888 S.E.2d 852
W. Va.2023Background
- Infant A.C.L. was stillborn at Charleston Area Medical Center (CAMC); CAMC allegedly allowed the fetal remains to be placed unprotected in a vehicle and transferred, prompting a negligent-mishandling suit.
- CAMC provided contemporaneous medical care to the mother, Angela Lester; the majority below treated Lester (not the fetus) as the relevant “patient” for the Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA).
- The dissent (Wooton, J.) argues the claim is an ordinary negligent mishandling of a corpse claim that does not implicate the MPLA because postmortem remains are not “patients.”
- Dissent contends the alleged mishandling requires no expert testimony or specialized medical judgment and aligns with administrative/lay standards of reasonable care.
- The dissent relies on Ricottilli v. Summersville Mem’l Hosp. and on out-of-state precedents holding corpse‑mishandling actions are not medical‑malpractice claims.
- The dissent criticizes the majority for stretching MPLA definitions (patient; “health care services”) and for addressing a purported privacy claim the dissent views as advisory and not plainly pled.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the MPLA apply to negligent mishandling of fetal/postmortem remains? | Lester: MPLA applies because CAMC was providing care to the mother and the handling was on her behalf. | CAMC: Mishandling of remains is ordinary negligence, not medical professional liability. | Majority: MPLA applies; Dissent: MPLA should not apply. |
| Can a stillborn/deceased individual be the MPLA "patient" (or does the mother qualify)? | Lester: The mother is the relevant patient whose care triggers MPLA protections. | CAMC: Precedent (Ricottilli) treats deceased as not qualifying as "patients." | Majority: Mother treated as patient for MPLA; Dissent: Ricottilli controls—deceased are not patients. |
| Does postmortem handling constitute "health care services" under the MPLA definition? | Lester: Handling/transport/custodial acts fall within statutory examples (transport, custodial care). | CAMC: Postmortem cataloging/transfer are administrative tasks not requiring medical judgment or expert proof. | Majority: Found within MPLA’s scope; Dissent: Not within the type of health care services the MPLA targets. |
| May the court resolve MPLA applicability to an asserted privacy claim not plainly pled? | Lester/Respondents: MPLA covers any related privacy claim against provider. | CAMC: Court should not decide hypothetical or unpled claims; resolving would be advisory. | Majority: Addressed MPLA applicability to the asserted privacy claim; Dissent: Doing so was an improper advisory resolution. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ricottilli v. Summersville Mem'l Hosp., 188 W. Va. 674, 425 S.E.2d 629 (1992) (holding deceased individuals do not qualify as "patients" under the MPLA)
- State ex rel. W. Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Scott, 246 W. Va. 184, 866 S.E.2d 350 (2021) (discussion on limits of MPLA expansion)
- Harshbarger v. Gainer, 184 W. Va. 656, 403 S.E.2d 399 (1991) (criticizing advisory opinions resolving hypothetical issues)
- State ex rel. Perdue v. McCuskey, 242 W. Va. 474, 836 S.E.2d 441 (2019) (refusing to resolve hypothetical controversies)
- Kelly v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 745 N.E.2d 969 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (negligent mishandling of a corpse is not necessarily medical malpractice)
- Dillard v. Parkland Hosp., 136 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. App. 2002) (father’s claim for mishandling corpse was not a health‑care liability claim)
- Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (stillborn‑fetus mishandling claim not treated as medical malpractice)
- Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (medical malpractice statute inapplicable to postmortem handling of remains)