STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Patrick Ryan NICOLETTO, Appellant.
No. 12-1862.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
April 11, 2014.
845 N.W.2d 421
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, until withdrawal, then Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorneys General, Rick L. Lynch, County Attorney, for appellee.
APPEL, Justice.
A jury convicted the defendant, a worker at a local pipe manufacturer who coached high school basketball pursuant to a coaching authorization but was not a licensed teacher, of sexual exploitation by a school employee in violation of
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
A reasonable jury could have found the following facts. Patrick Nicoletto worked as a night employee at a local pipe manufacturer. He also entered into contracts with the Davis County Community School District to be an assistant high school girls’ basketball coach during the 2007 to 2008 and 2008 to 2009 school years. The first contract, dated August 29, 2007, stated Nicoletto‘s term as coach would commence November 5 of that year and include “90 days of service and such other time as may be assigned to coach postseason tournaments or other related duties.” The second contract, dated March 25, 2008, contained the same language, except it stated Nicoletto‘s coaching term would commence November 4 of that year. Under the contracts, the State paid Nicoletto $1940.40 per year. As a condition of payment for his coaching services, Nicoletto was contractually required to obtain either a teaching certificate with a coaching endorsement or a coaching authorization. Because he is not a teacher, Nicoletto obtained a coaching authorization. In addition to basketball, Nicoletto coached high school baseball for Davis County.
Sometime during 2008, Nicoletto invited S.L. to his house. While at first Nicoletto and S.L. engaged in physical intimacy short of sexual intercourse, they eventually engaged in sexual intercourse every week or two at Nicoletto‘s home.
Nicoletto and S.L. took steps to conceal their relationship. For instance, S.L. would park her vehicle behind Nicoletto‘s house or park at a nearby park and wait for Nicoletto to pick her up. S.L. often informed her parents she was staying at the homes of various friends. Other times, S.L. would spend the night at a motel owned by her aunt and uncle and Nicoletto would pick her up. The relationship continued throughout the summer, at times during which S.L. would participate in organized basketball scrimmages against other high schools. Nicoletto was present at these scrimmages.
When S.L.‘s senior year began in the fall, her school schedule did not require her to be at school until 10:00 a.m. In the mornings, S.L. would go to Nicoletto‘s house to meet him after he arrived home from work. At some point near the beginning of the fall semester, the school principal became concerned about the possible relationship between Nicoletto and S.L. and telephoned Nicoletto to ask about it. Several weeks later, the principal called S.L. into his office to discuss the matter. S.L. denied existence of the relationship. Nicoletto ended the relationship with S.L. in mid-September.
When the new basketball season started, S.L. and Nicoletto discussed how to keep their relationship from the rest of the team. By January or February 2009, S.L. learned Nicoletto was experiencing relationship difficulties with another woman whom he was dating at the time. Nicoletto had also moved by this time, and when S.L. went to see his new house, they engaged in intimacy, which may have included intercourse, once more.
The State charged Nicoletto with sexual exploitation by a school employee in violation of
II. Issues.
On appeal, Nicoletto raises a number of challenges. Among other things, Nicoletto argues that because he was not a school employee as that term is used under
III. Scope of Review.
We review issues of statutory interpretation and application for correction of errors at law. E.g., State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 2013); State v. Gonzalez, 718 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Iowa 2006); State v. McCoy, 618 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 2000).
IV. Discussion.
A. Statutory Framework.
The sexual exploitation statute does not contain a definition of “school employee.” Instead, the sexual exploitation statute provides that “school employee’ means a practitioner as defined in section 272.1.”
Iowa Code chapter 272 pertains to the board of educational examiners.
The State concedes Nicoletto was not an administrator, teacher, or holder of a statement of professional recognition. It claims, however, Nicoletto was an “other licensed professional” under
“License” means the authority that is given to allow a person to legally serve as a practitioner, a school, an institution, or a course of study to legally offer professional development programs, other than those programs offered by practitioner preparation schools, institutions, courses of study, or area education agencies. A license is the exclusive authority to perform these functions.
Id. § 272.1(5) .
B. Positions of the Parties.
1. The State. The State centers its claim that Nicoletto is a licensed professional on definitions of “license” and “professional.” The State points to the definition of “license” in
The State then points to a dictionary‘s definition of “professional” as “one with sufficient authority of practical experience in an area of knowledge or endeavor to resemble a professional.” See Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 1811 (unabr. ed.2002) [hereinafter Webster‘s]. The State argues one who holds a coaching authorization is a professional under this definition because he or she is authorized to act in a capacity regulated by statute and must have successfully completed certain courses. The State also maintains the holder of a coaching authorization must complete special training on topics not within the scope of common knowledge, which qualifies the holder of a coaching authorization as a professional.
As to the requirement of
The State then connects the dots, arguing that because Nicoletto is a licensed professional and therefore a practitioner under
2. Nicoletto. Nicoletto generally argues he is not a licensed professional within the meaning of the statute. He contends that not every person employed by a school district is subject to prosecution for sexual exploitation of a student under
Nicoletto also maintains the legislature has recognized the difference between those holding coaching authorizations and those who are licensed school employees. In particular, Nicoletto points to
Turning to definitions of “license” and “professional,” Nicoletto asserts that while the definition of license in
Further, like the State, Nicoletto provides definitions of professional, but focuses on those defining the word to refer to someone with specialized training after years of academic preparation, such as medicine or the law. Nicoletto cites thirty-two professions for which the legislature has established licensing boards, and he notes coaching is not among them. See
Nicoletto points to the absurdities that could arise from the State‘s interpretation. If coaches are covered by the sexual exploitation statute, he notes, an eighteen-year-old assistant coach holding a coaching authorization could be prosecuted for kissing an eighteen-year-old student even if the coach was also a student or had recently graduated from the school. He further notes the same eighteen-year-old coach would not be subject to criminal liability for the same conduct if he coached the same student in a local community league or if the eighteen-year-old coach was a volunteer.
Finally, Nicoletto generally argues a coach is not one who provides educational assistance to students. He argues the reason teachers must have a separate coaching endorsement is that interscholastic athletics are not part of the educational curriculum. Nicoletto cites
C. Discussion.
When interpreting a statute, we begin with the words used in the statute. See, e.g., State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Iowa 2011); State v. Kidd, 562 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Iowa 1997). “To ascertain the meaning of the statutory language, we consider the context of the provision at issue and strive to interpret it in a manner consistent with the statute as an integrated whole.” State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Griffin Pipe Prods. Co. v. Guarino, 663 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Iowa 2003)). When the express terms of a statute are unambiguous, we may not search for meaning beyond those terms. E.g., Hearn, 797 N.W.2d at 583; State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998). Thus we “may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a statute” under the pretext of construction. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004). “In the absence of a legisla-
In this case, we are called upon to interpret a criminal statute. In interpreting a criminal statute, “provisions establishing the scope of criminal liability are to be strictly construed with doubts resolved therein in favor of the accused.” Hearn, 797 N.W.2d at 583; see also, e.g., State v. Allen, 708 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Iowa 2006); State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1999); State v. Gorman, 464 N.W.2d 122, 123 (Iowa 1990); Knott v. Rawlings, 250 Iowa 892, 895, 96 N.W.2d 900, 901 (1959).
Further, as recently noted by Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014), a case in which the Supreme Court strictly construed a federal statute to preclude imposition of a penalty enhancement, “[t]he role of [a court] is to apply the statute as it is written—even if we think some other approach might ‘accor[d] with good policy.‘“” 571 U.S. at 218, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715, 727-28 (2014) (quoting Comm‘r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 252, 116 S.Ct. 647, 656, 133 L.Ed.2d 611, 628 (1996)); see also id. at 218, 134 S.Ct. at 892, 187 L.Ed.2d at 728 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that “‘in the interpretation of a criminal statute subject to the rule of lenity,’ where there is room for debate, one should not choose the construction ‘that disfavors the defendant‘” (quoting id. at 216, 134 S.Ct. at 891, 187 L.Ed.2d at 726 (majority opinion))). We have repeatedly expressed a similar view. See Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1, 1 (Iowa 2011) (“Ours not to reason why, ours but to read, and apply.” (quoting Holland v. State, 253 Iowa 1006, 1011, 115 N.W.2d 161, 164 (1962))); Gorman, 464 N.W.2d at 123 (“We only concern ourselves with what the legislature said rather than what it should have said or might have said.“); State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652, 656-57 (Iowa 1973) (“It is not our function to rewrite the statute. If changes in the law are desirable from a policy, administrative, or practical standpoint, it is for the legislature to enact them, not for the court to incorporate them by interpretation.” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)).
Against the backdrop of these principles of statutory interpretation, we begin our analysis by considering the meaning of the term “licensed professional” and whether a person holding a coaching authorization falls within its meaning. We do not believe the ordinary meaning of the term “licensed professional” includes a person who merely holds a coaching authorization under
Persons holding coaching authorizations may be as young as eighteen, lack secondary education, have only a minimum of training, and often conduct their coaching as an avocation apart from their full-time jobs. To apply the term “licensed professional” to Nicoletto, who worked the night shift at a pipe manufacturer and received a very small stipend for his coaching services, would not comport with our longstanding rule of narrowly construing criminal statutes. See, e.g., Hearn, 797 N.W.2d at 583; Allen, 708 N.W.2d at 366; Schultz, 604 N.W.2d at 62. Under the State‘s interpretation, an eighteen-year-old who recently graduated from high school and who obtained a coaching authorization could be considered a licensed professional
Our caselaw is generally consistent with the thrust of the dictionary definitions. In State v. Winneshiek Co-op. Burial Ass‘n, 237 Iowa 556, 561, 22 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1946), we held that for purposes of a licensing statute, there was a distinction between a license to engage in a “profession” and a license to engage in “trade or business.” We concluded that undertakers were not professionals even though they were required to be registered by the board of health and pass an examination, and that instead undertakers engaged in a business. Id. at 561, 22 N.W.2d at 803-04. We observed the word profession implied “professed attainments in special knowledge, as distinguished from mere skill.” Id. at 561, 22 N.W.2d at 803 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in Halverson v. Lincoln Commodities, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Iowa 1980), we noted that a profession “requires more than mere training.” We further noted that the word profession “presupposes special mental and other attainments, special discipline and a liberal education, or its equivalent” and that a profession primarily involved “furnishing for others a needed faculty which they cannot provide, at least as well, for themselves.” Id. at 523. We think the definitions in the dictionaries and in our caselaw strongly suggest that one merely holding a coaching authorization should not be considered a licensed professional under
Aside from the broad definitional analysis, there is at least one more technical reason why a person holding a coaching authorization under
More support for our conclusion may be found in the structure of relevant Code provisions that distinguish between licenses and authorizations. For example, the authority of the board of educational examiners over licensing is detailed in
Other provisions of the Code related to sex abuse also distinguish between the holders of a license and the holders of an authorization. For instance,
The Code further demonstrates the legislature knows how to establish a licensing regime for those involved in athletics if it chooses to do so. Athletic trainers are subject to licensing pursuant to
In addition, we note that other jurisdictions find no trouble expressly drawing coaches within the scope of their sexual exploitation statutes. See, e.g.,
Finally, our interpretation draws support from the legislative history of
Moreover, when the legislature enacted the sexual exploitation statute in 1991, it applied only to counselors and therapists. See 1991 Iowa Acts ch. 130, § 2 (codified at
We emphasize that it is not the province of this court to speculate about probable legislative intent without regard to the wording of the statute, and any determination must be based upon what the legislature actually said rather than on what it might have said or should have said. E.g., Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa 1995). As we have traditionally and repeatedly stated, “We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.” State v. Brustkern, 170 N.W.2d 389, 392 (Iowa 1969) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Ricke, 160 N.W.2d 499, 501 (Iowa 1968); State v. Bishop, 257 Iowa 336, 339-40, 132 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1965); accord State v. Jennie Coulter Day Nursery, 218 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1974); Kruck v. Needles, 259 Iowa 470, 477, 144 N.W.2d 296, 301 (1966); Lever Bros. Co. v. Erbe, 249 Iowa 454, 469, 87 N.W.2d 469, 479 (1958); In re Guardianship of Wiley, 239 Iowa 1225, 1232, 34 N.W.2d 593, 596 (1948); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L.Rev. 417, 419 (1899). Policy arguments to amend statutes must be directed to the legislature. In re Estate of Whalen, 827 N.W.2d 184, 194 (Iowa 2013); In re Estate of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2012). These principles are not hypertechnical, but rather they are fundamental to the separation of powers and must be applied in a consistent fashion, across all spectrums of cases.
For the above reasons, we conclude a holder of a coaching authorization under
Our interpretation of
We found the legislature defined “school employee” broadly to encompass situations beyond those only involving a direct teacher-student relationship, such as those administrators and certain professionals, including para-educators. Id. at 177; see also
Whether and to what extent coaches who are not “licensed professionals” should be drawn into
V. Conclusion.
Although a coach who holds a teaching or other professional license is clearly subject to prosecution under
REVERSED.
All justices concur except WATERMAN and MANSFIELD, JJ., who dissent.
WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I conclude Ryan Nicoletto, the defendant basketball coach paid under a contract with the school district, was a “school employee” prohibited by
The majority‘s interpretation of
Iowa legislators presumably understood there is a risk of sexual exploitation of student athletes by coaches that warrants at least the same statutory prohibitions that are applied to teachers and other school employees. I see no persuasive indication the legislature intended to exclude coaches from
Anyone with experience in youth sports understands that student athletes generally are more vulnerable to exploitation by coaches than by classroom teachers or other school employees. The coach de-
cides who makes the team, who plays, and who sits on the bench. College scholarship opportunities may hang in the balance. Practices are after school hours. Games are at night with travel to other towns. Tension and emotional drama are inevitable. For obvious reasons, the training required to attain and renew coaching authorizations includes conduct advisories to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. See generally Iowa Admin. Code r. 282-22.1(2)(a)(5) (requiring five hours of coursework “relating to the knowledge and understanding of professional ethics and legal responsibilities of coaches” to earn coaching authorization). Nicoletto serves as an example of what can happen. Commentators agree:
The sad truth is that sports provide the perfect opportunity for adults to sexually exploit children. Coaches are placed on a pedestal by parents and children. They work closely with youngsters, often away from other adults. In some cases they travel out of town together, often staying overnight. Parents have assumed that their child will be protected because there are other children around. Clearly this is not a guarantee.
Robert J. Shoop, Sexual Exploitation in Schools: How to Spot It and Stop It 32 (2004).
Children in a coach-player relationship tend to be more susceptible to sexual assault for various reasons. Whenev-
The majority plays a linguistic shell game to get to its result. The majority concludes, erroneously, that a “coaching authorization” is not a “license” and a coach is not a “licensed professional.” A “coaching authorization” is simply a form of “license.” I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that a paid sports coach is not a “professional.” Common definitions of “professional” plainly include trained coaches paid to do their job. We use the word “professional” to distinguish a paid employee from a volunteer or amateur. See Webster‘s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 680 (1972) (defining “professional” as “participating for gain or livelihood in an activity or field of endeavor often engaged in by amateurs“; “engaged in by people receiving financial return“; “one that engages in a pursuit or activity professionally“); Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 1811 (unabr. ed.2002) (defining “professional” as “one with sufficient authority or practical experience in an area of knowledge or endeavor to resemble a professional“). You can hire a professional painter to touch up your living room ceiling or do it yourself. The painter does not need a doctorate to be a professional. There is no contextual indication the legislature intended a narrow definition for “licensed professional” in
The majority‘s effort to distinguish a “coaching authorization” from a “license” is unpersuasive.
“Practitioner” means an administrator, teacher, or other licensed professional, including an individual who holds a statement of professional recognition, who provides educational assistance to students.
“License” means the authority that is given to allow a person to legally serve as a practitioner, a school, an institution, or a course of study to legally offer professional development programs, other than those programs offered by practitioner preparation schools, institutions, courses of study, or area education agencies. A license is the exclusive authority to perform these functions.
Separately, a person who does not have a teaching license must obtain a
“coaching authorization” to serve as a paid coach in an Iowa public school. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 282-22.1 (“A coaching authorization allows an individual to coach any sport in a middle school, junior high school, or high school.“); see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 282-13.28(29)(b) (stating requirements to receive an “Athletic coach” teaching endorsement). As the district court recognized, that coaching authorization is what authorizes the coach to serve as a coach—which equates to a license. A coaching authorization is simply a form of a license. Many coaches have a teaching license. Under the majority‘s interpretation,
Significantly, the legislature treats authorizations the same as licenses throughout chapter 272, so why treat them any differently in this context? For example,
As the majority acknowledges, coaches like Nicoletto are mandatory reporters of child abuse, including improper sexual contact.
I would not give a pass to Coach Nicoletto, who at the time of his misconduct at issue was thirty years old, with a college degree and a decade of coaching experience. He is fourteen years older than his victim. He began having sex with the victim when she was age sixteen, a junior in high school, and playing on the girls’ varsity basketball team he was paid to coach. She became enamored with her coach during the varsity season and initiated their relationship through text messages that hinted she “liked him.” He balked at first, texting back that “it sounded dangerous and he wasn‘t sure he could trust [her].” She responded that she “was very trustworthy and he could trust” her. Their texts escalated into sexual banter. He invited her to his house in March of 2008, late in the basketball season. She
Nicoletto obviously had “fair warning” that sleeping with a student was wrong—he acknowledged as much and went to great lengths to keep his relationship with the victim secret. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1002, 108 L.Ed.2d 132, 141 (1990) (“[C]onstruction of a criminal statute must be guided by the need for fair warning....“).5 He told her never to phone him because he did not want her number on his phone bills. Yet, they exchanged thousands of text messages, ninety-one in one day. He warned her never to tell anyone about their relationship. He got very angry when she told a friend. Nicoletto told the victim that his family “would disown him” if they knew what he was doing. He ended their relationship only because a suspicious principal began asking them both questions. He had sex with the victim the morning he ended their relationship. When Nicoletto later tearfully confessed to his adult girlfriend, he asked if she “thought he was a pedophile.” After the relationship ended, Nicoletto “wouldn‘t even look at [the victim] at practice.” When confronted by her mother and later the police, the victim initially denied any relationship with Nicoletto and later came clean. She testified at his jury trial. The jury found him guilty.
For those reasons, I would affirm the district court‘s rulings that Nicoletto‘s misconduct is criminal under
MANSFIELD, J., joins this dissent.