Stаte of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Terence Duane Maurstad, Appellant.
A25-1259
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS
Filed July 6, 2026
Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Mille Lacs County District Court File No. 48-CR-24-1004. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Reyes, Judge.
Corey Haller, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant Public Defendеr, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges the district court‘s (1) admission of testimony under
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Terence Duane Maurstad with four counts of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of
The following facts are based on evidence received at trial, including the testimony of an expert witness, an officer that responded to the incident, and assault victims A., L., and D.
A. and L. testified to substantially similar versions of the incident from which appellant‘s criminal charges arose, which we restate here. One evening, A. and L. were at the home of L.‘s cousin when D. walked in, limping and сrying with red marks on her body. A. walked outside and saw the driver of a truck “revving the exhaust loud,” “yelling,” and “throwing [D.‘s] stuff out of the windows.” At that time, A. and L. did not know the identity of the driver or his relationship to D.
L. turned her car around аnd told D. to get in. “[D.] ran, jumped in the car, and then at that point the loud truck started to ride [L.‘s car] so close if [L.] hit the brakes it would have been into the back of [her car].” A. observed that L. and D. had anxious and frantic demeanors. D. was also “hyperventilating.”
L. drove to a police station. On the way, she tried to make a turn but because the truck was following her so closely, she “couldn‘t slow down enough” and drove halfway into a ditch. The truck pulled over behind L.‘s car. A. got out of the car and saw that appellant was the driver of the truck. A. saw appellant “start[] reaching for something” in his truck “[s]o in fear for [his] life [A.] turned around and got in the car and told [L.] to take off.” They resumed their drive to the station, and appellant continued to follow them.
Appellant stopped following them shortly before they pulled into the station‘s parking lot, where L. called law enforcement. D. was crying in the backseat, but she ultimately exited the car and walked away before law enforcement arrived.
After A. and L. testified, the state called D. to testify. D. stated that she and appellant “g[o]t intimate” and had a sexual relationship, “but [they] were never in a committed relationship.” D. did “[n]ot really” want to be there that day because she did not “feel [appellant] did anything wrong.” D. provided a version of events that differed
I‘m like, “What? Why?” You know, so I just—I did [get in the car] and we went straight to the [station]. I‘m, like, “What‘s going on? What are we doing?” She‘s like, “Well, he tried to hit you.” And I was, like, “Who?” Really. And he was, as far as I know, was just riding alongside me, trying to talk to me, and I was being a b-tch and ignoring him.
When asked about what occurred while she was in L.‘s car, D. testified that she had her headphones on and was not paying attention.
When the state asked D. about a statement she gave to an officer later that evening, D. testified that she remembered giving the statement but did not remember what she told the officer. She also testified that, in her past experiences related to “abusive partners,” D. “found that law enforcement has been more harmful for [her] than helpful,” so she preferred “not [to] talk to them.”
The officer located D. at a casino later in his shift. D. tоld him that she left the station before officers arrived because she was scared to talk to law enforcement as doing so “has hurt her in the past.” D. also told the officer that appellant drove closely behind her while she was walking, was trying to intimidate her, and attempted to hit her with his truck multiple times. D. stated that, after she got in L.‘s car, appellant “was attempting to rear-end” the car and “trying to intimidate them.”
The officer also testified about a lethality assessment that he performеd with D. The assessment consists of a list of questions that law enforcement asks victims of domestic assault. D. told the officer that appellant had used a weapon or object to threaten her before, he tried to control most of her daily activities, she “[a]bsolutely” believed that appellant was capable of killing her, appellant‘s behavior had escalated quickly over the past two weeks, and she had ended their relationship within the last six months. D. stated multiple times thаt she feared appellant.
Scaia testified generally about “the combination of physical and non-physical tactics used” by people who commit acts of domestic violence as well as the mоtivations underlying those tactics.1 Individuals will use “coercion and threats” to “attempt to dominate” victims and “get them to do” what the individual wants. For example, individuals may tell a victim who wants to call law enforcement, “Why would anyone believe you, but you go ahead and you‘ll see what will happen to you.”
Scaia further testified that victims who call law enforcement themselves may be more likely to cooperate than those who do not initiate that contact. A victim may also become less cooperative if they realize that that their “continued participation” in a case may result in an end to the relationship because, while “a lot of victims want the violence to end, . . . they don‘t want the relationship to end.” Scaia also shared that victims often recant, blame themselves, and minimize or deny incidents of harm.
The jury found appellant guilty on all counts charged. The district court entered convictions on counts II through V only. It imposed conseсutive sentences totaling 180 months in prison on counts II, III, and IV. It also imposed a 364-day sentence on count V, with 364 days of credit for time served.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court‘s (1) admission of the officer‘s testimony about D.‘s prior statements; (2) admission of Scaia‘s expert testimony; (3) conviction and sentencing on two counts of assault against A.; and (4) award of jail credit to the last sentence imposed. We discuss these issues in turn, then address separately arguments raised in a self-represеnted supplemental brief.
I. The district court plainly erred by admitting the officer‘s testimony about D.‘s prior statements, but this error did not affect appellant‘s substantial rights.
Appellant argues that the district court plainly erred by admitting the officer‘s testimony about D.‘s prior statements under
As an initial matter, appellant contеnds that he objected at trial to the admission of the officer‘s testimony about D.‘s prior statements. For support, he relies on an objection he made to the admission of body-worn-camera footage of witness statements. However, “an objection preserves review only for the stated basis for the objection or a basis apparent from the context of the objection.” State v. Martens, 18 N.W.3d 752, 757 (Minn. 2025) (quotation omitted). Here, the record shows no objection from appellant to the admission of the officer‘s trial testimony about D.‘s prior statements.
Because appellant failed to preserve the issue with an appropriate objection, this court reviews the evidentiary challenge under the plain-error standard. See id. Under that
A party may introduce “extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement” to impeach a declarant-witness if (1) the party “submit[s] a foundation that the statements are actually inconsistent, or that the [declarant-witness] fails to recollect the prior statement,” State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 224 (Minn. 2000) (quotations and citation omitted), and (2) “the [declarant-witness] is afforded a prior opportunity to explain or deny the [statement] and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the [declarant-witness] thereon,”
The state also failed to lay a proper foundation to admit the officer‘s testimony about D.‘s answers to the lethality assessment. The state did not mention D.‘s responses to the assessment during direct examination, so those responses could not be inconsistent with D.‘s trial testimony, and D. could not claim that she did not recall giving them. See Martin, 614 N.W.2d at 224 (requiring actual inconsistency between statements or failure to recall prior statement to admit rule 613(b) evidence). The admission of the officer‘s testimony about D.‘s answers to the lethality assessment contravened caselaw and was therefore plainly erroneous. See Webster, 894 N.W.2d at 787.
We next consider whether appellant carried the “heavy burden” of showing that the plain error affected his substantial rights. Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 620 (quotation omitted). “An error affects substantial rights if the error is prejudicial—that is, if there is a reasonable
Two factors favor the conclusion that the plain error affected appеllant‘s substantial rights. Appellant could not effectively counter the erroneously admitted testimony about D.‘s prior statements because the state introduced that testimony after D. was dismissed. See State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 59 (Minn. 2024) (concluding that defendant “did not effectively counter the inadmissible evidence” and this favored conclusion that error was not harmless); see also State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2011) (stating that substantial-rights analysis “is the equivalent of a harmless error analysis“). The testimony also had high persuasive value because it directly contrаdicted the only exculpatory evidence identified by the parties: D.‘s testimony. See Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 57-59 (concluding that high persuasive value of erroneously admitted evidence favored defendant).
However, two other factors weigh against appellant. The state presented eyewitness testimony from two other victims of the assaults, and those victims testified to substantially similar versions of events. See id. at 60 (“Strong evidence of guilt undermines the persuasive value of wrongly admitted evidence.” (quotation omitted)). The erroneously admitted evidence was also not given undue prominence at trial. See id. at 56 (stating that manner presented favored state when challenged statements “span[ned] about 12 pages of” 300-page trial transcript).
Weighing the factors favoring appellant against those favoring the state, we conclude that the erroneously admitted evidence did not affect appellant‘s substantial
II. Even if the district court abused its discretion by admitting the expert testimony, there is no reasonable possibility that its admission significantly affected the verdict.
Appellant challenges the admission of Scaia‘s testimony, arguing that it was not helpful to the jury and it “invited the jury to infer that, because [appellant‘s] conduct fit the profile of a male domestic abuser, then [appellant] must be a domestic abuser.” We are not convinced that appellate relief is warranted.
Appellate courts review preserved challenges to a district court‘s evidentiary determination for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Heller, 12 N.W.3d 452, 464 (Minn. 2024). “Admitting expert testimony is an abuse of discretion if the district court‘s decision to admit is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. at 466 (quotation omitted). However, an appellant must establish both an abuse of discretion and prejudice. State v. Bonnell, 31 N.W.3d 527, 549 (Minn. 2026). “To demonstrate prejudice, a defendаnt must show that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted).
To be admissible, expert testimony must be helpful to the jury.
We need not assess the helpfulness of Scaia‘s testimony because there is no reasonable possibility that its admission significantly affected the verdict. See Bonnell, 31 N.W.3d at 549. The jury heard limited evidence about appellant‘s conduct toward D., which included only what occurred the evening of the assаult, that D. and appellant had a sexual relationship, and D.‘s positive feelings toward appellant. No substantive evidence placed appellant within the parameters of a “profile” of people who commit domestic assault. Heller, 12 N.W.3d at 466. For that reason, the jury was not “asked to infer from the fact that the defendant shares some of the characteristics of these third persons that he shares their guilt of [domestic assault].” Id. at 466-67 (quotations omitted).
We also need not assess whether Scaiа‘s testimony about offender behavior was “akin to character evidence.” The supreme court in Fravel was presented with a similar argument concerning similar expert testimony. See 34 N.W.3d at 323-25, 327-29. The supreme court concluded that, even if the expert testimony was inadmissible, “[u]nder these facts, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the absence of this testimony would have had a significant effect on the jury‘s verdict.” Id. at 329. It explained that “the expert did not provide testimony” about the defendant or “describe [him] in any way.” Id. The same is true here. Scaia did not mention appellant or discuss the facts of appellant‘s case.
III. The district court erred by convicting appellant of and sentencing him on two counts of assault against A.
Appellant and the state agree that the distriсt court erred by convicting him of and sentencing him on count V, fifth-degree assault against A., because count V is an included offense of count IV, second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon against A. We also agree.
Second-degree аssault and fifth-degree assault are two parts of the ordinal statutory scheme for assault. Accordingly, fifth-degree assault is an “included offense” of second-degree assault because it is a “lesser degree” of assault.
Appellant and the state also agree that the district court erred by awarding jail credit to the last sentence imposed rather than the first sentence imposed. The parties are correct. When imposing consecutive sentences, “the [district] court must apply . . . jail credit to the first sentence only.” Minn. Sent‘g Guidelines § 3.C.2.b (2022). We therefore remand to the district court with instructions to apply the jail credit to сount II, the first count sentenced.
V. The arguments in appellant‘s self-represented supplemental brief do not merit relief.
Appellant makes several arguments in a self-represented supplemental brief. We reorder them for ease of reference and address each in turn.
Appellant first argues that the district court abused its discretion by “overlook[ing] direct appearance of drug influenced/intoxicated witness” and “den[ying] the drug testing of [an] intoxicated witness.” Appellаnt requested at trial that the district court drug test D., providing as a basis for the request her “reputation, her conviction record and things [appellant has] heard in the community.” The district court determined that it did not have a lawful basis to drug test D. at that time, but that it would “keep a watchful eye on that.” We decline to address appellant‘s argument because he did not support it with legal argument or authority. See State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 588 (Minn. 2013) (declining to address appellant‘s claims because he “fail[ed] to cite any evidence in the record or legal authority to support” them).
Appellant‘s next argument states only: “Improper jury; Not a peer present.” “The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a jury pool that reflects a fair cross-section of the community.” Andersen v. State, 940 N.W.2d 172, 181 (Minn. 2020). But to establish a violation of that right, an appellant must satisfy the three-prong test established in State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Minn. 1994). See Anderson, 940 N.W.2d at 181-82. Because appellant does not provide an analysis addressing the three-prong test, his argument is inadequately briefеd, so we decline to address it. See In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2017).
We decline to address appellant‘s remaining arguments because they lack support in the record or law. See Munt, 831 N.W.2d at 588. Appellant challenges: (1) his lack of
In sum, we affirm appellant‘s convictions of second-degree assault and felony domestic assault but reverse his conviction of fifth-degree assault. We remand to the district court with instructions to (1) vacate the fifth-degree-assault conviction and sentence, leaving the jury‘s finding of guilt on that count intact and (2) apply appellаnt‘s jail credit to count II, the first count sentenced.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.