STATE OF IOWA, Appellant, vs. LISA RENAE MAJERES, Appellee.
No. 88 / 05-0290
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Filed September 15, 2006
On rеview from the Iowa Court of Appeals. Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Robert J. Dull, District Associate Judge.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, Darin J. Raymond, County Attorney, and Amy K. Oetken, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Timothy J. Kramer of Waagmeester Law Office, P.L.C., Rock Rapids, for appellee.
The district court held the State could not use an uncounseled guilty plea to a prior misdemeanor to enhance a subsequent offense to operating while intoxicated (OWI), third offense where the court imposed incarceration as part of its sentence on the prior offense without an in-court colloquy. Our court of appeals reversed the district court‘s ruling. Because the defendant‘s written guilty plea in the prior proceeding met the requirements of the Sixth Amendment to thе United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa constitution, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for furthеr proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A Le Mars police officer stopped a vehicle Lisa Renae Majeres was driving after observing her commit multiple traffic infractions. After failing sevеral field sobriety tests, she was arrested and taken to jail. There Majeres provided a breath sample revealing a breath alcohol concentration of .236. The State charged Majеres with OWI, third offense, a class “D” felony.
Majeres had previously been convicted of OWI, first offense, in March 2000 in Woodbury County and OWI, second offense, in November 2001 in Sioux County. She had an attorney in connection with her guilty plea to the Woodbury County offense. The Sioux County offense was an aggravated misdemeanor. Instead of retaining an attorney for the Sioux County offense, she signed a plea agreement and written plea of guilty at the county attorney‘s office.
The written plea of guilty stated Majeres acknowledged the charge against her as OWI, second offense; her right to counsel; her right to plead
In this case, Majeres claims the State cannot use the uncounseled Sioux County offense for which she was incarcerated to enhance the present charge to OWI, third offense. The district court agreed with Majeres’ claim.
The State filed a notice of appeal. We treated the notiсe as an application for discretionary review and granted the application. We transferred the case to our court of appeals. Our court of appeals reversed the district court‘s ruling. We granted Majeres’ application for further review.
II. Issue.
It has previously been determined under the federal constitution that a court may use prior uncounseled misdemeanоr convictions where no prison terms are imposed to enhance a subsequent conviction. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745, 755 (1994). We have found the Iowa constitution to be in line with the federal constitution in this respect. State v. Allen, 690 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Iowa 2005). We have not decided if a court, in order to enhance a subsequent conviction, may use prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions where the court imposed incarceration as part of its sentence without an in-court colloquy. The State raises this issue in its appeal.
This appeal implicates constitutional claims under the state and federal constitutions. Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 687; State v. Moe, 379 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Iowa 1985). We usually review constitutional claims de novo. Allen, 690 N.W.2d at 687. However, where there is no factual dispute and the only issue is whether a court may constitutionally use a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance a subsequent crime, our review is for the correction of errors at law. Id.
IV. Analysis.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”
At all critical stages оf the criminal process, the Sixth Amendment affords an accused facing incarceration the right to counsel. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80-81, 124 S. Ct. 1379, 1383, 158 L. Ed. 2d 209, 215 (2004). Entry of a guilty plea, regardless of whether the plea is to a misdemeanor or a fеlony charge, “ranks as a ‘critical stage’ at which the right to counsel adheres.” Id. at 81, 124 S. Ct. at 1383, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 215. Although a defendant has such a right to counsel, a defendant can choose to waive the right to counsel. Id. at 87, 124 S. Ct. at 1387, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 219-20. A waivеr of the right to counsel requires that a defendant do so knowingly and
Accordingly, a prior uncounseled guilty plea to a misdemeanor charge where the court imposed incarceration as part of its sentence can be used to enhance a subsequent offense if the defendant knowingly and intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances waived the right to counsel in the prior proceeding. Thus, the determinative factor in this appeal is whether Majeres knowingly and intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances waived the right to counsel in the Sioux County procеeding. It is the defendant‘s burden to prove he or she did not competently and intelligently waive the right to counsel when collaterally attacking a prior uncounseled conviction. Id. at 92, 124 S. Ct. at 1390, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 223; see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31, 113 S. Ct. 517, 524, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391, 405 (1992) (stating the proof burden is on the defendant in view of “the presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments“).
When a defendant waives the right to counsel and enters a plea of guilty, the Sixth Amendment is satisfied by the trial court infоrming the defendant “of the nature of the charges against [the defendant], of [the defendant‘s] right to be counseled regarding his [or her] plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.” Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81, 124 S. Ct. at 1383, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 216. The information a defendant needs to waive counsel intelligently depends on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case. Id. at 88, 124 S. Ct. at 1387, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 220.
Majeres failed to meet her burden of proving she did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive her right to counsel in the Sioux County proceeding. In the present case, Majeres testified she did not have the money for an attorney and decided not to apply for court-appointed counsel in the Sioux County рroceeding. When questioned why she did not apply for court-appointed counsel, she responded, “I didn‘t feel I wanted one or needed one.” Prior to entering her plea of guilty in that case, Majeres
Consequently, the district court may use Majeres’ uncounseled guilty plea to the OWI, second offense, in Sioux County to enhance the offense in this case, even though the court imposed incarceration as part of its sentence without an in-court сolloquy.
V. Conclusion and Disposition.
The defendant‘s written guilty plea in the prior proceeding met the requirements of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa constitution. Accordingly, the priоr uncounseled plea to a misdemeanor that resulted in incarceration may be used to enhance the offense in the present criminal proceeding. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.