STATE OF MISSOURI, EX REL. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Petitioner, v. FOWLER LAND COMPANY, INC., AND MARGARET LEIST REVOCABLE TRUST, SANDY RUNNELS AND LINDA HENDERSON, TRUSTEES, Respondents.
No. SC99740
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc
July 20, 2023
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (hereinafter, “DNR“) seeks judicial review of the Missouri Mining Commission‘s (hereinafter, “the Commission“)1 decision awarding attorney fees and expenses in favor of Fowler Land Company, Inc. and the Margaret Leist Revocable Trust (hereinafter and collectively, “Landowners“) after they
prevailed in protracted litigation concerning the creation of water impoundments on their land. DNR raises points of error regarding which tribunal has jurisdiction or authority to rule on Landowners’ fee application, whether Landowners’ fee application was timely, and the effect of prior rulings and court remands to determine when Landowners prevailed to trigger the time period to seek an award of attorney fees and expenses pursuant to
This Court holds Landowners first prevailed, for purposes of
Factual and Procedural Background
Alternative Fuels, Inc. (hereinafter, “AFI“) owned mining operations in Barton County and leased land from Landowners to conduct coal mining pursuant to a permit issued by the Commission. During the original permit application process, Landowners consented to AFI‘s creation of specific water impoundments on their property. AFI constructed the water impoundments on Landowners’ property, but also constructed additional impoundments without their consent or authorization.
DNR initiated formal enforcement actions against AFI regarding the unauthorized water impoundments. AFI sought, and subsequently received in 2011, approval from DNR for a permit revision (hereinafter, “2011 Permit Revision“). Landowners appealed to the Commission, arguing any permit revision required their consent to create additional water impoundments on their land. In March 2012, the Commission upheld DNR‘s approval of the 2011 Permit Revision. Landowners filed a timely petition for judicial review in the Barton County circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the Commission‘s decision.
Landowners appealed the Commission‘s decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District. On May 6, 2015, the Southern District reversed the circuit court‘s judgment affirming the Commission‘s decision and remanded the case, stating:
The [circuit] court‘s judgment affirming the Commission‘s decision upholding [DNR‘s] approval of the 2011 Permit
Revision is reversed, and the case is remanded. The [circuit] court is directed to enter a new judgment, consistent with this opinion, reversing the Commission‘s decision and remanding the case back to the Commission with directions to the Commission to enter a new order, consistent with this opinion, denying AFI‘s application for the 2011 Permit Revision.
Fowler Land Co. v. Mo. Dep‘t Nat. Res., 460 S.W.3d 502, 512 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015) [hereinafter Fowler 2015]. The Southern District issued its mandate on May 22, 2015.
On June 12, 2015, pursuant to the Southern District‘s opinion, the circuit court entered a judgment reversing the Commission‘s decision approving AFI‘s 2011 Permit Revision application. The circuit court remanded the case to the Commission with directions for the Commission to enter a new order, consistent with the Southern District‘s judgment, denying AFI‘s 2011 Permit Revision application. The Commission issued that order on July 23, 2015.
On August 21, 2015, Landowners filed a fee application with both the administrative hearing commission (hereinafter, “AHC“) and the Commission. Landowners contended that, upon entry of the Commission‘s July 23, 2015 order, they became the prevailing party and were entitled to attorney fees and expenses. Landowners further argued special factors existed justifying an increase from the statutory hourly attorney fee rate of $75 per hour to $200 per hour.3 DNR filed a motion to dismiss, arguing Landowners first prevailed when the Southern District issued its opinion on May 6, 2015, which was final and unreviewable when the Southern District issued its mandate on May 22, 2015. Hence, DNR contended Landowners were required to file their fee application in the Southern District within thirty days pursuant to
Landowners filed a petition for judicial review of the AHC‘s decision in the circuit court. In September 2018, the circuit court reversed the AHC‘s dismissal of Landowners’ fee application and remanded the case to the AHC with directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing and issue a fee recommendation to the Commission. DNR did not appeal the circuit court‘s judgment. On remand, the AHC held an evidentiary hearing. On August 4, 2020, the AHC issued a fee recommendation in Landowners’ favor but denied their request for prejudgment interest and found no special factor existed justifying an increased hourly attorney fee rate. The Commission adopted the AHC‘s fee and expense award recommendation.
In February 2021, Landowners filed a petition for judicial review in the circuit court challenging the existence of a special factor and the denial of prejudgment interest.4 In the meantime, DNR filed a petition
The Southern District overruled Landowners’ dismissal motions, reversed the Commission‘s fee award, and remanded the case with directions for the Commission to enter a decision denying Landowners’ fee application. State ex rel. Dep‘t of Nat. Res. v. Fowler Land Co., No. SD 37045, 2022 WL 2816251 (Mo. App. S.D. July 19, 2022) [hereinafter Fowler 2022]. The Southern District determined Landowners first prevailed for purposes of filing a fee application in Fowler 2015 and, therefore, should have filed their fee application with the Southern District within thirty days of its decision in their favor. Id. at *5. The Southern District rejected Landowners’ argument they first prevailed before the Commission in July 2015, finding the Southern District was the first tribunal to accept their legal position. Id. The Southern District further found its “opinion disposed of all issues as to all parties and left nothing for further determination” because it issued “a limited remand with directions, which required the circuit court to enter a new judgment in conformity with the opinion.” Id.
This Court granted Landowners’ application for transfer and has jurisdiction.
a motion for additional attorney fees and expenses incurred since the AHC issued its fee recommendation in August 2020 and through this appeal.
Standard of Review
The court may modify, reverse or reverse and remand the determination of fees and other expenses if the court finds that the award or failure to make an award of fees and other expenses, or the calculation of the amount of the award, was arbitrary and capricious, was unreasonable, was unsupported by competent and substantial evidence, or was made contrary to law or in excess of the court‘s or agency‘s jurisdiction.
Prevailing Party and Finality
Landowners’ fee application was filed pursuant to
proceeding or final judgment in a civil action … to the court, agency or commission which rendered the final disposition or judgment ….”
“[T]o determine when the thirty-day statutory limit [is] triggered, it must first be determined what it means to prevail in such a proceeding, and when the final disposition or judgment was issued that made [Landowners] the prevailing party.” Greenbriar II, 47 S.W.3d at 353. A party prevails for purposes of
It is undisputed Landowners were the prevailing party. The parties disagree, however, about when the final disposition or judgment was issued making Landowners the prevailing party and triggering the thirty-day filing deadline. DNR argues that, after Fowler 2015, Landowners were required to file their fee application in the Southern District because the remand did not delay finality of its decision and was not subject to further review. In Fowler 2022, the Southern District determined Landowners first prevailed when it issued Fowler 2015 because that was when Landowners’ argument that owner consent was required to build the water impoundments was first accepted. The Southern District in Fowler 2022 maintained Fowler 2015 contained a limited remand with directions, and any action by the Commission that was contrary to the mandate and directions would be unauthorized and void. Accordingly, DNR urges this Court to adopt the Fowler 2022 reasoning to find the Fowler 2015 opinion and mandate left nothing to be decided and constituted a final disposition of the underlying agency adversary proceeding. Landowners disagree. They maintain there was no final judgment or final disposition in
an agency proceeding until the Commission issued its final decision on July 23, 2015, on remand. This Court rejects both of these assertions.
“‘[A] ‘final’ disposition in an agency proceeding or a civil action occurs whenever the decision disposes of all issues as to all parties and leaves nothing for future determination.‘” Greenbriar II, 47 S.W.3d at 353 (quoting Davis v. Angoff, 957 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997)). Contrary to the Southern District‘s analysis in Fowler 2022, the Fowler 2015 decision did not constitute a final disposition of the proceedings or resolve all legal issues because it remanded the case for further proceedings. Fowler 2022‘s and DNR‘s reliance on Greenbriar Hills Country Club v. Director of Revenue, 935 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. banc 1996) [hereinafter Greenbriar I], and Funk to support this position is misplaced. In Greenbriar I, this Court‘s disposition of the case was “[t]he decision of the AHC is reversed,” without an express or specific
What Fowler 2015 accomplished, however, was to remand the case to the circuit court so it could enter a new judgment. The circuit court‘s June 12, 2015 judgment finally disposed of the parties’ dispute regarding the 2011 Permit Revision in Landowners’ favor.
Landowners became the prevailing party on this date because they obtained a favorable judgment in a civil action pursuant to
Conclusion
The Commission‘s decision is reversed. Landowners’ motion for additional attorney fees and expenses is overruled.
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Judge
All concur.
