STATE OF MINNESOTA, Aрpellant, vs. Paul James Steichen, Respondent.
A24-0097
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
June 17, 2026
Hennesy, J. Dissenting, McKeig, Moore, III, JJ.
Court of Appeals. Filed: June 17, 2026 Office of Appellate Courts
Mary F. Moriarity, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota for appellant.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
S Y L L A B U S
- To satisfy the accuracy requirement for a valid guilty plea, a Norgaard plea, like an Alford plea, requires a strong factual basis sufficient to allow a district court to independently conclude that there is a strong probability that a defendant is guilty of the charge to which they are pleading guilty.
Because the State did not describe the evidence it would present at trial to convict respondent of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, respondent‘s Norgaard plea was not supported by a strong factual basis from which a district court could independently conclude that there was a strong prоbability that respondent was guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
HENNESY, Justice.
The State charged respondent Paul James Steichen with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. After the district court accepted his Norgaard plea1 to fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, Steichen appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that the plea was constitutionally invalid because it was not supported by a strong factual basis. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for Steichen to withdraw the plea, determining that the State had failed to provide an adequate factual basis from which the district court could have concluded that there was a strong probability that Steichen would be found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct at trial. The State petitioned for further review, arguing that the court of appeals erred by requiring
We hold that, to be valid, a Norgaard plea, like an Alford plea, requires a strong factual basis which, at minimum, must include a description of the State‘s evidence that is sufficient for a district court to find that there is a strong probability that a defendant is guilty of the charge to which they are pleading guilty. Based on the record in this case, we conclude that Steichen‘s Norgaard plea was not supported by a strong factual basis because the factual inquiry conducted at Steichen‘s plea hearing did not include any description of the evidence the State would have presented at trial to secure a conviction of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.
FACTS
The State charged respondent Paul James Steichen with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for forcing a vulnerable adult to engage in oral sex with him.
PROSECUTOR: Sir, I understand you—you don‘t recall the date in question, right?
STEICHEN: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. And the evidence you talked about reviewing with your attorney would establish, though, that on June 5th of this year, you were in Richfield, Hennepin County, when you encountered a male with the initials of C.T., and at some point the two of you engaged in sexual penetration. Specifically, you put your penis in his mouth and he either said no or resisted in some way, making that nonconsensual. You understand that that‘s the evidence that the State would present in this case?
STEICHEN: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: All right. And that‘s the evidence that you are, through your Norgaard waiver, are not contesting and accepting as sufficient for the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
STEICHEN: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. I believe that‘s sufficient, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I think it is too. And so we‘ll receive, then, the Norgaard plea document. And at this time, Mr. Steichen, I am finding that you have made a knowing waiver of your trial rights, sir, in this matter, and you have been advised of those rights thoroughly by your lawyer.... In addition, I‘m finding that—that there are sufficient facts that have been averred to support your Norgaard plea of guilty to the amended Count 1 of
criminal sexual conduct in the 5th degree occurring on or about June 5th of 2023. I‘m not going to acсept that plea at this time. Instead, we‘re going to schedule this matter for sentencing.
The district court subsequently accepted Steichen‘s plea and sentenced him to 14 months in prison but stayed the prison sentence conditioned upon his successful completion of three years of probation.
Steichen appealed, arguing to the court of appeals that his Norgaard plea was not valid because it was not supported by a strong factual basis. Relying on its decision in Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12–13 (Minn. App. 2009), the court of appeals stated that an “adequate factual basis” for a Norgaard plea requires two components: “a strong factual basis and the defendant‘s acknowledgment that the evidence would be sufficient for a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Steichen, No. A24-0097, 2024 WL 4927659, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec. 2, 2024) (quoting Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 12–13). These components, the court reasoned, “provide the court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty.” Id. (quoting Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 13). Here, the court of appeаls determined that the record did not provide a basis for it to “conclude that there [was] a strong probability that Steichen would be found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.” Id. at *3. As a result, the court of appeals concluded that Steichen‘s Norgaard plea was invalid and reversed and remanded to allow Steichen to withdraw his plea. Id. at *4. We granted the State‘s petition for review.
We first consider whether a Norgaard plea, like an Alford plea, must be supported by a strong factual basis. We then consider whether Steichen‘s plea meets the applicable standard. A plea‘s validity is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Schwartz, 957 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Minn. 2021).
I.
“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). Here, Steichen challenges only the accuracy of his plea. The purpose of the accuracy requirement “is to ensure that the defendant is in fact substantively culpable for the crime of conviction.” State v. Paulson, 22 N.W.3d 144, 151 (Minn. 2025). Accordingly, it is the plea‘s accuracy that prevents a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious charge than that of which the defendant could be found guilty at trial. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994).
For a guilty plea to be accurate, the district court must ensure that a proper factual basis supports the plea.3 State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007). “In a typical plea, where the defendant admits his or her guilt, an adequate factual basis is usually
There are, however, two types of pleas that allow a defendant to pleаd guilty without admitting the facts or circumstances constituting a crime: Alford4 and Norgaard pleas. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716–17. In an Alford plea, a defendant may plead guilty while maintaining innocence. See Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015); see also Alford, 400 U.S. at 37 (holding that express admission of guilt is not a constitutional requisite to a valid guilty plea and that an individual “may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime“). In a Norgaard plea, a defendant pleads guilty despite claiming
We have held that an Alford plea‘s accuracy is assured where a “strong factual basis and the defendant‘s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction provide the court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty” at trial. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649; see Alford, 400 U.S. at 26–27 (allowing a guilty plea to stand despite defendant‘s refusal to admit committing the acts constituting the crime because the record “contain[ed] strong evidence of actual guilt“). We have not, however, expressly decided whether a Norgaard plea also requires a heightened factual basis to be constitutionally valid. Steichen argues that it does. For the reasons that follow, we agree and explain what this standard requires.
A.
We begin by surveying our prior decisions on Norgaard and Alford pleas. We first recognized that a guilty plea could be valid despite a defendant‘s inability to remember the circumstances of the offense in State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1961). When taking Norgaard‘s guilty plea to second-degree assault, the prosecutor described “the events and circumstances which formed the basis of the information pertaining to the alleged assault.” Id. at 868–69. But when the State asked
[i]f we were to say under the record here that reversible error was committed, we would be ruling in effect that no matter how obvious the crime or how anxious the accused might be to plead guilty, if he said he did not recall what happened, the court should not under any conditions accept such a plea.
Id. at 872. Because Norgaard did not challenge the factual basis in his case, we did not address what constitutes a sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea when a defendant cannot remember committing the offense.
Over 30 years later, in State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717, we observed that although Alford and Norgaard pleas present “two unique situations in which a defendant may plead guilty without unequivocally admitting his or her guilt,” a district court should accept a Norgaard plea with the same caution as an Alford plea and “affirmatively ensure an adequate factual basis.” Id. at 716–17. In Ecker, we considered whеther there was a sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea that was not clearly an Alford or a Norgaard plea. Id. at 716. Ecker pleaded guilty to intentional felony murder, but during his plea colloquy told the court that he could not remember “pulling the trigger, although he remembered going into the gas station and robbing it.” Id. at 715. On appeal, Ecker argued that his plea was inaccurate because he had not acknowledged he had an intent to kill. Id. at 716. We did not determine whether the defendant‘s plea was an Alford or a Norgaard plea
We clarified the accuracy requirement for an Alford plea in State v. Theis, holding that an Alford plea must be supported by both a “strong factual basis and the defendant‘s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction[.]” 742 N.W.2d at 649. We observed that these dual requirements provide the district court “a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of innocence.” Id. But we did not expressly decide whether this heightened factual basis standard should also apply to Norgaard pleas.
For purposes of the accuracy requirement, however, this is a distinction without a difference. In Alford, the United States Supreme Court observed that there was no perceptible “material difference between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. Because “an express admission of guilt” is “not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty,” the Supreme Court concluded that “[a]n individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. (emphasis added). While defendants who enter Alford pleas may maintain their innocence because they are “unwilling” to admit committing the crimes alleged, Alford recognized that some defendants may choose to plead guilty because they are unable to admit the acts constituting a crime. Id.
Here, for example, Steichen professed he was unable—rather than unwilling—to admit to specific facts that satisfied the elements of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. Steichen acknowledged that he was not making any claim that he was innocent, but
First, we did not characterize the plea in Ecker as a Norgaard plea. See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717. Because Ecker claimed both lack of memory and lack of intent, we relied on our cases on both Alford and Norgaard pleas. See id. at 716–17. We observed that while a district court must accept a Norgaard plea, like an Alford plea, “with caution[,] ... Alford, Goulette and Norgaard, and the cases that have followed, allow Ecker to plead guilty without expressing the requisite intent so long as he believed the state‘s evidence was sufficient to convict him.” Id. at 717. As such, our conclusion that there was an adequate factual basis to support Ecker‘s guilty plea did not address whether the factual basis requirement for a valid Norgaard plea is different from the requirement for a valid Alford plea.
Second, while the State is correct that in Ecker we said that “an adequate factual basis” is necessary to ensure a plea‘s accuracy, we did not define what constitutes “an adequate factual basis.” Id. at 716. In fact, we did not explicitly state what constitutes an adequate factual basis for either a Norgaard or an Alford plea until 13 years after Ecker, in Theis, where we stated that an Alford plea must be supported by a “strong factual basis.” 742 N.W.2d at 649. Thus, prior to today, we have not expressly determined the standard for the factual basis required to ensure a Norgaard plea‘s accuracy.
B.
In addition, we hold that to establish a strong factual basis, the State must, at minimum, describe the type of evidence it would present at trial. This is consistent with our discussion in Theis about how the State should establish a strong factual basis. 742 N.W.2d at 649. There we observed that “the better practice” is to discuss the facts with the defendant on the record at the plea hearing:
This discussion may occur through an interrogation of the defendant about the underlying conduct and the evidence that would likely be presented at trial, the introduction at the plea hearing of witness statements or other documents, or the presentation of abbreviated testimony from witnesses likely to testify at trial, or a stipulation by both parties to a factual statement in one or more documents submitted to the court at the plea hearing.
Id. In determining whether there is a strong factual basis for an Alford or a Norgaard plea, a district court is tasked with ensuring that a defendant who enters either plea is protected from “pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This
II.
Having concluded that both Alford and Norgaard pleas must be supported by a strong factual basis, we now consider whether the factual basis for Steichen‘s Norgaard plea meets this requirement.
Steichen pleaded guilty to fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, which requires that (1) the defendant engaged in sexual penetration with the victim, and (2) the sexual penetration occurred without the victim‘s consent.
At his plea hearing, Steichen stated that he had been drunk on the day of the offense and could not remember what happened. The entirety of the factual basis for the plea derives from a single question the prosecutor asked Steichen:
And the evidence you talked about reviewing with your attorney would establish, though, that on June 5th of this year, you were in Richfield,
Hennepin County, when you encountered a male with the initials of C.T., and at some point the two of you engaged in sexual penetration. Specifically, you put your penis in his mouth and he either said no or resisted in some way, making that nonconsensual. You understand that that‘s the evidence that the State would present in this case?
The State did not provide any description of the type of evidence it would offer to show that Steichen engaged in nonconsensual sexual penetration with C.T. Nevertheless, the State argues that this is a sufficient factual basis even under the strong-factual-basis standard.
Neither the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Alford nor ours in Goulette supports the State‘s assertion. The pleas in each of those cases were supported by stronger factual bases than submitted here. In Alford, the United States Supreme Court held there was a strong factual basis for a plea to second-degree murder after multiple witnesses, including a police officer, testified during a “summary presentation” of the State‘s case. Alford, 400 U.S. at 28. Although no eyewitnesses testified, the testimony “indicated that shortly before the killing Alford took his gun from his house, stаted his intention to kill the victim, and returned home with the declaration that he had carried out the killing.” Id. The Court reasoned that when viewing Alford‘s plea “in light of the evidence against him, which substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered,” its validity could not be seriously questioned. Id. at 37–38.
In Goulette, we held that there was a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea where defense counsel “recited in summary form some of the key evidence which the prosecution would have offered ... to prove first-degree murder if the case had gone to
In future similar cases, especially those involving major felonies, a better practice would be the introduction, by the prosecutor, of statements of witnesses or other items from his file which would aid the court in its determination. In appropriate cases, the prosecutor might even consider calling some of the state‘s witnesses for the purpose of giving a shortened version of what their testimony would be were the case to go to trial.
Contrary to the records supporting the defendants’ valid pleas in Alford and Goulette, the factual basis offered to support Steichen‘s plea included no evidence beyond Steichen‘s affirmative answer “yes” to the State‘s question: “[Y]ou put your penis in [the victim‘s] mouth and he either said no or resisted in some way, making that nonconsensual. You understand that that‘s the evidence that the State would present in this case?” While Steichen acknowledged that there was a substantial likelihood that a jury would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct at trial based on his review of the State‘s evidence with his attorney, the single question the prosecutor posed was not strong еvidence of Steichen‘s actual guilt. Steichen‘s acknowledgment amounted to him simply agreeing that the State could
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
STATE OF MINNESOTA, Appellant, vs. Paul James Steichen, Respondent.
A24-0097
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
MCKEIG, Justice (dissenting).
For putting his penis in the mouth of a vulnerable adult, Paul James Steichen was charged with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
The court nonetheless determines that Steichen may withdraw his guilty plea because he claims for the first time on appeal that his plea was inaccurate and therefore invalid. To do so, the court today determines that a valid Norgaard plea requires a heightened factual basis in line with an Alford plea and concludes Steichеn‘s plea was invalid under this heightened standard. But neither our precedent nor the U.S. Supreme Court‘s requires the strong factual basis standard the court adopts today for Norgaard pleas. And, given the well-reasoned basis for treating Norgaard pleas and Alford pleas differently, I disagree with the court‘s decision to adopt that heightened standard for Norgaard pleas. I would thus hold that Steichen‘s plea satisfies the adequate factual basis standard required for Norgaard pleas. I would also hold that Steichen‘s plea meets even the heightened standard reserved for Alford pleas. And I would further clarify that the court‘s newly announced rule does not apply retroactively. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
A.
A constitutionally valid guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). A plea that fails to meet any of these requirements is invalid. Id. The accuracy requirement serves a protective purpose:
For nearly 50 years, Minnesota has recognized three types of guilty pleas: typical pleas, Alford pleas, and Norgaard pleas. See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716-17. In a typical case where a defendant admits guilt, “an adequate factual basis is usually established by questioning the defendant and asking the defendant to explain in [the defendant‘s] own words the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Id. at 716. This approach, however, does not work in “two unique situations in which a defendant may plead guilty without unequivocally admitting [the defendant‘s] guilt“: Alford pleas and Norgaard pleas. Id. at 716-17. In Alford pleas, first adopted by this court in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1977), the defendant “maintains [their] innocence” but “reasonably believes, and the record establishes, the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716; see also Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647. By contrast, in Norgaard pleas, first authorized by this court in State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1961), the defendant “claims a loss of memory, through amnesia or intoxication, regarding the сircumstances of the offense,” and the record “establish[es] that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade the defendant and [the
As the court notes, we determined in Theis that a district court must apply a heightened factual basis standard to Alford pleas. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970)). That is because “[a]n Alford plea is not supported by the defendant‘s admission of guilt, and is actually contradicted by his claim of innocence; precedent therefore requires a strong factual basis for an Alford plea.” Id. We noted that the U.S. Supreme Court held that a “strong factual basis for the plea” was enough to “substantially negate[] [Alford‘s] claim of innocence.” Id.; see Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-38. Thus, we implied, if not held, that the factual basis for an Alford plea must be heightened above the “adequate factual basis” required for other types of pleas because the defendant claims innocence. We then continued that this “strong factual basis and the defendant‘s agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support [the defendant‘s] conviction” together give the court “a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which [the defendant] pleaded guilty, notwithstanding [the defendant‘s] claims of innocence.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. This is the heightened factual basis standard.
The court asserts that the Supreme Court‘s discussion of nolo contendere pleas in Alford supported the strong factual basis standard for Alford pleas and now supports the court‘s new heightened factual basis standard for Norgaard pleas. Supra at 12 n.6
The court also incorrectly contends that in Ecker “we equated” Alford and Norgaard pleas. Supra at 10 (quoting Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716-17). In Ecker, we described both types of pleas as applying in “two unique situations“—unique not only from a typical plea, but also from each other—and explained Alford and Norgaard pleas in two separate paragraphs, including what the record must establish for each type of plea to be accurate. 524 N.W.2d at 716-17 (emphasis added). While we noted that district courts must exercise caution and ensure that adequate factual bases exist when accepting either type of plea, we neither equated the pleas nor suggested that the factual basis required for each plea was the same. That we discussed the plea standards together when applying them in Ecker was not because the plea standards were the same; it was beсause the issue presented in that case was whether a sufficient factual basis for the plea required the defendant to have acknowledged that he intended to kill the victim as part of his guilty plea. Id. at 717. The answer was the same regardless of the type of plea the
The court states that we have not expressly decided the factual basis required to ensure the accuracy of a Norgaard plea, where the defendant does not maintain their innocence. But the answer is readily available in our case law. Under Ecker and Fisher, the record in a Norgaard plea “must establish that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade the defendant and [the defendant‘s] counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716-17; State v. Fisher, 193 N.W.2d 819, 820 (Minn. 1972). And under Lussier and Kelsey, an “adequate factual basis” for a guilty plea exists when there are “sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant‘s conduct falls within the charge to which [defendant] desires to plead guilty.” Lussier, 853 N.W.2d at 154 (citation modified); Kelsey v. State, 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Minn. 1974). In Kelsey, we specifically noted that this holding “is in no way inconsistent with our prior holdings in cases such as State v.
It is a short step, then, to hold that an “adequate factual basis” for a Norgaard plea is one that “establish[es] that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade the defendant and [the defendant‘s] counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged” and “support[s] a conclusion that defendant‘s conduct falls within the charge to which [the defendant] desires to plead guilty.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716-17; Kelsey, 214 N.W.2d at 237. I would take this opportunity to so hold.
This holding would also be consistent with the rationale behind different proper factual basis standards for Norgaard pleas and Alford pleas. To submit a Norgaard plea, the defendant claims to not recall the circumstances surrounding the offense but does not maintain innocence; to submit an Alford plea, the defendant maintains their innocence. See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716-17. As we noted in Theis, a “strong factual basis” is necessary for Alford pleas because of “the inherent conflict in pleading guilty while maintaining innocence.” 742 N.W.2d at 649 (emphasis added). This “inherent conflict” is not present for Norgaard pleas—the defendant does not maintain their innoсence and instead is convinced by the State‘s evidence that “the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716 (emphasis added); see also Fisher, 193 N.W.2d at 820. Because a defendant submitting a Norgaard plea does not
Despite this clear differentiation, the court characterizes the defendant‘s claim of innocence as “a distinction without a difference” between Norgaard and Alford pleas. Supra at 11. To support this assertion, the court cites the Supreme Court‘s observations in Alford that there is no “material difference between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence.” 400 U.S. at 37. The Court also held that a defendant may plead guilty “even if [the defendant] is unwilling or unable to admit [the defendant‘s] participation in the acts constituting the crime.” 400 U.S. at 37. But while we have incorporated similar language in Theis regarding an Alford plea, we have never incorporated this language into our Norgaard cases. Contrast Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647 (noting scenarios where “a defendant could decide that a guilty plea is the best available course оf action despite [the defendant‘s] inability to admit guilt or [the defendant‘s] affirmative belief in [their] innocence“), with Norgaard, 110 N.W.2d 867, and Fisher, 193 N.W.2d 819, and Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712. Additionally, Alford involved a defendant who did not admit to conduct constituting a crime because he maintained he did not commit the crime; the Court was not required to determine whether the defendant could plead guilty despite failing to recall whether he engaged in criminal conduct. 400 U.S. at 27. Thus, to the extent that my colleagues rely on any of the Court‘s statements as applying to a defendant who cannot remember the offense, they are relying on unpersuasive dicta. See State v. Bonnell, 31 N.W.3d 527, 542 & n.15 (Minn. 2026) (noting that a statement in a different Supreme
Furthermore, we recognized Norgaard pleas in 1961, several years before the U.S. Supreme Court recognized Alford pleas. When we later adopted Alford pleas in Goulette in 1977, we expressly stated that it was the “first time” this court was confronted with the issue of whether “a trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused protests that he is innocent.” Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761. We did not cite Norgaard in Goulette. This means that we did not consider lack-of-memory pleas and claim-of-innocence pleas to be the same.
The court now decides that a Norgaard plea and an Alford plea are functionally the same: they both must be supported by the same heightened factual basis. This decision flies in the face of decades of precedent distinguishing Norgaard and Alford pleas based on a well-reasoned rationale to treat them differently. I would hold, consistent with our case law, that an “adequate factual basis” for a Norgaard plea exists when the record “establish[es] that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to persuade the defendant and [the defendant‘s] counsel that the defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged,” and there are “sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant‘s conduct falls within the charge to which [the defendant] desires to plead guilty.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716; Kelsey, 214 N.W.2d at 237. Thus, I dissent.
Also, I would not prescribe a specific procedure for the district court to obtain a factual basis for a Norgaard plea, as the court does. We have long held that for all guilty
B.
I would hold that Steichen‘s Norgaard plea satisfied the adequate factual basis standard that I articulated above. I would also hold that the plea satisfied even the strong factual basis standard that the court now requires.
Steichen reviewed the State‘s evidence with his counsel and, based upon that evidence, believed there was a “substantial likelihood” that he would be found guilty and convicted of fifth-degree criminаl sexual conduct at trial. Accordingly, Steichen and his defense counsel entered his Norgaard plea. The record reflects that the evidence against Steichen persuaded him that he was either guilty or likely to be convicted. The State then confirmed that Steichen agreed that the evidence would present the following facts at trial, “sufficient to prove [the State‘s] case beyond a reasonable doubt“: on June 5, 2023, in Hennepin County, Steichen sexually penetrated C.T. by putting his penis in C.T.‘s mouth, and C.T. “either said no or resisted in some way, making that nonconsensual.” These facts, stated on the record, fulfilled the elements necessary to find Steichen guilty
The plea satisfied both pieces of the adequate factual basis standard. Steichen was persuaded that the State‘s evidence was likely to result in a guilty verdict for fifth-degree criminal sexual assault, and the facts in the record supported a conclusion that Steichen‘s conduct fell within that charge. See Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716; Kelsey, 214 N.W.2d at 237.
Likewise, Steichen‘s plea also met the heightened factual basis standard. The facts constituted a strong factual basis for fifth-degree criminal sexual assault, and Steichen agreed to the evidence‘s sufficiency such that the district court could independently conclude that there was a strong probability that Steichen would be found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual assault at trial. Steichen‘s plea is unlike the defendant‘s plea in Theis, which we held did not establish a strong factual basis. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649-50. In Theis, we held that the defendant‘s Alford plea did not meet this standard because the defendant failed to acknowledge that the evidence “would be sufficient for a jury to find [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 650 (noting that the defendant acknowledged only a “mere ‘risk’ that [the defendant] would be found guilty“). Here, Steichen agreed there was a “substantial likelihood” that he would be found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct at trial. Additionally, the plea colloquy in Theis did not contain any of the facts that the evidence would prove. Id. Here, Steichen agreed that the State would present evidence that he encountered C.T. in Hennepin County, that
C.
The court does not address whether the new rule that it articulates today applies retroactively or prospectively. To avoid an improper application of the rule that would lead to an onslaught of postconviction petitions asserting inaccurate Norgaard pleas, I would specifically note that this holding does not apply retroactively. See State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 72 (Minn. 2002) (expressly applying the new rule of law to that case and prospectively “[g]iven the purposes to be served, the extent of reliance by the parties and courts on previous standards, and the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice,” despite the parties’ apparent lack of briefing or argument on rеtroactive versus prospective application). Generally, a new rule of law applies to “cases pending on direct appeal at the time of the new rule‘s announcement” and “cases arising
I would state explicitly that this general rule of applicability controls here, and that the new heightened factual basis standard for Norgaard pleas applies only to this case, cases pending on direct appeal, and future cases.
* * *
Steichen agreed, on the record, that the State would present evidence showing that Steichen put his penis in C.T.‘s mouth, and C.T. either said no or resisted. Steichen agreed that the State would show that he engaged in nonconsensual sexual penetration, fulfilling the elements of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct under
MOORE, III, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice McKeig.