SER Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. v. Thompson, et al
No. 22-0439
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
June 12, 2023
WOOTON, J., dissenting
released at 3:00 p.m. EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
I dissent to the majority‘s extension of the Medical Professional Liability Act (hereinafter “MPLA“) to acts of common, ordinary negligence merely because they involve a health care provider. This Court has previously determined that a hospital‘s negligence as to postmortem care and handling does not implicate the MPLA because such postmortem remains are not “patients” as defined therein. See Syl. Pt. 1, Ricottilli v. Summersville Mem‘l Hosp., 188 W. Va. 674, 425 S.E.2d 629 (1992). Here, because the postmortem remains fortuitously involve a fetus whose mother was contemporaneously rendered care by the hospital, the majority determines that the mother is the “patient” necessary to trigger the MPLA. Although the majority painstakingly attempts to pigeonhole the cause of action into the MPLA‘s definitions, I believe such an expansion of the MPLA runs contrary to our precedent and the widely understood nature of such claims; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The negligent mishandling of a corpse is well-established cause of action that does not bear any of the hallmarks of medical professional liability such as to trigger the special requirements of the MPLA. Handling and transfer of postmortem remains, while deserving of professionalism and the utmost care, simply does not implicate the type of negligent “health care services” the MPLA was designed to address. Whether petitioner Charleston Area Medical Center (hereinafter “CAMC“) was negligent in its handling of
In a nearly identical case, the Michigan Court of Appeals described precisely why such a cause of action does not bear any indicia of a medical professional liability action. In Urbanowicz v. Trinity Health-Michigan, No. 354970, 2021 WL 5021769 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2021), the mother of a “stillborn child” brought an action for mishandling a corpse against the hospital where the child was delivered; the hospital was allegedly to have negligently provided the afterbirth, rather than the remains, of the stillborn child to a funeral home for cremation. Id. at *1. The trial court dismissed for violation of the statute of limitations provided under Michigan‘s medical malpractice act. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, explaining why such a cause of action did not sound in medical malpractice:
In this case, plaintiff Tricia gave birth at the hospital and there was a contractual duty for the hospital to render professional healthcare services to her as she gave birth. Therefore, the hospital shared a professional relationship with plaintiff Tricia. And the parties do not dispute that the hospital, doctors, and employees who were rendering care to plaintiff Tricia were capable of committing medical malpractice. However, the reasonableness of the hospital‘s actions in determining where and how to store plaintiffs’ stillborn child and how to appropriately catalog whether the human remains were properly delivered to a third-party funeral home does not require medical knowledge or medical judgment. In other words, such storage and delivery policies do not require expert testimony. They are within the knowledge of any layperson who is familiar with administrative tasks. The hospital argues that care for a stillborn child is not something that a layperson would know how to perform. However, plaintiffs are not claiming that the hospital‘s medical care was negligent, but rather that the hospital negligently cataloged and transferred the wrong human remains to the funeral home. Resolving these allegations does not require specialized medical knowledge that the jury would only be able to understand as explained by an expert.
Id. at *2 (emphasis added). Other courts have come to the same conclusion under similar facts. See Kelly v. Brigham & Women‘s Hosp., 745 N.E.2d 969, 975 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (observing that negligent mishandling of a corpse is not a “medical malpractice” case); Dillard v. Parkland Hosp., 136 S.W.3d 16, 21 (Tex. App. 2002) (finding that father did not have “health care liability claim” for negligent mishandling of his son‘s corpse); Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 966 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that claim of mishandling of stillborn fetus did not constitute medical malpractice case); Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 242 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (finding medical
This is, in fact, the same conclusion to which this Court came nearly thirty years ago in Ricottilli. The plaintiff in Ricottilli alleged negligence against a health care provider in connection with her deceased daughter‘s autopsy. The Court concluded this action did not sound in medical malpractice based on the MPLA‘s definition of “patient“—a definition which the majority admits has not changed in the interim. The Ricottilli Court held: “By definition, a deceased individual does not qualify as a ‘patient’ under the Medical Professional Liability Act (‘Act‘),
The majority quickly and tersely distinguishes this case—not because the allegations, cause of action, or underlying conduct is substantially different but simply because the decedent in Ricottilli was a “prior patient.” (Footnote omitted). In other words, because the decedent in Ricottilli entered the hospital alive and was given a patient identification and registration, the decedent was the “patient” to be evaluated under the MPLA‘s definition. However, because CAMC does not provide a stillborn fetus a separate patient identification or registration, the majority concludes that A.C.L.‘s mother—respondent Angela Lester—is the relevant “patient” who triggers the application of the MPLA.
Once the majority determined that Mrs. Lester—and not A.C.L.—was the relevant “patient,” it had little difficulty finding that the handling of A.C.L.‘s remains constituted “health care services” rendered “on behalf of” Mrs. Lester. However, even assuming Mrs. Lester is the “patient” whose “health care” is at issue, the very definition of “health care services” reveals how ill-fitting the MPLA is to this cause of action. The majority utilizes
(2) Any act, service, or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider . . . for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient‘s medical care, treatment, or confinement, including, but not limited to, staffing, medical transport, custodial care, or basic care, infection control, positioning, hydration, nutrition, and similar patient services[.]
This case once again raises the concern I expressed in State ex rel. W. Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Scott, 246 W. Va. 184, 204, 866 S.E.2d 350, 370 (2021) (Wooton, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part) about expanding the reach of the MPLA to the types of claims which “were not the genesis of the MPLA‘s remedial efforts and are undeserving of the special protections the MPLA affords.” In fact, in its eagerness to extend the MPLA to virtually any claim involving a health care provider, the majority boldly extends the MPLA to a purported claim in this case it can neither specifically
While the reach of the MPLA may indeed be broad, it is not limitless. If the Legislature‘s intent were to require the MPLA‘s application to virtually any case filed against a health care provider regardless of the nature of the underlying allegations, it would scarcely have bothered to create definitions at all. Respondents’ allegations of negligent mishandling of A.C.L.‘s remains fall squarely into this Court‘s holding in Ricottilli; the majority‘s creation of elastic definitional boundaries in the MPLA undermines its essential purpose.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.