State ex rel. Stewart v. Russo (Slip Opinion), 49 N.E.3d 1272

In 1997 Larry Stewart was convicted of aggravated murder and related offenses; after a mitigation hearing the jury recommended life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 30 years, and the trial court imposed that sentence.
Stewart later sought a written sentencing opinion under R.C. 2929.03(F) explaining which mitigating factors existed, which aggravating circumstances were found, and why aggravators did not outweigh mitigators.
The trial court (Judge Russo) denied the motion, stating no separate opinion was required when the jury recommends a life sentence; Stewart did not appeal that ruling.
Stewart filed a mandamus petition in the court of appeals seeking an order compelling Judge Russo to file the R.C. 2929.03(F) opinion and a final, appealable judgment; the court granted summary judgment for the judge and dismissed the petition.
The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed whether R.C. 2929.03(F) requires a separate sentencing opinion when a jury (in a bifurcated capital trial) recommends life imprisonment rather than death.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Stewart)	Defendant's Argument (Russo)	Held
Whether R.C. 2929.03(F) requires a separate sentencing opinion when jury recommends life	R.C. 2929.03(F) mandates a separate written opinion regardless of death or life outcome before a final, appealable order	R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) requires the court to impose the jury’s life recommendation, so (F) does not apply when jury recommends life	Court held (D)(2) is controlling; (F) applies only when judge imposes life over a jury death recommendation, so no separate opinion required
Whether petitioner has clear legal right and judge has clear duty to issue opinion (mandamus standard)	Stewart contended he had a clear right to the (F) opinion and no adequate remedy at law	Judge Russo argued no legal duty exists to produce the opinion where jury recommended life	Court held Stewart lacked both a clear right and defendant had no clear duty; mandamus denied

State v. Palmer, 112 Ohio St.3d 457, 860 N.E.2d 1011 (2007) (the word "shall" in a statute is ordinarily mandatory)
Hubell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 873 N.E.2d 878 (2007) (determine legislative intent from plain statutory language)
State v. Moaning, 76 Ohio St.3d 126, 666 N.E.2d 1115 (1996) (statutes construed together and the Revised Code read as interrelated)
State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987) (discusses sentencing-opinion requirements in capital cases where judge, not jury, determines sentence)
State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 714 N.E.2d 867 (1999) (insistence on strict compliance with capital-case statutory procedure)