State of Louisiana v. Calvin Lewis, 236 So. 3d 1197

Late-night stop: Jefferson Parish deputy found Calvin Lewis in a truck stalled in the roadway; Lewis was inside attempting to restart the vehicle.
Signs of intoxication: Deputy observed slurred speech, alcohol odor, and Lewis leaned on the truck to steady himself; no open containers found. Lewis registered a BAC of 0.19 at the police station. Lewis claimed he drank one beer earlier and later testified he drank a half-pint of Wild Irish Rose after the truck stalled.
Vehicle condition: Deputy noted the engine was still very warm when he tried to restart it with jumper cables, but the truck would not restart and was towed.
Trial result: Trial court convicted Lewis of first-offense DWI (La.R.S. 14:98) and sentenced him to short jail time suspended, in-home incarceration, and probation.
Court of appeal: Majority reversed, concluding circumstantial evidence did not exclude reasonable hypothesis that Lewis drank after the stall; also questioned whether attempted restarts of a non-starting vehicle constituted "operation." Dissent would have upheld conviction.
Supreme Court ruling: Viewing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution under Jackson v. Virginia, the Court found sufficient evidence that Lewis operated the vehicle while intoxicated until it stalled and reinstated conviction and sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether evidence excluded reasonable hypothesis that defendant drank after the vehicle stalled	State: Deputy’s observations (warm engine, level of intoxication, inconsistent testimony) support conviction for operating while intoxicated until stall	Lewis: He drank a half-pint of fortified wine after the vehicle stalled; thus he was not intoxicated while operating	Held: Viewing evidence favorably to prosecution, reasonable trier of fact could reject post-stall drinking hypothesis; conviction reinstated
Whether attempting to start a vehicle that cannot be started constitutes "operate" under La.R.S. 14:98	State: Operating includes control or manipulation of vehicle controls even if vehicle does not move	Lewis: Jurisprudence from other jurisdictions indicates inability to place vehicle in motion may preclude "operation" finding	Held: Court deemed unnecessary to resolve legal question because trial court reasonably found actual driving before stall; prior authority suggests manipulation suffices but not decided here

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency review under due process)
State v. Morris, 414 So.2d 320 (circumstantial-evidence sufficiency standard in Louisiana)
State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676 (evaluation of alternative hypotheses in circumstantial-evidence cases)
State v. Rossi, 734 So.2d 102 (definition of "operate" as exercising control or manipulation of vehicle)
State v. Jones, 714 So.2d 819 (action with vehicle controls constitutes operating even if vehicle does not move)
State v. Brister, 514 So.2d 205 ("operate" includes controlling vehicle mechanism regardless of effect)