STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Sameer Girish THAKAR, Appellee (Defendant below).
No. 29S02-1705-CR-284
Supreme Court of Indiana.
October 2, 2017
80 N.E.3d 257
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Jane H. Ruemmele, Charles C. Hayes, Hayes Ruemmele, LLC f/k/a, Sweeney Hayes, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 29A02-1606-CR-1265
Massa, Justice.
The State charged then-38-year-old Sameer Girish Thakar with Class D felony dissemination of matter harmful to minors under
According to the charging information, in 2014, 38-year-old Thakar began chatting online under the username “sam_sam” with L.S., a 16-year-old girl in Oregon. Approximately one hour after learning L.S.‘s age, he sent her a photo of his erect penis. Shortly thereafter Oregon FBI agents reached out to the Fishers Police Department with this information, and when officers went to Thakar‘s house, he was cooperative in the extreme: Thakar admitted to the conversation under his username “sam_sam,” identified L.S. by name, and identified printouts of pictures he had sent, including the photograph of his penis.
The State of Indiana charged Thakar under the Dissemination Statute, and Thakar moved to dismiss on constitutional grounds, claiming the Statute was void for vagueness. In support, Thakar relied upon Salter v. State, 906 N.E.2d 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (electronic transmission of a photo of an erect penis to a 16-year-old girl out of state), where the court found the Dissemination Statute void for vagueness as applied, because the age of consent to sexual activity (absent unique circumstances) is only 16 in Indiana pursuant to
We granted transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision below.
Standard of Review
“We review a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to dismiss a charging information for an abuse of discretion [and a] trial court [] abuses its discretion when it misinterprets the law.” An-Hung Yao v. State, 975 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (Ind. 2012). A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a “pure question of law,” which we review de novo. State v. Doe, 987 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (Ind. 2013). “[A]ll statutes are presumptively constitutional, and the court must resolve all reasonable doubts concerning a statute in favor of constitutionality.” Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Dep‘t of State Revenue v. Caterpillar, Inc., 15 N.E.3d 579, 587 (Ind. 2014)). That being said, unlike the higher burden faced by those making a facial constitutional challenge, those challenging the statute as applied “need only show the statute is unconstitutional on the facts of the particular case.” State v. Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d 368, 369 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotations omitted).
The Dissemination Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague.
“Due process principles advise that a penal statute is void for vagueness if it does not clearly define its prohibitions,” and one such source of vagueness is if the statute lacks “notice enabling ordinary people to understand the conduct that it prohibits.” Tiplick, 43 N.E.3d at 1262 (quoting Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d 464, 467 (Ind. 2007)). Here, the Dissemination Statute made it a Class D felony at the
A matter or performance is harmful to minors for purposes of this article if:
(1) it describes or represents, in any form, nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse;
(2) considered as a whole, it appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors;
(3) it is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable matter for or performance before minors; and
(4) considered as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
Thakar does not assert that the Dissemination Statute (or the terms therein defined by separate statute) are unduly vague or otherwise unconstitutional standing alone; rather, relying on Salter, he asserts that since this 16-year-old girl could legally view his erect penis in person in Indiana as part of consensual sexual activity under
We agree with the State, finding Thakar‘s argument suffers from a number of decisive infirmities. First, canons of statutory construction (such as in pari materia) are only relevant once it is established that the statute in question is ambiguous. Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316, 327 (Ind. 2016). Here, the plain text of the Dissemination Statute contains no such ambiguity, and clearly encompasses the conduct Thakar has been charged with performing. “We thus begin—and end—our analysis” with that plain text. Id.
Second, Thakar attempts to impute ambiguity into the Dissemination Statute by pointing out disparate statutory treatment, claiming that the consent statute and the Dissemination Statute are in “apparent conflict” and should be read consistently. Appellee‘s Br. at 14-15. But there is no conflict between these two statutes requiring such resolution, because Thakar was capable of complying with both simultaneously: with respect to a 16-year-old, consensual sexual activity in person is permitted, the dissemination of a sexually-explicit photograph (consensually or otherwise) is not. And to baldly assert that for a 16-year-old girl consensual sex is equivalent to the abrupt appearance of an erect penis on her computer is nothing more than a policy determination, and it is not the place of our Court to usurp that role from our General Assembly.
Third, even assuming this statutory scheme taken as a whole could render the Dissemination Statute ambiguous, the first element of
Fourth, giving meaning to this first element of
We also wish to address two additional arguments discussed below. First, we find it of no consequence that our public exposure statutes contain an enhancement from “public nudity” to “public indecency” if the person intentionally exposed himself to a child under the age of 16, rather than age 18. See
The Dissemination Statute clearly protects minors under the age of 18 from the dissemination of matter harmful to them, and thus Salter v. State, 906 N.E.2d 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) is overruled. Whether this inconsistent statutory treatment of minors aged 16 and 17 is advisable with respect to sexually-related activity is a matter for the legislature, and whether Thakar‘s alleged conduct violated the Dissemination Statute is a matter for the jury.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court‘s dismissal order in this cause, and remand for further proceedings.
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.