State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Kristin Ann Altepeter, Appellant.
A18-2086
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
July 29, 2020
Hudson, J.
Court of Appeals. Filed: July 29, 2020, Office of Appellate Courts
Gregory A. Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant Polk County Attorney, Crookston, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
S Y L L A B U S
Affirmed.
HUDSON, Justice.
The question presented in this case is whether the “malicious punishment of a child” statute,
FACTS
Appellant Kristin Altepeter ran an in-home day care business in Crookston. On June 15, 2018, Altepeter had several children at her home for day care, including 4-year old J.V.R. Altepeter‘s property included a fenced-in yard with a set of monkey bars and a wooden picnic table. Normally, Altepeter allowed the children to play on the monkey bars in her yard, but that afternoon the picnic table sat on top of the monkey bars. The picnic table had been moved to the top of the monkey bars so that Altepeter could mow the grass, but no one was around to help her move the picnic table when she finished.
When Altepeter went outside with the children that afternoon, J.V.R. went over to the monkey bars and tried to push the table off so that he could use the equipment. Altepeter told J.V.R. to stop, and he climbed back down and ran across the yard, sticking his tongue out at Altepeter in a way that she described as “sassing” or “mocking.” When Altepeter saw J.V.R. a few minutes later, he was, again, on the monkey bars, trying to push the table out of the way to play on the equipment. She again told him to get off the bars. J.V.R complied, and then tried for a third time to run back to the monkey bars. J.V.R. was talking back and telling Altepeter he could go on the monkey bars.
J.V.R.‘s aunt picked him up at the end of the day. Altepeter told her about the bruises on J.V.R.‘s arms. When Altepeter explained to the aunt what happened, she said that “she told [J.V.R.] not to go on the monkey bars because she had a picnic table up there and he stuck his tongue out at her a couple of times, so she was trying to make him look at her.” Later in the evening, J.V.R.‘s mother took him to the emergency room to make sure he was okay.
Personnel in the emergency room called the Crookston Police consistent with their responsibilities as mandatory child-abuse reporters under Minnesota law. See
Respondent the State of Minnesota charged Altepeter with one count of malicious punishment of a child—less than substantial bodily harm,
Altepeter filed a timely notice of appeal. She argued that the court of appeals should overturn her conviction because
ANALYSIS
The question before us is whether
We review the interpretation of
We therefore begin with the language of the statute. The controlling statute in this case is
The rest of the statute addresses when the offense is a gross misdemeanor or is enhanced to a felony, and provides the applicable maximum sentence and fine. See
Altepeter argues that the plain language of the statute unambiguously requires the acts described in subdivision 1 to occur “in the course of punishment.” Altepeter points to the statute‘s repeated use of the phrase “the punishment” in subdivisions 2 and 4-6. She
The State argues that the statute requires proof that a caregiver used unreasonable force, but does not require proof that it was in the course of punishment. The State claims that the language of the statute is unambiguous because the word “punishment” is not used as part of the operative language of the statute and cannot be construed as an element of the offense.
The State‘s reading of the statute is consistent with the plain language of the statute. Subdivision 1 focuses on the defendant‘s prohibited conduct and defines two types of “malicious punishment“: (1) “an intentional act or a series of intentional acts with respect to a child” that “evidences unreasonable force . . . that is excessive under the circumstances” or (2) “an intentional act or a series of intentional acts with respect to a child” that “evidences . . . cruel discipline that is excessive under the circumstances.”
Moreover, subdivisions 2 and 4-6 address the applicable sentence based on the resulting harm caused to the victim, not on the defendant‘s acts. When subdivisions 2 and 4-6 mention “the punishment,” they are referring back to, not adding to, the definition of malicious punishment provided by subdivision 1. The term therefore has meaning without reading subdivision 1 in the manner urged by Altepeter. There is no need to read in an
Altepeter also makes an argument based on State v. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d 280 (Minn. 2015). She claims that
Whoever physically assaults a peace officer . . . when that officer is effecting a lawful arrest or executing any other duty imposed by law is guilty of a gross misdemeanor and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both. If the assault inflicts demonstrable bodily harm or the person intentionally throws or otherwise transfers bodily fluids or feces at or onto the officer, the person is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $6,000, or both.
Id. at 285 (quoting
We began by explaining that the term “physically assaults” in the first sentence is synonymous with the definition of fifth-degree assault provided in a separate statute, and held that the subsequent reference in the second sentence to “the assault” refers back to the term “physically assaults.” Id. at 285-86. We then turned to the second sentence of the subdivision to “determine whether the phrase located in the second sentence—‘or the person intentionally throws or otherwise transfers bodily fluids or feces at or onto the officer‘—defines an independent felony offense or whether it defines an aggravated form of the gross-misdemeanor physical assault referenced in the first sentence.” Id. at 285. We held that the phrase did not create a separate offense and that the State had to prove both a physical assault and the transfer of bodily fluids for the assault to be elevated to a felony.
Altepeter argues that we should interpret
In Struzyk, we analyzed how the first and second sentences of a subdivision related to one another to determine what constituted a crime under the statute. Struzyk, 869 N.W.2d at 282 (identifying the issue before the court as “whether the intentional act of throwing or transferring bodily fluids at or onto the officer, in itself, is the crime of felony fourth-degree assault of a peace officer“). Here,
Altepeter‘s fourth argument concerns the statutory context of the term “unreasonable force.” She argues that the plain language of the statute requires that a defendant must have used unreasonable force “in the course of punishment” based on the use of the term “cruel discipline” in the same subdivision. According to Altepeter, because “discipline” implies “punishment,” it would be illogical for the Legislature to require proof of punishment for one act but not for the other.
Altepeter‘s final point in support of her argument that the statute unambiguously requires proof of punishment is that such a requirement is necessary for the statute to survive constitutional scrutiny. Again her argument is misplaced. The possible constitutional implications of an interpretation are not a reason why the plain language of a statute is unambiguous. The question of whether a particular interpretation avoids a constitutional conflict only arises after we determine that a statute is ambiguous. See Schumann v. Comm‘r of Taxation, 253 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Minn. 1977) (“Where a statute is ambiguous, the construction that will avoid constitutional conflict is to be preferred, even though it is less natural.“).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.