STATE of Maine v. Adam D. GERRY
Docket: Wal-16-17
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
November 8, 2016
Corrected: November 17, 2016; Submitted On Briefs: October 13, 2016; 2016 ME 163
106 A.3d 1134 | 889 A.2d 297
[w]e review the court‘s factual findings for clear error and its ultimate conclusion regarding the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the trial court‘s lens. Evidence is sufficient to affirm an order terminating parental rights when a review of the entire record demonstrates that the trial court rationally could have found clear and convincing evidence in that record tо support the necessary factual findings as to the bases for termination.
In re R.M., 2015 ME 38, ¶ 7, 114 A.3d 212 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 17] Here, the court‘s factual findings recited supra have support in the record and are not clearly erroneous. See State v. Lowden, 2014 ME 142, ¶ 8, 106 A.3d 1134. As to the mother, the court found that she had the opportunity to utilize numerous services offered by the Department in an effort to reunify with the children; her cooperation with and participation in those services was insufficient, and she was unwilling to end her relationship with the father, which the court found to be a compelling factor. As to the father, the court found “no еvidence he ha[d] engaged in any services designed to address the jeopardy identified by this Court,” and that he had abandoned the children, which is sufficient, standing alone, to establish unfitness.
[¶ 18] From those facts and legal authorities, the court could rationally find by clear and convincing evidence thаt both parents were unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy or to take responsibility for them; that neither of those circumstances is likely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children‘s needs; that the father abandoned the children; and that termination of the parents’ rights is in the children‘s best interest. See
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
William B. Entwisle, Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosеcutorial District VI, Belfast, for appellee State of Maine
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶ 1] Adam D. Gerry appeals from the judgment of the trial court (Waldo County, Worth, J.) finding him guilty of operating under the influence (Class D),
[¶ 2] In its order denying the motion to suppress, the court found the following facts, which are supported by the record reviewed in the light most favorable to the court‘s order. See State v. Kierstead, 2015 ME 45, ¶ 2, 114 A.3d 984.
[¶ 3] On April 18, 2015, an officer of the Belfast Police Department was on patrol in Belfast. At approximately 1:00 a.m., the officer observed a vehicle turn off of Main Street and into the parking lot оf a drug store, which had been closed for several hours. The vehicle came to a stop and its lights were turned off. The officer thought it was unusual, at that hour, for a vehicle to pull into that parking lot, park, and have its lights turned off. Thinking that there may be a burglary in progress, аnd wanting to investigate further, the officer proceeded up the street a short distance, turned around, and returned to the parking lot.
[¶ 4] Upon returning to the parking lot, the officer drove around the back side of the drug store looking for anything unusual. When he did not observe anything unusual behind the store, he continued around the building to where the vehicle he had seen was parked. The officer could not see anyone inside the vehicle, so he used his spotlight to illuminate the car, at which time Gerry, who apparently had been reсlined in his seat, sat up so that he was visible.
[¶ 5] At that point, the officer approached Gerry and asked him if he was “all right and what he was doing.” Once the officer communicated with Gerry, he could smell alcohol coming from him. Due to the smell of alcohol, the offiсer‘s inquiry and investigation shifted to an investigation of possible operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants.
[¶ 6] Gerry was charged with operating under the influence pursuant to
[¶ 7] A testimonial hearing on the motion was held on September 2, 2015. For purposes of the motion to supрress, the State conceded that the officer‘s interaction with Gerry constituted a seizure.
[¶ 8] In a written order, the court denied Gerry‘s motion. The court found that the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal conduct from his observation of Gerry pulling into the parking lot of a closed business in the middle of the night, parking, and shutting off his vehicle‘s lights. The court further found that the officer‘s investigation of the back of the drug store and observation of the vehicle with no sign of an occupant substantiated his stated cоncern. Lastly, the court found that the subsequent observation of Gerry in the vehicle justified a brief inquiry with Gerry.
[¶ 9] On January 12, 2016, Gerry entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of operating under the influence. See
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶ 10] Gerry argues that his detention was not supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion, and therefore constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.1 He argues that the officer
[¶ 11] When reviewing a trial court‘s deniаl of a motion to suppress, we review the findings of fact by the trial court for clear error and review its conclusions of law de novo. Kierstead, 2015 ME 45, ¶ 14, 114 A.3d 984. We “will uphold the denial of a motion to suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court‘s decision.” Id.
[¶ 12] The protections of the Fourth Amendment are implicated when “[a]n encounter between a member of law enforcement and a citizen ... constitutes a seizure of ... the citizen.” State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, ¶ 10, 759 A.2d 1085. A law enforcement officer can permissibly detain a citizеn when “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Dulac, 600 A.2d 1121, 1122 (Me. 1992) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); see also State v. LaPlante, 2011 ME 85, ¶ 8, 26 A.3d 337 (“In almost all circumstances, a warrantless seizure is unreasonable in the absence of an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal conduct has taken place, is occurring, or will imminently occur.“). When the initial justification for a stop has evaporated, a law enforcement officer is not precluded from making further investigation based on facts obtained through the initial lawful contact. See State v. Huether, 2000 ME 59, ¶¶ 6-8, 748 A.2d 993.
[¶ 13] Gerry argues that the officer could not have harbored a reasonable articulable suspicion that a burglary was taking place or about to take place once he found Gerry aslеep in his car. The officer, however, never stated that he found Gerry sleeping, only that he did not see anyone in the car until he used his spotlight to illuminate the vehicle and then saw Gerry‘s head pop up from a reclined seat. As this occurred in the course of legitimately investigating whether a burglary may be occurring or was about to occur, asking Gerry what he was doing and if he was “all right” was a minimal intrusion on his Fourth Amendment rights. See State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (noting that a request to see a drivers license was a “minimal further intrusion” and did not require a reasonable articulable suspicion, so long as the initial stop was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion).
[¶ 14] In the circumstances of this case, the officer‘s questions were appropriate, even if the officer no longer suspected a burglary might be taking place. Hill, 606 A.2d at 794-95 (observing that although the justification for the initial detention had evaporated, an officer was justified in prolonging a detention in a way that created only a “minimal further intrusion” into the detained person‘s liberty interests, because there wаs a “significant State interest“; see also Gulick, 2000 ME 170, ¶¶ 19-20, 759 A.2d 1085; cf. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614-15, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (stating that “a traffic stop can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission of issuing a warning ticket,” but that the “mission” of a traffic stop includes making “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop“).
[¶ 16] The trial court found that the facts from State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, 759 A.2d 1085, were “very similar” to the facts of this case, and relied on that opinion in denying Gerry‘s motion to suppress. Gerry argues that unlike Gulick, the officer here had no concern for safety, and further contends that the opinion says nothing about a suspicion of wrongdoing being sufficient grounds for а reasonable articulable suspicion.
[¶ 17] Although there may have been no safety concern here, the assertion about wrongdoing ignores what may have been the officer‘s duty to at least check on any vehicle found in similar circumstances in the early morning hours. As we stated in Gulick, “[h]aving observed the car pull into the parking lot of a closed emergency medical care facility at almost three o‘clock in the morning, any prudent officer would have been justified in assuring that the occupants did not have a medical or other emergency or that illegal activity was not afoot.” Gulick, 2000 ME 170, ¶ 18, 759 A.2d 1085 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). We further stated that under those circumstances, an officer‘s failure to “investigate ... [the defendant‘s] presence there, and obtain identificatiоn, would have constituted a serious error in judgment.” Id. We ultimately held that “a detention related to a request ... that the motor vehicle operator demonstrate that the operator is licensed is not an unreasonable intrusion when the officer‘s initial contact with the operator is based on reasonable and articulable facts of a concern for safety or wrongdoing, whether or not the initial contact itself constituted a seizure.” Id. ¶ 21 (emphasis in original).
[¶ 18] Given that the drug store had been closed for several hours, and suspecting that a burglary may be afoot, the officer was justified in briefly detaining Gerry to ask if he was all right and to inquire as to his purpose in being there.3 The court was correct in determining that Gulick controlled.4
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.