STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, vs. FONTAE COLE BUELOW, Appellant.
No. 18–0733
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Submitted September 16, 2020—Filed December 11, 2020
Christensen, C.J.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica L. Zrinyi Wittig, Judge.
The State seeks further review of a court of appeals decision to grant a new trial due to exclusion of medical records and limitation of an expert’s review of the records. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Appel, Waterman, McDonald, Oxley, and McDermott, JJ., joined. Mansfield, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
David N. Fautsch (argued) and Elisabeth A. Archer of Weinhardt Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Genevieve Reinkoester (argued), Assistant Attorney General, C.J. May, County Attorney, and Brigit A. Barnes, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
In this case, defendant, Fontae Buelow, is accused of murdering Samantha Link. Buelow claims Link committed suicide. A jury convicted Buelow of second-degree murder. We must decide whether Link’s mental health records are admissible as evidence of Link’s suicidal disposition. The mental health records contain discussion of Link’s prior suicide attempts, statements of suicidal feelings, and possible mental health diagnoses that may increase the risk for suicide. On appeal, defendant argued that (1) the district court erred when it excluded Link’s mental health records at trial, (2) the district court erred when it limited the defense expert’s review of the medical records to only records from one year immediately preceding Link’s death, and (3) the district court erred in forbidding lay testimony on Link’s suicidal behavior. The court of appeals reversed on the district court’s evidentiary rulings regarding Link’s medical records and remanded for a new trial.
The State seeks further review of the court of appeals decision that held that evidence of Link’s mental health history tending to show a suicidal disposition should not be considered character evidence. The State also seeks further review of the court of appeals determination that temporal proximity does not keep out the evidence contained within Link’s medical records. Additionally, the State seeks review of the court of appeals holding that Buelow should be granted a new trial because
Upon our review, we conclude that evidence of a person’s suicidal disposition is not properly analyzed as character evidence under the Iowa Rules of Evidence in cases where the defendant alleges suicide. We also determine that under the facts of this case, the temporal proximity of the medical records is not too remote to be relevant to Buelow’s defense that Link committed suicide. Furthermore, we conclude that the exclusion of evidence regarding Link’s mental health records and the limitation of testimony on those records was not harmless error in this case.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Samantha Link, a twenty-one year old, lived with her twenty-five year-old significant other, Fontae Buelow, in a friend’s basement. On March 30, 2017, the couple began the evening at a hotel hot tub. They later went to a bar to drink with friends. The couple argued at the bar, but they ended up leaving together to go home. They continued to argue once home. No one else was present at the residence. Buelow says that Link grabbed a knife from a butcher’s block sitting on the kitchen counter and stabbed herself. Buelow called 911 and told the operator that Link had stabbed herself in the stomach. Buelow also told law enforcement that Link had stabbed herself one time in the stomach. Emergency responders pronounced Link dead at the scene. Link was determined to have three knife wounds. One of the stab wounds penetrated Link’s heart and another went through her lung. Both of these wounds were independently fatal. The third stab wound was also in her chest area. The State charged Buelow with first-degree murder. Buelow’s only defense is that Link committed suicide by stabbing herself.
Buelow filed a motion with the district court seeking Link’s mental health, therapy, and counseling records, because he believed the records might contain exculpatory evidence that would bolster his suicide defense. The district court reviewed the medical records in camera and then gave both parties access to them. The records contained discussion of Link’s prior suicide attempts, diagnoses that may increase the risk for suicide, and statements of suicidal ideations. Additionally, Link discussed her relationship with a former boyfriend in the records.
The district court allowed the defense’s expert to review Link’s medical records but limited the review to include only records within one year’s time before the date of her death. The district court did not allow the defense’s expert to comment on the manner of death or whether Link acted in conformance with her past conduct. Additionally, the court excluded all medical records from trial and did not allow lay testimony on Link’s suicidal disposition.
The defense filed a motion requesting the district court to expand its prior ruling on the State’s motion in limine. In part, the defense requested that the district court allow its expert to review five years of Link’s medical records prior to the date of her death, rather than one year, and to admit the records at trial. The defense also sought to introduce lay testimony from Link’s former boyfriend that during their relationship Link had grabbed a knife during an argument. The former boyfriend did not give a time frame for this occurrence. The district court ruled that this testimony was too remote to be relevant and that it was an attempt to present improper character evidence.
The jury found Buelow guilty of second-degree murder. The court of appeals reversed
II. Standard of Review.
“Evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.” State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Iowa 2018) (quoting State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 690 (Iowa 2017)). We reverse for an abuse of discretion if evidence was excluded based on an erroneous application of the law. Giza v. BNSF Ry., 843 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Iowa 2014). The standard of review for hearsay, however, is for errors at law. State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2009).
III. Analysis.
There are five evidentiary issues that were raised on appeal: (1) whether the statements in Link’s medical records constitute inadmissible hearsay evidence under
A. Hearsay. The first issue is whether Link’s medical records and the statements within them are inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is a statement that the declarant makes elsewhere than at the current trial, which is being offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”
Under
Link’s medical records are admissible hearsay under the exception for records of a regularly conducted activity.
Link’s statements within the medical records regarding her current health, feelings, and plans are admissible under the exception allowing for “[a] statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind . . . or emotional, sensory, or physical condition.”
Regarding Link’s medical records, the State concedes that any statements made by Link about her prior suicide attempts are not hearsay. To the extent that the statements within the medical records either are statements of Link’s then existing state of mind or condition or are statements made for diagnosis or treatment, the district court erred in concluding otherwise.
B. Relevance. The second evidentiary issue is whether Link’s mental health records and testimony regarding her mental health are relevant. Only relevant evidence is admissible.
The State contends that much of the information in the medical records, particularly past suicide attempts, is too remote to be admissible. An objection based on remoteness essentially raises an issue of relevancy. “While remoteness in point of time does not necessarily render evidence irrelevant, it may do so where the elapsed time is so great as to negative all rational or logical connection between the fact sought to be proved and the remote evidence offered in proof thereof.” State v. Engeman, 217 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Iowa 1974) (quoting 1 Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, Jones on Evidence, § 4:1, at 380 (6th ed. 1972)). This court has said that “for remoteness, no precise timetable may be set.” Godbersen v. Miller, 439 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Iowa 1989).
The State believes that evidence of prior suicide attempts and suicidal tendencies should only be admissible if the attempts or ideations happened near in time to the
Buelow wants to expand his expert’s review of Link’s medical and mental health records to a period of five years before Link’s death and admit records that show Link’s suicidal disposition. He also wants to admit testimony from a former boyfriend on Link’s suicidal behavior. The discussion of Link’s prior suicide attempts occurred a little under three years from the date of her death. Although the former boyfriend did not recall the date of the argument the defense sought for him to testify to, their relationship had ended just eight months prior to Link’s death. The issue is whether the testimony and Link’s medical records showing a prior suicide attempt and suicidal disposition are too remote to have any tendency to make it more or less probable that Link later committed suicide.
Over one hundred years ago, this court was faced with a similar fact pattern in State v. Meyer, in which the defendant was charged with murdering his wife and asserted suicide as his defense. 180 Iowa 210, 214, 163 N.W. 244, 245 (1917). There, we said that evidence tending to show a predisposition to suicide is admissible. Id. at 214, 163 N.W. at 246; see also 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 332, at 64–65 (2014) (“Where the theory of the defense is that the deceased committed suicide, any evidence otherwise competent tending to show that the deceased came to his or her death by the deceased’s own act is admissible.”). “Such predisposition may be shown by acts or declarations of the deceased within such reasonable time before the killing as that there may have been some tendency to establish such a condition of mind when this happened.” Meyer, 180 Iowa at 214, 163 N.W. at 246.
In State v. Beeson, another homicide case from the early 1900’s, this court similarly determined that the trial court had erred in keeping evidence of the deceased’s suicidal disposition out. 155 Iowa 355, 136 N.W. 317, 321 (1912). This court cited several other courts that held that suicidal declarations made as far back as three to six years prior to the alleged murder were admissible to support a theory of suicide. Id. at 355, 136 N.W. at 321 (citing People v. Conklin, 67 N.E. 624 (N.Y. 1903); Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872)).
Evidence of an alleged victim’s suicidal disposition has been admitted in more recent years in State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Iowa 1980). There, the defendant was initially charged with murdering his girlfriend. Id. At trial, evidence was allowed in showing that the deceased was depressed, had made suicidal statements, and had spoken to others about joining her two brothers who had committed suicide. Id.
In analyzing relevance in the present case, a New Mexico Supreme Court case held that suicide attempts going back more than ten years were relevant to an alleged homicide when the defense was suicide. See State v. Stanley, 37 P.3d 85, 90 (N.M. 2001); see also State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 407 (Utah 1999) (determining that mental health records from three to four years prior to an alleged homicide were relevant when the defense was suicide).
C. Character Evidence. The third evidentiary issue is whether evidence of a person’s suicidal disposition is properly characterized as character evidence. The district court concluded that under State v. Jacoby, it was required to exclude Link’s mental health records because Buelow did not bring the deceased’s character into issue by raising a self defense claim. See 260 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Iowa 1977). On appeal, the State did not cite Jacoby in its brief but instead offered a new rule in which temporal proximity is the determining factor in whether mental health evidence is character evidence. For the reasons stated above, we do not find this argument persuasive.
The Iowa Rules of Evidence do not define “character.” According to one commentator, evidence of a suicidal disposition should be analyzed under the character evidence rules. See 7 Laurie Kratky Doré, Iowa Practice Series: Evidence § 5.404:3(A) & n.5, at 245 (2019–2020 ed. 1999). The Iowa Practice Series for Evidence reads the exception in
This court has said, “[r]oughly stated, character is what a man actually is, while reputation is what his neighbors say he is.” State v. Poston, 199 Iowa 1073, 1074, 203 N.W. 257, 258 (1925). “[Q]uarrelsome, violent, aggressive or turbulent character” is character evidence. Klaes v. Scholl, 375 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Iowa 1985) (quoting Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d at 838); see also State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 243 (Iowa 2015) (determining that a party’s act of striking his ex-wife was relevant to proving a violent character). On the other end of the spectrum, evidence used to prove a person’s traits for “honesty, integrity, and good citizenship” or “peacefulness and nonviolence” is considered character
Thus, Iowa caselaw shows a framework of character evidence being “good” or “bad” traits of a person. See 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence, § 186 Character, in general, at 1131 (Robert P. Mosteller et al. eds., 8th ed. 2020) (describing character traits as “blameworthy or praiseworthy”); Character evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining character evidence as “[e]vidence regarding someone’s general personality traits or propensities, of a praiseworthy or blameworthy nature; evidence of a person’s moral standing in a community”).
The State concedes that mental health illnesses do not fit within the traditional framework of character evidence and suggests that the question in this case “should not be whether a person’s mental health history is character evidence, but rather, whether the character evidence rules should apply to this mental health history.” The State argues that
The conclusion that evidence of a suicidal disposition is not character evidence follows past Iowa precedent, which has allowed in evidence of victims’ suicidal dispositions and ideations to support the criminal defendant’s defense of suicide in homicide cases. See Marti, 290 N.W.2d at 575; Meyer, 180 Iowa at 214, 163 N.W. at 246; Beeson, 155 Iowa at 362–63, 136 N.W. at 320.
In its application for further review, the State cites a homicide case, State v. Heemstra, to support its contention that treating mental health records as character evidence is not a novel concept. 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006), superseded in part by statute, 2011 Iowa Acts ch. 8, § 2 (codified at
D. Probative Value v. Prejudicial Effect. The fourth evidentiary issue is whether Link’s medical records should be excluded from trial under
Courts should use
The State argues that the evidence was prejudicial because symptoms of mental illnesses vary widely and the defense expert’s speculation about the symptoms Link experienced on the night of her death would create a minitrial on Link’s mental health. This argument fails to illustrate why the evidence is unfairly prejudicial to the extent that it substantially outweighs its probative value.
We have explained that the accused’s right to present evidence that the deceased committed suicide is “a most important one.” Beeson, 155 Iowa at 362, 136 N.W. at 320. Additionally,
the death of the patient is a fact to consider in balancing the rights of a criminal defendant to exculpatory information in confidential records. After all, “[t]he holder of the privilege has little private interest in preventing disclosure, because he is [deceased].”
State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 490 (Iowa 2013) (first alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hansen, 955 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (D. Mont. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, No. 97-30214, 1998 WL 255192 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision)); see also Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 563 (concluding that disclosure of medical records was appropriate where defendant was faced with “the most severe penalty provided by our law” and “[t]he subject of the privilege is deceased”).
Because Buelow’s only defense to his murder charge is that Link committed suicide, the probative value of evidence showing Link’s possible increased risk for suicide is high. We do not believe that evidence of Link’s suicidal disposition will have an unfairly prejudicial effect by creating a minitrial on Link’s mental health. See State v. Drach, 1 P.3d 864, 869 (Kan. 2000) (noting that a majority of the cited jurisdictions allow into evidence
E. Harmless Error. The final evidentiary issue is whether the district court’s exclusion of Link’s medical records and related admissible testimony as evidence at trial was harmless error under
A criminal defendant’s right to present evidence that the deceased committed suicide is “a most important one.” Beeson, 155 Iowa at 362, 136 N.W. at 320. Buelow’s only defense in this case is that Link stabbed herself. Because the district court did not allow admission of any of Link’s medical records or related admissible testimony, Buelow was barred from introducing evidence that Link had prior suicide attempts, suicidal ideations, and possible medical diagnoses that would increase her risk for suicide. See Paredes, 775 N.W.2d at 571 (declining to find harmless error when evidence was excluded at trial that “would have clearly aided the defense in its only available theory”).
Furthermore, we do not conclude that the State’s case against the defendant rises to the same amount of overwhelming evidence of guilt we have found sufficient to avoid harmless error in the past. Unlike State v. Parker, there were no eyewitnesses. Both sides presented expert evidence that suggested the physical scene of the death better fit with their theory of what occurred. Therefore, exclusion of the medical records and limitation of related admissible testimony was not harmless error in this case.
IV. Conclusion.
For the aforementioned reasons, the district court judgment is reversed and remanded, and we need not address the remaining issues on appeal.
All justices concur except Mansfield, J., who takes no part.