THE STATE EX REL. STEVENS v. GEAUGA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS.
No. 00-1601
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Submitted September 28, 2000—Decided October 2, 2000.
90 Ohio St.3d 223 | 2000-Ohio-66
IN MANDAMUS.
{¶ 1} Hillbrook Club, Inc. (“Hillbrook“) designated relator, Eugene Stevens, as its agent to file a particular-location local option petition with respondent, Geauga County Board of Elections. Stevens retained Michael D. Ambrose to prepare, circulate, and file the petition for the submission of two local option questions to the electors of Precinct C in Russell Township, Geauga County, Ohio, at the November 7, 2000 general election.
{¶ 2} On August 23, 2000, Ambrose filed a petition with the board on behalf of Stevens as the petitioner and designated agent of Hillbrook. Each part-petition, which was on a form prescribed by the Secretary of State of Ohio, specified on the first page:
“LOCAL OPTION ELECTION PETITION
“Revised Code Sections
3501.38 ,4301.323 and4301.333 “A petition to submit the question of the sale of beer and intoxicating liquor at a particular location within a precinct if the petitioner for the local option election is an applicant for the issuance or transfer of a liquor permit at, or to, a particular location within a precinct; or the holder of a permit at a particular location within the precinct; or a person who operates or seeks to operate a liquor agency store at a particular location within the precinct.
“INSTRUCTIONS
“1. Any one or more of the following questions may be submitted.
“2. Place an ‘X’ in the box to the left of the question or questions to be submitted.
“3. Complete the description of the precinct for each question to be submitted.
“4. All of the above must be completed before obtaining any signatures.
” * * *
“TO THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF Geauga COUNTY, OHIO:
“We, the undersigned qualified electors of the precinct herein defined, respectfully petition that you submit to the electors of such precinct, the following question(s):
“[XX] A. ‘Shall the sale of beer and any intoxicating liquor be permitted by Hillbrook Club, Inc. doing business as Hillbrook Club, a(n) applicant for a D-1, D-2 and D-3 liquor permit, who is engaged in the business of operating a private social club at 14800 Hillbrook Drive, Russell Twp., OH in this precinct?’
“[ ] B. ‘Shall the sale of beer and intoxicating liquor be permitted for sale on Sunday by Hillbrook Club, Inc. doing business as Hillbrook Club, a(n) applicant for a D-6 liquor permit who is engaged in the business of operating a private social club at 14800 Hillbrook Drive, Russell Twp., OH in this precinct?’ ”1 (Underlining sic.)
{¶ 3} Each part-petition contained two “X“s in the box next to question A but did not contain an “X” for the box next to question B, which addresses the sale of beer and intoxicating liquor by Hillbrook on Sundays. The third page of each part-petition contained an affidavit of Stevens with a paragraph specifying, in
“[The proposed use] will be the operation of a full-service, family oriented social club offering full course meals including the sale of beer at retail either in glass or container, for consumption on the premises where sold, and to sell beer at retail in other receptacles or in original containers having a capacity of not more than five and one-sixth gallons not for consumption on the premises where sold as authorized by a D1 permit. To also sell wine and prepared and bottled cocktails, cordials and other mixed beverages manufactured and distributed by holders of A-4 and B-4 permits at retail, either in glass or container, for consumption on the premises where sold and to sell the same in original packages and not for consumption on the premises where sold or for resale as authorized by a D2 permit. And to sell spirituous liquor at retail, only by the individual drink in glass or from the container, for consumption on the premises where sold until one a.m. as authorized under a D3 permit. The operation of said social club shall also include the sale of intoxicating liquor on Sundays after 1:00 p.m. as authorized by a D6 permit.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 4} At an August 25, 2000 meeting, the board of elections voted to accept question A and submit that question to electors at the November 7, 2000 general election. The board determined that Stevens‘s petition requested the submission of only question A on the November 7 ballot, since there was no “X” mark in the space provided for question B. On August 29, the board forwarded absentee voter ballots to the printer to have them ready for use on October 3. See
{¶ 5} On September 5, Stevens filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to certify question B for placement on the November 7 election ballot. The parties filed evidence and briefs pursuant to the expedited election schedule set forth in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).
Donald J. McTigue, for relator.
David P. Joyce, Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Laura A. LaChapelle, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 6} Stevens seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the submission of question B on his local option petition to the electorate. “In extraordinary actions challenging the decision of a board of elections, the applicable standard is whether the board engaged in fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion, or clear disregard of statutes or pertinent law.” State ex rel. Valore v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 144, 145, 718 N.E.2d 415, 416. Stevens asserts that the board abused its discretion and acted in clear disregard of the applicable statutes by failing to certify question B. The term “abuse of discretion” connotes an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable decision. In re Election Contest of Democratic Primary Held May 4, 1999 for Clerk, Youngstown Mun. Court (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 258, 266, 725 N.E.2d 271, 278.
{¶ 7} Under
{¶ 8} The board must then examine and determine the sufficiency of the signatures and validity of the petition.
{¶ 9} The Secretary of State is authorized under
{¶ 10} The form and accompanying instructions prepared by the Secretary of State and used by Stevens in preparing, circulating, and filing his petition expressly required that the petitioner place an “X” in the box to the left of the
{¶ 11} Notwithstanding Stevens‘s assertions to the contrary, the form and instructions prescribed by the Secretary of State reasonably specify the legal requirements for the requested local option election. The form‘s mandatory instruction that petitioners place an “X” in the box to the left of the question or questions to be submitted implements the statutory requirements that the petition afford notice of the
{¶ 12} By not placing an “X” in the box next to question B, Stevens failed to comply with the notice requirement of
{¶ 13} Stevens counters that because he filled in the blanks of question B with all the information necessary and his affidavit attached to the petition included Sunday sales of intoxicating liquor as a proposed use of Hillbrook, it was evident that Stevens also sought the submission of question B to the electorate. But based on the first page of each part-petition, signers could have reasonably believed that an “X” was required for the question or questions to be submitted for vote and that because he failed to mark an “X” in the box next to question B, that question would not be submitted. In addition, Stevens‘s affidavit was on the third page of each part-petition and the proposed Sunday sales use contained therein was at the end of a lengthy, single-spaced paragraph in extremely small print.
{¶ 14} In other words, because only one of the two questions was marked for submission, the petition conveyed a mistaken or confusing impression about whether the second question was also being submitted to the electorate. Cf. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 298, 301, 699 N.E.2d 916, 918, quoting State ex rel. Hamilton v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 556, 562, 621 N.E.2d 391, 395 (” ‘Referendum petitions have been held invalid for conveying a confusing or mistaken impression as to the effect of a zoning resolution’ “). By creating this ambiguity, Stevens contravened the requirements for a valid local option petition.
{¶ 16} Based on the foregoing, Stevens has not established his entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief. Consequently, we deny the writ.
Writ denied.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
Notes
“(A) An applicant for the issuance or transfer of a liquor permit at, or to, a particular location within the precinct;
“(B) The holder of a liquor permit at a particular location within the precinct;
“(C) A person who operates or seeks to operate a liquor agency store at a particular location within the precinct;
“(D) The designated agent for an applicant, liquor permit holder, or liquor agency store described in division (A), (B), or (C) of this section.”
