109 S.E. 789 | N.C. | 1921
This action was brought by the plaintiff, who is a duly *929 certified public accountant, to enjoin the defendants from exercising certain of their duties beyond the limits of the State, and, to be more exact, from examining applicants for license and certificates to practice, as public accountants, beyond the State and in the city of Washington, D.C.
The case was tried below on demurrer to the complaint and the motion to vacate a restraining order theretofore granted. The court sustained the demurrer and vacated the restraining order, and refused a preliminary injunction to the final hearing. Plaintiff appealed. After stating the case: The State Board of Accountacy [Accountancy] was created by a special act of the Legislature of 1913, the act being chapter 157 of the Public Laws of 1913, brought forward in the Consolidated Statute as chapter 116, sections 7008 to 7024, inclusive. The function of this board is to examine applicants and grant certificates, as certified public accountants of the State of North Carolina, to those giving evidence by such examination that they are qualified. The statute provides (C.S. 7010) that: "The board shall determine the qualifications of persons applying for certificates under this chapter, and make rules for the examination of applicants and the issue of certificates herein provided." The statute further provides (C.S. 7016): "The examination shall be held as often as may be necessary in the opinion of the board, and at such times and places as it may designate, but not less frequently than in each calendar year."
Before entering upon a discussion of the merits, we will first consider a preliminary question based upon the motion (868) of the plaintiff in this Court to make the Attorney-General a party as coplaintiff, so that the title of the case shall be"The State on the relation of the Attorney-General and D. H. McCullough,"
as plaintiffs, against the present defendants. The defendants resist the granting of this motion on the ground that the amendment here will deprive them of the benefit of their second ground of demurrer taken below, that plaintiff had no right to bring this action, and that this Court will not allow an amendment, when such a result will follow. This is true generally as the cases cited by the defendants show. West v. R. R.,
We then have a case, in the name of the State upon the (869) relation of its Attorney-General and D. H. McCullough against the defendants, to enjoin the violation by the latter of the law creating them, wherein it is alleged that they have committed an ultra vires act, and to the extent that, if they may pay their expenses in the doing of the alleged unlawful act, they will misapply the trust fund established by the statute for the lawful costs and expenses of the board, and thereby are diminishing the amount which should go into the public treasury by the terms of the law, which provides in C.S. 7019, that after paying expenses, "Any surplus arising shall, at the end of each year, be deposited by the *931 treasurer of the board with the State Treasurer to the credit of the general fund." C.S. 1143, entitled "Actions by the Attorney-General to prevent ultra vires acts by corporations," provides:
In the following cases the Attorney-General may, in the name of the State, upon his own information, or upon the complaint of a private party, bring an action against the offending parties for the purpose of —
1. Restraining by injunction a corporation from assuming or exercising any franchise or transacting any business, not allowed by its charter.
2. Restraining any person from exercising corporate franchises not granted.
3. Bringing directors, managers, and officers of a corporation, or the trustees of funds given for a public or charitable purpose, to an account for the management and disposition of the property confided to their care.
4. Removing such officers or trustees upon proof of gross misconduct.
5. Securing, for the benefit of all interested, the said property or funds.
6. Setting aside and restraining improper alienations of the said property or funds.
7. Generally compelling the faithful performance of duty and preventing all fraudulent practices, embezzlement, and waste.
To restrain corporations from ultra vires acts, and which was applicable where purpose was not to dissolve a corporation, as under section 1187, but to preserve it in its useful functions without abuse of its powers.Attorney-General v. R. R.,
The authority, given by statute, as approved by this Court, would seem to be ample justification for granting the relief prayed for by plaintiff in this action. The Attorney-General is doing only what the statute permits him to do in the interest of the public, of his own motion, or upon the complaint of a private party.
Having disposed of this preliminary question, we proceed to consider the case upon its merits. It must be steadily (870) kept in mind that we are now dealing with an overruled demurrer, and we can consider only the facts alleged in the complaint (which are to be taken as admitted), and no extraneous matter. Hartsfield v. Bryan,
We are firmly convinced that the statute, under which the defendants professed to hold this examination, does not authorize them to perform their duties, and exercise their functions, outside the State, and that, on the contrary, it requires them to confine their activities strictly within its limits. We do not suppose, for an instant, it will be controverted, that defendants are public officers. The board created by the act is, at least, a quasi-public corporation, required to discharge certain public duties, and responsibilities to the State and bound for their proper, and legal, performance, and also for the care, and administration of the funds they handle, the surplus of which, not used for defraying the board's expenses, being required to be deposited in the State Treasury. In Groves v. Barden,
In 22 R.C.L. 396, boards of education, boards of legal examiners, and boards of equalization of taxes, are mentioned as among various well known instances of boards of public officers. It is admitted that the jurisdiction of the board is statewide, and if the members are officers, they are, therefore, State officers. The plaintiff contends, and it is true, that the jurisdiction of State officers is only coextensive with the territory of the State from which they derive their powers. "It is apparent that in strictness a mere license or power conferred by statute is only coextensive with the sovereignty from which the license or power emanates." 17 R.C.L. 502. "State officers are those whose duties concern the State at large, or the general public, although exercised within defined limits, and to whom are delegated the exercise of a portion of the sovereign power of the State. They are in a general sense those whose powers and duties are coextensive with the State." 36 Cyc. 852. In S. v. Hocker, 63 Am. Rep. 174, after reciting very fully the attributes necessary to constitute an officer, it was held that without any semblance of doubt the members of the board of legal examiners were State officers, the field for the exercise of whose jurisdiction, duties and powers, was coextensive only with the limits of the State.
It cannot be said that "coextensive with State boundaries" means more than the words imply, that is so contradictory that the mere statement of it is seemingly absurd. The word "jurisdiction" embraces not only the subject matter coming within the powers of officials, but also the territory within which the powers are to be exercised. S. v. Magney, (Neb.),
In Pardrige v. Morgenthau,
It is elementary that when the law confers upon a person powers that he as a natural person does not possess, power cannot accompany his person beyond the bounds of the sovereignty which has conferred the power. For example, letters testamentary or of administration have no legal effect beyond the territorial limits of the State in which they are granted. An executor or administrator cannot sue in his official capacity in the courts of any other state than that from which he derives has authority to act in virtue of the letters there granted to him, because his appointment stops at the boundary of the state which appointed him. 11 R.C.L., pp. 432-447. He must resort to ancillary administration in the other state. A state may have extra territorial officers, such as commissioners to take acknowledgements of deeds in other states and territories, but such cases are clearly exceptional. 22 R.C.L. 405. The same familiar principle that forbids court officials, executors, administrators, and guardians from acting in their official capacity beyond the state boundaries, is applied in the case of corporations. In the case of Miller v. Ewen,
As has been said, "jurisdiction" involves the hearing as well as the determining of matters to be decided — indeed, the hearing of the matter is the basis for the determination. The giving of examinations for determining the qualifications of applicants is not a mere incidental or ministerial duty such as might be delegated by the State Board of Accountancy to other persons, but is a judicial or quasi-judicial duty required to be performed by the members of the board themselves, and in the order further to safeguard the public, certain standards of skill are required of the examiners. The plaintiff contends that the submission and the supervision of the holding of the examination, and the determination of the qualifications of applicants, constitute one official act, requiring such judgment and discretion as to render it judicial or quasi-judicial in character; that it is the performing of a function of government designed to benefit the people of the State; and therefore, in going beyond the boundaries of the State to perform this function, the board would exceed its jurisdiction. It seems superfluous to cite other authorities than those already cited from our own Court in Ferebee v. Hinton,
Bishop or Non-Contract Laws, secs. 785, 786, says that quasi-judicial functions are those which lies midway between the judicial and the ministerial ones. The lines, separating them from such as are on their two sides, are necessarily indistinct; but in general terms, when the law, in words or by implication, commits to any officer the duty of looking into facts, and acting upon them, not in a *937
way which it specifically directs, but after a discretion in its nature judicial, the function is term quasi-judicial. In 18 R.C.L. 294, in discussing the extent to which a board of examiners may be controlled in granting professional licenses, the discretionary power to pass on qualifications is termed "judicial," and in every case where the acts complained of constitute an abuse of discretion or an excess of jurisdiction, it is held that the courts should intervene to enforce or enjoin, as the circumstances might be. In 22 R.C.L. 383, it is said that certain officers are considered quasi-judicial, as for example, members of a board of pilot commissioners, to whom the law has entrusted certain duties, the performance of which requires the exercise of judgment. In Boner v. Adams, Auditor, and Jenkins,Treasurer,
In S. v. State Medical Examining Board, 50 Am. Rep. (32 Minn.) 575; inPeople v. Dental Examiners,
The general rule for the construction of statutes, when applied to the law under consideration, clearly indicate that the intention of the Legislature, and the object to be secured by the performance of the duties presented for the board of accountancy, require that the words "at such places as it may designate," shall be construed to mean "as such places within the State as it may designate." In construing a statute, it is to be considered in its relation to other laws, as part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, in connection with other statutes on the same or cognate subjects, or even on different subjects. Where the language is of doubtful meaning, or adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice, the Court gives a reasonable construction consistent with the general principles of law. The spirit, or reason of the law, prevails over its letter. The meaning of general terms may be restrained by the evident object, or purpose to be attained, and general language may be construed to admit implied exceptions, in order to accomplish what was manifestly intended. It is proper to consider the occasion and the necessity for its enactment, and that construction should be given which is best calculated to advance the object by suppressing the mischief and securing the benefits contemplated. If the purpose, and well ascertained object of a statute, are inconsistent with the exact words, the latter must yield to the controlling influence of the legislative will resulting from a consideration of the whole act. A statute should not be extended beyond the fair and reasonable meaning of its terms because the Legislature did not use proper words to *939
express its meaning. Where the ordinary interpretation of a statute leads to consequences so dangerous and absurd that they could never have been intended, the Court may adopt a construction from analogous provisions and thus supply an omission. Abernethy v. Comrs.,
The above is a summary of some of the general principles for the construction of statutes as laid down in 36 Cyc. 1102 et seq., and many decisions and when applied to the statute under consideration in the case at bar, the conclusion is inevitable that the field for the discharge of the functions of the State Board of Accountancy is not the whole world, but only "such places within the State as the board may designate." In S. v. Ind. Co., (Ark.), L.R.A. 348, in construing a statute in which the word "any" occurred thirteen times in the first section, the Court held that although the Legislature may use generally words, such as "any" or "all," in describing the persons or acts to which the statute applies, still it does not follow that the law has any extra territorial effect; for it is presumed that the Legislature did not presume it to have such an extensive, or world-wide effect, unless the language of the statute admits (877) of no other reasonable interpretation. Bond v. Jay, 7 Cranch 351. The reports furnish numerous instances of the application of this rule, by which general words used in statutes are taken as limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the Legislature passing the statute, and confining its operation to matters affecting persons and property in such jurisdiction. If it were necessary, hundreds of cases and statutes could be referred to containing general words, which are thus limited. Among the vast number of cases construing such statutes, it is doubtful if one can be found in which such general words have not been treated as limited to some extent, for it is unusual for a legislature to intend that its statutes shall apply everywhere.
We have already referred to the law of corporations as being a law on a cognate subject. Even more closely allied is our law as it relates to such professions as law, medicine, etc. Until 1917, our statute did not prescribe where the examinations for entrance to the bar were to be held, and even now the statute (C.S. 195) says that examinations for license to practice law may be held in the city of Raleigh. Before 1917 the examiners of applicants for admission to the bar did not construe their authority to permit the holding of examinations outside the State nor, since 1917, at any place other than the city of Raleigh, even though the word "may" sometimes implies discretion. C.S. 6609, prescribes that the board of medical examiners shall meet in the city of Raleigh. C.S. 6701, prescribes that the *940
board of osteopathic examiners shall meet in Raleigh in July of each year, "and at such other times and places as a majority of the board may designate." In our statutes, some discretion is permitted the various other boards of examiners for dentists, pharmacists, nurses, teachers, etc. In these cases, however, we are not left to apply only the general rules for the construction of statutes. The law is unmistakably clear that the Legislature has no power to enact statutes, even though in general words, that can extend in their operation and effect beyond the territory of the sovereignty from which the statute emanates. The legislative authority of every state must spend its force within the territorial limits of the State. Cooley's Const. Lim., p. 154. As a general rule, no law has any effect of its own force beyond the territorial limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. 25 R.C.L. 781; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 N.S. 113;
We must not be understood as holding that the Legislature may not require certain official acts to be done beyond the State's limits, for it can legally do so, as for example in requiring depositions of witnesses or the acknowledgment of a deed or other instrument, to be taken in some other state, or even in a foreign country, and perhaps there are other illustrations of this legislative power. But they are done by its express permission, and are not merely implied.
The demurrer of the defendants admits as true the allegations *941 of the complaint that the defendants intended: 1. To hold the examination outside the State. 2. To use in that examination the same questions that had been used in the preceding week in an examination in Raleigh; and, 3. That these duplicate questions were available to candidates for certificates in the Washington examination.
The defendants say that it was at the solicitation of applicants and for their convenience (not for the public welfare or interest) that they proposed to give the duplicate examination in Washington the week following the Raleigh examination. As a matter of fact, the defendants do not deny that some applicants were going to Washington from North Carolina to take the duplicate examination. This Court may judge for itself of the relative "convenience" of Washington and Raleigh for applicants already in this State, and of the interest of the citizens of this State to be served by holding a duplicate examination outside the State the week after such examination was held in Raleigh. The plaintiff seems to be in entire accord with the statement of the defendants in their demurrer that the act creating the State Board of Accountancy and prescribing its duties and powers, was passed in the interest of the general public, to protect them against incompetent, inefficient, or dishonest persons, and not for the purpose of granting special privileges or emoluments to any class of persons. The plaintiff contends, however, that in attempting to hold an examination in the city of Washington, "at the earnest solicitation of numbers of applicants living in that (879) section," and, as stated by defendants on the hearing "for the convenience of applicants," the board was attempting to "grant special privileges" to those applicants, and an even greater "special privilege" was the intended use of duplicate questions which were available to applicants. This Court with these admitted facts before it, can judge whether an official act thus performed is "for the public interest" or for the promotion of the personal interest of applicants. It is an unprecedented thing for the other examining boards of the State to go beyond the borders of the State to give examinations (much less duplicate examinations) to applicants who may not find it convenient to come to the State to take the same. Yet the defendants claim that they are justified in going hundreds of miles beyond the State boundaries, the week following an examination in Raleigh, to give a duplicate of that examination, because it is more convenient to certain applicants to take the examination in Washington; and some of the applicants going from this State to Washington for that purpose. As well suggested by the plaintiff's learned counsel, it is peculiar to certified accountants in Washington that the mountain should come to Mohament. It is an established rule that *942 when the means for the exercise of a granted power are given, no other or different means can be implied, as being more effective or convenient. Cooley's Const. Lim. (4th ed.) p. 78. In stating in the call that this was "positively the last examination to be held outside the State," the Board of Accountancy impliedly admits that it considered such procedure irregular, to say the least.
The authorities cited above, defining judicial and quasi-judicial officers, also establish the principle that when such officers exceed their jurisdiction or abuse their discretion, it is subject to review by the courts; in fact, so fundamental is this principle that in most of the cases the courts do not discuss it, but address themselves to determining whether or not the act complained of was in excess of jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion, and if they decide these questions in the affirmative, then it is held as a matter of course that the act should be enforced or enjoined, as the case may be. In Throop on Public Officers, pp. 525, et seq., it is said that where, in the exercise of a power, an officer is vested with a discretion, his act is regarded as quasi-judicial. . . . But, of course, if the officer or board attempts to exercise a power, either judicial or ministerial, in a case to which his or its jurisdiction does not extend, the act is either absolutely void or voidable by judicial proceedings, as the case may be. But the exercise of discretionary power is always, subject, in some respects, to review by the courts. So it may be reviewed, where it has violated some rule of public policy, and of course it will be violated by any illegality or excess of jurisdiction. This principle has been enacted into our State laws for municipalities (C.S. 2962), (880) giving to any taxable inhabitant the right to maintain an action to set aside or prevent any illegal official act on the part of the municipality of its officers, and it is also well settled by numerous decisions of this Court, and has received the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States in Crampton v. Zabriskie,
The State in the lawful exercise of its police power has created the State Board of Accountancy and required examinations of applicants to safeguard the public against incompetent accountants. Every citizen of the State is in a certain sense injured when the duties of the board are performed in such a manner as to let down the bars and lower the standards of the profession. There is an especial injury to properly accredited members of the profession who have met the conditions imposed by law, in the manner prescribed by law. Poor Richard says, "He who hath a trade hath an estate." A man's profession is his capital. The State has set standards for entrance into this profession, and those who have entered in the manner prescribed by law are entitled to the protection of the State to the extent, at least, that they shall not be unjustly discriminated against by admission of others into the profession in any other way than that prescribed by law.
It is not necessary to go beyond the decisions of our own Court to establish the contention that this is a subject for the cognizance and intervention of our courts. In Glenn v. Comrs.,
The decisions of the courts of other states and the principle announced by the various text-books, are well summarized in Perkins v. Indi. SchoolDist.,
As to the demurrer, we have covered the entire field of inquiry, as the facts stated in the complaint are to be taken as admitted. On the motion for a continuance of the injunction to the hearing, there is an affidavit of Mr. G. G. Scott denying that the same questions as propounded in the State were used in the Washington examination, thereby giving the applicants there a decided advantage over those examined here. But we need not settle the controversy of fact, because it has been the rule for time out of mind that where there is conflict in the evidence the injunction is generally continued to the hearing. We stated the prevailing rule in Cobb v. Clegg,
The entire judgment below will be reversed, injunction to the final hearing issued, the demurrer overruled, and the defendants permitted to answer over, if they so desire.
Reversed.
Cited: Cherry v. R. R.,
(883)