STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. PERCY WILLIAMS III
No. 107951
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
October 3, 2019
2019-Ohio-4059
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.
Civil Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court Case No. 2014 CVF 015940
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 3, 2019
Appearances:
Zeehandelar, Sabatino, & Associates, and Steven J. Zeehandelar, for appellee.
Percy Williams III, pro se.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Percy Williams III (“appellant“), brings the instant appeal challenging the trial court‘s denial of his motion for relief from judgment in a breach of contract action. After a thorough review of the record and law, this court affirms.
{¶ 2} Appellant and a motorist insured by plaintiff-appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm“), were involved in a motor vehicle accident on November 23, 2008. In August 2009, State Farm and appellant reached an agreement under which State Fаrm would not pursue legal action for the damages and injuries resulting from the accident in exchange for appellant‘s promise to pay $11,104.32 (hereinafter “settlement agreement“). Appellant executed an “installment agreement and [promissory] note” on August 6, 2009, memorializing the terms of the settlement agreement. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, appellant was required to make monthly payments of $75 until the balance was fully paid.
{¶ 3} Appellant initially made payments pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement. At some point, appellant stoppеd making payments, and as a result, State Farm filed a complaint against appellant on October 27, 2014. Therein, State Farm alleged that appellant stopped making timely payments pursuant to the settlement agreement, defaulted on the installment agreement and promissory note, and that the outstanding balance appellant owed State Farm was $6,919.32.
{¶ 4} Appellant field a motion to quash service of process and to dismiss the case on December 19, 2014. He appeared to argue that the case should be dismissed because State Farm failed to perfect service of its complaint upon him. On
{¶ 5} State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment on November 20, 2015. In support of its motion for summary judgment, State Farm submitted an affidavit of representative Jennifer Simple in which she averred, in relevant part:
4. On November 23, 2008, [appellant] and [two State Farm policy holders] were involved in an automobile collision.
5. The State Farm records reveal that [apрellant] rear-ended [the policy holders] while they were stopped at a yield sign.
6. [The policy holders] submitted a claim to State Farm for their damages which totaled $11,104.32.
7. State Farm paid the foregoing amount, less [the] $500.00 deductible and thereby became subrogated in that amount.
8. State Farm sent the claim to counsel to protect its subrogation claim.
9. With our consent, Counsel settled the claim on our behalf with [appellant] pursuant to the terms of the [promissory note.]
10. State Farm abided by the terms of the Note.
11. [Appellant] has thus far paid $4,185.00 on the claim.
12. [Appellant] has failed to make any payments since July 31, 2014.
13. The amount still owed by [appellant] pursuant tо the terms of the Note is $6,919.32.
{¶ 6} On April 20, 2016, the trial court denied State Farm‘s motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 7} Appellant filed an answer and asserted affirmative defenses on February 24, 2016. Appellant appeared to assert the following relevant affirmative defenses: lack of contractual capacity due to head injuries sustained in a 2002 RTA
1. [Appellant] specifically denies under oath the genuineness and due execution of the [settlement agreement]; * * * the truth being that [appellant] does not recall the document, as a result heis [sic] denying signing the [agreement].
By the way of special and affirmativе defenses, [appellant] avers:
1. That the obligation [under the settlement agreement] is legally inexistent, and thus cannot be considered due and demandable.
2. [State Farm] has no cause of action against [appellant] as he denies execution of signature, and delivery of promissory note to [State Farm].
{¶ 8} A bench trial was conducted on September 12, 2016. On February 13, 2017, the trial court issued a judgment entry in which it entered judgment in favor of State Farm in the amount of $6,919.32 plus costs and interest.
{¶ 9} Appellant filed a motion requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 22, 2017. On August 3, 2017, the trial cоurt issued the following relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
* * * The narrative of the accident was; [State Farm‘s insured motorist] * * * had stopped to yield for traffic when [appellant] reported to police
he was distracted and did not notice [the insured motorist] coming to a full stop. ([State Farm‘s] Exhibit #1). Testimony was given by [appellant], that he did not remember anything about the accident, but he did admit to signing an agreement with [State Farm] for damages caused in the accident, as a settlement of the claim resulting from [appellant] not having insurance on or about August 6, 2009. ([State Farm‘s] Exhibit #4). [Aрpellant] also testified he did not remember making any payments to [State Farm] per the Promissory note.
Testimony presented by [State Farm‘s] witnesses showed payments were made on the account, via checks signed by [appellant]. [Appellant] testified that the signature on the checks looked like his, but he did not recall making any payments.
Per the testimony of [State Farm], the balance due for damages resulting from the auto accident was $6,919.32
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Therefore judgment was entered for [State Farm] for $6,919.32 plus costs and interest from February 13, 2017.
{¶ 10} On August 15, 2017, appellant filed an amended motion fоr findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court did not rule on appellant‘s motion, nor issue supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law.
{¶ 11} On February 7, 2018, appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
{¶ 12} On November 14, 2018, the trial court issued a judgment entry denying appellant‘s motion fоr relief from judgment and ordering appellant to continue making payments pursuant to the settlement agreement and agreed judgment entry entered on February 13, 2017. In denying the motion for relief from judgment, the trial court concluded that during pretrial proceedings and at trial, appellant did not request the trial court to appoint an attorney to represent him, nor did appellant show any signs of mental incapacity during trial. Furthermore, appellant did not present any medical records or evidence pertaining to his purported psychological issues. The trial court explained that appellant acknowledged entering into a settlement agreement with State Farm, and appellant testified that the signature on the check for one of the payments looked like his signature.
{¶ 13} On December 3, 2018, appellant filed the instant appeal challenging the trial court‘s judgment. In his notice of appeal, appellant asserts that he is appealing from “the final judgment entered in this action on 10/29/2018.” The trial court did not issue a judgment entry or enter final judgment on October 29, 2018.
{¶ 14} Appellant requested an
{¶ 15} Appellant failed to show cause or file an
{¶ 16} Appellant filed an untimely
{¶ 17} On March 28, 2019, appellant filed a motion for appointment of appellate counsel and an extension of time to file an appellate brief. On April 2,
{¶ 18} On March 29, 2019, appellant filed a motion to supplement the trial court‘s record. On April 10, 2019, this court grantеd appellant‘s motion to supplement the record in part. This court granted the motion with respect to the checks referenced in the trial court‘s October 29, 2018 judgment entry and the samples of appellant‘s handwriting; this court denied appellant‘s motion with respect to appellant‘s request for the trial court‘s notes.
{¶ 19} On April 10, 2019, the trial court submitted correspondence indicating that there were no additional documents or evidence with which to supplement the record on appeal. Specifically, the trial court indicated that (1) the checks wеre presented at trial, but were not admitted into evidence, and (2) the trial court was unable to locate the samples of appellant‘s handwriting or signatures.
{¶ 20} In this appeal, appellant appears to raise six assignments of error for our review:
- Whether or not [appellant] was incompetent at the time [of trial], and should have been represented by an attorney.
- Whether or not [appellant] was advised and waived his right to a jury trial.
- Whether or not the police report, [State Farm‘s] Exhibit 1, was inadmissible hearsay.
- Whether or not [appellant‘s] signature оn the contract of [State Farm‘s Exhibit 4] is valid.
- Whether or not [appellant] could have filed a timely objection without a written decision from the magistrate.
Whether or not judgment should have been against the [State Farm], [a]nd for [appellant].
{¶ 21} To the extent that appellant‘s assignments of error are interrelated, they will be addressed together. Furthermore, for ease of discussion, appellant‘s assignments of error will be addressed out of order.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Record on Appeal
{¶ 22} As noted above, we initially note that the record before this court does not contain a transcript of the trial court‘s proceedings or an
{¶ 23} On January 23, 2019, this court ordered appellant to show cause, before February 25, 2019, as to (1) why the record should not be converted into an
{¶ 24} Appellant failed to show cause or file an
{¶ 25} Appellant filed a motion for an extension of time to file his brief on March 8, 2019. Therein, he indicated that he filed his
{¶ 26} On March 13, 2019, this court granted appellant‘s motion for an extension “to file assignments of error and brief.” This court did not grant appellant an extension of time to file an
{¶ 27} After this court converted the record into an
Statement 1
[Appellant] was ask[ed] to describe his version of the accident. [He] recited that the car in front of him moved to[o] far in traffic when at the yield sign, and began to backup, as [appellant] was moving forward.
* * *
Statement 2
[Appellant] was shown a contract and asked did he recall the document. [Appellant] recited that he had no memory of such document, nor did he remember signing such a document.
* * *
Statement 3
[Appellant] provided samples of his handwriting to the trial court when requested.
[State Farm] when requested did not have any samples of signatures by [appellant].
* * *
Statement 4
[Appellant] was asked by the trial court, as to why he was making payments to [State Farm]. [Appellant] recited that he received threatening phone calls from [State Farm] to revoke his license. [Appellant] recited that he thought that the agency of [State Farm] was associated with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles.
* * *
Statement 5
The trial court asked [appellant], how long he has been living at his present residence. [Appellant] recited that he could not remember. [Appellant] also recited that he has memory problems due to an accident on the RTA.
See appellant‘s motion to submit a statement under
{¶ 28} The record reflects that on March 11, 2019, the trial court denied appellant‘s motion to submit an
{¶ 29} Accordingly, appellant has failed to file a transcript from the trial, and the
{¶ 30} As noted above, appellant initially indicated that this was an
{¶ 31} Although appellant acted pro se in the proceedings below, and is acting pro se in the instant appeal, “‘[i]t is well established that pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and that they are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel.‘” In re Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 138 Ohio St.3d 43, 2013-Ohio-5478, 3 N.E.3d 173, ¶ 22, quoting State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 100 Ohio St.3d 352, 2003-Ohio-6448, 800 N.E.2d 25, ¶ 10. Appellant‘s failure to comply with
{¶ 32} Based on the foregoing analysis, and without a transcript or
B. Scope of Appeal
{¶ 33} We also note that appellant appears to raise arguments in all five of his аssignments of error pertaining to pretrial proceedings, the February 2017 trial, and the trial court‘s February 13, 2017 verdict.
{¶ 34} “‘[A] motion for relief from judgment cannot be predicated upon the argument that the trial court made a mistake in rendering its decision.‘” Hawken School v. Norstrom, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106295, 2018-Ohio-2302, ¶ 34, quoting Chester Twp. v. Fraternal Order of Police, 102 Ohio App.3d 404, 408, 657 N.E.2d 348 (11th Dist.1995).
Similarly, this court has indicated that ”
Civ.R. 60(B)(5) does not contemplate possible error in the legal reasoning underlying a judgment as any other reason justifying relief from judgment.” Rea v. Pecsok, Rea & Demarchi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 71014, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1437, 9 (Apr. 10, 1997); Anderson v. Garrick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 68244, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4501, 13 (Oct. 12, 1995) (”Civ.R. 60(B) is not a viable means to attack legal errors made by a trial court; rather, it рermits a court to grant relief when the factual circumstances relating to a judgment are shown to be materially different from the circumstances at the time of the judgment.“).
Hawken School at ¶ 35; see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 16 (a
{¶ 35} If appellant wished to challenge the legality of the trial court‘s final judgmеnt, he was required to file a timely direct appeal challenging the February 13, 2017 judgment entered in favor of State Farm.
{¶ 36} Based on appellant‘s failure to file a direct appeal challenging the trial court‘s final judgment, any issues and arguments pertaining to the pretrial proceedings, trial, or the verdict are untimely and not properly before this court for review. Accordingly, these issues and arguments are summarily overruled. The scope of this appeal will be limited to appellant‘s motion for relief from judgment and the trial court‘s judgment denying the motion.
C. Motion for Relief From Judgment
{¶ 37} In order to prevail on a motion for relief from judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that: “(1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds
{¶ 38} This court reviews a trial court‘s ruling on a
{¶ 39} In the instant matter, appellant argued in his motion for relief from judgment that he was entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party * * * from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: * * * (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adversе party; * * * or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
{¶ 40} Initially, we note that in his motion for relief from judgment, appellant summarily asserted that he was entitled to relief under
{¶ 41} Appellant failed to develop any specific argument seeking relief under
With regard to
Civ.R. 60(B)(3) , “[i]n order to set aside a final judgment for fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of the adverse party, the conduct complained of must be such as prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense.” Further, the fraud or misconduct referred to inCiv.R. 60(B)(3) is fraud or misconduct material to obtaining the judgment, not fraud or misconduct upon which a claim or defense is based.
(Emphasis added.) LaSalle Natl. Bank v. Mesas, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 02CA008028, 2002-Ohio-6117, ¶ 15, quoting Tower Mgt. Co. v. Barnes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 51030, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7788, 8 (Aug. 7, 1986).
{¶ 42} In the instant matter, if appellant did not sign the settlement agreement or if his signature was forged thereon, he could have raised these issues as a defense to State Farm‘s breach of contract claim at trial. Appellant was not prevented from raising these potential defenses and fully adjudicating them at trial. As noted above, the limited record before this court indicates that appellant acknowledged at trial that he did, in fаct, sign the settlement agreement.
{¶ 43} Appellant also failed to develop any specific argument seeking relief under the catchall provision of
{¶ 44} After reviewing appellant‘s motion for relief from judgment and his appellate brief, it is evident that he raises only one argument that can reasonably be construed as being pertinent to
{¶ 45} Appellant argues that State Farm presented the checks at trial in order to demonstrate that appellant‘s signature on the checks matched his signature on the settlement agreement. Appellant appears to presume that the trial court determined that he did, in fact, sign the settlement agreement after comparing his signature on the agreement to his signatures on the checks. This presumption is unsupported by the record.
{¶ 46} Finally, appellant еmphasizes that the checks are not in the record before this court because they were either negligently or inadvertently lost. He appears to contend that the trial court‘s failure to retain the checks in the record and
{¶ 47} After reviewing the record, we find no merit to appellant‘s argument pertaining to the checks that were presented at trial. As an initial matter, the correspondence that the trial court sent to this court on April 10, 2019, provided that the trial court cоuld not supplement the record on appeal with the checks that were presented at trial because the checks were not admitted into evidence. Accordingly, we cannot fault the trial court or State Farm for the absence of the checks from our record. Furthermore, without a transcript or
{¶ 48} The limited record beforе this court reflects that the trial court did not conclude that appellant signed the agreement based on a comparison of appellant‘s signature on the agreement to the signatures on the checks. Rather, the trial court concluded that appellant signed the agreement based, in large part, on (1) appellant‘s admission at trial that he did, in fact, sign the agreement, and (2) the fact that appellant tendered payments to State Farm pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.
{¶ 49} It is evident that appellant improperly attempted to use his
{¶ 50} We emphasize again that the arguments that appellant raises in his motion for relief from judgment and his appellate brief pertaining to pretrial proceedings, trial, and the trial court‘s verdict should have been raised in a direct appeal from the trial court‘s February 13, 2017 judgment in favor of State Farm. Based on the foregoing analysis, we find that appellant failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to rеlief under
{¶ 51} To the extent that appellant is challenging the trial court‘s verdict, the evidence submitted by State Farm, whether State Farm established the existence or breach of a contract, or whether the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, these issues should have been raised in a direct appeal from the trial court‘s verdict. However, as noted above, appellant failed to file a timely appeal challenging the trial court‘s verdict in favor of State Farm. Rather, appellant improperly attempts to use his
{¶ 52} Without a transcript or
{¶ 53} In this case, as a result of the limited record before this court, we are left with the trial court‘s findings of fact. Accordingly, we must presume regularity of the trial court‘s proceedings and affirm the trial court‘s judgment in favor of State Farm. See State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101806, 2015-Ohio-881, ¶ 13.
{¶ 54} For all of the foregoing reаsons, we find no basis upon which to conclude that the trial court‘s judgment denying appellant‘s motion for relief from judgment was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 55} Appellant failed to file a timely appeal challenging the trial court‘s verdict in favor of State Farm. Appellant failed to file a transcript or an
{¶ 56} Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief from judgment under
{¶ 57} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR