125 A.3d 354
Me.
2015

STATE of Maine v. Daniel H. PELLETIER

Docket No. Oxf-15-28

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Decided: Oct. 13, 2015

2015 ME 129 | 126 A.3d 1147

Submitted on Briefs: Sept. 28, 2015.

M.R.S. § 1901 (2014), C.L. contends that the court misapplied the standard for determining de facto parenthood by failing to take into account the evidence of his involvement as a parent during the years of A.L.‘s life that preceded the child protection proceeding. He further argues that “exceptional circumstances” warrant a determination of de facto parenthood.

[¶ 20] We review the court‘s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 9, 90 A.3d 1169. To obtain parental rights as a de facto parent, an individual must show that (1) “he or she has undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child‘s life,” and (2) “there are exceptional circumstances sufficient to allow the court to interfere with the legal or adoptive parent‘s rights.” Id. ¶ 27 (quotation marks omitted).4

[¶ 21] Here, the court found that C.L. failed to meet both parts of this test. With respect to the first prong, the court found that C.L. did not occupy a responsible parental role with respect to A.L. Specifically, the court found that he had failed and refused to set necessary limits to assist A.L. at school, had not provided adequate housing or food, had not enabled A.L. to maintain basic hygiene, and had declined to stop smoking in the home where A.L. resided with him. Although most of these findings concern C.L.‘s most recent conduct, they support the court‘s determination that C.L. had failed, as of the time of hearing, to undertake a “permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child‘s life.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). We therefore affirm the court‘s determination that he failed to meet the first required element for establishing de facto parenthood.

[¶ 22] The creation by a court of an additional, legally recognized parental relationship with a child permanently alters the relationships among the child and the other parents. Introducing another adult into the group of adults who will care for and make decisions about the child should not occur in instances where that adult is unable to act as a responsible parent. C.L.‘s relationship with A.L. does not “entitle” him to de facto parenthood if he cannot, or will not, undertake a permanent responsible parental role in her life.

[¶ 23] Because we affirm the court‘s finding that C.L. failed to establish the first element of de facto parenthood, we do not reach or review the court‘s finding that C.L. failed to satisfy the second necessary element by establishing “exceptional circumstances” sufficient to allow the court to interfere with the legal parents’ rights. Id. Nor is it necessary for us to reach the biological father‘s equitable arguments against a determination that C.L. is a de facto parent.

The entry is:

Appeal from child protection order dismissed. Judgment in family matter affirmed.

Daniel H. Pelletier Jr., appellant pro se.

Andrew S. Robinson, District Attorney, and Joseph M. O‘Connor, Asst. Dist. Atty., Office of the District Attorney, South Paris, for appellee state of Maine.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

[¶ 1] Daniel H. Pelletier was summonsed on February 16, 2014, and charged with operating while his license was suspended or revoked (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A), (D) (2014), and operating after his vehicle registration was suspended (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2417 (2014). After a nonjury trial, the trial court (Oxford County, Clifford, J.) found Pelletier guilty of operating while license suspended or revoked,1 and sentenced him to thirty days in jail with all but three days suspended, and the mandatory minimum $500 fine. See 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(3)(B) (2014).

[¶ 2] Pelletier has not denied that he was driving or that his license was suspended. Instead, the only issues on appeal are whether the court below had jurisdiction to enforce the laws of the State of Maine against Pelletier and whether the requirement that each driver hold a valid driver‘s license violates the United States Constitution.

[¶ 3] Because these arguments, although frivolous, are raised with some regularity, we write to provide an unambiguous declaration that Maine‘s courts have jurisdiction to enforce Maine‘s laws against those physically present within the state‘s geographic bounds and to reaffirm the constitutionality of Maine‘s law requiring each driver to hold a valid driver‘s license.

A. Jurisdiction of Maine‘s Courts

[¶ 4] Pelletier contends that the “State of Maine” is a legal fiction,2 and his mere physical presence within certain latitudinal and longitudinal bounds does not constitute presence “within the State of Maine” for the purpose of rendering him subject to Maine‘s laws.

[¶ 5] We have addressed this issue previously and summarily dismissed the contention that Maine‘s courts lack jurisdiction to enforce Maine‘s laws against those within the geographic boundaries of the State. See State v. Pelletier, 587 A.2d 1100, 1101 (Me.1991).3 Pelletier‘s argument is contrary to jurisdictional principles as old as the State itself: “[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877) (emphasis added).4 Here, the United States Supreme Court makes clear that state jurisdiction over an individual extends to those present within the physical bounds of the state.

B. Constitutionality of Driver‘s Licenses

[¶ 6] Pelletier further contends that Maine‘s law requiring each driver to hold a valid driver‘s license is facially unconstitutional, as it restricts the exercise of a purported fundamental right to travel, guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

[¶ 7] The Supreme Court settled this point in 1915: “[A state] may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers. . . . This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the States and essential to the preservation of the health, safety and comfort of their citizens.” Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385 (1915).5 Likewise, we held in 1909 that the State may, as a valid exercise of its police power, place limitations on the operation of motor vehicles on the State‘s roads. State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 66, 75 A. 295, 297 (1909).

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Notes

1
1. The operating after registration suspended charge was dismissed.
2
2. According to Pelletier, “[t]he phrase State of Maine appears to be not much more than a dba or pseudonym for lawyers and police officers.”
3
3. The defendant in the 1991 appeal was named Leon A. Pelletier.
4
4. This common-law test will soon be superseded because the Legislature adopted the Act to Update Maine‘s Family Law. See P.L. 2015, ch. 296, § A-1 (adopting the Maine Parentage Act, which includes a subchapter regarding de facto parentage) (effective July 1, 2016) (to be codified, in relevant part, at 19-A M.R.S. § 1891). 4. Although subsequent opinions have limited Pennoyer‘s effect in many respects, the existence of in personam jurisdiction over those physically present in the forum state is not one of them. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977); Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).
5
5. Hendrick v. Maryland addresses the constitutionality of driver‘s licenses as a limitation on the right to interstate travel. 235 U.S. at 624. Without speculating as to whether such a right exists, we hold also that driver‘s licenses are a valid limitation on the right to intrastate travel, to the extent that such a right is protected under the U.S. Constitution. See Showtime Entm‘t, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 77 n. 10 (1st Cir.2014).
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