259 So. 3d 793
Fla.2018Background
- Lewars was sentenced under Florida’s prison-releasee reoffender (PRR) statute to a mandatory minimum for burglary; he argued PRR did not apply.
- Less than two months before the burglary, Lewars had been sentenced to a DOC prison term but, due to 766 days of jail credit, served the prior 24-month sentence entirely in county jail and was released directly from the county jail without ever entering a DOC facility.
- The trial court imposed PRR treatment based on that prior sentence; the Second District reversed, holding PRR status requires release from a DOC-operated facility, not merely DOC custody.
- The Second District certified conflict with the First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts (Wright, Taylor, Louzon), which had held that release from county jail under similar circumstances satisfies the statute (constructive release/custody-based approach).
- The Florida Supreme Court accepted review to resolve the conflict and to decide whether “released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor” requires physical release from a DOC-operated facility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Lewars) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does “released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor” require physical release from a DOC-operated facility, or is release from DOC custody (even if physically in county jail) sufficient? | PRR satisfied if defendant was released after serving a prison sentence or committed to DOC custody—even if release occurred from county jail (constructive/legal custody release). | Must be physically released from a DOC-operated facility; release from a county jail is not release from a DOC facility. | The statute’s plain language requires physical release from a DOC-operated facility (or equivalent); release from county jail does not qualify. |
| Does the absurdity doctrine or equal protection concerns justify construing the statute to include releases from county jail (custody-based) despite plain language? | State contends strict text leads to arbitrary outcomes and may prevent equal application of PRR, supporting a custody-based reading to avoid absurd results. | Plain meaning is reasonable; any legislative line-drawing is permissible and not absurd or unconstitutional. | Court rejects absurdity/equal-protection arguments; no rare/exceptional circumstance to override clear statutory text. |
Key Cases Cited
- Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984) (courts must apply unambiguous statutes as written; may not rewrite statutes)
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000) (PRR statute focuses on recent imprisonment failing to deter subsequent qualifying conduct)
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000) (PRR statute withstands equal protection challenge; statute need only bear reasonable relation to legitimate state interest)
- Hopkins v. State, 105 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012) (distinguishes jail from prison; definition of jail as local detention center)
- Wright v. State, 180 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (held release from county jail while committed to DOC custody can satisfy PRR)
- Louzon v. State, 78 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (similar custody-based holding for PRR applicability)
- Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (construed analogous federal-institution language consistent with custody-based approach)
- Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 2018) (statutory-construction principles; start with plain language)
- State v. Miller, 227 So. 3d 562 (Fla. 2017) (same: de novo review of statutory construction)