STATE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner, vs. DAZARIAN CORDELL LEWARS, Respondent.
No. SC17-1002
Supreme Court of Florida
December 13, 2018
LAWSON, J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Lewars v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1098 (Fla. 2d DCA May 12, 2017), which certified conflict with the decisions in State v. Wright, 180 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), and Louzon v. State, 78 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). The certified conflict concerns the construction of one element of the definition of “prison releasee reoffender” provided in
We have jurisdiction due to the certification of conflict. See
FACTS
Dazarian Cordell Lewars was convicted of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. Lewars, 42 Fla. L. Weekly at D1098. For this offense, Lewars was sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years’ imprisonment under
To support PRR sentencing, the trial court relied on the fact that Lewars had been released from a twenty-four-month sentence within the three years preceding the burglary. Id. The legal issue concerning the applicability of the PRR statute centers on whether Lewars’ release from that sentence satisfies the “released from” language of the PRR statute, given that Lewars served his prior twenty-four-month sentence entirely in the county jail, rather than in prison, due to his accumulation
Although the sentencing order for the prior case committed Lewars to the custody of the DOC for a prison sentence, Lewars was never physically transferred to a prison facility. Id. After sentencing in that case, the local sheriff‘s office observed that Lewars had been sentenced to time served and contacted the DOC for instructions. Id. Upon receiving confirmation from the DOC that Lewars was entitled to release, the local sheriff‘s office had Lewars sign a “prison release form” sent by the DOC and then released him directly from the county jail. Id. DOC records state that Lewars was released from the “Central Office.” However, it is undisputed that “Lewars never actually set foot in a DOC facility before committing the burglary” for which he was given a PRR sentence. Id.
In reversing Lewars’ PRR sentence, the Second District relied on the plain, unambiguous language of the PRR statute, reasoning as follows:
The pertinent language of
section 775.082(9)(a)(1)(q) defines a PRR as “any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit . . . burglary of a dwelling . . . within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor . . . .” (Emphasis added.) In requiring release from a DOC “facility“—rather than, for example, from DOC “custody” or simply “by DOC“—PRR status plainly contemplates release from a physical plant operated by the DOC (or a private vendor).[n.2][n.2] Webster‘s New World College Dictionary 485 (3d ed. 1996), which was published near the time that the legislature created the PRR designation, see
ch. 97-239, § 2, at 4398-4401, 4404, Laws of Fla. (effective May 30, 1997), defines a “facility,” in pertinent part, as “a building, special room, etc., that facilitates or makes possible some activity.” See also Sanders v. State, 35 So. 3d 864, 871 (Fla. 2010) (“When a word in a statute is not expressly defined, it is ‘appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions . . .’ in order to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning’ of the word.” (omission in original) (quoting Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty. v. Survivors Charter Schs., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009)))).There is no dispute that, less than two months before committing the qualifying PRR offense of burglary of a dwelling, Lewars was released from a county jail having never spent a moment in a DOC facility. Consequently, under the unambiguous language of the statute, he does not qualify as a PRR.
The Second District recognized that “the three other district courts of appeal that have addressed the issue would have held that Lewars does qualify as a PRR” and, accordingly, certified conflict with the three decisions establishing this point: Wright, Taylor, and Louzon. Id. at D1099, D1101. The Second District noted that these three cases, like the case before it, all involved defendants who had been released from either federal or DOC custody while housed in county jails and that these courts had found the PRR statute applicable under a theory of “constructive release” from qualifying facilities.1 Id. at D1100. Rejecting these holdings, the
ANALYSIS
The certified conflict concerns an issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo. See Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018); State v. Miller, 227 So. 3d 562, 563 (Fla. 2017). To answer a question of statutory construction, courts must first look to the statute‘s language, Miller, 227 So. 3d at 563, considering its words in the context of the entire section rather than in isolation, Thompson v. State, 695 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1997). If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court must recognize the statute‘s plain meaning and, therefore, need not employ any other rules of statutory construction.
The plain-language approach is required because the courts of this state lack the “power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit[] its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)). Such a construction “would be an abrogation of legislative power.” Id.; see
being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor or . . . being released from a correctional institution of another state, the District of Columbia, the United States, any possession or territory of the United
States, or any foreign jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state.2
The district courts disagree over whether a defendant is “released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor” when the defendant is physically released from a county jail after having been committed to the legal custody of the Department of Corrections but not physically taken to a facility operated by the Department of Corrections. Compare Lewars, 42 Fla. L. Weekly at D1099-1100, with Wright, 180 So. 3d at 1044-46, and Louzon, 78 So. 3d at 680-81; cf. Taylor, 114 So. 3d at 355-56 (construing the similar language pertaining to federal institutions consistently with the decisions in Louzon and Wright). In support of the proposition that it is the legal, rather than physical, custody that matters, the State argues that release from a “prison sentence,” as opposed to a prison facility, is sufficient to satisfy the language of this provision.
However, the language at issue unambiguously supports the conclusion reached by the Second District, that release from a county jail does not satisfy the “released from” element of statute‘s PRR definition. This language addresses the
The surrounding language in
being released from a correctional institution of another state, the District of Columbia, the United States, any possession or territory of the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state.
As another indication of a focus on prison, as opposed to jail, the PRR statute states that “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection.”
That the length of the sentence is not a determining factor under
“Prison releasee reoffender” also means any defendant who commits or attempts to commit any offense listed in sub-subparagraphs (a)1.a.-r. while the defendant was serving a prison sentence or on escape status from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor or while the defendant was on escape status from a correctional institution of another state, the District of Columbia, the United States, any possession or territory of the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that to satisfy the “released from” aspect of the PRR definition based on release from “a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor,” a defendant must have been incarcerated in and physically released from a prison, and not a county facility operated by the local government, within the statutory period. We agree with the observation made below that, in reaching a different or inconsistent conclusion, the courts in Wright, Taylor, and Louzon “skipped the ‘plain language’ step of the statutory-construction analysis” and injected into the PRR statute words, such as “constructive release,” that “simply are not there.” Lewars, 42 Fla. L. Weekly at D1100.
Judge Makar, in his dissent from the Wright decision, explained why the plain language of
A reasonable person could take the view that offenders released from DOC-operated state prisons are, on average, guilty of more serious crimes such that offenders released from a county facility would not trigger PRR sentencing; or perhaps the Legislature erred on the side of
caution, limiting PRR status to releases from state prisons to avoid potential misclassifications of prisoners released from county facilities. Even if these are anomalous views, they are not wholly unreasonable; in fact, they make some sense.
Wright, 180 So. 3d at 1048 (Makar, J., dissenting). To this analysis, the Lewars court added two possible reasons the Legislature might have chosen not to apply to the PRR statute to the circumstances presented in this case: (1) “the legislature reasonably could have excluded offenders like [Lewars] from PRR status because it intended only to punish, and to protect society from, those prior offenders who had not been dissuaded by the possibility of extended prison terms despite having already had a sample,” or (2) “the legislature could have reasoned that enhanced sentencing would have been unwarranted for those like Lewars who had previously been confined for longer than their sentence of imprisonment required.” Lewars, 42 Fla. L. Weekly at D1100-01.
We agree with the rationale stated by Judge Makar and the Lewars court. Indeed, this rationale is consistent with our identification of the basis for the PRR statute‘s classification system in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 356 (Fla. 2000), when addressing an equal protection challenge: “While the Act‘s classification scheme does not differentiate based upon the character of the releasee‘s prior crimes, it does focus on the character (and severity) of the latest criminal conduct, together with the fact that recent imprisonment did not dissuade the defendant from engaging in the qualifying offense.” In addition, we agree with Judge Makar‘s
Further, we agree with Judge Makar‘s point that the absurdity doctrine is not appropriate for this statute because, to reach the interpretation advanced by the State and the courts in Wright, Taylor, and Louzon, we would have to rewrite the statute, rather than correct a “technical or ministerial error.” Wright, 180 So. 3d at 1048-49 (Makar, J., dissenting). This we cannot do. See Fla. Dep‘t of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789 So. 2d 320, 324 (Fla. 2001) (“[C]ourts cannot judicially alter the wording of statutes. . . . A court‘s function is to interpret statutes as they are written and give effect to each word in the statute.“) (footnote omitted).
Nevertheless, to bolster its argument under the absurdity doctrine, the State identifies a number of potential scenarios that it argues could result in an arbitrary denial of the State‘s opportunity to seek PRR sentencing against a defendant who would have qualified but for fortuitous circumstances. The State argues that these considerations show that the plain-language construction we have reached would violate defendants’ rights to equal protection. Although it is proper to consider
The concerns expressed by the State in this case are addressed by our analysis in Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 660 (Fla. 2000), where we rejected a similar equal protection challenge to the PRR statute (which at that time did not include release from federal prison as an alternative way to satisfy the “released from” requirement):
[Grant] contends that the Act draws no rational distinction between offenders who serve county jail sentences and those who commit the same acts and yet serve short prison sentences; between those who commit a new offense on the third anniversary of release from prison and others who commit a similar offense three years and a day after release; and between offenders who commit enumerated felonies within three years after their release from the Florida state prison system and those who were recently released from federal prison, local jails or other state prisons. . . . As observed by the Fifth District in King [v. State, 557 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)], “[e]qual protection does not require a state to choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking it at all.” Id. at 902 (citing In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40, 46 (Fla. 1980)). “It is not a requirement of equal protection that every statutory classification be all-inclusive.” Rather, “the statute must merely apply equally to members of the statutory class and bear a reasonable relationship to
some legitimate state interest.” LeBlanc v. State, 382 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1980) (citations omitted). The Legislature “has wide discretion in creating statutory classifications, and there is a presumption in favor of validity.” State v. Leicht, 402 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 1981) (citations omitted). A statutory classification will be deemed to violate equal protection only if it causes “different treatments so disparate as relates to the difference in classification so as to be wholly arbitrary.” In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1980) (citations omitted). As we have stated in a different context, where, as here, no suspect classification is involved, “the statute need only bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest.” Some inequality or imprecision will not “render a statute invalid.” Acton v. Fort Lauderdale Hospital, 440 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1983).
We concluded in Grant that the PRR statute survived an equal protection challenge because it is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest, a test that we explained tolerates “[s]ome inequity or imprecision” in statutory classifications. Id. at 660. That legitimate state interest is, in part, an interest in heightened punishment for repeat offenders whose recent imprisonment “did not dissuade [them] from engaging in the qualifying offense[s].” Id. (quoting Cotton, 769 So. 2d at 356). This reasoning applies equally to the arguments presented in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that “release from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor,”
Ultimately, the State may be correct in its assertion that the Legislature intended for defendants who are sentenced to prison but released from county jails without ever setting foot in a prison to be punished as PRRs. Or, it is possible that the Legislature did not contemplate this circumstance. However, any intent to have a defendant like Lewars punished as a PRR is not clear from the plain language of the statute. The plain language requires the opposite, and it does not result in absurdity or an equal protection violation. We are bound by our precedent and the doctrine of separation of powers to apply the statute as written. See Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.
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Second District - Case No. 2D15-3471
(Lee County)
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Suzanne Beschard, Bureau Chief, and Lisa Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, Matthew Overpeck, and Maureen E. Surber, Assistant Public Defenders, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Respondent