State of Iowa v. Patrick Ryan Nicoletto, 2014 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 39

Nicoletto worked as a night shift employee at a pipe manufacturer and coached Davis County HS girls basketball under a coaching authorization, not a teaching license.
Employment contracts paid Nicoletto $1,940.40 annually and conditioned payment on possessing a teaching certificate with coaching endorsement or a coaching authorization.
Nicoletto and a 16-year-old student, S.L., engaged in a romantic/sexual relationship beginning in 2008, with text messages that escalated to sexual activity.
The relationship was concealed by the parties and extended into the 2008-2009 school year, with Nicoletto continuing to coach during this period.
Nicoletto was charged with sexual exploitation by a school employee under Iowa Code section 709.15(3)(a) and (5)(a) and found guilty; he was sentenced to five years plus a ten-year special sentence.
The issue on appeal was whether a coach holding only a coaching authorization qualifies as a 'licensed professional' under 272.1(7) and thus a 'school employee' for purposes of 709.15.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a coaching authorization qualifies as a license under 272.1(7).	State argues coaching authorization is a license and makes Nicoletto a licensed professional.	Nicoletto contends coaching authorization is not a license; coaching can be performed without it and coaching authorization is not exclusive to a profession.	Coaching authorization is not a license; not a licensed professional.
Whether section 709.15(3) extends to coaches who are not licensed professionals.	Rom er broad reading shows legislative intent to protect students from school employees, potentially including coaches.	Statutory scope should not be expanded beyond the text to include non-licensed coaches.	Section 709.15(3) does not include coaches who hold only coaching authorizations.

State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 2013) (broad definition of school employee to protect students)
State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 2011) (strict construction of criminal liability; interpret statute as written)
Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014) (strictly apply statute as written; avoid policy-based substitutions)
State v. Anderson, 801 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2011) (statutory interpretation guiding lenity principles)
State v. Gorman, 464 N.W.2d 122 (Iowa 1990) (strict construction in criminal statutes)
State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 1999) (interpretation of criminal statutes with caution to avoid absurd results)
State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 1973) (statutory interpretation fundamentals)