State ex rel. Wadd v. ClevelandState ex rel. Wadd v. Cleveland
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Moyer, Pfeifer, Cook, Lundberg Stratton, Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney
{¶ 1} Respondent city of Cleveland is divided into six police districts. When a motor vehicle accident occurs in Cleveland that disables the automobiles involved, a police officer in the district where the accident occurred makes a report at the accident scene. If the automobiles are not disabled, the individuals involved in the accident make a report with any district police officer, which sometimes causes duplicate accident reports. The Cleveland Police Division‘s Traffic and Accident Investigation units also create motor vehicle accident reports. Supervisors of the reporting officers review the reports for completeness and accuracy and forward them to the Records File Section of the Cleveland Police Division. The records section staff then processes the reports by eliminating duplicates, detecting errors and omissions, redacting exempt information, and assigning numbers to the reports.
{¶ 2} Prior to April 1996, Cleveland made unnumbered motor vehicle accident reports available for inspection and copying on the day following the accident. After April 1996, Cleveland did not give access to accident reports until completion of processing.
{¶ 3}
{¶ 4} In contrast, other Ohio cities provide access to motor vehicle accident reports within seven days after the accidents occur. For example, Columbus provides access to reports the day after the accident, and Cincinnati makes reports available to the public within three to five days after the accident.
{¶ 5} In 1997, Wadd filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, Cleveland, its police chief, and its police records file section commander, to prepare and provide access to motor vehicle accident reports within eight days after the accidents occur. After Cleveland installed a new computer system and assigned additional employees to assist in the processing of motor vehicle accident reports, it reduced the delay in making the reports available to the public to an average of ten days, and a low of seven days, from the dates of the accidents. We issued an alternative writ, and the parties presented evidence and briefs.
{¶ 6} This cause is now before the court for a consideration of the merits.
R.C. 149.43; General Standards
{¶ 7} Wadd asserts in his first and second propositions of law that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus to enforce
Mootness
{¶ 8} Wadd does not contend that he has been denied access to the requested records. Instead, he claims that he has not been afforded access with the requisite promptness. Wadd challenges the timeliness of respondents’ provision of records rather than the complete refusal to provide records. Therefore, this is not a case that comes within the ambit of the general rule that provision of requested records to a relator in an
{¶ 9} In addition, this mandamus action is not moot because there exist important issues that are capable of repetition yet evading review. Id., 78 Ohio St.3d at 402, 678 N.E.2d at 560, citing State ex rel. Margolius v. Cleveland (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 456, 456-457, 584 N.E.2d 665, 667, fn. 1. This case raises the important issue of when public records must be prepared and made available to the public for inspection and copying. When records are available for public inspection
{¶ 10} Based on the foregoing, this case is not moot, and we proceed to consider the merits of Wadd‘s mandamus claim.
Mandamus; Promptness
{¶ 11} Wadd asserts in his first and second propositions of law that respondents’ thirteen- to twenty-four-day delay to provide access to accident reports from the dates the accidents occurred was unreasonable and that respondents must provide access within eight days following the accidents.
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} The word “promptly” is not defined in
{¶ 14} The pertinent facts in this case establish that respondents did not act promptly when they delayed for up to twenty-four days after accidents to provide access to accident reports. First, respondents provided access to accident reports within one day after accidents prior to April 1996. Second, respondents now claim that they are providing access to accident reports within seven days after accidents. Third, other Ohio municipalities mentioned in this case, including comparably large cities like Columbus and Cincinnati, generally provide access to their accident reports within seven days of accidents.
{¶ 15} Respondents assert that their installation of a new computer system, as well as Cleveland‘s policy of processing “raw” accident reports into “final” form prior to providing access, supports their argument that they acted reasonably by delaying access to requested accident reports. But their own concession that they are now capable of providing access to accident reports within seven days of accidents undermines this assertion. Further, there is nothing to suggest that Wadd would not be entitled to public access of the preliminary, unnumbered accident reports following prompt redaction of exempt information such as Social Security numbers.1 But, cf., State ex rel. Logan Daily News v. Jones (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 322, 324, 677 N.E.2d 1195, 1197.
{¶ 16} Respondents also note that their efforts at preparing and providing access to accident reports should be judged by the city‘s efforts, despite scarce
{¶ 17} Finally, respondents’ contention that Wadd‘s records requests were improper general requests is likewise meritless. Wadd did not request “complete duplication” of respondents’ files; instead, he properly requested accident reports for specific dates. See State ex rel. Warren Newspapers, Inc. v. Hutson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 619, 624, 640 N.E.2d 174, 179, citing State ex rel. Waterman v. Akron (Oct. 21, 1992), Summit App. No. 14507, unreported, 1992 WL 308525; cf. State ex rel. Zauderer v. Joseph (1989), 62 Ohio App.3d 752, 577 N.E.2d 444.
{¶ 18} Based on the foregoing, and after according
Attorney Fees
{¶ 19} In his third proposition of law, Wadd asserts that he is entitled to an award of attorney fees. An award of attorney fees in a public records case is not mandatory because
{¶ 20} In granting or denying attorney fees under
{¶ 21} First, respondents had a reasonable basis to believe that they were complying with
{¶ 22} Second, although Wadd‘s mandamus action has resulted in some public benefit, the degree of the public benefit is questionable, since even by the time he filed this mandamus action, he conceded that respondents had already achieved some success in reducing the original thirteen- to twenty-four-day delay in providing access to accident reports.
{¶ 23} Accordingly, we grant a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to prepare and provide access to motor vehicle accident reports within eight days after accidents occur, and deny relator‘s request for attorney fees.
and attorney fees denied.
Moyer, C.J., Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.
Douglas, Resnick and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 24} I concur in the judgment of the majority in the issuing of a writ. I dissent with regard to the denial, by the majority, of attorney fees to the relator. Once again the majority uses the wrong standard with regard to the entitlement to attorney fees of a successful relator in a mandamus action brought pursuant to
Resnick and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.