STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DONCORRION SPATES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19-0749
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
October 21, 2020
MAY, Judge.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bradley J. Harris (trial) and Thomas A. Bitter (second motion for new trial), Judges.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and May and Greer, JJ.
Doncorrion Spates was convicted of murder in the first degree, attempted murder, and intimidation with a dangerous weapon for his participation in a drive-by shooting. On appeal, Spates argues (1) the jury venire did not represent a fair cross-section of the community; (2) the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence; and (3) the district court erred when it denied a second motion for new trial alleging the jury was not fair and impartial. We conditionally affirm and remand for further proceedings detailed in this opinion.
I. Background.
On July 17, 2016, four men left a get-together and travelled to a local store. Jacques Williamson drove his Chevy Tahoe. His passengers were Spates, Shavondes Martin, and Armand Rollins.
After leaving the store, Williamson drove the Tahoe by a Waterloo residence. Some young men were in the front yard. Martin reached over Williamson and shot out of the driver‘s window. Shots also rang out from the Tahoe‘s rear driver‘s-side window. Three men in the yard were hit by bullets. One of them died from his wounds.
The State charged Williamson, Spates, Martin, and Rollins for the shooting. Williamson pled guilty in exchange for a reduction in charges and his truthful testimony against Spates, Martin, and Rollins. The State tried Spates, Martin, and Rollins together. The jury acquitted Martin and Rollins. But it convicted Spates. He appeals.
A. Fair Cross Section
We begin with Spates‘s claim that the jury venire did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. Because Spates‘s claim is rooted in the state and federal constitutions, our review is de novo. State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Iowa 2017). To obtain relief, Spates must establish three elements:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.
State v. Lilly, 930 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Plain, 898 N.W.2d at 822).
As for the first element, Spates alleges African-Americans were excluded from the jury pool. The State concedes that African-Americans are a “distinctive” group for purposes of this analysis. So Spates established the first element.
With respect to the second element, the district court found representation of African-Americans in the jury venire could not be reliably determined. This is because a large portion of prospective jurors declined to self-identify their race on the jury questionnaire. But we need not explore the second element further because, as will be explained, Spates cannot satisfy the third element.
The third element requires Spates to show that the purported “underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). “[S]tatistically significant disparities alone are not enough. Rather, [Spates] must tie the disparity to a particular practice.” See id. at 307.
As a fallback position, Spates suggests remand is appropriate in light of the supreme court‘s decisions in Lilly, 930 N.W.2d 293, State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 2019), and State v. Williams, 929 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 2019). But Spates does not explain what difference Lilly, Veal, or Williams could make to his case. He claims we should remand “to give” him “an opportunity to develop a record” in light of those decisions. But he does not explain—even in general terms—how he would develop the record differently as to any of the three Plain elements. And so he does not explain how a different record might support a different outcome.
Because Spates has not explained how remand could help his case, we cannot conclude remand is necessary.
Spates also challenges the district court‘s denial of his motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence. Our review is “for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016). “‘A district court abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable[,]’ which occurs when the district court decision ‘is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law.‘” State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 564 (Iowa 2018) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
“Under
We disagree. True, Williamson‘s testimony was not totally consistent with his prior statements. But it was not so contradictory as to render his testimony absurd or impossible. Cf. State v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 774, 785 (Iowa 2001).
Spates also notes a witness testified she saw a black sleeve out of the back window of the vehicle. And Spates wore a white T-shirt the night of the shooting. But we do not find these facts particularly compelling. The witness did not specifically testify that the person with the black sleeve fired a gun. Instead, she testified she saw an arm covered in a black sleeve extended out of the vehicle
Moreover, during their investigation, police recovered casings in two different calibers. This suggests two different guns were fired. It is not a leap to conclude there were two shooters—one in front and one in back of the Tahoe. This reasonable conclusion is consistent with Williamson‘s testimony and further implicates Spates as a shooter.
Additionally, we note that, before the group left for the liquor store that evening, Spates briefly got into the backseat of the vehicle. One could infer he placed a weapon in the vehicle with the intention of using it later.
On this record, we cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.
C. Impartial Jury
Finally, Spates claims the district court erred in denying his second motion for new trial because he did not receive a fair and impartial trial.
Spates‘s motion claimed racial animus impacted jury deliberations. Spates is African-American—and his motion alleged jurors made derogatory statements about African-Americans during the deliberation process. In light of Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017), the district court responded by
On appeal, Spates argues he was entitled to a new trial under the federal constitution as interpreted in Pena-Rodriguez and its progeny or, alternatively, under “an independent approach under
We begin our analysis by acknowledging the importance of jurors in our system of justice. We entrust jurors with enormous responsibility—and justifiably so. We believe our jurors are “intelligent and impartial.” Fowle v. Parsons, 141 N.W. 1049, 1050 (Iowa 1913) (citation omitted). They carry “the common knowledge and experience” of our citizenry. Id. (quoting Moore v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 131 N.W. 30, 32 (Iowa 1911)). And although, “[l]ike all human institutions, the jury system has its flaws, . . . experience shows that fair and impartial verdicts can be reached if the jury follows the court‘s instructions and undertakes deliberations that are honest, candid, robust, and based on common sense.” Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861.
But, like all of our laws,
And, indeed, both constitutions expressly regulate the conduct of criminal prosecutions. A key example is the right to trial by an impartial jury. It is protected by both the
| Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution | Article 1, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution |
|---|---|
| In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. (Emphasis added.) | In all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life, or liberty of an individual the accused shall have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the accusation against him, to have a copy of the same when demanded; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for his witnesses; and, to have the assistance of counsel. (Emphasis added.) |
In Pena-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court considered whether the
The Court explained:
that where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror‘s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.
Significantly, though, the Pena-Rodriguez Court did not explain “what procedures a trial court must follow when confronted with a motion for a new trial based on juror testimony of racial bias.” Id. at 870. Nor did the Pena-Rodriguez Court “decide the appropriate standard for determining when evidence of racial bias is sufficient to require that the verdict be set aside and a new trial be granted.” Id. The Court left these issues open for development by the lower courts. As far we can tell, no Iowa appellate court has previously addressed either issue.
And so this case calls on us to plow some fairly new ground. In doing so, we rely heavily on the words of Pena-Rodriguez itself. We find useful guidance in this excerpt:
Not every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify setting aside the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial inquiry. For the inquiry to proceed, there must be a showing that one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury‘s deliberations and resulting verdict. To qualify, the statement must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror‘s vote to convict. Whether that threshold showing has been satisfied is a matter committed to the substantial discretion of the trial
court in light of all the circumstances, including the content and timing of the alleged statements and the reliability of the proffered evidence.
We have also considered our courts’ traditional vigilance in protecting the right to trial by an impartial jury. Indeed, we believe “[t]he right to a trial by an impartial jury lies at the very heart of due process.” State v. Christensen, 929 N.W.2d 646, 669 (Iowa 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 224 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); see also Dixon v. State, No. 16-2195, 2018 WL 3471833, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. July 18, 2018) (citation omitted). “To protect the defendant‘s right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, we have in place an elaborate pretrial process to select and empanel a fair and impartial jury.” Dixon, 2018 WL 3471833, at *6. But ”[w]hen these processes fail and a biased juror is seated on the case, the defendant‘s right to trial by an impartial jury is compromised.” Id. (emphasis added). To repeat: if even a single biased juror is seated, the process has failed. Id. “This failure directly affects the defendant‘s interest in having a fair determination of guilt.” Id. (citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 292 (1930) (“A constitutional jury means twelve [persons] as though that number had been specifically named; and it follows that, when reduced to eleven, it ceases to be such a jury quite as effectively as though the number had been reduced to a single person.“), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 91-92 (1970)). “This failure also undermines the public‘s confidence in the integrity of our trial processes.” Id.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the practical question that faced the district court, namely, how the court should respond to a motion for new trial
First, the court must decide whether—notwithstanding
If the defendant fails to meet this threshold standard, the inquiry ends. But if the defendant meets this standard, then the court should next consider whether a new trial is appropriate.
At this second stage, we anticipate that—as in the case at bar—the district court will conduct an evidentiary hearing at which the defendant and the State may present live testimony from jurors and, if appropriate, other witnesses. Ultimately, the court should make findings of fact—including, whenever appropriate, express credibility determinations—as to (1) whether defendant has proven by “compelling evidence” that—in fact—a “juror made clear and explicit statements” relating to race; and (2) if so, the specific content and context of the statements, including both the particular words spoken and any relevant contextual details. Then, based
We emphasize that both determinations—whether to receive juror testimony and whether to grant a new trial—should be based on objective circumstances, e.g., what was said; how and when it was said; what was said and done before and after; whether and how the statements relate to evidence in the case; whether and how the statements relate to the issues the jury will decide when reaching a verdict. Conversely, neither determination should depend on the jurors’ subjective evaluations of their own motives—or the motives of other jurors—in voting to convict. On this issue, we follow the example of cases involving the improper introduction of extraneous information, another narrow area in which courts are permitted to consider juror testimony. See
Similarly, when deciding whether to grant a new trial on the basis of a juror‘s race-related statements, the relevant inquiry is not whether jurors subjectively believe racial animus impacted their own vote or anyone else‘s. Instead, the relevant inquiries are (1) what was the content and context of the race-related statements; and (2) viewed objectively, do those statements establish that the speaker‘s “racial animus was a significant motivating factor in his or her vote to convict.” See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861. And again we emphasize that—if even one juror voted to convict because of race—a new trial is required. See Christensen, 929 N.W.2d at 681 (“A jury consisting of even one biased juror is constitutionally infirm.“).
With these principles in mind, we turn to Spates‘s claim. It requires us to consider two questions. First, did the district court abuse its discretion by permitting Spates to present juror testimony about race-related statements? Id. (“Whether that threshold showing has been satisfied is a matter committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court in light of all the circumstances, including the content and timing of the alleged statements and the reliability of the proffered evidence.“). Second, did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Spates‘s motion for new trial? See State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 231 (Iowa 2015)
We address each question in turn.
1. Decision to hear juror testimony.
The present issues arose when, in July 2018, Spates‘s counsel filed his second motion for new trial. It alleged that Spates‘s counsel had “recently spoken with a juror” who advised “that two fellow jurors made comments during deliberations which that juror deemed to be racist.” And the motion cited Pena-Rodriguez.
Spates also sought permission to subpoena jurors as witnesses for a hearing on his claim. In support, Spates‘s counsel signed and filed an affidavit. It reported counsel‘s recollection of a personal conversation with a juror. According to the affidavit, the juror heard two other jurors—one male and the other female—say “derogatory things about black people” during deliberations. It also provided details, including these:
f. While deliberating over why the defendants left a shell casing left in the vehicle, the male juror stated that they‘re “all” in gangs and if you do drive by shootings “all the time” you‘re just used to it, and that was why the defendants overlooked disposing of the casing.
g. During deliberations, the female juror stated that the way black people are raised, “it‘s o.k. to kill people“.
Here, the defendant is African-American, and the allegation is that a juror or jurors said derogatory things about African-American people during deliberations. The specific comments are included in the defendant‘s filings. Those comments, if made, tend to show that race played a substantial factor in the deliberation process and in the verdict reached by the jury. Pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court‘s holding in Pena, this court is compelled to consider the evidence of the juror‘s statement and any resulting denial of the defendant‘s jury trial guarantees. Hearing will be held, and the defendant will be permitted to offer testimony from the juror(s) in question.
(Emphasis added.)
We see no abuse of discretion in this ruling. While the court could have chosen to demand other evidence—such as an affidavit signed by a juror rather than the second-hand recollections of an attorney—the court had discretion to accept counsel‘s representations. Moreover, the statements detailed in the affidavit drew a direct connection between race-based assumptions and verdict determining facts, namely, “drive by shootings” and “kill[ing] people.” And so, like the district court, we think the statements detailed in the affidavit—“if made“—could very well show that racial animus played a substantial role in one or more jurors’ decisions to convict. So we agree the court was “compelled to consider the evidence of the juror‘s statement[s] and any resulting denial of the defendant‘s jury trial guarantees.” The court was right to hold a hearing and receive juror testimony.
2. Denial of new trial.
In another thorough, detailed ruling, the district court concluded the motion for new trial should be denied. As will be explained, we remand to make additional findings and conclusions in a new ruling on the motion for new trial. But we
Still, we conclude the district court‘s approach differed from the approach we have outlined here. Most significantly, in denying Spates‘s motion for new trial, the district court relied in part on the jurors’ subjective evaluations of their own motives. The court noted “[e]very juror confirmed that his/her verdict was unaffected by the defendant‘s race.” As explained, however, we do not believe subjective considerations of this kind should be a part of the analysis. Cf. Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 34-35 (holding that district court should not have considered juror affidavits stating that the cartoon in no way influenced their decision in extraneous evidence case).
So we remand for the district court to rule again on the motion for new trial in light of this opinion and the current record. The court‘s determinations on remand should include:
- whether the defendant has proved by “compelling evidence” that a “juror made clear and explicit statements” relating to race;
- if so, the specific content of the statements;
- all relevant context for the statements; and,
- ultimately, whether defendant has proven by “compelling evidence” that a “juror made clear and explicit statements indicating that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in his or her vote to convict.” As explained, this is an objective determination based on
If the district court answers this last question in the affirmative, a new trial should be granted. Otherwise, the conviction and sentence will stand.
III. Conclusion.
Spates‘s challenge to the jury venire fails because he has not established any underrepresentation of a distinctive group in the jury venire was the result of systematic exclusion. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Spates‘s motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence. And we remand to the district court to make additional findings as to Spates‘s second motion for new trial.
CONDITIONALLY AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.