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Brown v. State
868 N.E.2d 464
Ind.
2007
Check Treatment

*1 healthy subject utilities whether should legisla- policy

to Section is a choice the readily

ture could make based a desire private encourage investment sewer Indeed, majori-

and water facilities.

ty’s less reading seems reasonable to me.

Distressed utilities would seem to be the acquired by gov-

best candidates to be entity

ernmental to assure stable service. legislature

On its face is odd that the prevent governmental choose ac-

quisition perhaps of this imaginary

distressed but permit utilities it as to

healthy ones. policy

Whatever considerations

be, it seems to me this section was

carefully crafted to apply all utilities. If

that is proper reading not a of Section Assembly

the General easily could correct

it, City and the could then initiate a new

eminent domain proceeding. Because I Appeals correctly

believe the Court of re- issue, deny

solved this I would transfer.

Given that granted, transfer has I been

respectfully dissent.

DICKSON, J., concurs. BROWN, Appellant

Richard

(Defendant below), Indiana, Appellee

STATE of

(Plaintiff below).

No. 49S05-0612-CR-494.

Supreme Court Indiana.

June

not serve as a basis for the convictions and that case evidence insuffi- cient to establish all of the statutory ele- deception, ments we reverse. *3 The criminal charges stemmed from a defendant, series of in incidents which the pretending station, to work radio telephoned at least three adult men and falsely informed them a in radio contest they which could each win a new car or they cash if places drive from their of employment to a address (which happened to be the defendant’s res- idence), enter and remove all of their clothes, exchange them for a T-shirt. Each of the men appeared at defen- home, dant’s and two of the men satisfied requirements fictitious contest but re- Schumm, IN, Joel M. Indianapolis, At- prize. no ceived Each man contacted the torney for Appellant. radio station and discovered that it had no Carter, Attorney Steve General of such employee and was sponsoring Indiana, Stein, Kathryn Jodi Deputy At- such contest. torney General, IN, Indianapolis, Attor- The defendant asserts numerous issues neys for Appellee. on appeal, dispositive. but two are 1. Criminal Confinement as Removal by Fraud or Enticement The defendant contends DICKSON, that the crimi- Justice. nal confinement convictions vague- fail for defendant, The Brown, Richard Carlos ness provides because the statute neither appeals his convictions and sen resulting adequate notice to defendants about what tence on three counts of criminal confine conduct has been nor criminalized minimal ment and identity three counts of decep guidelines to distinguish in- criminal from tion, all felonies. The Court of nocent conduct. The State denies that the Appeals reversed the criminal confinement statutory language vague, especially convictions, finding the applicable statuto applied case, when to the defendant ry provisions unconstitutionally vague, but that, because the defendant’s conduct it affirmed the convictions for de enticement, “was fraud ception and remanded for sentencing. conduct falls squarely within the confines Brown v. 699, 713, 716 and the statute was not (Ind.Ct.App.2006), aff'd, reh., 856 vague applied to him.” Br. Appellee’s N.E.2d (Ind.Ct.App.2006). 739 Both the at 16. transfer, defendant and the sought State which we granted. Brown v. Each of the three counts of criminal (Ind.2006) (table). N.E.2d 599 Finding the defendant that the criminal confinement can- statute knowingly used “fraud” “enticement” to Inc., 770 N.E.2d at 816 Healthscript, to an- one person] from [a

“remove ” Harriss, 80, United States v. (quoting 81. To Appellant’s App’x .... other 617, 808, 812, 612, 74 S.Ct. L.Ed. charges, the U.S. to these pertinent the extent (1954)). State provided: applicable (Ind.1985), this Court em (a) inten- knowingly or phasized something that “there tionally: a criminal statute to indicate where the (1) ... trivial and line is to be drawn between by fraud, person, removes things substantial so that erratic arrests force, force, or threat convictions for trivial acts and omis another; place to from one *4 will not It cannot left to sions occur. be ..., ... a criminal confinement commits juries, judges, prosecutors draw felony. D Class statutory the Accordingly, such lines.” (2004) 35-42-3-3(a) (emphasis sufficiently definite language “convey added) (amended 2006). . proscribed warning as conduct when understanding.” measured common validity of a challenge to A State, 89, v. 477 N.E.2d 93 Rhinehardt presumption a that must overcome statute (Ind.1985). v. Lom is constitutional. State the statute (Ind.2000). 653, bardo, N.E.2d 655 738 But a statute “is not void for has the challenging statute party

The ordinary if vagueness individuals of intelli Brady v. proving of otherwise. burden it to the extent gence comprehend could (Ind.1991). 981, State, 575 N.E.2d fairly it inform them of that principles advise process Due Klein, 698 generally proscribed conduct.” vagueness is if penal a statute void for that Lombardo, 299; at accord prohibitions. its it does not define the statute does not N.E.2d at 656. And (Ind. 296, 299 v. 698 N.E.2d Klein prohib all of specifically have to list items 1998) Rockford, City v. (citing Grayned conduct; rather, it must inform ited 2294, 104, L.Ed.2d S.Ct. U.S. generally pro individual conduct (1972)). criminal statute be invali A Lombardo, 738 N.E.2d scribed. of two inde vagueness for for either dated vagueness challenge a The examination of failing provide for pendent reasons: cir light of the facts and performed enabling ordinary people to under notice case. Id. each individual cumstances of prohibits, and the conduct that it stand vagueness claim focuses it The defendant’s that authorizes or possibility for the “remove,” terms in the statute: discriminatory three encourages arbitrary or en “fraud,” Morales, To determine and “enticement.” v. Chicago City forcement. applies, 1849, 1859, vagueness doctrine 41, 56, 144 whether 119 S.Ct. 527 U.S. (1999); terms not consider each of these Healthscript, we L.Ed.2d 79-80 (Ind. isolation, The statute does but in context. 815-16 Inc. 2002). for provide definition is the re related consideration per terms. our evaluation give a of these three quirement penal that a claim, vagueness which ordinary that the defendant’s intelligence fair notice son of ordinary people under- hinges upon how is forbidden so contemplated conduct prefer con- we criminally statutory language, “no held re stand man shall be dictionaries, specialized not a he could not sult standard sponsible for conduct which by the dictionary as cited State. proscribed.” legal reasonably understand be dictionaries advise that ing Such “re an untruth to persuade an Alzheim- a place move” means to move from or patient er’s to enter the location of position.1 proscribes The statute thus con caregiver. person duct that causes another to move Criminal confinement for removal en- place

from one to another for iden reasons ticement can likewise applied to crimi- fraud, enticement, improper: tified as legitimate, nalize an assortment of normal force, or threat force. The word “re everyday behavior. The word “entice- move,” as used in the rather ment” is commonly understood to mean straightforwardly fairly rea informs of attracting, luring, act tempting or sonably intelligent person that is unlaw by arousing hope or desire.3 ful to cause another to move from a The specified confinement, or improper location offense reject the reasons. We defendant’s claim felony, would thus occur per- whenever a unconstitutionally vague that the statute is son knowingly intentionally arouses by reason of its use the word “remove.” hope or desire in another lure change attract the other to location. Lit- But the terms “fraud” “en erally, this proscription would *5 include ticement,” statute, in used as are array broad quite of acceptable human problematic. Ordinary people commonly behavior, e.g., intra-spousal parent- and to “trickery,” understand “fraud” mean child communications to change induce a “deception,” or “deceit.”2 Thus under location; stood, commercial advertising the offense of criminal to entice confine ment, felony, events; com travel or visits stores or reli- person mitted whenever a knowingly or gious appeals to foster church attendance. intentionally person causes another to As enticement, to both possi- fraud change by location of trickery, means bilities seem endless. deception, scope or deceit. The of such possibilities Such intuitively obvious of proscription would embrace a vast as improper applications of the criminal con- sortment very acceptable of and even finement persuasive statute is evidence salutary conduct that is crim that, respect with by to removal or fraud nature,

inal in e.g., using misleading rea enticement, the statute fails to “indicate sons to secure a person’s attendance for where the line is to be drawn between surprise celebration; their birthday trivial things and substantial evoking so that errat- Santa Claus’s watchful eye to bed; ic induce a child go arrests and convictions for trivial employing acts flattery exaggeration or to motivate an omissions will not occur.” event; other to attend an assert- 476 N.E.2d at 123. And it is likewise See, e.g., The American part induce something another with of val- b: an act (2d ed.1985) ("[t]o position move from a legal right ue or to surrender a occupied”); College The Random House Dic- deceiving TRICK”). misrepresenting: or (Rev. ed.1984) ("to tionary 1116 move from a position”). or 3.See, e.g., Heritage Dictionary The American (2d ed.1985) (defining "entice” to mean: See, e.g., Heritage Dictionary The American desire; by arousing "To hope attract or (2d ed.1985) ("1. deception deliberately A lure”); Collegiate Webster's Ninth New Dic- practiced in order to secure unfair or unlaw- (1987) tionary (defining "entice” to gain. piece trickery”); ful 2. Webster’s artfully adroitly mean: "to attract (1987) Collegiate Dictionary Ninth New arousing TEMPT”). hope or desire: ("1 DECEIT, TRICKERY; a: specifically]: perversion intentional of truth in order to there was no evidence charges encour- because it authorizes or because vulnerable identifying that he used the information discriminatory enforce- arbitrary or ages individual. N.E.2d at 815-16. Healthscript, 770 ment. fraud or removal prohibit

As seeks counts of Each of the three confinement stat- the criminal defendant “did deception charged of the the individual inform ute fails to knowingly identifying information use the Lombardo, generally proscribed. conduct person, namely Radio Now of another (93.1), N.E.2d at 656. consent person’s without other to harm or defraud and with the intent conclude that We therefore an- person,., profess to be another statute, person, agent that is: an Radio other 35-42-3-3, to its inclusion (93.1).” Appellant’s App’x 80-81. Now “enticement,” is void for “fraud” and words charges, pertinent To the extent to these for the and cannot be basis vagueness, applicable provided: But convictions this case. defendant’s (a) ..., knowingly or in- invalidate the statute as this does not in- ... tentionally uses the constitutionality preserve To whole. person: formation another it a “may give courts a criminal consent; person’s without the other nul it from narrowing construction save lification, does not such construction where to: with intent policy new or different basis establish a (A) person; harm or defraud legislative intent.” with and is consistent (B) ...; or N.E.2d at 123.4 Downey, 476 *6 (C) person; to be another profess above, infirm statute is not As noted the identity deception, a Class commits We of the term “remove.” by reason felony. the Indiana construe therefore (2004) (amend- 35-43-5-3.5(a) § Ind.Code from statute to exclude Sec- 2006). this purposes provi- For the ed 3-3(a)(2) fraud, “by entice- phrase the tion charged of- sion, to the and as relevant ment,” leaving proscrip- it intact as to its fense, information” phrase “identifying the knowingly or a against tion to mean “information defined specifically by intentionally “removes individual, including an an that identifies to place one or threat of force” from force name, address, date of ... individual’s was con- Because the defendant another. iden- birth, employer employment, removing persons by fraud victed name, number, maiden mother’s tification criminal con- we reverse his number, any identifica- Security Social finement convictions. en- by governmental a tion issued number 35-43-5-l(h) § tity ...” Ind.Code Using Identity Deception Infor- 2. added) (current version at Ind. (emphasis an Individual mation that Identifies 35-43-5-1(0). “individ- The word Code refer to a commonly the understood to contends that ual” is The defendant “per- in contrast being,5 single the ele human insufficient establish evidence is individual son,” either an which can mean identity deception of the three ments added) 35-46-l-4(a)(l) (emphasis a criminal Court construed In this amended). (since neglect aof defining the offense of "may” in the dependent to exclude the word See, e.g., American endanger life or health.” phrase "that (2d ed.1985) (defining "individual” the noun being human or other corporation Because the evidence does not establish legal entity.6 that the defendant committed the offense by using specifically identify- information addressing a claim insuffi ing another being, individual human the evidence, appellate cient an court con insufficient prove evidence is all only probative siders evidence and identity elements of the crimes of supporting reasonable inferences deception. judgment whether a assess reason able trier fact could have found the Conclusion beyond a guilty defendant reasonable The defendant’s convictions for criminal doubt. v. Whedon confinement and are deception (Ind.2002). Applying this reversed, each and we remand further standard, the trial evidence establishes proceedings with conformity opin- spoke peo the defendant to three ion. contest, ple about phony each time representative himself as a SULLIVAN, BOEHM, RUCKER, station, corporation. of the radio And JJ., concur. with at people, least one the de C.J., SHEPARD, part dissents as to Ross,” fendant claimed be “Scott part and concurs as separate without representative of the radio station. But opinion. this was fictitious name created

the defendant did not coincide with person. real statute, penal construing

When

ambiguous language construed strictly against the State and in favor of STATE of Indiana ex rel. Kurt the accused. Merritt v. HOFFMAN, Relator, M. (Ind.2005). 472, 475 Applying phrase “identifying information” as defined charge against the defendant *7 COURT, The ALLEN CIRCUIT Therese required prove State that the defen Brown, Thereof, M. as Clerk and The address, name, dant an used individual’s Craig Bobay, Hon. Judge J. There- birth, identifiers, date of or other to com of, Respondents.

mit the crime. While there was No. 02S00-0704-OR-161. evidence that the defendant used informa tion corporate radio station Supreme Court of Indiana. consent, without its there was no evidence June name, address, that he used the date of birth, or other of any existing identifiers being

human in perpetrating his hoax. single to mean: "A being human considered being organiza- son” to mean: "A human separately group society.”); from a or from duties.”); legal rights tion with Random College (Rev. Dictionary Random House (Rev. ed.1984) College Dictionary House ed.1984) (defining the noun "individual” to (in part defining "person” the noun to mean: single being, mean: "a human as distin- being, group "a beings, human human guished group.”) from estate, corporation, legal entity an or other See, recognized by rights e.g., having law as American (2d ed.1985) (in part defining duties.”) "per- the noun

Case Details

Case Name: Brown v. State
Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 22, 2007
Citation: 868 N.E.2d 464
Docket Number: 49S05-0612-CR-494
Court Abbreviation: Ind.
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