STATE OF ARIZONA, Petitioner, v. HON. ERIC E. GORDON, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MOHAVE, Respondent Judge, GREGORY JAMES OWEN, Real Party in Interest.
No. CR-24-0064-PR
Supreme Court of the State of Arizona
December 12, 2025
257 Ariz. 95
Special Action from the Lake Havasu Consolidated Court No. M0844TR2022000209 REVERSED. Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County The Honorable Eric E. Gordon, Judge No. CR202300497 AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One 257 Ariz. 95 (App. 2024) VACATED.
Charles F. Yager, Lake Havasu City Attorney, Sherman Jackson (argued), Assistant City Prosecutor, Lake Havasu City, Attorneys for State of Arizona
Kevin D. Heade, Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Florence, and Mikel Steinfeld, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice
Eric M. Fraser (argued), Michael A. Moorin, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae of Cathy Feck, Dolores Adams, and the Estate of Charles Feck
JUSTICE MONTGOMERY authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, and JUSTICES BEENE and KING joined. JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by JUSTICE PELANDER (Retired),* dissented.
JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, Opinion of the Court:
¶1 Gregory James Owen rear-ended a Jeep stopped at a red light, killing one of the Jeep‘s passengers. After rear-ending the Jeep, Owen‘s vehicle continued through the red light and into the intersection. Consequently, the State charged Owen with violating the enhanced penalty statute,
¶2 The enhanced penalty statute imposes a criminal penalty for violating one of several enumerated civil traffic statutes if “the violation results in an accident causing serious physical injury or death to another person.”
* Justice Maria Elena Cruz is recused from this matter. Pursuant to
FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 Owen was driving a motorhome on SR 95 in Lake Havasu City when he rear-ended a Jeep Grand Cherokee that was stopped at a red light at the intersection of SR 95 and Acoma Blvd.2 The impact propelled the Jeep into and through the оther side of the intersection, killing one of the passengers. Owen‘s motorhome also continued through the intersection while facing a red light. The State charged Owen with causing death by a moving violation under the enhanced penalty statute based on a red-light violation.
¶5 Following a bench trial, the municipal court observed in a minute order disposing of the case “that in using the term ‘accident’ the [L]egislature intended to mean that series of events that constitute an accident.” The court therefore concluded that the “series of events that constitute the ‘accident’ . . . includes and can be attributed to the defendant‘s violation of
¶6 Owen appealed the verdict to the superior court, arguing that he did not commit a red-light violation that resulted in the victim‘s death because “the accident happened befоre the intersection, and the predicate moving violation can only happen upon entering an intersection.” The superior court found that Owen did commit a moving violation because he
¶7 The State then filed a special action petition with the court of appeals, challenging the superior court‘s interpretation of the red-light and enhanced penalty statutes. Echoing the municipal court, the court of appeals reasoned that the use of the term “accident” in the enhancеd penalty statute encompasses a series of events broader than a single collision. State v. Gordon, 257 Ariz. 95, 99 ¶ 15 (App. 2024). Consistent with this reasoning and in reliance on State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 123, 126 ¶ 9 (App. 2001), and other out-of-state authorities, the court offered the following broad interpretation of the term “accident“: “when determining whether an accident resulted from a red-light violation, a court must consider an accident as a continuous event in which the traffic violation causes an event that results in death or injury.” Gordon, 257 Ariz. at 99–100 ¶¶ 15–16.
¶8 Accordingly, the court reasoned that when “a driver fails to stop and remain standing at a red light and then hits another vehicle, immediately propelling both vehicles into the intersection, the entire event—from initial collision to when the vehicles ultimately cease movement—is an accident that resulted from the driver‘s failure to stop at the red light.” Id. at 100 ¶ 19. The court thus concluded that imposition of the enhanced penalty does not require a driver to run a red light before the initial collision so long as the accident comprises one continuous event that results from a driver failing to stop at a red light. Id. ¶ 21. Consequently, the court vacated the superior court‘s decision and remanded the case to the municipal court for further proceedings. Id.
¶9 We granted Owen‘s petition for review because whether a driver must enter an intersection to commit a red-light violation before an accident for the enhanced penalty statute to apply is an issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
DISCUSSION
¶10 Owen argues that the enhanced penalty statute requires “both a causal link and a certain temporal relationship” with the red-light statute, such that it requires a red-light violation “before the accident and before the resulting injury or death.” Owen thus contends that he is not guilty of violating the enhanced penalty statute because he committed a red-light violation only after he collided with the Jeep.
¶11 The State disagrees, asserting first that the enhanced penalty statute uses the word “accident” instead of “collision,” which is a broader term covering the entire event that begins when Owen struck the Jeep and ends when the vehicles came to rest. The State therefore concludes that because “the required conduct is the violation of the red-light statute and the required result is the accident causing serious physical injury or death,” the enhanced penalty statute‘s causation requirement is satisfied.
¶12 We review the interpretation of statutes de novo. Cao v. PFP Dorsey Invs., LLC, 257 Ariz. 109, 113 ¶ 15 (2024). “Our task in statutory construction is to effectuate the text if it is clear and unambiguous.” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 5 (2024) (quoting BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep‘t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17, 19 ¶ 9 (2018)). To effectuate the text “we interpret statutes according to their plain language,” id., giving “words ‘their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended,‘” State v. Luviano, 255 Ariz. 225, 228 ¶ 10 (2023) (quoting Ariz. ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd., 243 Ariz 539, 541 ¶ 7 (2018)). And “[w]here unambiguous, we apply the express terms of a . . . statutory provision without resorting to secondary methods of construction.” Mussi v. Hobbs, 255 Ariz. 395, 398 ¶ 13 (2023) (quoting Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehab., & Pub. Safety v. Hobbs, 249 Ariz. 396, 406 ¶ 28 (2020)).
¶13 We are also mindful that the provisions of a penal statute “must be construed according to the fair meaning of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law, including the purposes stated in
¶14 Owen asserts that any red-light violation requires a driver‘s failure to “stop before entering the intersection and . . . remain standing.” The State counters that a driver can commit a red-light violаtion without ever entering the intersection, as does the court of appeals, Gordon, 257 Ariz. at 100 ¶ 21, and the dissent, infra ¶ 43.
¶15 As noted, the red-light statute requires: (1) a driver facing a red-light to “stop“; (2) “before entering the intersection“; and (3) “remain standing until an indication to proceed is shown.”
¶16 Accepting the State‘s argument would void the requirement to stop “before entering the intersection.” Likewise, the dissent‘s
¶17 Thus, in the matter before us, Owen could not commit a red-light violation until after his vehicle crossed the connection of the lateral curb lines comprising the intersection of SR 95 and Acoma Blvd. We next consider the circumstances in which the enhanced penalty statute applies to an accident.
B. Arizona‘s Enhanced Penalty Statute
¶18 Owen argues that because the accident occurred before he went through the red light, any red-light violation did not result in an accident. The State asserts—as the court of appeals, Gordon, 257 Ariz. at 99 ¶ 15, and the dissent, infra ¶ 49, likewise reason—that the accident here, for purposes of imposing an enhanced penalty, constituted an entire series of events commencing with the initial impact and continuing through the intersection. Thus, the State further argues that “[t]he contact with the victim‘s vehicle and defendant‘s vehicle was a simultaneous event with failing to stop for a red light and barreling through the entire intersection.” The State therefore concludes that “Owen‘s failure to stop at a red light and remain standing directly caused both vehicles to go through the entire intersection and cause thе death of [the Jeep‘s passenger].”
¶19 An enhanced penalty for a civil traffic violation only applies if: (1) a driver violates a specified statute; (2) that “violation results in an accident“; and (3) that accident “caus[es] serious physical injury or death to another person.”
¶21 The State therefore errs in arguing that an accident that occurs simultaneously with a violation сan satisfy the enhanced penalty statute‘s requirements. Such a conclusion negates the necessary causal relationship by conflating a sequence of two events into one continuous or simultaneous event. See
A person commits robbery if in the course of taking any property of another from his person or immediate presence and against his will, such person threatens or uses force against any person with intent either to coerce surrender of property or to prevent resistance to such persоn taking or retaining property.
(Emphasis added.)
¶23 As noted, the court of appeals relied on Powers to define an accident as consisting of a series of events. Gordon, 257 Ariz. at 99 ¶ 15. Powers involved a driver who accidentally struck a mother and her infant daughter, killing the mother and seriously injuring the daughter, and then driving away. Powers, 200 Ariz. at 125 ¶ 2. The question before the court was whether the driver could be charged with one or two counts of leaving the scene of an accident. Id. ¶ 3. The driver challenged the second count as multiplicitous, which would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, because there was only one accident scene. Id. ¶ 5. The State countered that there were two separate accidents, one involving the mother and the second involving the infant. Id. at 126 ¶ 7. The court concluded that “[t]he plain and ordinary meanings of the terms ‘accident’ and ‘scene of the accident’ do not depend on the number of victims. As commonly understood, only one accident scene exists even though accidents often involve multiple victims and impacts.” Id. ¶ 9.9
¶25 With respect to the dissent‘s analysis and conclusion, it contradicts our statutory interpretation jurisprudence, overlooks the successive nature of the causal relationship between a red-light violation and a fatal accident, and misapprehends the application of victim rights.
¶26 First, the dissent seeks to combine the red-light and enhanced penalty statutes to create a general safety measure “so that the language of
¶27 Our colleagues’ invocation of Brogdon v. State, 683 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009), as well as the court of appeals’ approving citation, is prоblematic for two reasons. First, the Brogdon court utilized a method of statutory interpretation inconsistent with this Court‘s jurisprudence. And second, the Brogdon court effectively rewrote the statute in question, an approach inconsistent with this Court‘s jurisprudence.
¶28 In Brogdon, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that “[i]n construing statutes, we look to the literal language of the statute, the rules of statutory construction and rules of reason and logic, the most important of which is to construe the statute so as to give effect to the legislature‘s intent. Where the literal language does not square with reason or intent, then the literal must yield.” Id. at 104 (emphasis added) (cleaned up).
¶29 Looking to the text, utilizing canons of construction, and employing rules of reason and logic is all consistent with our jurisprudence. And at first glance, it may seem our approach to applying the plain meaning of a statute—the “literal language” in the parlance of Brogdon—is in accord with the Brogdon court. Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464 ¶ 11 (2003) (noting that we apply the plain meaning of a statute “unless [it] would lead to impossible or absurd results“). However, Brogdon‘s approach permits a court to ignore the plain meaning of the text if it perceives a departure from legislative intent. In other words, Brogdon engages in discerning legislative intent and then considers the text. That is not our method. We do not look beyond the text of a statute to discern a legislative purpose absent ambiguity because the plain meaning of the text itself reflects the intent of the Legislature. S. Arizona Home Builders Ass‘n v. Town of Marana, 254 Ariz. 281, 286 ¶ 31 (2023) (“Statutory interpretation requires us to determine the meaning of the words the [L]egislature chose to use.“); Farris v. Advantage Cap. Corp., 217 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 5 (2007) (“A statute‘s plain language is the best indicator of legislative intent, and we will not ‘engage in other means of statutory interpretation’ unless a statute is ambiguous.” (quoting Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 212 Ariz. 255, 257 ¶ 7 (2006))); see also State ex rel. Arizona Dep‘t of Revenue v. Tunkey, 254 Ariz. 432, 437 ¶¶ 23–24 (2023) (Bolick, Beene, Montgomery, and
¶30 Applying its stated method of statutory interpretation, the Brogdon court interpreted its red-light statute11 to “require[] that a driver facing a red traffic light stop behind the stop line or crosswalk and also behind those vehicles stopped in observance of the traffic light.” 683 S.E.2d at 104. (Emphasis added.) In reaching this result, Brogdon addеd language to its statute as the dissent does to ours. Infra ¶ 46. But “it is not the function of the courts to rewrite statutes.” City of Phoenix v. Butler, 110 Ariz. 160, 162 (1973). “Moreover, we recognize that a judicial expansion of statutory language can violate a defendant‘s due process right to fair warning.” Powers, 200 Ariz. at 126 ¶ 8. And if we were to adopt Brogdon‘s logic and that of our dissenting colleagues, then a red-light violation could occur anytime a vehicle rear-ended another one anywhere before a red light, regardless of how far it occurred before the intersection. Say, for example, the 80th car from a red light in a traffic jam rear-ends the 79th car. The dissent‘s logic would result in a red-light violation in this situation, even though they were a quarter mile from the intersection. See infra ¶ 46 (asserting that “‘[b]efore the intersection can be three inches, ten feet, thirty feet, or some other distance.“).
¶31 Finally, the third error concerns the errant invocation of the Victims’ Bill of Rights. Restitution is certainly a constitutionally guaranteed right. See
¶32 However, Owen‘s red-light violation did not result in the accident because the accident occurred prior to Owen entering the intersection. Instead, the accident was the result of—a consequence of—Owen‘s failure to stop before his vehicle collided with the Jeep, which is a violation of
¶33 The circumstances here reflect an outcome the Legislature may wish to address. See Patel, 251 Ariz. at 140 ¶ 37 (noting legislative action to address a pеrceived statutory “loophole” involving a driver who ran a red light and killed a pedestrian). Regardless, the fact that the plain meaning of the enhanced penalty statute does not achieve the dissent‘s preferred resolution does not make our application of its plain meaning absurd. Infra ¶ 58.
CONCLUSION
¶34 For the reasons stated, we vacate the court of appeals’ opinion and affirm the superior court‘s order reversing the municipal court‘s judgment of conviction and directing a verdict of acquittal.
https://az511.gov/
Owen‘s vehicle and the Jeep moved right to left through the intersection. See supra ¶ 2.
BOLICK, J., joined by PELANDER, J. (Retired), dissenting:
¶35 On January 14, 2022, Gregory James Owen was driving his motorhome trying to make it through a yellow light before it turned red. He failed to get there in time as the light turned red before his arrival. Had his vehicle entered the intersection on the red light and then smashеd into other vehicles thereby causing serious physical injury or death, he would have been subject to an enhanced criminal penalty.
¶36 But in regard to the criminal offense, under the majority‘s view, Owen was lucky. Because standing between him and the intersection was a Jeep Grand Cherokee that had properly stopped for the red light. As the trial court found, Owen‘s motor home “barrel[ed] into the victim‘s vehicle . . . forcing both of the vehicles through the red light and finally coming to a stop on the other side of the intersection.” The Jeep‘s backseat passenger/victim was killed. But Owen, according to the majority here, was not subject to the enhanced criminal statute because the initial crash occurred before Owen‘s motor home hurtled into the intersection.
¶37 If this seems a discordant, improbable result, that is because the enhanced penalty statute does not split hairs in this fashion; and to the extent it is ambiguous, it is legally absurd to interpret it in the fashion the majority does here. For that reason, we would affirm the court of appeals’ unanimous holding that the relevant statutes “do[] not require a vehicle to have entered the intersection before causing the accident,” State v. Gordon, 257 Ariz. 95, 97 ¶ 2 (App. 2024), and uphold Owen‘s conviction.
¶38 The enhanced criminal penalty statute applies if a motorist commits one of several enumerated moving violations “and the violation results in an accident causing serious physical injury or death to another person.”
¶39 In interpreting statutes, if the point of the statute is obvious from its text, we are admonished to effectuate it as best we can with fidelity
¶40 The majority essentially interprets
¶41 That is not to say, at all and to the contrary, that the second statute changes the meaning of the first, but rather that the meaning of both should be assessed through the lens—the context—of the overall object of the combined statutes. Chalmers, 571 P.3d at 889 ¶ 16 n.2 (setting forth in pari materia doctrine). Plainly, that object is to prevent serious or fatal injuries by requiring vehicles to stop before the intersection at a red light. As we explain below, the conclusion that there is no enhanced penalty where death is precipitated by an accident that initially occurs before the intersection and is continued through the intersection—that is, where the offending driver has not stopped for a red light before the intersection and death or serious injury occurs аfter the vehicles proceed through the intersection—is at best a hypertechnical one that defeats the statutes’ clear purpose. Given that a plain-meaning approach would lead to a different result, we should favor that interpretation.
¶42 Construing
¶43 But the majority rewrites the statute to add a fourth element, holding that “the driver must enter the intersection to commit a violation.” Supra ¶ 15. Had the Legislature intended such meaning, it could hаve said “vehicular traffic may not enter an intersection on a red light,” or words to that effect. Had it done so, we would be obliged to enforce that language, whatever the consequence. But it did not.
¶44 This added fourth element, in the majority‘s view, is the crucial element, concluding that “a red-light violation can only be committed once the vehicle enters an intersection.” Supra ¶ 3. Thus, the fact that “Gregory James Owen rear-ended a Jeep stopped at a red light, killing one of the Jeep‘s passengers,” supra ¶ 1, does not, in the majority‘s view, amount to violating a statute instructing that on a red light, a driver “shall stop before entering the intersection.” Supra ¶ 2 (citing
¶45 In contrast to the majority, in our view, the statute‘s operative term is stop. That is the actus reus of the violation. In its three elements, the statute tells us what, where, and when. The “when” is a solid red light. The “what” is tо stop. And the “where” is before the intersection.13 Under this plain reading, the entry of the vehicle into the intersection is not an implicit (much less dispositive) element of the crime, but merely proof positive that the crime was committed. Indeed, by shearing off the antecedent “before” from “the intersection,” the majority renders that crucial term devoid of meaning, which the majority aptly instructs is an inappropriate way to read a statute. Supra ¶ 16.
¶47 Nor, as the majority concedes, is the fact that the accident was a continuous series of events significant. We agree that the term “results in” suggests that the combination of the requisite moving violation and an accident triggers an enhanced penalty “regardless of whether the accident consists of a single event or a series of events.” Supra ¶ 20. Given that concession, we are not sure how the majority can find no violation here even under its expansive reading of the statutory elements, given that Owen‘s vehicle did not come to an eventual stоp until after the intersection.
¶48 Clearly, Owen failed to stop at the red light before the intersection. Indeed, the municipal court, superior court, and court of appeals all agreed that Owen violated
¶49 Indeed, the majority unpersuasively suggests an “accident” connotes a split-seсond (or split-millisecond) moment of impact. See supra ¶¶ 1, 20–22. That would be a “collision,” which is not the term used in the statute. Accidents, by contrast, are often unfolding events, such as a chain-reaction crash. See Gordon, 257 Ariz. at 99 ¶¶ 14–15 (collecting case law and dictionary definitions to that effect). Here, as the trial court found, the vehicles traveled in tandem after the initial collision through the
¶50 Similarly, the majority excises from
¶51 Nor does the causation requirement in the enhanced penalty statute change the result. Owen‘s violation of
¶52 The majority resorts to statutory interpretation rules to guide its analysis. Supra ¶ 13. Specifically, it cites
¶53 But fair warning of what? The statutes on their face give fair warning that a driver who fails to stop before an intersection on a red light and causes death or serious injury will be held to account. The obvious point of the statute is to prevent harm for failing to stop. It is not apparent what warning is omitted from, and what unfair prejudice is inflicted upon, a person who fails to stop for a red light before the intersection and in the process strikes a lawfully stopped vehicle and causes death or serious injury. Such a plain reading, it seems to us, promotes justice and effects the objects of the law.
¶55 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees victims the right to justice and due process.
¶56 In that regard, it is the Jeep‘s driver who did not have fair warning of the statute‘s scope, as altered by the majority here. Had she seen Owen‘s motorhome barreling toward the stopped Jeep in her rear-view mirror, and tried to avoid an accident by entering the intersection against the red light with the exact same result (an accident leading to the passenger‘s death), perversely she would have preserved the family‘s restitution rights, because then, in the majority‘s view, Owen would have committed the predicate crime leading to the enhanced penalty.
¶57 But only if she was able to move the entire vehicle into the intersection before the crash. Had an inch of the rear bumper not yet entered the intersection, then in the majority‘s eyes the accident would have occurred before the intersection and Owen would not have violated
¶58 Which leads to our final argument. It is difficult to clear the threshold into legal absurdity, but as illustrated by the foregoing example, the statute as the majority construes it does so. “A result is absurd if it is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion.” State v. Estrada, 201 Ariz. 247, 251 ¶ 17 (2001) (quoting Perini Land Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380, 383 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The cited case in turn provides that “[i]f enforcing the clear language of the constitution results in an absurd situation, the [C]ourt may look behind the bare words of the provision to discern its intended effect.” Perini, 170 Ariz. at 383. If two plausible statutory interpretations exist, the Court should choose the one thаt makes sense. See Scalia & Garner, at 234 (“Some absurd outcomes can be avoided without doing real violence to the text.“). Our colleagues obviously believe their statutory interpretation is correct; but if they think “before entering the intersection” can plausibly mean a command to stop at a red light before the intersection, they should interpret it in that manner to avoid an absurd and manifestly unjust result.
¶59 Surely after this case the Legislature can, if it wishes, further clarify what we consider an already clear statute. But even if it does, it will be cold comfort to the victim family, which in our view was clearly within the intended protective scope of the enhanced penalty statute.
¶60 For all the foregoing reasons, and with great respect to our colleagues, we dissent.
Notes
Traffic, except pedestrians, facing a steady CIRCULAR RED signal alone shall stop at a clearly marked stop line or, if there is no stop line, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if there is no crosswalk, before entering the intersection, and shall remain standing until an indication to proceed is shown.