STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Craig E. HARRISON, Appellant.
No. 12-0139.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
May 2, 2014.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Kelly G. Cunningham, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
WATERMAN, Justice.
Are police officers permitted to stop a motorist because his license plate frame covers up the county name? Two district court judges in this case issued conflicting rulings on that question, although both denied defendant‘s motion to suppress evidence of the crack cocaine found in his possession after the traffic stop at issue. Police officers gave two reasons for stopping defendant‘s Jeep - their belief his license plate was in violation of
A district court judge, who presided at the suppression hearing, initially ruled the license plate frame gave no reason to stop defendant because the large plate numbers and letters were visible, but upheld the traffic stop based on a reasonable suspicion of drug dealing. A different judge who presided at trial upheld the stop based on the license plate violation alone and excluded evidence of the informant and suspicious behavior preceding the traffic stop. The jury found defendant guilty as charged. He appealed, and we transferred his appeal to the court of appeals, which held the traffic stop was lawful based on reasonable suspicion of drug dealing without deciding the license plate issue. That court also affirmed the district court‘s rejection of defendant‘s claim the State breached a plea agreement. We granted defendant‘s application for further review to decide whether a license plate violation justified this traffic stop.
For the reasons explained below, we hold a license plate frame that covers up the county name violates
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The evening of July 7, 2009, Davenport police officers Craig Burkle and Jason Ellerbach were on patrol in an unmarked Crown Victoria when they received a phone call from a confidential informant. The informant gave the officers an address and told them they would find “a black male ... slinging dope” in a red Jeep Cherokee with Iowa license plate No. 994 RDB. The officers drove to the address, found the Jeep parked there unoccupied, and waited nearby for the driver to return.
Minutes later, the officers located the Jeep a few blocks away. The officers followed the driver back to the address given by the informant, where he parked. The officers believed the driver “possibly was doing drops, dropping off narcotics to other residences.” Shortly thereafter, the driver left again in the Jeep. The officers followed for three miles and then initiated a traffic stop because the Jeep‘s license plate frame covered up the county name on the license plate, which the officers believed violated
On August 11, the State charged Harrison with (1) possession with intent to deliver a schedule II controlled substance, in violation of
On June 7, Harrison filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the traffic stop. A hearing on the motion was held June 9. Officer Ellerbach and Officer Burkle testified regarding the events leading up to the traffic stop. Officer Ellerbach acknowledged the county name on a license plate is unnecessary for law enforcement to conduct a license plate check.
On June 14, the district court issued its ruling on Harrison‘s motion to suppress. The court first concluded
The jury trial began September 19, 2011. A different judge presided over the trial, and this judge disagreed with the prior ruling on the license plate issue. The trial judge gave this explanation for upholding the traffic stop based on the license plate violation:
[I] looked at this file and my concern is that the motion to suppress was granted on one ground, and the Court at that time found that the other ground was pretextual for the traffic stop. I disagree with that. The traffic stop was done by the policemen because they could not see the entire writing on the license plate, and I looked at the statute and I‘m having trial this morning, so I would find that the traffic stop was a valid traffic stop because the section 321.166(2) requires a license plate to have a county designation on it. The other statute, 321.37, states that a registration plate or a license plate has to permit full view of all numerals and letters printed on the registration plate. So I believe it was a valid traffic stop, which means that the confidential informant does not have to be mentioned whatsoever.
The trial court thus excluded any mention of the confidential informant or Harrison‘s behavior before the traffic stop. The jury ultimately found Harrison guilty on all counts.
Harrison appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. Harrison argued the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress because neither the alleged license plate violation nor the surrounding circumstances created reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. He also challenged the district court‘s ruling that allowed the State to withdraw from the plea agreement.
The court of appeals concluded the informant‘s tip and Harrison‘s driving gave the officers reasonable suspicion to stop him. The court of appeals did not consider whether the alleged violation of
II. Scope of Review.
“On further review, we have the discretion to review all or some of the issues raised on appeal....” State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 2012). In this appeal, we exercise that discretion and confine our review to whether the officers validly stopped Harrison for violating
The validity of the traffic stop based on the frame covering up the county name on the license plate presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review for correction of errors at law. See State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 2013).
III. Analysis.
“When a peace officer observes a traffic offense, however minor, the officer has probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.” State v. Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Iowa 1993). A traffic violation therefore also establishes reasonable suspicion. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
Harrison argues the phrase “numerals and letters” in
Every registration plate or pair of plates shall display a registration plate number which shall consist of alphabetical or numerical characters or a combination thereof and the name of this state, which may be abbreviated. Every registration plate issued by the county treasurer shall display the name of the county, ... except Pearl Harbor and purple heart registration plates issued prior to January 1, 1997, and collegiate, fire fighter, and medal of honor registration plates.
Harrison argues that when the legislature intends to refer broadly to all of the information on a license plate, it uses different terminology than “numerals and letters.” Namely,
Harrison further argues
The State counters that the language of
In response to Harrison‘s argument that the county name is not an important piece of information, the State emphasizes that
The State alternatively asserts Harrison violated
We have not previously interpreted
We conclude the plain language of
It is unlawful for the owner of a vehicle to place any frame around or over the registration plate which does not permit full view of all numerals and letters printed on the registration plate.
We reject Harrison‘s interpretation that
Harrison‘s interpretation would undermine the display requirements for Iowa license plates.
Our interpretation of
The trial judge correctly ruled that
district court therefore correctly denied his motion to suppress. Because we uphold the stop on the basis of his license plate violation, we need not decide and do not reach the issue of whether the stop was independently justified on grounds of reasonable suspicion of drug dealing.
IV. Disposition.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of appeals opinion on the plea agreement issue, vacate its decision on the reasonable suspicion issue, and affirm the district court judgment and sentence.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except APPEL and HECHT, JJ., who dissent.
APPEL, Justice (dissenting).
In my view, the term “all numerals and letters” in
Every registration plate or pair of plates shall display a registration plate number which shall consist of alphabetical or numerical characters or a combination thereof and the name of this state, which may be abbreviated. Every registration plate issued by the county treasurer shall display the name of the county.... (Emphasis added.)
This provision distinguishes between the registration plate number, which contains
There is, however, a countervailing policy and a larger story in this case that should not be overlooked. Davenport police had received a tip from a confidential informant, but the tip contained only conclusory information. Unlike a tip from a citizen informant, a tip from a confidential informant is not entitled to a presumption of reliability. See State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Iowa 1996) (“Because the confidential informant was not a citizen informant, the informant was not entitled to a presumption of reliability.“); State v. Drake, 224 N.W.2d 476, 478-79 (Iowa 1974) (noting the rule requiring the state to prove the informant‘s “prior reliability is considerably relaxed” in the case of a citizen informant).
At the suppression hearing, the State offered no evidence of the informant‘s reliability. Instead, the State attempted to rely on corroboration at the scene, which consisted almost solely of corroboration of innocent facts like the make, model, and license plate number. Mere corroboration of innocent facts does not establish the basis for a Terry-type traffic stop. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1379, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 261 (2000) (holding that to establish reasonable suspicion, the tip must “be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person“); United States v. Roch, 5 F.3d 894, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding tip from known confidential informant who had previously given reliable information did not provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop because the tip failed to provide “significant details” or “a prediction of future behavior” and police did not observe any suspicious behavior in their surveillance of the defendant).
The only allegedly suspicious activity is that the suspect‘s car pulled over to the side of the road for a few minutes after having been followed from “a far distance,” or at a distance of “a block or two,” by an unmarked police car. I am not sure a car pulling over gives rise to a hunch, let alone the reasonable suspicion traditionally required to execute a traffic stop under either the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Revoal, 269 P.3d 1238, 1241 (Colo. 2012) (no reasonable suspicion when defendant looked left, looked right, and walked away when he noticed a police vehicle); State v. McCleery, 251 Neb. 940, 560 N.W.2d 789, 793 (1997) (holding approaching motorist who turns around and drives away rather than pass through a checkpoint does not trigger reasonable suspicion for a stop); State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d 649, 661 (Tenn. 2006) (flight, without more, does not establish reasonable suspicion); State v. Gatewood, 163 Wash. 2d 534, 182 P.3d 426, 428 (2008) (walking away from police does not give rise to reasonable suspicion).
The officers seem to have realized they did not have a basis for the traffic stop based upon the unreliable and uncorroborated confidential informant‘s tip and the mere pulling over of a vehicle along the side of the road. So, instead, they defended the stop by asserting the license plate frame covered the name of the county on the bottom of the plate.
This stop raises the question of pretext. The officers were not engaged in their stakeout to look for license plate violations,
There is a question as to whether a pretextual basis for a stop or search is constitutionally sufficient. The United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-16, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774-76, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 97-100 (1996), answered this question in the affirmative under the Fourth Amendment, and we are bound by that interpretation for purposes of the United States Constitution. Following the Supreme Court‘s lead, one court allowed a stop based on the obstruction caused by hanging air fresheners and fuzzy dice. See Commonwealth v. Shabazz, 18 A.3d 1217, 1222 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
At least two state appellate courts, however, have rejected Whren in the context of traffic stops in interpreting their state constitutions. The most recent case is State v. Ochoa, 146 N.M. 32, 206 P.3d 143 (App. 2008). In this case, the New Mexico appellate court considered whether a stop for a seat belt violation of a suspect being investigated for drug activity violated the search and seizure clause of the New Mexico Constitution. Id. at 146-47. The New Mexico court canvassed numerous authorities, noting, in particular, the ease with which law enforcement may stop automobiles on the road in light of the pervasiveness of minor traffic violations. Id. at 148-50. The New Mexico court emphasized that under the New Mexico Constitution, there is no reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile. Id. at 151. The New Mexico court further stated:
In performing a pretextual traffic stop, a police officer is stopping the driver, “not to enforce the traffic code, but to conduct a criminal investigation unrelated to the driving. Therefore the reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction has occurred which justifies an exception to the warrant requirement for an ordinary traffic stop does not justify a stop for criminal investigation.” Id. at 149 (quoting State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 979 P.2d 833, 837-38 (1999)).
The New Mexico court relied on a case from the Washington Supreme Court, which reached a similar conclusion. See id. (citing Ladson, 979 P.2d at 837-38); see also State v. Heath, 929 A.2d 390, 402 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006) (concluding that stops “demonstrated to have been made exclusively for the purpose of investigating an officer‘s hunch about some other offense” violate the Delaware Constitution). See generally Michael Sievers, Note, State v. Ochoa: The End of Pretextual Stops in New Mexico?, 42 N.M. L. Rev. 595 (2012) (discussing the New Mexico court‘s decision in Ochoa and concluding the court was right to depart from United States Supreme Court precedent).
While we have recognized police may stop a vehicle when there is reason to believe there is an ongoing civil infraction, State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 774 (Iowa 2011), we have never directly considered the validity of a traffic stop where the basis of the stop was alleged to be pretextual. This issue of whether Whren is good law under the Iowa Constitution when a traffic stop is based on pretext, however, was not raised by Harrison and we do not address it today.
Much has been written about unbridled discretion to stop vehicles on the open road. In particular, commentary has been concerned that without some constitutional restraints, African-Americans and other
We recently began to closely examine traffic stops to prevent expanded and unwarranted searches and seizures. See, e.g., State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 297-98 (Iowa 2013) (concluding there was neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle for a license plate violation and that the officer may have specifically targeted the vehicle for some other unknown reason); Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 782-84 (holding consent to search a vehicle was invalid where the suspect had been subject to a pat-down search, detained in the police vehicle, and was not advised that he was free to leave, that he could refuse consent, or that all business related to the initial stop was complete). Other state supreme courts have utilized their state constitutions to prevent arbitrary police conduct on the open road in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Sitz v. Dep‘t of State Police, 443 Mich. 744, 506 N.W.2d 209, 210 (1993) (declining to follow under state constitution on remand the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 361-63 (Minn. 2004) (rejecting United States Supreme Court decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), which permitted custodial arrest for seat belt violation); Ascher v. Comm‘r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994) (declining to follow the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Sitz, in case involving temporary road block); State v. Sterndale, 139 N.H. 445, 656 A.2d 409, 411 (1995) (rejecting “automobile exception” to warrant requirement and declining to follow United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)); State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 790 A.2d 903, 912 (2002) (consent to search a vehicle must be based on reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing beyond initial valid motor vehicle stop, departing from Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), in context of traffic stop). These state supreme courts refuse to simply color match cases under their state constitutions with federal precedent and, instead, engage in independent analysis of the state constitutional issues presented.
In the meantime, the take-away point for Iowa citizens is that they better go out
HECHT, J., joins this dissent.
See also 842 N.W.2d 661.
Dennis H. HAGENOW and Rosalee A. Hagenow, Appellees, v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
No. 12-2088.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
May 2, 2014.