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State v. Jones
772 N.W.2d 496
Minn.
2009
Check Treatment

*1 496 that the district court’s Appellants argue the at considering time when

reasonable Bode, authority over the revenue bonds lack of even circumstances. tendant subject juris matter void, implicates the court’s we at issue was judgment though always Our cases have not been diction. to determine proper it was concluded still matters that clear to the classification of as to vacate was made motion whether and, jurisdiction subject matter involve time. 612 N.W.2d a reasonable within jurisdic in specifically, whether rem more that the Here, although recognize we 870. subject like tion be treated more should and still does not never had court district jurisdiction personal jurisdiction. matter or the 876 jurisdiction over in rem have Florance, 626, In re 360 N.W.2d Compare Bonds, question that we believe (Minn.1985) in (discussing 1 rem 629 n. to vacate was motion appellant’s whether of the court’s jurisdiction in the context reasonable time is better made within a v. subject jurisdiction), matter with court because by the district addressed Hoff (Minn. 361, n. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 365 5 prop not sufficient for us to record is this 1982) understanding our (expressing attendant circum all erly determine commonly jurisdiction grouped in rem is Fjelstad, v. 271 See Newman stances. ‘personal jurisdic “under the rubric (1965) 522, 137 186 Minn. N.W.2d ”). tion’ (“ time must be a reasonable ‘Since what is all attendant circum light

determined the nature of the need not resolve We stances, rights, proof by loss of intervening case, jurisdictional issue in this because com party, the adverse or prejudice one rendered in the judgment void “[a] case, general equities of manding jurisdiction subject over the absence of final judgments be desirability v. Mat parties.” matter or the Matson upon prob factors bear other relevant (Minn.1981) son, 310 N.W.2d 506 ”) Moore, Federal Practice (quoting added). lem.’ Notwithstanding our (emphasis ¶ ed.1955)). (2d 60.27 distinguish years pro in recent efforts limits, jurisdictional from cedural tools 17, 2007, May vacate the We therefore see, Giem, e.g., In re Civil Commitment of to the Port response order district court (Minn.2007), 427-29 there 742 N.W.2d Authority’s petition. We reverse and clarification of our is a need for further to the district court to remand the matter jurisdic subject on matter jurisprudence whether, considering all attend- determine tion. circumstances, appellants’ motion ant 2004 orders the court’s 2002 and vacate time. brought within a reasonable

MAGNUSON, Justice, no Chief took of this

part in consideration or decision case. Minnesota, Respondent, STATE of v.

DIETZEN, (concurring). Justice JONES, Appellant. Don Although I concur the court’s decision regarding that the and 2004 orders No. A07-1168. 876 are void because the

Basic Resolution Supreme Court of Minnesota. jurisdiction in rem district court lacked Sept. 2009. bonds, separately I write over the revenue my to voice concern about unevenness jurisdiction. matter subject

of our cases on *4 Carlson,

Jodie L. Assistant State Public Defender, Paul, MN, St. for appellant. Swanson, General, Attorney Lori St. Paul, MN, Ciliberto, and Patrick J. Scott County Zettler, Attorney, Todd P. Assis- tant County Attorney, Shakopee, Scott MN, respondent. nothing to do with the check and had

OPINION Towing Recovery. & Detec- Shanndyn’s ANDERSON, BARRY, Justice. G. an taped also interview tive Kvasnieka County a Scott February On Shannon, in which Shannon confirmed with Antoine Jones Don jury appellant found was closed and towing business forgery check felonies: guilty of three signature on the check was not $2,500), Minn.Stat. (greater than her mother’s. 4(2) (2008); offering a 609.631, § subds. $2,500), than Minn. (greater check forged appeared was arrested and with- Jones 4(2) (2008); 609.631, § subds. Stat. hearing on Febru- out counsel for his bail $2,500), than (greater theft swindle ary 2006. The district court informed 3(2) 609.52, 2(4), § subds. Minn.Stat. to counsel and Jones that he had (2008). convicted Jones district court for 'services from the apply could him on charges and sentenced on all three bail, and on posted defender. months charge to 30 forgery the check court, 3, 2006, he told the district March of Corrections. the Commissioner with attorney.” going get private “I’m to- appeals affirmed his convic- The court of *5 by that he one Jones stated could find tion, following the four raises and Jones for a continu- May, and the State asked (1) whether the district appeal: issues on hearing. ance of by denying application Jones’s court erred (2) 5, 2006, defender; May appeared whether Jones’s On Jones without public for a (3) valid; whether counsel was for first Jones appearance. waiver of his (4) misconduct; and defender, the State committed for a but the dis- applied public by court erred whether the district application. his No ra- trict court denied advisory counsel for Jones. appointing given for the tionale on the record was affirm. We 5, application, May denial. The dated 2006, job indicated that Jones had no but Duff- girlfriend, Shannon Jones and his expenses had no for rent or food because Towing & Re- ney, Shanndyn’s co-owned application with sister. The he lived his covery, jointly opened two business that also his 1- showed Jones lived with Bank. The accounts accounts at TCF year-old girlfriend, daughter, late 2004 and were both opened in were Shannon, $2,080 9, a month. January earning who was by August 2005. On closed 2006, deposited monthly to an account Jones owned a car and had ex- Jones $1,500 check Guaranty alleged payroll Bank an than for car and penses of less closed TCF accounts drawn on one of the support. child The value of the car was $3,600. check bore of the amount equal owed on the car. At the debt Duffney, Vicky of Shannon’s signature top application, “deny— the words mother, by it endorsed Jones. and was over were circled. On the rec- guidelines” later, returned the check to days Two TCF ord, the district court stated that this was Bank the TCF account Guaranty because the second time Jones had been denied Guaranty Bank demand- had been closed. defender, public and recommended that he Jones, from but Jones never repayment ed a continuance to retain counsel from seek money. repaid the attorneys. the court’s of reduced-fee list myself “I can one replied, Jones hire on Guaranty police Bank contacted the a month. I am probably probably about 2006, 21, and in the course of the January my going pay to have to sell truck to Laura Kvasnieka investigation, Detective why the reason I Duffney signing any probably denied was Vicky learned that —that time, my application was denied the first because or a attorney list, reduced-fee option truck.” but neither worked for him. After recess, a brief the district court stated that 9, told the district court on Jones June County lawyer Jones’s Dakota was willing 2006, that public he was denied twice for a represent Jones but waiting was for his defender and that none of the reduced-fee paid retainer to by be Jones before under- attorneys worked out for him. The dis- taking represent Jones on another mat- gave copy trict court Jones a com- ter. The district court acknowledged that plaint and that apply reiterated he could doing “Jones has been things he has to for a defender or that a list of just do but not finalizing jury them.” The attorneys reduced-fee provided. could be trial was February continued to attorney Jones then waived his to an and the court warned Jones his attor- appearance. September for the first On ney should file a certificate of representa- appeared Jones for his omnibus tion January 30. Jones, hearing. After with speaking prosecutor informed the district court that But February on appeared Jones Jones wanted to set the trial. again case for without counsel. The district court him, Jones told the district court that he “[M]y told plan Jury is to have a Trial getting “kind of a little today stable” and could you assume that have given up contact one of the attorneys. your right reduced-fee attorney have an represent jury The district court you you set the trial for a since have chosen not to retain January date in appear so that Jones could anybody and have them today.” here lawyer. court with a argued wrongly he had been *6 public denied a defender because girl- his trial, appeared again Jones for without job. friend had a objected When Jones to counsel, January on 2007. voir Before the district court’s statement that he was began, objected dire Jones to proceeding himself, choosing represent to the court counsel, claiming without that he had had an extended conversation with Jones wrongly public been denied a defender result, about his financial situation. As a (but three times. The district court the court ordered to fill out Jones another the same district court judge who had application a public for defender to make presided over earlier proceedings) noted the record clear. previous that his application was denied income, expenses, based on his and application February his The dated income, girlfriend’s live-in and the district employed, indicated that Jones was court stated that it making would not review that an plus hour overtime was $12 and time, By decision. this Jones was em- getting a raise to an hour. Shannon $15 ployed, and the district court noted that was also working, and the two mak- were earnings $4,500 Jones’s current would disqualify ing at least a month together. him public rent, from a expenses food, defender. The district Jones listed day- for care, court also stated that support Jones’s failure to and child totaling less than during $3,000 retain counsel previous continu- a month. The court collector ex- ances meant that no plained further continuances on the record that Jones was ineli- granted. alone, would be gible Jones mentioned that because including his income lawyer overtime, he had a an open greater for case Dakota than 125% of the County, court, but that he could not coun- poverty guidelines. afford The district more, sel for another saying case. He stated that the without appli- denied Jones’s kept offering public court him a defender cation.

502. governmental bene- ceives means-tested jury for trial that after- appeared

Jones fits; asked the district or prosecutor noon. The waiver of coun- an informed get court “to (2) defendant, through any combi- a The court conducted record.” sel on the in- and current liquid nation of assets colloquy, which counsel brief waiver of come, pay the rea- would be unable right that he had the acknowledged Jones by counsel charged private costs sonable had been refused attorney, that he to an judicial for a defense of in that district times, or five four public defender matter. the same counsel on his to retain he been unable had 611.17(a) (2008); § Minn. Minn.Stat. repre- that he would agreed own. Jones 5.02, P. subd. 3. The district R.Crim. jury guilty found Jones sent himself. inquiry into “appropriate court must make charges, and the court of on all three the [defen the financial circumstances of conviction., appeals affirmed dant],” including the defendant’s assets liabilities, property of real liquidity I. assets, any as and other transfer of 5,May that his contends alleged offense.2 sets since the date of the February applications 2006, and 611.17(b); P. § Minn. R.Crim. Minn.Stat. improperly were den defender public for a 5.02, inquiry, 4. In such an subd. right Although the ied.1 show that burden is on the defendant to VI; constitutional, Const. amend. U.S. financially to afford “he or she is unable I, repre § art. Minn. Const. 5.02, P. 4. counsel.” Minn. R.Crim. subd. statutory, by a defender is public sentation provide must also the infor The defendant (2008). A § defendant 611.14 Minn.Stat. necessary eligibility mation to determine de representation entitled duty any continuing and has a to disclose eligible 611.14 is fender under section or her financial changes relevant to his only if he or she is public defender services 611.17(b). § If circumstances. Minn.Stat. to afford or coun financially unable obtain court determines that a defendant (2008); § 611.15 Minn. sel. Minn.Stat. requirements, the stated then it meets 1(2). 5.02, The district P. subd. R.Crim. *7 appoint public repre must a defender to a counsel for defen appoint court shall not § Minn.Stat. 611.18 sent defendant. pri retain financially is able to dant who (2008). parties agree Both that we should to do so. Minn. vate but refuses counsel the abuse of discretion standard of apply 611.17(b) (2008); Minn. P. § R.Crim. Stat. Stuart, from In re 646 N.W.2d review 1(2). 5.02, The district court must subd. (Minn.2002), to the district court’s de 523 any request public for a defender screen eligibility. termination of following using the standard: financially is unable to May A defendant first contends that his if: counsel obtain application wrongly 2006 denied (1) defendant, because the district court should have con any dependent or that only sidered his income and not of his who resides of the defendant defendant, girlfriend deciding eligibility. re- when his household as same necessarily argues provide representation does not mean that 1. that Jones failed to The State appellate We ineligible public a record for review. a defender. sufficient he or she is for 611.20, disagree. (2008); § 4 See Minn.Stat. subd. 5.02, P. subd. 5. Minn. R.Crim. employed Merely a defendant or 2. because adequate partial payments for is able to make required comprehensive court is to make its inquiry required The district under § on “the financial circum- decision based Minn.Stat. 611.17. applicant,” stances of the but neither the Again, the district court must consider nor the rules of criminal proce- statutes all available information about the defen- inquiry dure state that the must be limited dant’s financial circumstances that “might only liquid defendant’s assets and applicant’s be relevant to the eligibility for duty, current income. The district court’s public a defender.” We have held that a however, inquiry is to make broad into “district court must exercise its discretion financial defendant’s circumstances to determine whether [a has defendant] “might applicant’s be relevant to the met his burden of establishing that eligibility for a public defender.” Minn. through any liquid combination of assets 611.17(b). § Stat. The income of a live-in and current income he would be unable to girlfriend might is information that be rel- pay the charged reasonable costs by pri- to a eligibility, especially evant defendant’s vate counsel for defense of a case.” In re

when the defendant does not in- dispute Stuart, 646 N.W.2d 527. Vincent, cluding the income. See State v. (Utah 1994) (consid- 883 P.2d 283 n. 6 case, In this the record reflects that the ering the persons income both “a district court just considered more than unit, regard domestic without to whether poverty the federal guidelines. The dis- married”). they legally are trict court’s discussion with Jones about

his financial February circumstances on eligi The burden to show financial 14, 2007, spanned pages of the tran- bility public for a defender is on the de situation, script. family His his and his fendant, and argue Jones did not girlfriend’s income, his current cost of unwilling help Shannon was him retain support, child ability post bond or that her income was otherwise and retain County counsel Dakota were inaccessible to him. Based on the infor all application discussed. The 5,May mation in application, defender significant services also included district court decided that Jones did not sources, assets, detail about his income qualify for a public defender. Jones did and expenses. argument Jones’s depends provide any additional information to a very reading on narrow of the record show that financially he was unable to that only because the court collector re- record, afford counsel. On this the district ferred to poverty guidelines the federal as court did not denying eligibility, abuse its discretion.3 reason for Jones’s

nothing else was considered. Given the record, Jones also contends that his Febru context of including the entire but 14, ary application wrongly 2007 was de inquiry by limited to the the district court, nied because the district court limited its agree appeals we with the court of inquiry to the fact that Jones’s income was that thorough the court conducted a inves- higher than of poverty tigation 125% the federal particular into Jones’s financial guidelines. argues Jones poverty that the situation. conclude that the district We guidelines only indigency measure and court fail did not to exercise its discretion proxy should not be used as a rely solely poverty guide- or on the federal support credibility 3. We find by no in this record for the and the of statements Jones in appeals’ application plays court of conclusion that the district his no role in our decision "implicit credibility finding," today. court made an 504 436, (Minn.2006); 715 N.W.2d 443-44 Wor-

lines.4 Jones, 276; at v. 266 thy, 583 N.W.2d State (Minn.1978). 706, A 712 written N.W.2d II. right necessary to counsel is waiver of the that he did not argues next Jones felony unless the defendant re- cases he was right to counsel because waive his sign fuses to such a waiver. See Minn. waiver, any a because not offered written (2008); § P. 611.19 Minn. R.Crim. Stat. by the district court colloquy given waiver 1(4). 5.02, require subd. And we district insufficient, by and waiver because courts, accepting before a waiver of the inapplicable to his situation. conduct is counsel, right fully to to the defen- advise any attempt by record does not reflect The by inquiry regarding intense the na- dant court to obtain a written waiv the district charges, possible punish- ture of the Jones, counsel from but district er of ment, circumstances, all mitigating a waiver of counsel collo court did conduct “ understanding ‘facts essential to broad appeals the record. The court of quy on consequences of the of the of the waiver affirmed, stating that Jones waived counsel, right including advantages conduct, right by quoting to counsel Unit disadvantages of the decision to waive (7th Bauer, 693, v. 956 F.2d 695 ed States ” Osborne, “ 715 counsel.’ N.W.2d 443-44 Cir.1992), proposition for the ‘the 5.02, 1(4)); (quoting Minn. R.Crim. P. subd. ability pay for counsel combination California, 422 see also Faretta v. U.S. right to do so does waive the plus refusal 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 45 L.Ed.2d 562 by to counsel at trial. It is waiver con (1975); Camacho, ” State v. 561 N.W.2d Jones, 755 duct.’ State v. N.W.2d (Minn.1997). (Minn.App.2008). only We will over of a “finding turn a valid waiver finding district court’s finding counsel if that right defendant’s expressly right Jones waived his to counsel clearly Worthy, erroneous.” State v. is by unsupported is the record. There was (Minn.1998). 270, 276 583 N.W.2d prosecutor no written waiver. The asked get the district court “to an informed waiv Though right to counsel is a record,” er of counsel on the but the ensu requirement, may constitutional it be relin ing colloquy was insufficient. The district (2) (1) waiver, ways: in three quished court asked Jones if he understood that he (3) See, conduct, and forfeiture. by waiver right attorney, had a to an and the district Pedockie, 137 P.3d e.g., State v. prior proceedings. court summarized the (Utah 2006). concepts These three are stating After that Jones had not been able length discussed at the Third Circuit counsel, to retain the district court asked Goldberg, 67 United States v. F.3d if going proceed he was on his (3d Cir.1995). 1099-1102 represent agreed own and himself. Jones voluntary relinquish that he At represent would himself. no Waiver right. during colloquy a known Id. at 1099. We time did the district ment of of the required charges have the waiver constitu court address the nature of the or knowing, advantages to counsel to be intel disadvantages tional a de *9 Osborne, voluntary. and State v. cision to waive counsel. More ligent, importantly, supplemental authority, appeal Having 4. submitted ation of the on its merits. Jones merits, a in and the State filed motion this court to deny we considered the the State’s authority. We strike the admission of that motion. motion until consider- deferred the State's

505 1101; objected proceeding twice to without F.3d at Hampton, see also 92 P.3d that, record, 874; Carruthers, conclude on this counsel. We at 35 S.W.3d at 548. give knowing, intelligent, not Jones did usually Forfeiture is reserved for severe voluntary right waiver of his to coun- misconduct, when other efforts to remedy sel. See, the situation have failed. e.g., Hamp- ton, 92 P.3d at 874-75 (listing cases dis- by sepa Waiver conduct is a doctrine). cussing the forfeiture concept. Goldberg, by rate Under waiver if a in engages conduct occurs defendant Other courts applied have forfeiture dilatory tactics after he has been warned situations similar to the pre- circumstances right that he will lose his to counsel. 67 Klem, sented E.g., here. Wilkerson v. 412 by applies F.3d 1100. Waiver conduct (3d 449, Cir.2005). F.3d 451-56 In Wilker- “voluntarily to those defendants who en- son, the Third Circuit found that a state gag[e] in knowing they misconduct what court did not unreasonably by act applying affirmatively stand to lose are not [but] the forfeiture doctrine to a defendant who requesting proceed pro se.” Id. at 1101. “duly trial, notified of the date of his colloquy required The same for affirmative who has been advised to obtain counsel in given waivers also must be before a defen trial, sufficient time to ready be right dant can be said to have waived his appears who on the scheduled date without by to counsel conduct. Id. at (requir 1100 counsel and with no reasonable excuse for Bauer, ing warnings); Faretta see also 956 his present.” failure to have counsel Id. at Pedockie, 695; 723-24; F.2d at 137 P.3d at 454-56; State, see also Siniard v. 491 241, Hampton, State v. 208 Ariz. 92 P.3d So.2d 1064 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (2004); Carruthers, 874 State v. 35 (finding forfeiture when a defendant failed (Tenn.2000). Bauer, S.W.3d 548 to retain eight counsel after months and dangers defendant was warned of the continuances). two The rationale behind self-representation before the court applying the forfeiture doctrine is that right found that he waived his to counsel preserve courts must be able their abili- by his conduct. 956 F.2d at 695. Again, Wilkerson, ty to conduct trials. 412 F.3d case, in this the district court failed to Johnson, at 455 (quoting Fischetti v. 384 conduct a colloquy satisfy sufficient to (3d Cir.2004)). F.3d 146 Applying the requirements 5.02, of Minn. R.Crim. P. forfeiture doctrine to right to counsel 1(4). subd. is a impression matter first for our Lehman, court. v. State The final N.W.2d relinquishing method of Cf. (Minn.App.2008) 81-82 right (noting that the to counsel is forfeiture.5 Under issue of right whether the can Goldberg, a defendant who engages “ex be forfeited was an tremely dilatory may impres- conduct” issue first be said to Minnesota, finding sion in have forfeited his forfeiture counsel. 67 1101; when a generally F.3d at see defendant attacked his Wayne R. de- al., court). in open LaFave et fender But Criminal Procedure we have noted 11.3(c) (3d 2007). § ed. that a Forfeiture does balance must exist between a defen- require the court to “right conduct waiver dant’s to counsel of his choice colloquy with the Goldberg, against defendant. the public maintaining interest of regarding 5. Our statements forfeiture in State the context of issues that were raised for Osborne, (Minn.2006), v. 715 N.W.2d 436 unobjected review but to at trial. Id. at 441- Osborne, bearing have no on this case. In we 44. (or silence) dealt with forfeiture waiver *10 506 evidence, by asking Shan- judicial system.” eliciting hearsay effective

an efficient claiming if was that other wit- Courtney, N.W.2d 82 non she v. State by asking (Minn.2005). jury, questions nesses lied to the testimony prior about Jones’s that elicited Here, engaged in conduct Jones violation of an order for convictions and his dilatory. Almost a full extremely that was by making ap- emotional protection, ap Jones’s first bail year passed between denigrat- peals jury improperly to the appeared trial. Jones and his pearance handling of his own defense. ing Jones’s eight separate on court without al- object any not to of these Jones did occasions, of those On seven occasions. during trial. We review leged errors counsel. Jones told to retain was Jones misconduct un- unobjected-to prosecutorial de and was denied applied for plain-error der a standard of re- modified repeatedly He three times. fender least Ramey, view. State v. N.W.2d planning that he was told the district court (Minn.2006). approach, Under this counsel, and he was retaining private on (2) (1) error Jones must demonstrate solely for the three continuances granted Id. plain. plain If Jones demonstrates him time to do so. The purpose giving error, then the to the State burden shifts set Jones’s trial date district court also rights to show that Jones’s substantial hearing so four after his omnibus months affected, meaning not that the State were counsel. And the dis that he could hire is no reasonable likeli- must show there it to Jones that he trict court made clear prosecutorial the hood that the absence of a pro no more continuances as get would affect- significantly misconduct would have February 2007. party after se Id. jury. If there is ed the verdict of Moreover, aware of the Jones was plain error that affects Jones’s substantial representing himself. disadvantages of rights, we must then assess “whether the coun objections proceeding without error be addressed to ensure fair- should sel, that he would not concerned Jones was integrity judicial pro- ness and the un trial because he would not get a fair ceedings.” Id. being said. He stated derstand what was record, this has demon- On State that, counsel, sitting like “a he felt without strated that none of the claimed instances duck, Even with this basically target.” prosecutorial signifi- misconduct had a failed to retain knowledge, Jones still jury cant effect on the verdict. The court found that counsel. The district closing argument empha- did not State’s he had to finalizing” Jones was “not what incidents, any complained-of size of the and that he was do to retain counsel overwhelming that and the evidence was initia “somebody taking not [was] who check, knew that presented they get need to do to tive to do what Vicky sign not a check authorized The district court concluded counsel.” towing and never tried company, from “given up that Jones had [his] Thus, pay money back. Jones is not record, attorney.” have an On this we prosecutorial entitled to relief on his mis- decision was hold that the district court’s conduct claims. clearly not erroneous. Jones forfeited his right to counsel.

IV. III. Finally, Jones claims that the by appointing court erred advi argues Jones also district sory counsel for him. Under Minn. improperly State committed misconduct

507 5.02, 2, income, P. subd. a district court assets and current R.Crim. would be un- “may appoint ‘advisory pay counsel’ to assist able to the reasonable costs charged voluntarily by private the accused who and intelli- judicial counsel in that district (Em- gently right waives the to counsel.” for a defense of the same matter.” Id. added.) phasis Appointing advisory requirements 5.02, or The of Rule subdivision 3(2), standby “procedural counsel is a matter of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal determination,” judicial parallel Jones does Procedure those of section 611.17(a)(2). “a advisory not have constitutional To determine financial eligi- Clark, 460, bility, counsel.” State v. 722 N.W.2d the district court required is (Minn.2006). addition, 466-67 In “the appropriate role “make inquiry into the finan- standby fundamentally of counsel is differ- cial circumstances” of the defendant. 611.17(b) (2008). generally.” § ent from the role of counsel Minn.Stat. The defen- Richards, v. State 552 N.W.2d 207 dant must “submit a financial statement (Minn.1996). 5.02, In the comment to Rule under setting oath or affirmation forth the purpose advisory subdivision of applicant’s assets and liabilities.” Id. Further, “appointed objection over the of the “burden is on the [defendant] help the defendant is to the accused under- to show that he or financially she is unable negotiate through pro- 5.02, stand and the basic to afford counsel.” Minn. R.Crim. P. appointment cedures of the trial.” The is subd. 4. discretionary court, especially for a district requires Section 611.17 also a district if the court is concerned about the fairness court just to consider more than in a trial involving pro of a se defendant or a applies come of defendant who for a potential disruptiveness about the of the public defender. See also Minn. R.Crim. 5.02, defendant. Minn. R.Crim. P. subd. 2 (“[T]he 5.02, P. subd. 5 cmt. defend request advisory cmt. Jones did not coun- appointed person er can be for the of any showing sel or make that the structur- subject moderate means who would be integrity al of his trial was affected. See if hardship substantial financial forced to Clark, Thus, 722 N.W.2d 467. we con- full pay adequate representa cost of clude that the district court did not abuse tion.”). held, recently We have as as appointing advisory

its discretion that a “district court must exercise its counsel here. discretion to determine whether [a defen Affirmed. has establishing dant] met his burden of through any liquid combination of as PAGE, (dissenting). Justice sets and current income he would be un respectfully I In appeal, dissent. this pay charged able to the reasonable costs presented the record is insufficient for by private counsel for defense of a case.” purposes determining whether dis- (Minn. Stuart, In re N.W.2d trict court abused its discretion when it 2002); Passer, see also Hanson v. 13 F.3d ineligible decided Jones was for a (8th Cir.1994) (“[t]he phrase ‘fi public defender. nancially unable to obtain counsel’ does not 611.17(a)(2) (2008), § require showing indigency

Under Minn.Stat. a to entitle counsel; financially a defendant who is unable to an it stringent accused to less standard”). Stuart, appoint- obtain counsel is to the entitled because the district a public liquidity ment of defender. A defendant is court chose not to consider financially holdings, unable to obtain counsel if he or real we re defendant’s estate she, case, “through any liquid concluding combination of manded the that the dis *12 top fense of the same matter.” At the of to exercise its discretion

trict court failed - form, “deny at determining eligibility. guide- 646 N.W.2d the the words over in wholesale the use Although adopting 526. lines” were circled. guide objective poverty criteria like the of 14, 2007, February application The was eligibility pro the lines would streamline similarly application denied. That listed cess, the statuto purpose the of it defeats monthly and the combined income of Jones requires consideration of a ry scheme that $3,784 girlfriend monthly as and their assets, liabilities, and financial defendant’s $3,592. expenses point, as At some the Stuart, Thus, under a dis circumstances. amended to show that application was only the use of the adopts trict court that girlfriend Jones and his had combined duty has not met its poverty guidelines $4,500 monthly approximately income of has inquiry a full financial and conduct monthly expenses approximately and its discretion. failed to exercise $3,000. application The also showed that for, applied It Jones and was appears $2,000, Jones owned a car valued at denied, of counsel four or appointment the with a girlfriend pregnant that his due times, only applications

five but two of the 5, 2006, May March 7. Like date on the 5,May dated are the record —one 14, 2007, application, February applica- February 2007.1 Both and one dated tion contained no information as to the were The applications of these denied. counsel, of private reasonable costs nor is at applications denials of these two are anyplace that information found else in the be- issue in this case. Because court transcript hearing record. of the any findings explain to make or low failed February application which the was dis- denying applications its reasons for on cussed, the district court asked the court any way, it meaningful the record why explain public collector to Jones’ de- an impossible apply abuse of discretion application fender was denied. The court standard of review to the court’s denials of income, collector testified that Jones’ applications. these itself, $2,280, was, by over 125% of the 5,May application, In his Jones poverty guidelines. federal This was the income, monthly expenses of listed no only given for the reason denial. $2,000, $17,000 and a car valued at but $17,000. court, reading with a balance owed of The based on its of the children, us, dependent three one of also listed record before concludes the dis- girlfriend. whom lived with him and his trict court did not abuse its discretion also application ap- The included information when it denied Jones’ defender record, however, monthly girlfriend’s plications. about his income belies the $2,080 monthly expenses First, totaling respect be- court’s conclusion. with $1,384 $1,484 car, 5, 2006, May application, only tween for the insur- indi- ance, Ac- support payments. and child cation as to the reason for the denial itself, cording application, application Jones’ rent and comes from the on which - food paid “deny guidelines” were Jones’ sister. The the words over were If, application appears applica- contained no information as to written. it from the as “the charged by private only reasonable costs tion that the reason for the denial was judicial poverty district for a de- that Jones’ income was above the Copies applications, applications 1. of the are attached as but relevant to our dis- respectively. cussion, addendum 1 and 2 For reasons been has redacted. privacy, certain information contained on an abuse of the the court collector for the the denial was denial was that guidelines, because the stat- district court’s discretion Jones’ income alone exceeded the poverty consideration of a utory requires scheme guidelines. Again, a denial for that reason financial circumstances includ- defendant’s *13 alone was an abuse of the district court’s assets, income, assets, current ing liquid discretion, as it was with the denial of the liabilities, and the reasonable costs associ- 5,May 2006, application. I conclude that paying private ated with for counsel. On discretion, the district court abused its us, the record before there is no indication if even it considered all the information any that the district court considered February contained on the 14 application. if these factors. But even the district Though the difference between Jones’ court considered all the information con- income, monthly including girl- of his I con- application, tained on the would still friend’s, monthly and expenses Jones’ was that the court its discretion. clude abused $1,500, nothing there is still in the record Assuming deciding ap- without that it was $1,500 explain why in excess income propriate impute for the district court to over Jones’ expenses “pay is sufficient to girlfriend, of his the Jones the income charged by private reasonable costs monthly income difference Jones’ between Further, judicial counsel in that district.” $500, expenses approximately the record reflects that had retained the record discloses no assets of substan- in private separate counsel matter. denying application, tial value. None of these costs were in included explain why court did not district $500 application, let alone the district court’s monthly difference between income and eligibility determination.2 reason- expenses “pay was sufficient charged by private able costs above, For the discussed I reasons con- judicial district.” Nor does this court clude that the district court abused its explain why the difference between $500 5,May discretion when it denied Jones’ monthly expenses income and is sufficient 14, 2007, February applications pay representa- the reasonable costs of public for a defender. To the extent that opin- tion. To the extent that the court’s the court is correct its conclusion that monthly ion holds that a difference $500 appropriate the district court conducted an expenses between Jones’ income and circumstances, inquiry into Jones’ financial pay sufficient to the reasonable costs for I would remand to the district court for private representation, the court should because, explanation further on the record why an explain such amount is sufficient. us, impossible before it is to determine But the court can it has done so. Nor engaging do so on this record without in whether the were an denials abuse dis- fact-finding. improper cretion.

Second, respect February with to the 2007, application, only given by reason ATTACHMENT court, application particulars arrange- 2. The for a defender is a district of that form, one-page only appear application, and there are two blanks ment did not on the even applicant Although an he the court collec- to list liabilities. after was interviewed legal Jones mentioned his other matter to the tor.

5H *17 77, 88, 1379, 124 158 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. MEYER, (dissenting). Justice (2004); Osborne, v. 715 209 State N.W.2d majori- from respectfully I dissent (Minn.2006). 436, The defendant 443-44 ty’s opinion ground on the that Jones nei- may right communicate the waiver of the right nor to coun- ther waived forfeited by expressly to counsel or his conduct. appeals I would reverse the court of sel. 270, 275, Worthy, v. 583 N.W.2d See State a trial. grant and Jones new (Minn.1998). 276-77 The and Fourteenth Amendments Sixth circumstances, courts have In extreme guaran- to the United States Constitution “forfeited” his found that a defendant criminal in state courts a tee defendants right Amendment to counsel. Unit- Sixth by right represented fundamental to be (3d 237, 250 Leggett, ed v. 162 F.3d States Wainwright, counsel at trial. v. Gideon Cir.1998); Goldberg, v. see United States 792, 335, 342-43, 83 9 (3d Cir.1995). 372 U.S. S.Ct. 1092, Al- 1100 67 F.3d (1963). right 799 to counsel L.Ed.2d line between forfeiture and though the defendant, blurred, can waived a such be but be- waiver is often the distinction only voluntary, concepts valid if it is know- is crucial. As the waiver tween the two Tovar, has articulated: “Unlike ing, intelligent. Iowa v. 541 Third Circuit 514

waiver, a requires knowing protected and in- counsel should not be when he which deliberately so relinquishment right, outrageously of a known abuses tentional Similarly, a privilege. where defen- right results the loss of a forfeiture judi- purposeful manipulation dant’s of the knowledge of the defendant’s regardless system ability cial blocks a court’s to en- irrespective of whether thereof and waiver, sure a sufficient the court cannot relinquish intended to defendant expected protect right. be See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100. Be- right.” Lucarelli, Commonwealth v. 971 A.2d a conclusion of forfeiture results in cause (Pa.2009) (“Should 1173, 1179 an unrepre- right, the unintended loss of a fundamental engage sented defendant choose not to “extremely serious misconduct” or “ex- court, colloquy process with trial tremely dilatory required conduct” is provision were there no for forfeiture of support finding of forfeiture. See id. at counsel, impermissi- that defendant could 1101-02. bly clog machinery justice or ham- disagree majority I with the that Jones’s per delay the state’s efforts to effec- extremely dilatory. conduct was Forfei- tively justice.”). administer inBut cases generally ture is reserved for defendants where the defendant purposefully did not verbally physically who have or abused abuse the privilege, and the court could See, attorneys. e.g., Leggett, their 162 assess the defendant’s awareness of the (at 240, hearing, F.3d at defendant self-representation, risks of forfeiture head, attorney in punched his and then applied. should not be v. See State choke, him); began and scratch spit, Hampton, 208 Ariz. 92 P.3d Lehman, State v. 749 N.W.2d 81-82 (2004) (stating finding that a of forfeiture (Minn.App.2008) (listing holding cases and only “should result when less restrictive right the defendant forfeited his to counsel inappropriate,” measures are and declin- attorney attacked his in open where he ing to hold that conduct warranted forfei- court). McLeod, States v. United ture, though even the defendant threat- concluded that a Eleventh Circuit defen- life). lawyer’s ened the dant had forfeited his to counsel A very small number of courts have attorney after the defendant’s second “extremely found misconduct dilatory” withdraw, moved to testifying that the de- when a in obtaining, defendant’s actions verbally fendant had abused and threat- with, working changing representation or him, him, ened to harm threatened to sue delay have led to excessive or inconven- attempted and had to make him engage See, Mitchell, e.g., ience. United States v. unethical activities. F.3d 325-26 (5th Cir.1985) (hold- 777 F.2d 257-58 *18 (11th Cir.1995). ing it was not an abuse of discretion for a examining Most cases forfeiture have a trial proceed court to where defendants high for what quali- standard misconduct “requested continuance in bad faith and [a] “extremely dilatory.” fies as See purpose delay” for the of and one defen- Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1095 (holding that manipulate dant tried “to the court’s qualify “extremely conduct did not as dila- by retaining schedule attorney an he knew tory” appointed attorney where withdrew conflict”); to have a State v. Cummings, trial, days testifying before that defendant 199 Wis.2d 546 N.W.2d 418-20 him, (1996) had threatened and defendant failed (holding defendant had forfeited his counsel). private to physi- retain Cases of right consistently to counsel he where re- lawyer cal verbal abuse to a or most cooperate complained fused to about clearly qualify; right attorney a defendant’s to manipulate, his order to dis- After a federal district court denied Miscon- 451. delay proceedings). rupt, and re- petition, a habeas the Third Circuit’s dilatory” “extremely also labeled duct was limited to whether the state view was to a access gave defendant when a court to, contrary or in- court’s decision “was counsel, $20,000 retain new specifically to of, application an unreasonable volved repre- to have still failed but the defendant law, as deter- clearly established federal weeks later. at a trial date five sentation by Supreme of the United mined Court Lucarelli, A.2d at 1180. there Id. at 452. Because were States.” case, not the record does show In this involving decisions for- Supreme no Court to be la- manipulation as purposeful such any guidance clear as “providing feiture or “extremely dilatory misconduct.” beled applied to be before can [it to the standard made it unclear financial situation Jones’s a defendant’s miscon- that] be concluded a de- qualify public for he would whether forfeiture!,] a necessari- [i]t duct warrants fender, rep- for such applications and his that court’s decision ly follows state with no clear ex- were denied resentation application an unreasonable here was not qualify. not why as to he did planation precedent.” Id. at 454- Supreme Court fluctuated his financial status Questions on (internal (first original) alteration stabi- his finances were between whether omitted). marks and citation quotation public for qualified he lizing, or whether majority overstates Wilker- I believe lasted un- This confusion representation. type precedential value for son’s trial, by the as evidenced day til the of his forfeiture. that can constitute misconduct reapply allowed to again fact that he was that it was de- expressly noted Wilkerson appeared He defender. applica- the state court’s ciding “whether proceedings, at all relevant participated case was of forfeiture to Wilkerson’s tion to opportunity trial court the giving the precedent.” by Supreme Court precluded self-repre- of mind about assess his state only The court’s conclusion Id. at 456. Further, court the district sentation. “pro- decisions Supreme was that Court that failure findings no Jones’s made with a ‘basis to conclude’ state courts vide faith or to attorney was done bad get an by a conduct de- certain obstructive delay proceedings purposefully —the a forfeiture of may constitute fendant doing acknowledged court A protections.” Id. Amendment Sixth done, failed simply to be but what needed forfeiture, on the facts based conclusion things. to “finalize” by the extremely review of this deferential Circuit, support. little Third has on majority mainly relies Wilkerson (3d Cir.2005), Klem, that Jones did 412 F.3d 449 I would conclude v. to counsel and right forfeited or forfeit his assertion that Jones waive support its Wilkerson, right represented therefore his be to counsel. I would reverse the was violated. court that he informed a state defendant a new trial. appeals and order court of down”; “step current counsel to wanted his it, defen- advised the the court allowed but (dis- ANDERSON, H., Justice PAUL a trial lawyer and set get new dant *19 senting). days later. Id. at 450-51. date for 30 Meyer. of Justice join I in the dissent with- on the trial date appeared defendant counsel, trying saying family his out trial court but the representation,

obtain had forfeited

concluded that the defendant proceeded. Id. to counsel

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Jones
Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota
Date Published: Sep 10, 2009
Citation: 772 N.W.2d 496
Docket Number: A07-1168
Court Abbreviation: Minn.
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