THE STATE EX REL. STEWART, APPELLANT, v. RUSSO, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
No. 2015-0457
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted September 15, 2015—Decided February 9, 2016.
145 Ohio St.3d 382, 2016-Ohio-421
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Kelley A. Gorry, and James R. Gorry, for appellees.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Larry Stewart, appeals from the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint for a writ of mandamus against appellee, Judge Michael J. Russo. Though indicted for aggravated murder with capital specifications, Stewart was sentenced to 30 years to life in prison after the jury recommended against the death penalty. Seeking a writ of mandamus, Stewart now contends that he was entitled to a separate sentencing opinion under
{¶ 2} For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
FACTS
{¶ 3} In 1997, a jury found Stewart guilty of aggravated murder, attempted murder, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. After a mitigation hearing, the jury recommended, and the trial court imposed, a sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 30 years for Stewart’s aggravated-murder conviction. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed Stewart’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal. State v. Stewart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 73255, 1998 WL 811313 (Nov. 19, 1998).
{¶ 4} In 2014, Stewart filed in the trial court a motion for a final, appealable order and resentencing under
{¶ 5} Instead, on January 2, 2015, Stewart filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eighth District Court of Appeals seeking an order compelling Judge Russo to issue a “final appealable order consisting of both a sentencing opinion pursuant to
{¶ 6} Judge Russo filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he had no duty to file a separate sentencing opinion under
{¶ 7} The Eighth District granted Judge Russo’s motion for summary judgment and, relying on several Ohio appellate decisions, held that
{¶ 8} Stewart timely appealed to this court.
ANALYSIS
{¶ 9} To obtain a writ of mandamus, Stewart must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the trial court to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. O‘Grady v. Griffing, 140 Ohio St.3d 290, 2014-Ohio-3687, 17 N.E.3d 574, ¶ 11. Stewart must prove he is entitled to the writ by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Stewart has not satisfied the first or the second prong and therefore is not entitled to the requested relief.
{¶ 10} The issue presented by Stewart’s claim is whether when a jury in a bifurcated capital trial recommends that the offender be sentenced to life in prison, the trial judge is required to issue a separate sentencing opinion setting forth the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors that were found to exist and the reasons why the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating factors.
{¶ 11} Stewart argues that
The court or panel, when it imposes life imprisonment * * * under division (D) of this section, shall state in a separate opinion its specific findings of which of the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code it found to exist, what other mitigating factors it found to exist, what aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing, and why it could not find that these aggravating circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors. * * * The judgment in a case in which a sentencing hearing is held pursuant to this section is not final until the opinion is filed.
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} When the meaning of a legislative enactment is at issue, we look first “to the plain language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent.” Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 11. The plain language of
{¶ 14} In addition, it is a “well-settled rule of statutory interpretation that statutory provisions be construed together and the Revised Code be read as an interrelated body of law.” State v. Moaning, 76 Ohio St.3d 126, 128, 666 N.E.2d 1115 (1996). Construing
{¶ 15} To accept Stewart’s argument that
{¶ 16} Stewart invokes our decision in State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987), arguing that it “reasonably implies” that a defendant is entitled to a separate sentencing opinion under
{¶ 17} Stewart’s argument ignores the unambiguous statement in the final paragraph of
{¶ 18} Stewart also contends that the Eighth District’s decision denying him a writ of mandamus “contradicts this Court’s precedent that trial courts are required to strictly adhere to statutory procedure in capital cases.” Indeed, we have “consistently required strict compliance with Ohio statutes when reviewing the procedures in capital cases.” State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 240, 714 N.E.2d 867 (1999). But as explained above, Stewart was not and is not entitled to a separate sentencing opinion under
{¶ 19} The plain language of
{¶ 20} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals denying Stewart a writ of mandamus.
Conclusion
{¶ 21} Because Stewart does not have a clear legal right to a separate sentencing opinion and Judge Russo does not have a clear legal duty to provide one, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals dismissing Stewart’s complaint.
Judgment affirmed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O‘NEILL, JJ., concur.
Larry Stewart, pro se.
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James E. Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.