STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CALVIN LEWIS (Parish of Jefferson)
No. 2017-OK-0081
Supreme Court of Louisiana
October 18, 2017
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #050 FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 18th day of October, 2017, are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2017-OK-0081 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CALVIN LEWIS (Parish of Jefferson)
Finding the evidence sufficient, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, for the trial court to reasonably conclude defendant operated his vehicle while intoxicated until it stalled, we reverse the court of appeal and reinstate defendant‘s conviction and sentence.
REVERSED
STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS CALVIN LEWIS
No. 2017-OK-0081
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
10/18/17
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL FIFTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON
PER CURIAM
On March 27, 2015, a Jefferson Parish Sheriff‘s deputy encountered a truck stopped in the middle of the roadway late at night. He found defendant inside attempting to restart the truck. Defendant, who smelled of alcohol and whose speech was slurred, explained that the truck had just stalled and would not restart. The deputy noticed that the truck‘s engine was still quite warm when he attempted to restart it with jumper cables. The truck could not be restarted, however, and was
When defendant got out of the truck, he leaned on it to steady himself. Defendant was arrested after he failed field sobriety tests. At the Westwego Police Department, defendant registered a blood alcohol level of 0.19. After he was Mirandized, defendant claimed he drank one beer several hours earlier in the afternoon.
Defendant was charged with misdemeanor first-offense driving while intoxicated,
In a split decision, the court of appeal reversed defendant‘s conviction and sentence. State v. Lewis, 16-0614 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/19/16) (unpub‘d). While recognizing that the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant was intoxicated, the majority of the panel found the circumstantial evidence insufficient to exclude the reasonable hypothesis of innocence advanced by defendant at trial, i.e., that he became intoxicated by drinking Wild Irish Rose after the vehicle stalled. In addition, the majority of the panel found that, although defendant was intoxicated when he repeatedly turned the key in the ignition, this did not constitute operation of the vehicle within the meaning of
Judge Gravois dissented, finding that defendant operated the vehicle within the meaning of
Under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original), “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
Here, the court of appeal correctly found the evidence of defendant‘s intoxication to be clear. Although defendant could have consumed a half pint of Wild Irish Rose after his vehicle stalled, that hypothesis, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution—including the deputy‘s observation of the warm engine, defendant‘s level of intoxication in comparison to the quantity of alcohol he claimed to consume, and his changed version of events between the night of the arrest and trial—is not so reasonable that a rational factfinder could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant operated his vehicle while intoxicated until it stalled.
To “operate” a vehicle in Louisiana, a person must exercise or have exercised “some control or manipulation over the vehicle, such as steering, backing, or any physical handling of the controls for the purpose of putting the car in motion.” State v. Rossi, 98-1253, p. 1 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/14/99), 734 So.2d 102, 102-03. It is not necessary that the actions have any effect or cause the vehicle to move. See State v. Jones, 97-1687, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/15/98), 714 So.2d 819, 821 (“operating” shown when deputy awoke a drunken driver, asleep at the wheel of a car parked in a convenience store parking lot with its engine running, and the driver revved the motor and tried to shift); State v. Brister, 514 So.2d 205, 207 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1987) (“The term ‘operate’ includes merely controlling the vehicle. Doing anything with regard to the mechanism of a motor vehicle, whether it has any effect on the engine or not, is also included in the term ‘operate.‘“).
While the question of whether defendant‘s attempts to start a vehicle that could not be started while he was intoxicated constituted operating the vehicle in the context of
REVERSED