STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TYSHON BOOKER
No. E2018-01439-SC-R11-CD
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE
November 18, 2022
February 24, 2022 Session Heard at Nashville
Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals Criminal Court for Knox County No. 108568 G. Scott Green, Judge
Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed in Part
SHARON G. LEE., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., SP.J., joined. HOLLY KIRBY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. JEFFREY S. BIVINS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGER A. PAGE, C.J., joined.
Eric Lutton, District Public Defender, and Jonathan P. Harwell, Assistant District Public Defender, for the appellant, Tyshon Booker.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andree Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General; Zachary T. Hinkle, Associate Solicitor General; Mark Alexander Carver, Honors Fellow, Office of the Solicitor General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and TaKisha M. Fitzgerald and Phillip Morton, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Amy R. Mohan and L. Webb Campbell II, Nashville, Tennessee, and Marsha L. Levick, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the Amicus Curiae, Juvenile Law Center.
Charles W. Bone, Nashville, Tennessee, and J. Houston Gordon, Covington, Tennessee, for the Amici Curiae, The Foundation for Justice, Freedom and Mercy, and Cyntoia Brown Long.
Edmund S. Sauer and Richard W.F. Swor, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Raphah Institute.
Gibeault C. Creson, Alexandra Ortiz Hadley, and Robert R. McLeod, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Julie A. Gallagher.
Gregory D. Smith, J. David Wicker, and Alexandra T. MacKay, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Tennessee State Conference of the NAACP.
Meri B. Gordon, Rachel H. Berg, Joshua D. Arters, and Samantha M. Flener, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amici Curiae,
Michael R. Working, David R. Esquivel, Jeff H. Gibson, Sarah Miller, Angela L. Bergman, Bradley A. MacLean, and Jonathan D. Cooper, Nashville, Tennessee, and Lucille A. Jewel and Stephen Ross Johnson, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Amici Curiae, Tennessee Association of Criminal Defensе Lawyers, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Charles Lowe-Kelley, and Amos Brown.
Thomas H. Castelli, Stella Yarbrough, James G. Thomas, and Nathan C. Sanders, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee.
W.J. Michael Cody and William David Irvine Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the Amici Curiae, American Baptist College, The American Muslim Advisory Council, The Rt. Rev. John C. Bauerschmidt, Bishop of The Episcopal Diocese of Tennessee, The Rt. Rev. Brian L. Cole, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of East Tennessee, The Rt. Rev. Phoebe A. Roaf, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of West Tennessee, The Most Reverend J. Mark Spalding, Bishop, Catholic Diocese of Nashville in Tennessee, The Most Reverend Richard F. Stika, Bishop, Catholic Diocese of Knoxville in Tennessee, The Most Reverend David P. Talley, Bishop, Catholic Diocese of Memphis in Tennessee, The Reverend Kevin L. Strickland, Bishop of the Southeastern Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, The Black Clergy Collaborative of Memphis, Memphis Interfaith Coalition for Action and Hope, Nashville Organized for Action and Hope, Chattanoogans in Action for Love, Equality, and Benevolence, Interdenominational Ministers Fellowship, Islamic Center of Nashville, CCDA Knoxville, Woodland Presbyterian Church, Knoxville Christian Arts Ministries, Nashville Jewish Social Justice Roundtable, Rabbi Micah Greenstein, Rabbi Jeremy Simons, Rabbi Philip Rice, Ministry Table of West End United Methodist Church, Pastor Anna Lee, Knoxville Underground, Yoke Youth Ministries, Bishop Joseph Warren Walker, Bishop Edward H. Stephens, Jr., Pastor Peris J. Lester, Reverend Dr. Byron C. Moore, MPC, Reverend Dr. J. Lawrence Turner, Minister J.P. Conway, Minister Josh Graves, Professor Lee Camp, Raising a Voice, Reverends Jeannie Hunter and Robert Early, Reverend Mike Wilson, Reverend Mary Louise McCullough, Reverend C. Nolan Huizenga, Reverend Timothy E. Kimbrough, Dave McNeely, Pastor Brad Raby, Pastor Doug Banister, Pastor Russ Ramsey, Pastors Jonathan Nash, Elliott Cherry, and Matt Avery, and Mosaic Church.
OPINION
I.
This case requires us to rule on the constitutionality of the statutory sentencing process for juvenile homicide offenders. History teaches that our constitutional union is preserved best when the three branches of government respect our state and federal constitutions, particularly the proper roles assigned to each branch of government. As Justice Bivins recently reminded us, the Tennessee
This Court cannot wield its constitutional prerogative in a way that usurps the authority of the other two branches of government. See
However, if our constitutions are to remain viable and their integrity maintained, we must strike down statutes that violate either the federal or the state constitution.2
II.
We begin with a review of the facts of this case. On Sunday afternoon, November 15, 2015, sixteen-year-old Tyshon Booker and another juvenile, Bradley Robinson, were riding around in Knoxville with Mr. Robinson‘s friend, the twenty-six-year-old victim, G‘Metrik Caldwell. The victim drove his car, with Mr. Robinson riding in the front рassenger seat and Mr. Booker in the rear passenger seat. Late in the afternoon after the victim pulled his car to a curb, Mr. Booker shot him six times in the back, the side of the chest, and right shoulder. Mr. Robinson and Mr. Booker, who had the victim‘s cell phone, ran from the scene. More than $800 and a baggy containing a green leafy substance were found in the victim‘s pockets after the shooting. He died from multiple gunshot wounds.
Mr. Booker was charged with murder in a petition filed in Knox County Juvenile Court. Following a hearing, the juvenile court transferred his case to the Knox County Criminal Court.3 Mr. Booker was later indicted on two counts of first-degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery for taking the victim‘s cell phone.4
At trial, a neighbor of Mr. Booker‘s testified that the morning after the murder, Mr. Booker told her that he and Mr. Robinson had planned to rob the victim but that the victim resisted and Mr. Robinson yelled at Mr. Booker to shoot. The neighbor further stated that Mr. Booker
The jury convicted Mr. Booker of two counts of first-degree felony murder5 and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two felony murder convictions and, without a hearing, sentenced Mr. Booker to life in prison. This sentence has a sixty-year term with release after fifty-one years if all applicable sentencing credits are earned and retained. See
In the Court of Criminal Appeals, Mr. Booker challenged the constitutionality of Tennessee‘s automatic life sentence for first-degree murder when imposed on a juvenile.7 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, acknowledging Mr. Booker‘s argument but deferring to existing precedent. State v. Booker, E2018-01439-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 1697367, at *33 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2020).
We granted Mr. Booker‘s application for permission to appeal to address the constitutionality of Tennessee‘s sentence of life imprisonment when automatically imрosed on a juvenile homicide offender. Order, State v. Booker, No. E2018-01439-SC-R11-CD
III.
We review questions of constitutional interpretation de novo without presuming the correctness of the lower court‘s legal conclusions. State v. Burns, 205 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tenn. 2006) (citing S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)). Ruling on a constitutional challenge to a statute is often an exercise in judicial restraint. We must be careful not to impose our own policy views on the matter or overstep into the General Assembly‘s realm of making reasoned policy judgments. See Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tenn. 1997). Similarly, when construing statutes, “it is our duty to adopt a construction which will sustain [the] statute and avoid constitutional conflict if any reasonable construction exists that satisfies the requirements of the Constitution.” Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 529 (Tenn. 1993).
The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Sentencing
Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the principle of proportionality is embedded in the Eighth Amendment. The Court said that “it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
The Court‘s later opinions applying the proportionality principle do not chart a straight course.9 In 1983, after noting that “[t]he principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence,” the Court stated “as a matter of principle . . . a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 290 (1983). But eight years later, in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), the Court‘s controlling opinion10 held that the Eighth Amendment contains a “narrow proportionality principle” that “does not require
As to juveniles tried as adults, the Court has been clear about the central importance of proportionality when imposing significant criminal punishment. In 1988, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited executing juveniles who were under the age of sixteen at the time of the offense. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). Three principles formed the cornerstone of the Court‘s opinion.
The first principle was that the “authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.” Id. at 821. The second principle was proportionality. The Court said that the “punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.” Id. at 834 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O‘Connor, J., concurring)). The third principle was that “there are differences which must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children as compared with those of adults.” Id. at 823 (emphasis omitted).
Based on these principles, the Court endorsed “the proposition that less culpability should attaсh to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult.” Id. at 835. After noting that “[t]he basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation,” the Court stated that “[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.” Id.11
The Thompson Court declined to extend its decision to juvenile offenders older than sixteen years. Id. at 838. Yet when revisiting the question in 2005, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited imposing the death penalty on all juvenile offenders. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574, 578-79 (2005).
The Roper Court based its decision on the same principles that animated the Thompson Court‘s decision. First, the Court said that the Eighth Amendment‘s protection against cruel and unusual punishments “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned.‘” Id. at 560 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002)). Second, the Court explained that three differences between juveniles and adults show that “juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.” Id. at 569.
The three differences between juveniles and adults identified in Roper mirror the reasons identified in Thompson. The first difference is that juveniles lack maturity and have “an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). The second difference is that juveniles are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). The third difference is that “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.” Id. at 570.
Like the Thompson Court, the Roper Court addressed the Eighth Amendment issue by adopting a bright-line prophylactic rule based on the age of the juvenile when the crime was committed. Justice O‘Connor, writing separately, agreed that “juveniles as a class are generally less mature, less responsible, and less fully formed than adults, and . . . these differences bear on juveniles’ comparative moral culpability.” Id. at 599 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). But she disagreed with creating a bright-line rule because “the class of offenders . . . is too broad and too diverse to warrant categorical prohibition.” Id. at 601. Justice O‘Connor preferred to address proportionality concerns “through individualized sentencing in which juries are required to give appropriate mitigating weight to the defendant‘s immaturity, his [or her] susceptibility to outside pressures, his [or her] cognizance of the consequences of his [or her] actions, and so forth.” Id. at 602-03. Thus, Justice O‘Connor favored addressing the Eighth Amendment issue with a procedural remedy.
In 2010, the Court employed another bright-line prophylactic rule, holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing a juvenile who has not committed homicide to a life-without-parole sentence. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). Reflecting the reasoning in Thompson and Roper, the Graham Court‘s decision was based on the proportionality principle and the lesser culpability of juveniles. The Court said that “[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 59. Then, relying on the three differences between juveniles and adults discussed in Roper, the Court stated that juveniles are “less deserving of the most severe punishments” beсause they are less culpable. Id. at 68. Finally, the Court said that “[n]o recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court‘s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles.” Id.
Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment, agreeing that Mr. Graham‘s life-without-parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. Chief Justice Roberts cited the Roper Court‘s conclusion that “juvenile offenders are generally less culpable than adults who commit the same crimes.” Id. at 86 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). And he invoked the narrow proportionality rule applicable to noncapital cases. Noting that “an offender‘s juvenile status can play a central role in the inquiry,” id. at 90, the Chief Justice said:
Terrance Graham committed serious offenses, for which he deserves serious punishment. But he was only 16 years old, and under our Court‘s precedents, his youth is one factor, among others, that should be considered in deciding whether his punishment was unconstitutionally excessive. In my view, Graham‘s age—together with the nature of his criminal activity and the unusual severity of his sentence—tips the constitutional balancе. I thus concur in the Court‘s judgment that Graham‘s sentence of life
without parole violated the Eighth Amendment.
In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court based its decision on the two essential principles found in Thompson, Roper, and Graham but fashioned a different remedy to address the constitutional violation.
First, after noting that “[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment,” the Court said that the Eighth Amendment “guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions” and that this right “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned’ to both the offender and the offense.” Id. at 469 (first quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 59; and then quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560).
Second, the Court said that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 471. Relying on the “three significant gaps between juveniles and adults” discussed in Graham, the Court said that juveniles “are less deserving of the most severe punishments” because they “have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). The Court added that “the distinctive attributes оf youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” Id. at 472.
But the Court declined to devise another bright-line rule to remedy the Eighth Amendment problem and instead turned its attention to the sentencing process itself. Consistent with Justice O‘Connor‘s dissenting opinion in Roper seven years earlier, the Court decided that the proportionality concerns should be addressed by requiring individualized sentencing so that the sentencer could give appropriate weight to the youthfulness of the defendant. Id. at 489. The Court held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles “contravene[d] Graham‘s (and also Roper‘s) foundational principle: that imposition of a State‘s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.” Id. at 474. Thus, the Court found that subjecting juveniles to a mandatory life-without-parole sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because the sentencing authority did not have the opportunity to consider the “mitigаting qualities of youth.” Id. at 476 (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367).
The Miller Court emphasized the fundamental importance of individualized sentencing to avoid imposing disproportionate punishment on juveniles facing a state‘s harshest penalties. Mandatory sentencing laws “remov[e] youth from the balance” and “prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law‘s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” Id. at 474. Without individualized sentencing for juveniles facing a state‘s harshest penalties, the sentencing authority “misses too much,” and thereby runs “too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Id. at 477, 479.
The Court decided two Miller-related cases after 2012. In 2016, the Court held that Miller should be applied retroactively because it announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016). The petitioner
In neither case did the Court retreat from the essential principles in Thompson, Roper, Graham, and Miller. In Montgomery, the Court repeated Miller‘s point that “[b]y making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence,” a mandatory life-without-parole sentence “poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 195 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479). In Jones, the Court acknowledged that “youth matters in sentencing,” and the “key assumption” in Miller is “that discretionary sentencing allows the sentencer to consider the defendant‘s youth, and thereby helps ensure that life-without-parole sentences are imposed only in cases where that sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant‘s age.” Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1314, 1318.
The Miller Court‘s decision that the mandatory imposition on a juvenile of a life-without-parоle sentence poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment reflects its concern, at least when a state‘s severest punishments are involved, that a mandatory sentencing scheme risks erroneously depriving a juvenile‘s right to receive a proportionate sentence. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. The Court‘s remedy does not preclude juveniles from being sentenced to life without parole. Rather, the remedy requires a procedural safeguard—individualized sentencing—to minimize the risk of erroneously imposing a disproportionate sentence. Id. at 489.
Although this case involves a life sentence, and not death or life without parole, three essential rules can be derived from the Thompson, Roper, Graham, and Miller line of cases when considering proportionality. The first principle is that the Eighth Amendment‘s requirement of proportionality means that punishment has to be graduated and proportioned. The second principle is that steps must be taken to minimize the risk of a disproportionate sentence when juveniles are facing the possible imposition of a state‘s harshest punishments. The third principle is that these steps, whatever they may be, must allow the sentencer to take the mitigating qualities of youth into account by considering, among other relevant factors, (a) the juvenile‘s “lack of maturity” and “underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” which can lead to “recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking“; (b) the juvenile‘s vulnerability and susceptibility to negative influences and outside pressure, as from family and peers; and (c) the fluidity of the development of the juvenile‘s character and personal traits. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70).
Tennessee‘s Automatic Life Sentence
With these principles in mind, we turn to a proportionality analysis. In determining
“Reliable objective evidence of contemporary values” can be provided by a review of “legislation enacted by the country‘s legislators.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) abrogated by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. This is in addition to “[a]ctual sentencing practices” because they are “an important part of the Court‘s inquiry into consensus.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 62.
Compared to the other forty-nine states, Tennessee is a clear outlier in its sentencing of juvenile homicide offenders. So much so that Tennessee‘s life sentence when automatically imposed on a juvenile is the harshest of any sentence in the country. No one, including the dissent, disputes that a juvenile offender serving a life sentence in Tennessee is incarcerated longer than juvenile offenders serving life sentences in other states. For example, had Mr. Booker committed felony murder in nearby Alabama, he would have been eligible for release in fifteen yeаrs; twenty years in Virginia; twenty-five years in North Carolina, Kentucky, and Missouri; thirty years in Georgia; and twenty-five to thirty years in Arkansas.12
Juvenile homicide offenders with life sentences (and in some states, even life-without-parole sentences) may be eligible for release within twenty-five years or less in twenty-three states (Alabama, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) and the District of Columbia.13 The release eligibility
In short, Tennessee is out of step with the rest of the country in the severity of sentences imposed on juvenile homicide offenders. Automatically imposing a fifty-one-year-minimum life sentence on a juvenile offender without regard to the juvenile‘s age and attendant circumstances can, for some juveniles, offend contemporary standards of decency.
Next, we consider whether a sixty-year life sentence requiring a minimum of fifty-one years of service when imposed on juvenile offenders is grossly disproportionate to the crime. The answer is—it depends. A fifty-one-year prison sentence will be proportionate for some offenders, but not for others. This is where individualized sentencing matters. Proportionality concerns can bе addressed when the sentencer can consider the offender‘s age and circumstances, the nature of the crime, and the severity of the sentence. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 90 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). But in juvenile first-degree murder cases, and only in these cases, a sentence is automatically imposed without considering age, the nature of the crime, or any other factors. The mandatory life sentence when imposed on juvenile offenders is one-size-fits-all. Yet juvenile offenders and their crimes are not all the same. Thus, Tennessee‘s automatic life sentence when imposed on juvenile offenders lacks the necessary procedural protection to guard against disproportionate sentencing.
One consistent thread running through the Supreme Court‘s decisions is that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (describing the proposition established by Roper and Graham). These differences include a child‘s “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,”
Yet Tennessee statutes that require a juvenile homicide offender to be automatically sentenced to life imprisonment allow for no consideration of the principles stated in these Supreme Court decisions. In Tennessee, there is no sentencing hearing. There is no recognition that juveniles differ from adults. And the sentencer has no discretion to consider or impose a lesser punishment. See Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1321 (noting that in a case involving a juvenile who committed a homicide, a state‘s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient). Instead, Mr. Booker‘s life sentence requires service of between fifty-one and sixty years. Even if he earns every available sentencing credit, Mr. Booker will spend more time behind bars than nearly any adult with the same sentence. As the Supreme Court has observed, lengthy sentences inflict more punishment on juvenile offenders than similarly situated adult offenders because juveniles will spend a higher percentage of their natural lives in prison. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 70-71; Miller, 567 U.S at 477.
Although Mr. Booker had no sentencing hearing for the first-degree murder conviction, he did have a sentencing hearing on the especially aggravated robbery conviction. At that hearing, the trial court was allowed to consider as a mitigating factor whether Mr. Booker lacked substantial judgment in committing the offense because of his youth.
Had there been a sentencing hearing for the first-degree murder conviction, the trial court could have considered Mr. Booker‘s age and circumstances and the nature of his crime. According to evidence presented at his juvenile transfer hearing, proof at trial, and evidence proffered at the hearing on the motion for new trial, Mr. Booker grew up in a poor, unstable, and chaotic environment. Violence was common, and Mr. Booker witnessed shootings and often heard gunfire in his neighborhood. Before Mr. Booker was born, his father was murdered. According to Mr. Booker, he was physically and emotionally mistreated by his mother. He saw his mother being physically abused. Once when his mother was selling drugs, Mr. Booker and his family were held at gunpoint during a home invasion. Mr. Booker‘s relationship with his mother was “rocky,” and she often “kicked” him out of the house. During these times, he lived with friends and “door to door.” In the eighth grade, Mr. Booker started smoking marijuana to cope with his problems. He smoked marijuana with his family, including his mother. When he was thirteen, Mr. Booker became close to his paternal grandfather. But his grandfather was stabbed to death at his home just over a year later. Mr. Booker, who had visited his grandfather shortly before the stabbing, blamed himself for not being there to protect his grandfather. After his grandfather was murdered, Mr. Booker began skipping school, increased his marijuana use, and misbehaved more often. Before his grandfather‘s murder, Mr. Booker had never been in serious trouble. According to his juvenile record, he was cited for disorderly
According to psychological expert testimony, Mr. Booker suffered from cannabis use disorder, secondary to post-traumatic stress disorder, and was amenable to treatment. Expert testimony about adolescent brain development showed that the systems that register emotions, arousal, and reward sensitivity do not fully develop until around ages fourteen to sixteen. Yet the parts of the brain that inhibit and regulate those drives do not fully develop until age twenty to twenty-five. Mr. Booker‘s post-traumatic stress disorder exacerbated this disparity—making the brain‘s “alarm system” overly sensitive to thrеats, bypassing adaptive responses like judgment and executive functioning, and hijacking the brain into a state of “fight, flight, or freeze.” Thus, a young person like Mr. Booker is more impulsive, a bigger risk-taker, and has poor judgment. In sum, Mr. Booker‘s background failed to provide him stability and security, which only increased the likelihood that he would make rash, reckless, and impulsive decisions. But these circumstances were not considered at sentencing for the murder conviction.
Finally, we consider whether Tennessee‘s automatic life sentence is supported by sufficient penological objectives when imposed on a juvenile. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472-74. These objectives are generally considered to be retribution, deterrence, preventing crime through incarceration, and rehabilitation. Id. Retribution is tied to an offender‘s culpability and blameworthiness. Thus, the reason for retribution is reduced with a juvenile compared to an adult because of the juvenile‘s reduced culpability. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72. And deterrence is not effective because “the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults‘—their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity—make them less likely to consider potential punishment.” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 71). The benefit of preventing crime through incarceration is no justification—since it necessarily implies that the “juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society” because he is incorrigible, and “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.” Id. at 472-73 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 72-73). The justification of rehabilitation also fails because Tennessee‘s automatic life sentence rejects the notion that a juvenile should have the chance to change and mature. Id. at 473. Although a state need not guarantee a juvenile offender eventual freedom, it must not foreclose all genuine hope of a responsible and productive life or reconciliation with the community. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. This denial renders “an irrevocable judgment about that person‘s value and place in society.” Id. at 74. Thus, the life sentence imposed on Mr. Booker is not supported by sufficiеnt penological objectives.
From Thompson, Roper, Graham, Miller, Montgomery, and Jones, we know that juveniles are constitutionally different than adults for sentencing purposes; juveniles have lesser culpability and greater amenability to rehabilitation. To be clear, we are not holding that a juvenile may never receive a life sentence in Tennessee. But consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the sentencer must have discretion to impose a lesser punishment and to properly consider an offender‘s youth and other attendant circumstances. Tennessee‘s sentencing scheme for juvenile homicide offenders
In sum, Tennessee‘s automatic life sentence when imposed on juvenile homicide offenders is an outlier when compared with the other forty-nine states, it lacks individualized sentencing which serves as a bulwark against disproportionate punishment, and it goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish legitimate penological objectives. For these reasons, we hold that Tennessee‘s automatic life sentence with a minimum of fifty-one years when imposed on juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment.
Because we conclude that Tennessee‘s mandatory fifty-one- to sixty-year sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, we need not consider Mr. Booker‘s arguments that his sentence is equivalent to life without parole and is thus subject to Miller,17 or that his life sentence violates
Remedy for Constitutional Violation
We exercise judicial restraint when remedying the unconstitutionality of the current statutory scheme for sentencing juvenile homicide offenders. Rather than creating a new sentencing scheme or resentencing Mr. Booker, we apply the sentencing policy adopted by the General Assembly in its previous enactment of
The dissent claims, without any basis, that by upholding the protections of our Unitеd States Constitution, we are making policy. But when the Court does its duty and rules on the constitutionality of a statute, it makes no policy of its own. The Court simply implements the policy embodied in the Constitution itself. Without question, the General Assembly
The dissent would have us wait until the United States Supreme Court rules on this precise issue. But we will not shirk our duty and ignore an injustice. Our decision today directly affects Mr. Booker and over 100 other juvenile homicide offenders who are or will be incarcerated in Tennessee prisons under an unconstitutional sentencing scheme.19 For thеse incarcerated individuals, time matters. The United States Supreme Court may not have the chance to rule on this precise issue soon, if ever. And we need not wait because the Supreme Court has given us clear guidance in Roper, Graham, Miller, Montgomery, and Jones. Many other state supreme courts have resolved this issue without delay. We must fulfill our duty.
Although the constitutionality of Tennessee‘s practice of automatically sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to life in prison is an issue of first impression for this Court, the dissent claims the issue is settled law in Tennessee based on several unreported decisions from the Court of Criminal Appeals. Yet, as the dissent should know, this Court is not bound by decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See, e.g., State v. Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d 550, 557 n.7 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tenn. 1984)). And none of the intermediate appellate court decisions relied on by the dissent analyzed the constitutional issue, correctly noting that the intermediate appellate court is bound to follow existing precedent. See State v. Douglas, W2020-01012-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 4480904, at *25 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2021) (stating that although the court had “considered the Defеndant‘s policy arguments regarding the particular length of Tennessee‘s life sentences, as well as the special considerations applicable to juvenile offenders and their potential for rehabilitation,” the court was bound “to apply the law as it has been enacted by [the Tennessee] legislature and interpreted by [the Tennessee] courts“); State v. Fitzpatrick, M2018-02178-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 3876968, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2021) (“The power to break with well-established precedent does not lie with this court, and we are not prepared to expand the parameters of the Eighth Amendment in this regard, notwithstanding the fact that the Defendant‘s sentence ‘may push, and possibly exceed, the bounds of his life expectancy[.]‘” (quoting State v. King, W2019-01796-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 5352154, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2020))); State v. Polochak, M2013-02712-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 226566, at *34 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2015) (“While the next logical step may be to extend protection to [juvenile] sentences [of life with the possibility of parole], that is not the precedent which now exists.” (quoting Perry v. State, W2013-00901-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 1377579, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2014))).
The remedy here—granting a parole hearing rather than resentencing—serves the State‘s interest in finality and the efficient use of its resources and also protects juvenile homicide offenders’ rights under the Eighth Amendment. Applying the previous unrepealed version of
This decision need not be the end of the discussion about sentencing juvenile homicide offenders. The General Assembly, in its collective wisdom, may decide to continue to adhere to its previously adopted sentencing scheme as reflected in the unrepealed version of
IV.
Mr. Booker committed a serious offense for which he deserves serious punishment. But he was only sixteen years old when he committed the offense. The United States Supreme
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals to the extent it upheld the automatic life sentence imposed on Mr. Booker under
SHARON G. LEE, JUSTICE
Notes
Martin v. Hunter‘s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342 (1816).[T]he constitution not only contemplated, but meant to provide for cases within the scope of the judicial power of the United States, which might yet depend before state tribunals. It was foreseen that in the exercise of their ordinаry jurisdiction, state courts would incidentally take cognizance of cases arising under the constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.
Release eligibility for a defendant committing the offense of first degree murder on or after November 1, 1989, but prior to July 1, 1995, who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life occurs after service of sixty percent (60%) of sixty (60) years less sentence credits earned and retained by the defendant, but in no event shall a defendant sentenced to imprisonment for life be eligible for parole until the defendant has served a minimum of twenty-five (25) full calendar years of the sentence . . . .