State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Noah Anthony Charles King, Appellant.
A19-0362, A22-0290
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
May 17, 2023
McKeig, J.
Saint Louis County
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Kimberly J.M. Kromatka, Saint Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota, for respondent.
S Y L L A B U S
- A recanting codefendant‘s prior inconsistent statement is properly admitted as substantive evidence if the statement meets the requirements of
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) . When viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to prove that a victim‘s death was a reasonably foreseeable result of the burglary when the perpetrators were armed and the defendant participated in planning the burglary. - The district court does not abuse its discretion in denying postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to communicate and explain an Alford plea when the petitioner does not present any substantive evidence other than their own assertions that such a plea offer was made.
- When multiple offenses are alleged in the charging instrument,
Minnesota Statute section 609.035 , subdivision 1 (2022), does not prohibit the district court from finding the defendant not guilty of some charges but guilty of the remaining charges. - A challenge to an indictment is forfeited if not raised before trial; absent a showing of good cause, the appellate court will not review the issue.
- When viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to prove that the defendant committed first-degree felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
McKEIG, Justice.
Following a bench trial, appellant Noah Anthony Charles King was convicted of first-degree felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability. King filed a direct appeal that we stayed so he could pursue postconviction relief. In his
FACTS
On February 14, 2017, William Grahek was fatally shot during a burglary in the basement of his home in Duluth. Grahek‘s brother heard the gunshots and called the police. Following an investigation, the police concluded that Noah Baker, Deandre Davenport, and King broke into Grahek‘s home with the intent to rob Grahek, and when Grahek resisted, he was fatally shot.
The State charged King with second-degree intentional murder under
Meanwhile, Baker pleaded guilty to second-degree murder pursuant to a plea agreement.2 As part of his plea, Baker admitted the following facts. Baker was close friends with Davenport and King. In January 2017, Davenport told Baker and King that Grahek kept drugs in his home, which was located across the alley from King‘s home. Based on this information, the three men decided to rob Grahek.
In February 14, 2017, in accordance with their plan, Baker and Davenport parked a white Jeep down the street from King‘s home and then walked to King‘s home where the three men changed into black clothing and armed themselves—Baker and Davenport each carried handguns, and King carried a large wrench. After the men kicked in the doors to Grahek‘s home, Davenport pointed his gun at Grahek and ordered him to get down, Baker also aimed his gun at Grahek, and King stood behind them. When Grahek did not drop to the floor, Davenport fatally shot him, at which point the three men ran from Grahek‘s house, reconvened at the white Jeep, and drove to Baker and Davenport‘s shared residence. On the way, they took their clothing off and put it in a trash bag. Baker‘s sister drove King back to his home in the white Jeep shortly after the men arrived at the Baker/Davenport residence. Baker burned their clothes the next day, and then Baker and Davenport went to
In October 2018, six months after Baker‘s guilty plea, King waived his right to a jury trial. At the ensuing bench trial, the State presented testimony from several witnesses, including the investigating police officers, the medical examiner, and Baker‘s sister. When the State called Baker to testify, he recanted his plea-hearing testimony, claiming he committed the murder alone. When the State offered Baker‘s plea transcript as a trial exhibit, defense counsel objected. The district court overruled the objection and admitted the transcript as substantive, non-hearsay evidence under
After considering the evidence presented at the bench trial, the district court made the following findings of fact. King lived directly across the alley from Grahek. Davenport learned that Grahek kept drugs and money in a safe in Grahek‘s basement bedroom. On February 14, 2017, King used his girlfriend‘s phone to contact Davenport throughout the day, both before and after Grahek‘s murder. Baker and Davenport approached King‘s house around 1:26 p.m. after they parked a white Jeep down the street from King‘s house. Baker and Davenport entered through the back door of King‘s house and then the three men left the house together through the back door.
Grahek‘s brother heard a loud bang from the basement followed by an unfamiliar voice yelling “get down on the ground.” Within moments, Grahek‘s brother heard two or
A portion of the fatal bullet was salvaged from Grahek‘s body and sent to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) for testing. Police also collected spent and unfired cartridges from Grahek‘s basement. Officers called a canine tracking officer and his dog after they found fresh shoe prints in the snow leading away from Grahek‘s house.
At 2:16 p.m. Baker‘s sister drove the white Jeep to drop King off at the Cenex station across the street from King‘s house. About an hour and a half after King initially left with Baker and Davenport, he returned to his home. Before he left the house again, King asked his girlfriend to delete calls he made from her cell phone that day.
The police canine tracked a scent associated with the shoe prints at Grahek‘s residence to the alley, across the alley to King‘s fenced in yard, and from the rear of King‘s home to the front porch where the canine refused to leave, indicating that the scent‘s owner entered the front of the residence. The shoe prints from Grahek‘s yard matched the tread pattern of the shoe prints on the steps at King‘s home.
While the canine tracked the shoe prints and scent, officers saw King leave his home through the front door and walk to the Cenex. Officers briefly spoke with King at the Cenex. King then returned home and told his girlfriend to tell the police that he was home all day. When the canine finished tracking the scent from the crime scene to the front door of King‘s residence, officers knocked and asked King to step outside. During this second conversation with police, King had changed out of the shoes he wore to the Cenex and instead wore a pair of boots.
Based on its findings of fact, the district court found King guilty of second-degree intentional murder, and first-degree felony murder while committing a burglary, both under aiding and abetting theories of criminal liability. The district court found King not guilty of the remaining charges.
King appealed his conviction in March 2019. We granted King‘s motion to stay his direct appeal to allow him to pursue postconviction relief. King petitioned for postconviction relief in November 2019 claiming, in part, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney did not communicate an Alford plea deal to him. In support of his petition, King signed an affidavit that alleged that his attorney failed to explain to him “that the State had offered to allow [him] to enter an Alford plea,” which would have let him maintain his innocence—an offer King would have accepted. At an evidentiary hearing in September 2021, King chose not to testify and did not submit any additional evidence. The district court denied King‘s postconviction petition, concluding that King failed to prove his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel by a preponderance of the evidence because he did not present any testimony or evidence at the evidentiary hearing.
ANALYSIS
In this consolidated appeal, King makes three arguments in his principal brief. First, King argues the district court improperly allowed the prosecutor to call a recanting codefendant solely for impeachment purposes. Second, King argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove he aided and abetted Grahek‘s murder because the murder was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the burglary. Third, King argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied him postconviction relief because his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to explain an Alford plea.
In his pro se supplemental brief, King makes three additional arguments. First, he argues that because the district court found him not guilty of two of four charges,
I.
We first consider whether the district court abused its discretion when it admitted Baker‘s plea transcript under
King argues that the admission of Baker‘s plea transcript violated the rule announced in State v. Dexter, 269 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. 1978).3 In support of his argument, King asserts that the State knew Baker intended to recant the statements he made during his plea hearing and that it called Baker as a trial witness solely for impeachment purposes, thereby creating a risk that the trier of fact would use the evidence for an improper purpose. According to the State, Dexter does not apply in situations, like here, where the witness‘s prior inconsistent statements are substantively admissible. The State argues that the Dexter rule is meant to prevent the risk of improper use of impeachment evidence as substantive evidence; that concern does not exist when the prior inconsistent statement is substantively admissible.
We agree with the State. Baker‘s plea agreement was properly admitted as substantive evidence of guilt under an exception to the hearsay rule; consequently, Dexter does not apply.
A different situation is presented when the prior statement is hearsay and inadmissible as substantive evidence. Such evidence may still be admitted to attack a witness‘s credibility.
The rule articulated in Dexter—and later in State v. Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d 39, 42–43 (Minn. 1985)—applies when evidence of an inconsistent statement is admitted to impeach a witness‘s’ credibility. In Dexter, the State conceded that the statements at issue were not admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Dexter, 269 N.W.2d at 721. Nevertheless, the State argued that the district court erred when it barred the State from impeaching its own witness with extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements that the witness made to her friends in a casual setting. Id. We disagreed, explaining that the less rigorous requirements of Rule 607 create a possibility that impeachment evidence could be misused as substantive evidence. Id.
In Ortlepp, we cautioned about the danger of a prosecutor impeaching their own witness with a prior inconsistent statement when the statement is not admissible as substantive evidence because such impeachment creates “a large risk that the jury, even if properly instructed, will consider the prior statement as substantive evidence.” 363 N.W.2d at 43. But we made clear that when a prior inconsistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), the “defendant has no legitimate cause to complain” and no Dexter problem exists. Id. Consequently, the district
II.
Second, we consider King‘s argument that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that Grahek‘s murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the burglary. The State argues that given the facts here, King could have reasonably foreseen Grahek‘s death because he participated in the armed burglary of a dwelling.
“When reviewing whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the factfinder
Though the sufficiency-of-the evidence standard is very deferential to the verdict, the due process clause still requires that each element of the charged crime be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Merrill, 428 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn. 1988). In Minnesota, a person commits first-degree felony murder if they intentionally “cause[] the death of a human being . . . while committing or attempting to commit burglary.”
According to King, the State failed to prove that Grahek‘s death was reasonably foreseeable as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the burglary. We have “previously recognized that the burglary of a dwelling always carries with it the possibility of violence.” Merrill, 428 N.W.2d at 366–69 (citation omitted) (internal
When viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial establishes the following facts. King, Baker, and Davenport developed a plan to break into Grahek‘s home with the intent to steal Grahek‘s drugs and money. King was armed with a large wrench and knew that Baker and Davenport were armed with handguns. King actively participated in the burglary by kicking in Grahek‘s door and holding a large wrench while standing with Baker and Davenport as they brandished their handguns.
Burglaries always carry with them a heightened risk to human life, see Nunn, 297 N.W.2d at 754, which is undoubtedly enhanced when the perpetrators knowingly carry dangerous weapons. Under the facts here, it is a reasonable inference that the codefendants were prepared to use force to accomplish the burglary. See State v. Jackson, 726 N.W.2d 454, 460–61 (Minn. 2007) (holding that there was sufficient evidence that a victim‘s murder was reasonably foreseeable when two codefendants entered a store armed with a
III.
Third, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion by denying King‘s postconviction petition, which claimed that King received ineffective assistance of counsel related to his plea bargain. “The person seeking postconviction relief bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that his claims merit relief.” Crow v. State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 2019). We review the denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record, or exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Crow, 923 N.W.2d at 9 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review a district court‘s factual determinations for clear error. Scherf v. State, 788 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Minn. 2010). We review a district court‘s legal conclusions de novo. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007).
Under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, King had to show (1) that his attorney‘s representation ” ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ ” and that (2) ” ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
In his postconviction petition and supporting affidavit, King claimed his trial counsel failed to meet the objectively reasonable Strickland standard by failing to communicate a formal plea offer that included an Alford plea.5 King‘s postconviction petition alleged that his attorney “did not explain” that King could accept the State‘s plea offer “while still maintaining his innocence” and failed to explain “what an Alford plea was.” In an effort to corroborate his allegation, King attached a document that is purportedly an email from the State to King‘s attorney setting forth a plea offer from the State that would have capped his sentence at 360 months.6 The purported email does not
In accordance with
King argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied his postconviction petition. He asserts that the postconviction statute does not require testimonial evidence and the State failed to contradict or rebut King‘s affidavit. The State argues that because King failed to show that he was offered an Alford plea, he cannot show that his trial counsel‘s actions fell below the objectively reasonable standard by failing to discuss an Alford plea offer with King.
Even if King‘s self-serving affidavit could be deemed an adequate substitute for live testimony—which unlike an affidavit is subject to cross examination and provides
IV.
Fourth, we consider whether the district court violated
if a person‘s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them. All the offenses, if prosecuted, shall be included in one prosecution which shall be stated in separate counts.
The State charged King with second-degree intentional murder under
V.
Fifth, we turn to King‘s argument that the prosecutor knowingly offered false evidence to the grand jury, thereby invalidating the indictment. We conclude that King has forfeited the claim.
Under the
King moved to dismiss the indictment in February 2018, arguing the indictment failed to establish probable cause, but the motion did not include any accusation that the prosecutor submitted false evidence to the grand jury. Concluding that the indictment established probable cause, the district court denied King‘s motion.
Because the motion King filed in the district court did not include any accusation that the prosecutor submitted false evidence to the grand jury and King does not allege that the falsity of this evidence is newly discovered, he has forfeited appellate review of the issue. Moreover, King has not provided us any good cause argument. We therefore decline to consider King‘s objections to the indictment. See State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 96 (Minn. 2002) (holding that when a defendant forfeits their objections to an indictment by failing to include them in the requisite motion and fails to demonstrate good cause to grant relief from their forfeiture, “we need not consider [the] objections to the indictment“).
VI.
Finally, King‘s pro se supplemental brief presents a different sufficiency of the evidence challenge than that raised in his principal brief and addressed in Part II of this opinion, this time to whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
King‘s argument rests on the credibility of Baker‘s trial testimony, but “[w]e accord great deference to the trial court‘s determination” on credibility because credibility and “the weight to be given” to a witness‘s testimony are determinations for the factfinder. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given that we defer to the district court‘s credibility determination and disregard any testimony conflicting with the verdict, King‘s arguments about Baker‘s testimony fail. See Merrill, 428 N.W.2d at 366 (holding that in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[a]ny conflicting evidence must . . . be resolved in the state‘s favor“).
King alleges that other evidence is false, but to prove the evidence is false, King merely points to what he believes are discrepancies in the evidence submitted to the district court. For example, King focuses on perceived discrepancies in his footwear the day of the crime, claiming that it is impossible that he could have worn the shoes that created the shoe prints in Grahek‘s yard based on King‘s stated timeline, the video evidence, and the
When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial proves beyond a reasonable doubt that King committed first-degree felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability. Baker testified about King‘s involvement in the burglary and Grahek‘s subsequent murder. The district court found that the statements that Baker made during his guilty plea, which implicated King and Baker, were more credible than his trial testimony, which only implicated himself. We defer to that credibility determination. See Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 843. Furthermore, the statements made by Baker during his guilty plea are supported by other record evidence including, but not limited to, King‘s girlfriend‘s testimony that the codefendants met at King‘s home just before the crime and all left together; the white Jeep sped away from the scene of the crime, but returned within the half hour and dropped King off at the Cenex across from his home; King told his girlfriend to delete calls he made to Davenport from her phone and to lie to police about King‘s whereabouts that day; King‘s wrench was recovered in the white Jeep and matched the description of the wrench Baker claimed King
Thus, when the evidence presented at trial is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, it establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that King committed first-degree felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.
Notes
We nonetheless deny the State‘s motion to the extent the reply brief raises this charge of prosecutorial misconduct in the context of “[t]he Dexter problem at King‘s trial.” The Dexter issue was squarely raised in King‘s principal brief. The charge of prosecutorial misconduct under Dexter, however, was addressed and rejected in our subsequent decision in Ortlepp. As we explained, in that case “[t]he prosecutor knew that [the witness‘s] testimony was not going to be helpful and yet he called him for the purpose of getting his prior statement before the jury under the guise of impeachment. In fact, the prosecutor referred to the content of [the witness‘s] statement in his opening remarks . . . .” 363 N.W.2d at 43 (emphasis added). We framed the central question in Ortlepp as “whether [the witness‘s] statement was admissible substantively.” Id. Because “[i]f it was, the Dexter problem is not present and defendant has no legitimate cause to complain.” Id. So too is the case here. We have held that Baker‘s plea hearing testimony was admissible substantively, so there is no Dexter issue to the extent the prosecutor knew that Baker was going to recant his trial testimony.