STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Benjamin Joseph LYON, Appellant.
No. 13-1938.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
April 17, 2015.
IV. Conclusion.
Accordingly, the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss filed by Penn-Kennedy. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment and sentence of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Maurice Curry and Olu Salami, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we consider the validity of a conviction for operating a motor vehicle
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed Lyon‘s conviction. We granted further review. We now vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A. The Arrest. Polk County Sheriff‘s Deputy Jason Tart was on duty in Polk County at approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 31, 2013. At about that time, he stopped a vehicle driven by Benjamin Lyon based on his suspicion that the vehicle was operating without a properly illuminated rear license plate in violation of
At the station, Deputy Tart gave Lyon Miranda warnings and the implied-consent advisory required by
B. Motion to Suppress. Lyon filed a motion to suppress alleging both statutory and constitutional violations.
His statutory grounds were founded on
Lyon also asserted constitutional violations in his motion to suppress. He claimed the stop was not based upon reasonable suspicion or probable cause under
The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. The sole witness at the hearing was Deputy Tart. With respect to the circumstances giving rise to the stop of Lyon‘s vehicle, Deputy Tart testified that in the early morning hours of May 31, 2013, he was “probably doing stationary patrol, waiting for cars to drive by that had some sort of a violation.” He observed Lyon‘s vehicle and believed the license plate light was out. He followed Lyon‘s vehicle for some distance, making sure his headlights did not illuminate Lyon‘s license plate. Deputy Tart agreed that if you get within a hundred feet or so the headlights will illuminate the license plate because it contains reflective material. Based on his observation, Deputy Tart testified that he was “100 percent certain” his headlights did not illuminate Lyon‘s license plate.
Turning to the
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the district court read its ruling into the record and denied Lyon‘s motion. The court first concluded Deputy Tart developed reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when he observed Lyon‘s vehicle turning from northbound on Main Street to eastbound on Second Avenue without an illuminated rear license plate. Additionally, the court held Deputy Tart had probable cause to initiate the stop after he followed Lyon‘s vehicle and verified the rear license plate light was out. The court further found Deputy Tart complied with the provisions of
A jury subsequently found Lyon guilty of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. After Lyon stipulated to the disposition of his underlying first offense for OWI, he was convicted of OWI, second offense. Lyon appealed. The court of appeals affirmed Lyon‘s conviction. For the reasons expressed below, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
II. Standard of Review.
We review alleged violations of constitutional rights de novo. State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 1997). We make an independent evaluation of the totality of circumstances shown by the entire record. Id.
“[W]e review the defendant‘s challenge of the district court‘s interpretation of
III. Discussion of Lawfulness of Stop.
A.
B. Positions of the Parties.
1. Lyon. Lyon argues police “seized” him within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980) (noting that under the Fourth Amendment, a person is “seized” when, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave“); Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d at 100. He asserts that in order to engage in a roadside detention, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity [is] afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968); State v. Reisetter, 747 N.W.2d 792, 794-95 (Iowa Ct. App.2008).
From this familiar formulation, Lyon argues that, in this case, Deputy Tart lacked reasonable suspicion to make the stop. He asserts that when Deputy Tart was questioned about the stop at the hearing on Lyon‘s motion to suppress, the deputy testified the license plate was not visible, even outside fifty feet. Lyon asserts, however, that the fact Deputy Tart did not see illumination on the license plate from a distance outside fifty feet was irrelevant, as the statute requires only that the license plate be illuminated for legibility from a distance of fifty feet. According to Lyon, Deputy Tart further testified that when his vehicle was within one hundred feet or so of Lyon‘s vehicle, his own headlights illuminated the rear plates, making it impossible to tell whether the license plate was properly illuminated at that distance. As a result, Lyon argues there was no evidence to establish that Deputy Tart observed his license plate “in a non-illuminated state around or inside of fifty feet.”
In support of his argument, Lyon cites Reisetter, 747 N.W.2d at 794-95, in which the court of appeals held that an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based upon
Lyon claims the video footage of the stop demonstrates that it was not possible to determine whether at a distance of fifty feet the license plate was sufficiently illuminated to be legible. Because Deputy Tart had not observed Lyon‘s license plate at a distance approximating fifty feet without the spoiling feature of reflection from his own vehicle‘s headlights, Lyon argues the district court‘s conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make the stop must be reversed.
2. The State. The State disagrees. It asserts
The State notes that at the suppression hearing Deputy Tart testified the license plate was not illuminated. When he made the determination there was no illumination, Deputy Tart testified he was “100 percent certain” that no light was cast from his car to Lyon‘s license plate. As a result, the State argues Deputy Tart had reasonable suspicion Lyon‘s license plate was not properly illuminated in violation of the first prong of
In addition, the State asserts Deputy Tart also had reasonable suspicion of a violation of the second prong of
The State addresses the Reisetter case in two ways. First, the State suggests Reisetter was wrongly decided and should be overruled by this court. Citing Louisiana authority, the State believes reasonable suspicion that a license plate is not legible from fifty feet may arise from an observation point as far back from the vehicle as ninety feet. State v. Purvis, 684 So.2d 567, 569-70 (La.Ct.App.1996).
In any event, the State suggests Reisetter is distinguishable. In Reisetter, 747 N.W.2d at 794, the deputy testified he was “probably under a hundred feet [away from the vehicle] or close to it.” In this case, however, the State suggests the distance is materially closer. The State further notes that the Reisetter case did not consider the illumination prong of the statute.
C. Prior Caselaw. The prior caselaw begins with Reisetter. In Reisetter, the court of appeals considered the validity of a traffic stop based upon suspicion of a violation of
In a subsequent case, the court of appeals distinguished Reisetter. In Gustafson, 2009 WL 4842474, at *3, the court of appeals considered a traffic stop under
In Gustafson, a special concurrence noted that the validity of the stop did not turn on the exact distance between the vehicles. Id. at *4 (Zimmer, S.J., concurring specially). The special concurrence distinguished between a license plate light that was not working at all and a license plate light that did not provide sufficient illumination to be legible at a distance of fifty feet. Id. It noted that an officer may form reasonable suspicion that a license plate light is not working from a distance farther away than fifty feet. Id. At a minimum, the special concurrence called for clarification of Reisetter to distinguish between the two prongs of the statute. Id. at *5.
D. Analysis. Traffic stops on the open road have been subject to controversy. See State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 772-73 & nn. 2-4 (Iowa 2011) (noting “the proper scope of police authority in the context of routine traffic stops has been the subject of countless commentaries, many cases, and a number of consent decrees“). Unlimited discretion to stop vehicles on the open road may give rise to allegations of racial discrimination, characterized by the descriptive phrase “driving while black.” See State v. Harrison, 846 N.W.2d 362, 371-72 (Iowa 2014) (Appel, J., dissenting); Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 772 & n. 2 (citing David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544 (1997)). This is particularly true when an ordinary traffic stop morphs into a larger criminal investigation without reasonable suspicion beyond that provided by the original offense. See Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 772-73.
It is thus important to recognize what is not involved in this case. There is no indication in the record of an improper purpose behind the stop. Cf. Harrison, 846 N.W.2d at 369-73 (noting the case raised the question of pretext, as the “officers’ obvious goal was not to take care of the [claimed Code violation], but rather to investigate an alleged crime for which they had no basis to initiate a stop“). Nor is this a case involving a consent search when the stop morphs far beyond the purpose of the stop. See, e.g., Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 772. And, it is not a case in which an out-of-proportion arrest occurred as a result of a minor traffic violation. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 361-62, 373, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1561, 1567, 149 L.Ed.2d 549, 581-82, 589 (2001) (O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that in holding the arrest of an individual for a minor criminal offense punishable only by a fine does not offend the Fourth Amendment, the majority “cloaks the pointless indignity that [the petitioner] suffered with the mantle of reasonableness“). Instead, this case involves an ordinary traffic stop, based upon a claim of reasonable suspicion, in which the officer, in the course of an ordinary investigation of a traffic infraction, uncovers
In addition, although Lyon raises claims under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, he does not advocate the application of a different standard under the Iowa Constitution than is generally applied by the United States Supreme Court under the United States Constitution. As a result, for the purposes of this case, we generally apply the federal standard, reserving the right to apply that standard in a fashion stricter than the federal caselaw. See Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 291-92.
Both parties focus on whether Deputy Tart had reasonable suspicion to stop Lyon‘s vehicle to investigate an alleged violation of
We also agree with the thrust of the special concurrence in Gustafson. See 2009 WL 4842474, at *4. When the issue is whether the license plate is illuminated at all, that lack of illumination can be detected from a distance greater than fifty feet. Id. In this case, the deputy formed a reasonable suspicion that there was no working license plate light when he observed the vehicle drive past him without an illuminated license plate and then followed the vehicle to confirm his suspicions that there was no illumination at all. He trailed the vehicle from a distance sufficient to ensure that his headlights were not reflecting on the license plate. Under these circumstances, we find no constitutional infirmity under either the Iowa or the United States Constitutions.
Our holding is not inconsistent with Reisetter. In Reisetter, 747 N.W.2d at 794-95, the court of appeals focused only on the second prong of
IV. Discussion of Iowa Code Chapter 804 .
A. Introduction. The second issue in this case requires us to revisit
Any peace officer or other person having custody of any person arrested or restrained of the person‘s liberty for any reason whatever, shall permit that person, without unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of detention, to call, consult, and see a member of the person‘s family or an attorney of the person‘s choice, or both. Such person shall be permitted to make a reasonable number of telephone calls as may be required to secure an attorney. If a call is made, it shall be made in the presence of the person having custody of the one arrested or restrained. If such person is intoxicated, or a person under eighteen years of age, the call may be made by the person having custody. An attorney shall be permitted to see and consult confidentially with such person
alone and in private at the jail or other place of custody without unreasonable delay. A violation of this section shall constitute a simple misdemeanor.
B. Positions of the Parties.
1. Lyon. There is no question that Deputy Tart permitted Lyon to make several phone calls after his arrest. Lyon, however, asserts Deputy Tart misled him about the purpose of calling a family member or attorney under
First, after he received his Miranda warnings and the implied-consent advisory pursuant to
Lyon asserts Deputy Tart‘s response was misleading. According to Lyon, the purpose of a phone call under
Second, Lyon also attacks the timing of Deputy Tart‘s phone call offer. According to Lyon, Deputy Tart had not yet asked for further chemical testing. Lyon asserts Deputy Tart offered the phone calls before he requested further chemical testing in order to undermine Lyon‘s ability to obtain advice on the consent issue.
In support of his claims, Lyon cites several of our cases decided under
2. The State. On the merits, the State contends Deputy Tart had no affirmative duty to inform Lyon of the purpose of making a phone call under
In any event, even if there was an affirmative obligation under
C. Caselaw Under
We revisited the statute in Didonato. In Didonato, 456 N.W.2d at 368, an accused sought to call a friend rather than an attorney or a family member as allowed under
With respect to the timing of the phone call, we noted in Didonato that a phone call after the implied-consent form was signed is still timely because consent may be revoked. Id. When a phone call was made and the accused “ha[d] an actual opportunity to consult with counsel or a family member before submitting to the chemical test, the purposes behind the statute are served.” Id.
In Garrity, 765 N.W.2d at 594, we confronted a situation in which the party accused of drunk driving sought to make a phone call to a narcotics officer in order to arrange a deal in which he would reveal a large drug operation in return for not doing jail time. The arresting officers declined the request as outside the scope of
In Garrity, we explored the permitted purposes of the phone call. Id. at 596. We recognized that “[o]ne purpose of
the arrestee may choose to contact family or a legal representative for advice, or to have them inform his employer that he is not likely to be at work, pick up children from school, or arrange to have the dog let out.
Id. We stated that when an accused seeks to make a phone call to a person not covered by
D. Analysis. As a general matter, we have insisted that law enforcement officers not play games when faced with a request from a person in custody to communicate with the outside world after being arrested. So, for example, an accused who seeks to talk to a narcotics officer may be advised that he or she cannot do so, but must then affirmatively be advised that he or she can call an attorney or family member. See Garrity, 765 N.W.2d at 597. Similarly, a suspect‘s inquiry of an officer whether his or her mom might be called when his or her vehicle is impounded and whether he or she could “call somebody to get me out?,” is sufficient to trigger an affirmative duty on the part of law enforcement to explain the arrestee‘s right to call a family member under the statute. See Hicks, 791 N.W.2d at 92, 96.
But in this case, Lyon asks us to go well beyond our caselaw. Law enforcement in this case plainly honored Lyon‘s request to make phone calls to an attorney or to family members. Indeed, he was able to contact his father. Lyon seeks more. He asks us to require law enforcement officers to explain that a purpose of the call is to obtain advice regarding whether to submit to a chemical test. Lyon claims Deputy Tart misled him when he did not respond to his question regarding whether the primary purpose of the call was to get him out of jail.
While there is language in Didonato that might be recruited to support Lyon‘s position, we think the reasoning in Garrity is more persuasive and precludes Lyon‘s claim. It is no doubt true that one purpose of the call may be to obtain advice on the question of whether to consent to chemical testing. But as Garrity makes clear, the phone call can certainly be used for other purposes as well, including making arrangements for a suspect to be bailed out or picked up upon his or her release. See 765 N.W.2d at 596. We do not believe law enforcement officers must help shape the nature of the communication with attorneys and family members once they have honored the accused‘s right to communicate with such individuals. Deputy Tart‘s response to Lyon‘s statement, in essence that it was up to him to determine the nature of the communication with his attorney or family member, was thus not misleading but was a correct statement of law.
We also reject the claim that Deputy Tart improperly sequenced events to eviscerate Lyon‘s statutory right to contact an attorney or family member. After his arrest, Lyon was provided his Miranda rights and the implied-consent advisory. While a specific request for a specimen had not yet been made, a reasonable per-
V. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except HECHT, J., who takes no part.