the Mahoning County Juvenile Detention Center. The state moved to transfer the case to the adult court, alleging it was a category two offense subject to mandatory transfer pursuant to
Case No. 2017CR1119
{¶6} As Appellant was no longer a juvenile at the time of his subsequent offense, this second case originated in Mahoning County Common Pleas Court, General Division. On November 9, 2017 an indictment was filed in case number 2017CR1119, charging Appellant with one count of aggravated robbery in violation of
{¶7} Following plea negotiations, Appellant reached an agreement with the state wherein he would plead guilty to one count of aggravated robbery with an accompanying firearm specification and one count of having a weapon while under disability. In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the robbery charge. The state also agreed to recommend a total sentence of ten years on the charges.
Plea Hearing
{¶8} The cases remained separate, but were assigned to one trial court docket. On July 18, 2018, both cases came on for a plea hearing. At the outset of the hearing, the state informed the court that a plea agreement had been reached in both matters and {¶9} At his sentencing hearing on September 6, 2018, Appellant was sentenced to five years of incarceration for robbery in case number 2017CR590. In case number 2017CR1119, he was sentenced to six years for aggravated robbery, three years on the firearm specification and 24 months for having a weapon while under disability. The aggravated robbery and weapons under disability charges were to run concurrently. The sentences for 2017CR590 and 2017CR1119 were also to run concurrently, for a total stated prison term of nine years. {¶10} Appellant filed these timely appeals, which we consolidated for consideration. The Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas erred as a matter of law when it failed to sentence Drequan Abdullah in accordance with {¶11} Appellant contends the trial court erred when it failed to sentence him in accordance with the reverse bindover procedures for matters transferred from the juvenile court to the adult court pursuant to {¶12} Juvenile courts have exclusive initial subject matter jurisdiction in matters involving a child who is alleged to be delinquent for committing acts which would constitute a felony offense if committed by an adult. State v. Mack, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 14 MA 82, 2015-Ohio-4148, ¶ 8 citing State v. Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 692 N.E.2d 608 (1998). A juvenile matter can be transferred to the general division of the common pleas court. (A) A child who is alleged to be a delinquent child is eligible for mandatory transfer and shall be transferred as provided in section 2152.12 of the Revised Code in any of the following circumstances: * * * (2) The child is charged with a category two offense, other than a violation of section 2905.01 of the Revised Code, the child was sixteen years of age * * * (b) The child is alleged to have had a firearm on or about the child‘s person or under the child‘s control while committing the act charged and to have displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated possession of the firearm, or used the firearm to facilitate the commission of the act charged. {¶13} Appellant was seventeen years of age when he committed the offense at issue. He was charged with aggravated robbery in violation of {¶14} Pursuant to law, after the matter is transferred and has proceeded through the adversarial process, the juvenile offender may ultimately be convicted of a lesser offense, one that would have permitted the juvenile court to retain the juvenile. This would allow the juvenile to benefit from juvenile rehabilitative services he or she would receive {¶15} (B) If a complaint is filed against a child alleging that the child is a delinquent child, if the case is transferred pursuant to division (A)(1)(a)(i) * * * of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code, and if the child subsequently is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense in that case, the sentence to be imposed or disposition to be made of the child shall be determined as follows: * * * (3) If the court in which the child is convicted of or pleads guilty to the offense determines under division (B)(1) of this section that, had a complaint been filed in juvenile court alleging that the child was a delinquent child for committing an act that would be that offense if committed by an adult, division (A) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code would not have required mandatory transfer of the case but division (B) of that section would have allowed discretionary transfer of the case, the court shall determine the sentence it believes should be imposed upon the child under Chapter 2929 of the Revised Code, shall impose that sentence upon the child, and shall stay that sentence pending completion of the procedures specified in this division. * * * {¶17} In this case, Appellant waived his probable cause hearing by agreed judgment entry. Essentially, he agreed that although he was seventeen years of age, he may have committed an act which would constitute the crime of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification. Because it was a category two offense with a firearm specification, it was subject to mandatory bindover. He was subsequently indicted in the adult court on aggravated robbery with a firearm specification, and robbery. {¶18} Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of robbery. The state dismissed the charges of aggravated robbery and the firearm specification pursuant to the plea agreement. Robbery is not a category two offense. Therefore, if Appellant had only been charged with robbery, he would not have been subject to mandatory transfer under the statute. This reduction in the offense from aggravated robbery with a firearm specification {¶19} Appellant’s first assignment of error has merit and is sustained. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it accepted unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary guilty pleas, in violation of {¶21} Guilty pleas governed by {¶22} “The underlying purpose, from the defendant‘s perspective, of {¶23} The requirement is not all-encompassing, however. The colloquy must include discussion of only certain constitutional and nonconstitutional rights. {¶24} The trial court also must inform the defendant of certain nonconstitutional rights including: the nature of the charges; the maximum possible penalty, including postrelease control, if applicable; whether the defendant is eligible for probation or community control sanctions; and that the trial court may immediately proceed to sentencing after accepting the guilty plea. Bell at ¶ 10. The trial court need only substantially comply when informing the defendant of these nonconstitutional rights. Id. Substantial compliance has been defined as “under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” Id., citing Veney at ¶ 15. If the trial court fails to substantially comply in advising a defendant of these nonconstitutional rights, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice in order to invalidate the plea. Bell at ¶ 10. {¶25} In the instant appeals, Appellant first contends that reverse bindover implicates a constitutional right. He asserts that because it involves a jurisdictional issue, due process requires that only a court of competent jurisdiction may impose imprisonment, and that strict compliance was required. In other words, under reverse bindover, it was the juvenile court that had jurisdiction to impose imprisonment for the offense committed while he was seventeen, and not the general division of the common pleas court. {¶27} The state contends the trial court was not required under {¶28} It is well established that there are five constitutional rights enumerated within {¶30} Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. Drequan was denied the effective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; and, Article I, Sections 10, and 16, Ohio Constitution. (7/18/18 T.pp.1-11; 9/6/18 T.pp.1-11) {¶31} Appellant argues that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel failed to inform the trial court about the effect of {¶32} The state contends trial counsel was not defective because Appellant was properly sentenced under {¶33} In order to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). The burden on proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the appellant. Strickland, at 687. The reviewing court must also strongly presume that trial counsel adequately defended the interests of the client. Id. at 690. {¶34} Appellant filed a notice of additional authority pursuant to {¶35} The holding in Abrams is readily distinguishable in this matter. In Abrams, there was only one case before the trial court at sentencing: the juvenile matter that was bound over to common pleas court. The offender was clearly prejudiced, as he may be subject to a lesser penalty in the juvenile system if the matter was remanded. {¶36} Additionally, we have previously held that when the trial court commits plain error in failing to properly sentence an offender pursuant to {¶37} Appellant’s third assignment of error is moot. The trial court erred when it granted Drequan only 360 days of jail-time credit, even though he was confined for a total of 573 days in connection with these cases. {¶38} Appellant contends on appeal that he is entitled to 573 days of jail-time credit in connection with both cases combined, instead of the 360 days granted by the court. Because the trial court failed to include in the calculation the days Appellant spent in the Mahoning County Juvenile Detention Center while the case that originated in the juvenile court was pending, the court erred in its calculations. The state concedes that the trial court erred in calculating Appellant’s jail-time credit. {¶39} Although codified by {¶40} The trial court must make a factual determination as to the actual number of days of confinement that a defendant is to have credited to his sentence. {¶41} Pursuant to {¶42} It is apparent from the record that Appellant was held in the Mahoning County Juvenile Justice Center from late October of 2016 until the juvenile matter was bound over to the court of common pleas. The precise dates are not part of this record. The record does reveal Appellant spent 360 days in the Mahoning County jail in case number 2017CR1119, the case which originated in the common pleas general division. {¶43} In its separate sentencing entries in case number 2017CR590 and 2017CR1119 the trial court held, “Defendant is granted THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX (336) DAYS credit as of this date of sentencing along with future custody days while Defendant awaits transportation to the appropriate State institution.” (9/25/18 J.E.) Appellant asserts he was ultimately credited with 360 days of jail time, which presumably {¶44} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error has merit and is sustained. {¶45} Based on the foregoing, Appellant’s guilty pleas are valid, as the reverse bindover process set forth in Donofrio, J., concurs. D’Apolito, J., concurs. A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution. This document constitutes a final judgment entry.ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
Conclusion
NOTICE TO COUNSEL