STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JOHN LOGAN BROWN, Appellant.
No. CR-24-0143-PR
Supreme Court of the State of Arizona
October 7, 2025
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County, No. CR20220381-001, REVERSED AND REMANDED. Memorandum of the Court of Appeals, Division Two, No. 2 CA-CR 23-0138, VACATED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General, Section Chief of Criminal Appeals, Casey D. Ball (argued), Amy M. Thorson, Assistant Attorneys General, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona
James L. Fullin, Pima County Legal Defender, Alex D. Heveri (argued), Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson, Attorneys for John Logan Brown
Jared G. Keenan (argued), Attorney at Law, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Arizona, Phoenix, Attorney for Amici Curiae The American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona & Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice
JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:
¶1 John Brown was charged with three counts of aggravated assault. At trial, Brown asserted that he acted in self-defense and requested several justification jury instructions. The superior court denied Brown’s request that it instruct the jury on the defense of residential structure,
¶2 In this case, we determine whether a bedroom within a condominium constitutes a “residential structure.” We also consider the scope and application of a justification statute that presumes an individual lawfully uses force when defending against an unlawful entry into a residential structure.
¶3 After oral argument before this Court, we issued a decision order finding that the superior court erred in denying Brown’s requested instructions. We also indicated that this Opinion fully explaining our decision would follow.
BACKGROUND
¶4 At the time relevant to the events in this case, Brown lived with J.A., his long-term partner, and their two minor children in a two-bedroom condominium. Although Brown considered J.A. his wife, they lived in separate rooms.
¶5 Brown and J.A. met M.H., the victim, in 2020. M.H. was their neighbor but also occasionally lived with the couple. About a year before the incident leading to Brown’s charges, Brown told J.A. that he was
¶6 In December 2021, Brown and J.A. separated, and he moved out. A month later, after M.H. told J.A. that he did not want her to reconcile with Brown, the two men got into a fight during which M.H. assaulted Brown and broke one of his guitars. Shortly after the fight, Brown moved back in with J.A., and they agreed that M.H. would not return to their condominium.
¶7 However, one week later, J.A. invited M.H. over to help her clean the condominium after Brown left for work. Although Brown knew that M.H. was coming over, he “wasn’t happy about it.” After returning from work and noticing that M.H. was still in the condominium, Brown locked himself in his bedroom. Brown then texted J.A. to “leave him alone for the evening.”
¶8 Defying this request, J.A. attempted to unlock the door to Brown’s bedroom. When that effort failed, J.A. forced the door open, but Brown quickly shut it, telling J.A. that he did not want to talk to her. Undeterred, J.A. forced the door open again. After seeing J.A. and M.H. standing in the doorway to his bedroom, and not knowing who forcibly opened his bedroom door, Brown picked up a microphone stand and began swinging it around to prevent them from coming into his bedroom. Brown and M.H. fought over the microphone stand and during this altercation, M.H. was struck in the face.
¶9 A grand jury indicted Brown on three counts of aggravated assault. One count was based on his actions involving the microphone stand. The two other counts involved conduct that occurred later. The jury found Brown guilty only of the count involving the microphone stand. The trial court sentenced Brown to five years in prison.
¶10 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Brown, No. 2 CA-CR 2023-0138, 2024 WL 2263468, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. May 17, 2024) (mem. decision). The court rejected Brown’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on defense of
¶11 The court began its analysis with
¶12 The court then addressed whether M.H. had the “right to be in” the property as an “invitee.” Id. at *3 ¶ 19;
¶13 After determining that the presumption instruction was not applicable, the court then discussed whether Brown was nonetheless entitled to an instruction on the defense of premises and the defense of a residential structure. Id. at *4 ¶¶ 22–23;
¶14 Regarding the defense of premises instruction, the court reasoned that “Brown could not have reasonably believed that force was ‘immediately necessary to prevent or terminate a . . . criminal trespass’” because “[a] ‘criminal trespass’ requires that the defendant ‘knowingly enter[]’ or ‘remain[] unlawfully on a property.’” Brown, 2024 WL 2263468, at *4 ¶ 22 (alterations in original) (first quoting
¶15 The court of appeals similarly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the defense of residential structure instruction. Id. at *4 ¶ 23. The court also determined that, because
¶16 We granted review because the issues presented in this case are of statewide importance and capable of repetition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
DISCUSSION
I.
¶17 “We review a trial court’s decision to give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Ewer, 254 Ariz. 326, 329 ¶ 10 (2023) (quoting State v. Aragón, 252 Ariz. 525, 528 ¶ 6 (2022)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court commits a legal error by misinterpreting or misapplying the law.” Voice of Surprise v. Hall, 255 Ariz. 510, 513 ¶ 11 (2023). But the trial court has discretion over whether to give or refuse an instruction, and we will not upset that decision “absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309 (1995).
¶18 We review de novo whether a trial court properly instructed the jury. State v. Champagne, 247 Ariz. 116, 130 ¶ 22 (2019). “A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction if the record contains the ‘slightest evidence’ that he acted in self-defense.” State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 90 ¶ 14 (2010) (quoting State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 104 (1983)).
II.
¶19 As indicated above, the trial court declined Brown’s request to instruct the jury on the defense of residential structure and the presumption related to that defense.
¶20 “We interpret statutes ‘in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject.’” Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137, 142 ¶ 15 (2024) (quoting Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568 ¶ 11 (2019)). Courts will read each word, phrase, clause, and sentence in a manner that ensures “no part of the statute
¶21 In Arizona, the statutory definition of a “residential structure” is “any structure, movable or immovable, permanent or temporary, that is adapted for both human residence and lodging whether occupied or not.”
¶22 These statutes use three important but undefined terms: “human residence,” “lodging,” and “separately securable.” When statutory terms are undefined, “courts generally give words their ordinary meaning and may look to dictionary definitions.” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 7 (2024). “Residence” is defined as “the place where one actually lives,” or “a temporary or permanent dwelling place, abode, or habitation to which one intends to return as distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn or transient visit.” Residence, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976); Residence, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) (“A factual place of abode.”). Thus, a “human residence” is a “dwelling place, abode, or habitation” that has been adapted for human living. Next, “lodging” has been defined in common language as “a place to live,” “a place in which to settle or come to rest,” “sleeping accommodations,” or “a room or rooms in the house of another used as a place of residence.” Lodging, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976). Finally, “securable” has been defined as “capable of being secured.” Securable, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976). “Secure,” in turn, means “to relieve from exposure to danger,” or to “make safe.” Secure, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976). Reading these statutes and dictionary definitions together and in the broader statutory context provides that a “residential structure” is: (1) any place with sides and a floor, (2) that is separately securable from any other structure attached to it, and (3) is adapted for both human residence and lodging. The statutory text does not require that a residential structure be completely distinct from any other residential structure, nor does it preclude a residential structure from being nested within another residential structure, as in the case of rooms within a boarding house.
¶24 Our dissenting colleague takes issue with our conclusion that a residential structure may be nested within another residential structure. See infra ¶ 59. The dissent argues that we “largely ignore” the portion of
¶25 Our interpretation of
¶26 The dissent also argues that “[a] residence is generally more than a place to sleep,” and that a residence “typically includes a kitchen, bathroom, and other living areas that together make the home suitable and comfortable for human occupancy,” and concludes that “the entire living space should be considered the ‘residential structure.’” See infra ¶ 62. Again, we disagree.
III.
¶28
¶30 The court of appeals relied on Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), for its conclusion that Brown could not “unilaterally exclude J.A.—or her invitee M.H.—from [Brown’s] bedroom.” Brown, 2024 WL 2263468, at *4 ¶¶ 19–20. This is a misreading of Randolph.
¶31 In Randolph, the United States Supreme Court considered whether an evidentiary seizure was lawful when one occupant to the premises granted permission to search despite the other occupant’s presence and express refusal to consent to the search. 547 U.S. at 106. In analyzing this issue, the Court stated:
Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering that the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.
Id. at 114 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court concluded that law enforcement could not lawfully enter and search a shared residence based on the consent of one occupant when the other occupant was also present and contemporaneously objected to the search. Id. at 120.
¶32 The court of appeals’ reliance on Randolph to support its conclusion that a co-tenant has the authority to prevail over the express wishes of another co-tenant was erroneous. In fact, Randolph supports the opposite conclusion—that J.A. had no authority to invite M.H. into Brown’s bedroom against his express wishes.
¶33 Moreover, the court of appeals’ error regarding Randolph’s holding was heightened when it incorrectly concluded that M.H.’s entry into Brown’s bedroom was lawful because he was J.A.’s “invitee.” See Brown, 2024 WL 2263468, at *3–4 ¶¶ 19–21. Although Brown acknowledged that J.A. was “allowed to invite people over,” an invitee can become a
¶34 In sum, the evidence in this case supports a conclusion that M.H. forcefully entered Brown’s bedroom—a residential structure—and that M.H. did not have the “right to be in” Brown’s bedroom. See
IV.
¶35
[A] person is justified in threatening to use or using physical force or deadly physical force against another person if the person reasonably believes himself or another person to be in imminent peril of death or serious physical injury and the person against whom the physical force or deadly physical force is threatened or used was in the process of unlawfully or forcefully entering, or had unlawfully or forcefully entered, a residential structure.
¶36 The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury regarding defense of residential structure because “no evidence suggested that Brown ‘reasonably believe[d]’ he was ‘in imminent peril of death or serious physical injury’” and “Brown could not have reasonably believed M.H. was ‘unlawfully or forcefully entering’” a residential structure. Brown, 2024 WL 2263468, at *4 ¶ 23 (alteration in original) (quoting
¶37 Because we conclude that
V.
¶39 Under Arizona law, an individual is justified in threatening or using force to defend their “premises.”
A person . . . in lawful possession or control of premises is justified in threatening to use deadly physical force or in threatening or using physical force against another when . . . a reasonable person would believe it immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by the other person in or upon the premises.
¶40
¶41 The court of appeals determined that the defense of premises instruction was not warranted because “Brown could not have reasonably believed that force was ‘immediately necessary to prevent or terminate . . . a criminal trespass.’” Brown, 2024 WL 2263468, at *4 ¶ 22 (alteration in original) (quoting
¶42 As noted above, an individual is justified in threatening or using force to defend their premises if “a reasonable person would believe it immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by the other person.”
¶43 Here, Brown was in lawful control of the premises—his bedroom—when M.H. unlawfully entered without his consent. Under
¶44 Furthermore, the court of appeals erroneously concluded that the facts, absent
VI.
¶45 The State argues that the discrepancy between Arizona’s burglary statutes and the model burglary provisions within the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) expressly indicates the Legislature’s intent to exclude individual rooms from the definition of “residential structure.” We are not persuaded by the State’s argument.
¶46 The Legislature largely relied on the MPC when drafting and revising Arizona’s criminal statutes. State v. Bowsher, 225 Ariz. 586, 587–88 ¶¶ 9–10 (2010); State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 540 (1997). Thus, this Court has stated that the Legislature’s deviation from the MPC provisions may indicate the Legislature’s rejection of that language. Bowsher, 225 Ariz. at 588 ¶ 10; see King, 225 Ariz. at 90 ¶¶ 10–12 (concluding that the Legislature’s adoption of an objective standard for self-defense rather than the MPC’s subjective standard indicates that self-defense “no longer turns on the defendant’s subjective motivations”). However, when the Legislature fails to adopt the applicable MPC provision but also does not enact a statutory provision with directly contrary language, this Court is not bound to infer legislative rejection of the MPC’s language. See State v. Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 538 (1995) (adopting the MPC’s approach requiring the state to prove jurisdictional facts when the Legislature had neither adopted the relevant MPC provision nor enacted language contrary to the MPC).
¶47 Here, the Legislature did not enact the MPC’s burglary provision but also did not enact a provision with directly contrary language indicating that it rejected the idea that individual bedrooms could constitute residential structures. Section 221.1 of the MPC defines burglary as entering a “building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof” with a “purpose to commit a crime therein.” In contrast, Arizona defines burglary as “entering or remaining unlawfully” in or on different types of structures “with the intent to commit any theft or any felony therein.” See
¶48 Additionally, the State argues that State v. Gardella, 156 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 1988), established precedent that a bedroom cannot be a residential structure on its own because it is necessarily a smaller component of a larger residential structure. Gardella is distinguishable. In Gardella, the court of appeals considered whether an attached motel laundry room—a nonresidential area—could be considered a residential structure. 156 Ariz. at 340. The court created a two-step test based on interpretations of the word “residence” from other jurisdictions. Id. at 340, 342. In its analysis, the court first considered whether the main building was used for commercial or residential purposes. Id. at 342. The court then stated that if the main building is residential, “lesser included structures” are “subsumed” into the greater residential structure if they “make[] the building more suitable, comfortable or enjoyable for human occupancy” but that lesser included structures of commercial buildings must be independently assessed for their purpose. Id. at 342. Applying its test, the court concluded that the motel was used for commercial purposes and that the laundry room, standing alone, was not a residential structure. Id.
¶49 The State seeks to expand the scope and applicability of Gardella’s holding. The Gardella court was tasked with determining whether a clearly nonresidential laundry area could be considered part of a motel, which it ultimately determined was a commercial structure. Accordingly, the court’s analysis on “lesser included structures” attached to or located within the residential structure—including its determination that the greater residential structure would “subsume” any lesser structure—was dicta that was unnecessary to its outcome, and we decline to adopt such an analysis here. See Ariz. Corp. Comm’n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 Ariz. 404, 412 (1951) (defining dicta). In fact, subsequent opinions applying Gardella’s reasoning were largely concerned with whether clearly nonresidential areas, such as garages or storage units, could be deemed “attached” to a connected residential structure such as an apartment or house. See, e.g., State v. Browning, 175 Ariz. 236, 237 (App. 1993) (determining whether a separate but attached garage constituted a residential structure); State v. Ekmanis, 183 Ariz. 180, 181 (App. 1995) (considering whether a storage room of a patio home was a residential structure). Because the facts in Gardella are distinguishable from the circumstances here, the State’s reliance—as well as the dissent’s—on Gardella is misplaced.
¶50 The Legislature’s declaration of policy offers further evidence suggesting that a securable bedroom is included within the definition of residential structure. In the Legislature’s declaration of policy, articulated when it adopted
[T]he justification in use of force . . . [to be] applicable to all victims in domestic violence . . . whether such domestic violence occurs in a private or public place and whether or not the victim and the perpetrator of domestic violence are residents of the same home.
Id. The broad language in the legislative declaration of policy supports our conclusion that the terms “residential structure” and “structure” as used in the justification statutes at issue in this case include an individual’s right to defend oneself when another person invades their separately securable bedroom. Cf. Grand Canyon Tr. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 210 Ariz. 30, 40 ¶ 43 (App. 2005) (“When . . . the [L]egislature specifies its purpose in the session law that contains the statute, it is appropriate to interpret the statutory provisions in light of that enacted purpose.”).
¶51 This declaration emphasized the Legislature’s recognition of an individual’s right to the “safe and peaceful enjoyment” of their own home, even against encroachment from residents of the same household, and underscores that all individuals within a shared residence enjoy legal
VII.
¶52 Finally, we reject the State’s argument that any error created by the failure to give Brown’s requested justification jury instructions was harmless. “When an issue is raised but erroneously ruled on by the trial court, this court reviews for harmless error.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993). The state bears the burden of showing harmless error, and we consider whether the error was harmless under the totality of the circumstances. Id.; State v. Strong, 258 Ariz. 184, 200 ¶ 45 (2024). An error is harmless if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no influence on the jury’s judgment. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 18 (2005); Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 294 (2017). In essence, the state must demonstrate that even with the error, no reasonable jury could have found that the state failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 561 ¶ 82 (2003).
¶53 The State argues that no reasonable jury could have concluded “that an objectively reasonable person in Brown’s position would believe it was immediately necessary to use physical force against [M.H.] to prevent criminal trespass or to prevent imminent peril of death or serious physical injury.” It asserts that because Brown testified that he did not feel threatened by M.H. before he swung the microphone stand and because he knew that M.H. was an invitee to the condominium, no reasonable jury could have concluded that he was justified in using force even with the benefit of
¶55 We have previously concluded that a trial court’s decision to give a jury instruction is not harmless error if it “eliminat[ed] the state’s burden of proof” and permits a reasonable jury to conclude that the state did not have to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 178 (1991). It logically follows that a failure to give an instruction is also not harmless if it removes the state’s burden of proving that the defendant was not justified in using force against the victim. Had the trial court instructed the jury as Brown requested, the State would have needed to demonstrate the absence of such justification beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on Brown’s justification defenses eliminated the State’s burden of proof regarding these defenses, the error was not harmless.
CONCLUSION
¶56 We vacate paragraphs 12 through 23 and 35 of the court of appeals’ memorandum decision, affirm the remainder of the decision, reverse the trial court, vacate Brown’s conviction and sentence, and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial consistent with this Opinion.
¶57 The trial court instructed the jury on three justification defenses: self-defense, defense of a third person, and defense of property. See
¶58 Both
¶59 After examining the ordinary meanings of “residence,” “lodging,” and “securable,” the majority defines a “residential structure” as “(1) any place with sides and a floor, (2) that is separately securable from any other structure attached to it, and (3) is adapted for both human residence and lodging.” See supra ¶ 22. Because this definition “[does not] preclude a residential structure from being nested within another residential structure,” the majority concludes that “a residential structure [does not have to be] completely distinct from any other residential structure.” See id. Thus, my colleagues conclude Brown’s bedroom
¶60 I disagree that a “residential structure” under
¶61 The court of appeals’ decision in State v. Gardella, 156 Ariz. 340 (App. 1988), is illustrative. The issue there was whether the defendant committed burglary of a non-residential structure by entering a motel’s laundry room through an outside door. Id. at 340–41. The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the laundry room was part of the motel and therefore a residential structure, so he was wrongly convicted of burglarizing a non-residential structure. See Id. at 341–42. The court implicitly recognized that if the defendant had entered a motel room, he would have burglarized a “residential structure” because the room was separately securable from any other attached structure—like another motel
¶62 Second, the majority’s narrow focus on a bedroom’s use ignores that the room can form part of an occupant’s greater residence. See supra ¶ 23.
¶63 This interpretation does not “effectively rewrite” the statutory definitions of “residential structure” and “structure,” as the majority asserts. See supra ¶ 27. To the contrary, the statutory text supports my view. The definitional statutes contemplate a single structure adapted for residency or lodging and do not address components of those structures. See
¶65 Fourth, and finally, I disagree with the majority that the Legislature’s declaration of policy concerning domestic violence has any bearing on the interpretation of “residential structure.” See supra ¶¶ 50–51. The definitions of “residential structure” and “structure” are set forth in the criminal trespass and burglary statutes and were neither enacted nor altered in the session law containing the Legislature’s policy declaration. Compare
¶66 Turning to the record here, I conclude Brown was not entitled to the defense-of-premises or defense-of-a-residence jury instructions. He resided in the entire condominium, including his bedroom. Because the bedroom was not itself separately securable from other structures attached to the condominium, it is not a “structure.” See