State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Michael Anthony Lee, Appellant.
A20-0758
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
June 22, 2022
Moore, III, J.
Court of Appeals. Filed: June 22, 2022 Office of Appellate Courts
Lauri A. Ketola, Carlton County Attorney, Jeffrey L.H. Boucher, Chief Deputy County Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Leonard J. Schweich, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Department of Human Services.
Kelsey R. Kelley, Robert I. Yount, Assistant Anoka County Attorneys, Anoka, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota County Attorneys Association.
S Y L L A B U S
The mandatory conditional release period required by
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
MOORE, III, Justice.
While civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Treatment Program (MSOP), appellant Michael Anthony Lee was convicted of fourth-degree assault of a secure treatment facility employee (demonstrable bodily harm) under
FACTS
The facts of this case are undisputed. Appellant Michael Anthony Lee is indeterminately committed to MSOP-Moose Lake as an SDP patient under
Lee filed a petition for postconviction relief. He argued that imposing a mandatory 5-year conditional release period on persons convicted under
engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by law, policy, or rule is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $4,000, or both:
(1) assaults the person and inflicts demonstrable bodily harm; or
(2) intentionally throws or otherwise transfers bodily fluids or feces at or onto the person.
The court of appeals upheld the district court‘s denial of Lee‘s petition for postconviction relief. State v. Lee, No. A20-0758, 2021 WL 2639974, at *1, *2 (Minn.
guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $4,000, or both:
(1) assaults the person and inflicts demonstrable bodily harm; or
(2) intentionally throws or otherwise transfers urine, blood, semen, or feces onto the person.
We granted Lee‘s request for further review.
ANALYSIS
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution provides: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Lee presented his as-applied constitutional challenge in a petition for postconviction relief, which the district court summarily denied. We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Bolstad v. State, 966 N.W.2d 239, 244 (Minn. 2021). “The district court abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Minnesota‘s statutes are presumed constitutional and we “will strike down a statute as unconstitutional only if absolutely necessary.” State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Minn. 2011).
A.
In analyzing a claimed equal protection violation, our threshold inquiry is whether the claimant is similarly situated in all relevant respects to others whom the claimant contends are being treated differently. Cox, 798 N.W.2d at 521. We review equal protection claims de novo, including the question of whether two groups are similarly
We start by determining “whether the law creates distinct classes within a broader group of similarly situated persons or whether those treated differently by the law are sufficiently dissimilar from others such that the law does not create different classes within a group of similarly situated persons.” Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 947 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Minn. 2020). To make this determination, we must consider whether the law treats the claimant differently from others “to whom the claimant is similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Id. (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cox, 798 N.W.2d at 521 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause . . . keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The similarly situated inquiry is not whether the claimant is similarly situated in all respects-instead, the focus is on all relevant respects. See Fletcher Props., 947 N.W.2d at 22 (“Whether a claimant is ‘similarly situated’ to other persons cannot be decided based solely on the very classification challenged as violating equal protection.“). The question, then, is which similarities are relevant in this case. Specifically, when considering whether two groups are similarly situated for an equal protection challenge premised on disparate sentencing, is the proper focus on the similarity of the penalized conduct, or the similarity of the broader characteristics of the two groups as a whole?
Our equal protection jurisprudence supports Lee‘s narrow inquiry and his focus on the specific criminalized conduct at issue here. In Cox, we held that “to prevail on an equal-protection claim based on the disparity in sentencing for two different offenses . . . a defendant must show that the two statutes prohibit the same conduct because the specific conduct of the defendant would support a conviction for either offense.” 798 N.W.2d at 523. Lee‘s framing of the issue is consistent with our decision in Cox: the challenged government action is the imposition of a 5-year conditional release term for persons convicted under one subdivision but not the other. It is logical to limit the relevance inquiry to similarities and differences in the specific criminalized conduct giving rise to the disparate sentence. Lee is similarly situated because subdivisions 3a(b)(1) and 3a(c)(1),
Though the equal protection challenge in Cox did not involve an individual‘s statutory classification, we have applied the same reasoning in cases that do. Our decision in Holloway is illustrative. There, the equal protection challenge focused on a legislative decision to make a mistake-of-age defense available to defendants who were 10 or fewer years older than the victim but not to defendants who were more than 10 years older than the minor victim of sexual assault. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d at 343. When assessing whether the two classes of perpetrators were similarly situated, we did not focus on the challenged classification-that is, the age differential. Id. at 347. Instead, we concluded that the two classes were similarly situated because the criminalized conduct was the same-both classes were subject to criminal liability for sexual contact with a minor. Id. at 347-48; cf. Cox, 798 N.W.2d at 523-24 (holding that the two classes of defendants were not similarly situated because the statutes criminalizing theft by check and dishonored checks require different mens reas); State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 838-39 (Minn. 2002) (determining that the defendant was not similarly situated to an individual convicted under RICO because that conviction must be based on participation in at least three criminal acts).
Like the claimant in Holloway, whose statutorily-classified age differential placed him in one group rather than the other, Lee has a different statutory classification than the group he compares himself to-namely, his SDP civil commitment status. Consistent with our decision in Holloway, we conclude that Lee‘s statutory classification is irrelevant to
The State and amici would have us engage in a broader relevance inquiry that asks whether individuals committed as SDP or MID-in other words, the two groups as a whole-are similarly situated. The court of appeals framed its analysis using these broad distinctions and concluded that persons convicted under subdivisions 3a(b) and 3a(c) are not similarly situated. Lee, 2021 WL 2639974 at *4-*6. It is not surprising that this more generalized inquiry yields several differences between the two groups. But the fact that the Legislature created two different statutory classifications does not determine whether the classifications pass constitutional equal protection muster. Fletcher Props., 947 N.W.2d at 22. In other words, the mere existence of the SDP and MID classifications does not by default mean the groups are “sufficiently dissimilar” from each other. Id. The differences, as noted above, must be relevant to the challenged government action. See also Klinger v. Dep‘t of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The similarly situated inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated to another group for purposes of the challenged government action.“).5
The differences relied on by the court of appeals and the State are not relevant to the similarly situated inquiry because the differences do not relate to the specific distinction
Determining the scope of “all relevant respects” in the similarly situated inquiry is “not a contextless comparison of the classes.” Fletcher Props., 947 N.W.2d at 22. Thus, when determining whether two classes are similarly situated, we also consider “the position[] of the claimant and all others in light of the broad purpose and operation of the statute.” Id.; see also Klinger, 31 F.3d at 731 (“Thus, because the similarly situated inquiry depends on what government action the plaintiffs are challenging, we must first precisely define the plaintiffs’ claim.“).
The fourth-degree assault statute,
Subdivisions 3a(b)(1) and 3a(c)(1), prohibit the same conduct-assaulting and inflicting demonstrable bodily harm on secure treatment facility personnel-in identical language. The patients’ commitment status is not relevant to the statutory purpose of protecting the staff at secure treatment facilities from bodily harm because victims of the conduct prohibited by subdivisions 3a(b)(1) and 3a(c)(1) suffer the same harm. There is no indication that the purpose of the statute is to reduce the risk of ordinary assault by SDP patients but not MID patients. Thus, the commitment classifications have minimal relevance to the similarly situated analysis for the equal protection claim.
Because persons convicted and sentenced under subdivisions 3a(b)(1) and 3a(c)(1), are alike in all respects relevant to the challenged government action, we conclude that Lee, as an SDP patient convicted under 3a(b)(1), is similarly situated to an MID patient convicted under subdivision 3a(c)(1). Lee has therefore satisfied the first step of our equal protection framework.
B.
Having concluded that Lee‘s equal protection claim crosses the “similarly situated” threshold, we must next consider whether his right to equal protection has been violated. The level of scrutiny we apply to his equal protection claim depends on the nature of the challenged statute. If the statute involves a fundamental right or a suspect classification, then we apply a heightened level of scrutiny. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d at 348 (discussing strict scrutiny); see State ex rel. Forslund v. Bronson, 305 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1981) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender-based classifications). If not, we review whether the challenged statute has a rational basis. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d at 348. Because Lee‘s challenge does not implicate a fundamental right and because he does not claim to be a member of a suspect class, we consider whether the sentencing disparity between SDP patients convicted under subdivision 3a(b)(1) and MID patients convicted under subdivision 3a(c)(1) survives rational basis review.
We have used several formulations to describe rational basis review. See Fletcher Props., 947 N.W.2d at 21 (summarizing various rational basis frameworks from past equal
Here, the parties agree that the purpose of subdivisions 3a(b)(1) and 3a(c)(1), is to protect secure treatment facility staff. Neither party disputes that this is a legitimate policy goal. Thus, the question is whether imposing a conditional release period on SDP patients for assaulting and inflicting demonstrable bodily harm on facility staff, but not doing the same for MID patients, is a rational way of protecting staff who work with them.
The State argues that deterrence is an adequate justification for the distinction. According to the State, the disparate sentence is a rational means of protecting staff because, unlike MID patients, SDP patients do not suffer from organic disorders of the brain and therefore are more likely to understand the consequences of their actions. Consequently, they are more likely than MID patients to be deterred from assaulting staff if additional punishment is imposed.
Having examined the legislative history of subdivisions 3a(b)(1) and 3a(c)(1), we turn back to the question of “whether, in view of the purpose the Legislature is trying to
We are “deferential to the judgment of the lawmaking body” in our rational basis analysis, so “in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, we will not second-guess the accuracy of a legislative determination of facts.” Fletcher Props., 947 N.W.2d at 19. Under this deferential standard, we conclude that the potential deterrent effect of a 5-year conditional release period on SDP patients who inflict demonstrable bodily harm on
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
Notes
Whoever, while committed under chapter 253D, Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 253B.185, or Minnesota Statutes 1992, section 526.10, commits either of the following acts against an employee or other individual who provides care or treatment at a secure treatment facility while the person is
Notwithstanding the statutory maximum sentence provided in [section 609.2231, subd. 3a(b)], when a court sentences a person to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for a violation of [section 609.2231, subd. 3a(b)], the court shall provide that after the person has been released from prison, the commissioner shall place the person on conditional release for five years. The terms of conditional release are governed by sections 244.05 and 609.3455, subdivision 6, 7, or 8; and Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109.
Whoever, while committed under section 253B.18, or admitted under the provision of section 253B.10, subdivision 1, commits either of the following acts against an employee or other individual who supervises and works directly with patients at a secure treatment facility while the person is engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by law, policy, or rule, is
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