THE STATE EX REL. PATTERSON, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 94-1776
Supreme Court of Ohio
December 24, 1996
77 Ohio St.3d 201 | 1996-Ohio-263
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 77 Ohio St.3d 201.]
(No. 94-1776—Submitted May 21, 1996—Decided December 24, 1996.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 93APD03-318.
{¶ 1} In 1984, Frank H. Patterson was exposed to pigeon droppings while in the course of his employment as a work-relief employee for appellee Guernsey County Welfare Department, and, as a result, he contracted histoplasmosis. Patterson filed a workers’ compensation claim, and he was awarded temporary total disability compensation. Patterson died in 1985 as a result of the disease.1 Thereafter, Patterson‘s widow, appellant Viola Patterson, filed an application for
{¶ 2} Appellant appealed the amount of the award to the regional board of review. The board affirmed the hearing officer‘s order. Appellant further contested the amount of the award, but it was ultimately administratively affirmed.
{¶ 3} On March 9, 1993, appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, claiming that the commission abused its discretion in awarding her death benefits below the minimum set forth in
{¶ 4} The matter was initially heard by a referee, who recommended that the court of appeals deny the writ. The referee concluded that
{¶ 5} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. Neither the commission nor the welfare department has responded to appellant‘s appeal.
Daniel D. Connor Co., L.P.A., and Daniel D. Connor, for appellant.
{¶ 6} Appellant‘s weekly award of $33.11 was based upon
“The basis upon which compensation or benefits shall be computed, is the amount of work-relief which would have been afforded to the injured person for the calendar week in which the injury or death occurred. In no event shall such compensation exceed the maximum reimbursement relief award established by the state which the claimant would have been entitled to had he not been injured.”
{¶ 7} Appellant claims that her award should not have been based upon
“In case an injury to or an occupational disease contracted by an employee causes his death, benefits shall be in the amount and to the persons following:
“* * *
“(B) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, the weekly payment shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the average weekly wage, but not to exceed a maximum aggregate amount of weekly compensation which is equal to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the statewide average weekly wage as defined in division (C) of section 4123.62 of the Revised Code, and not in any event less than a minimum amount of weekly compensation which is equal to fifty per cent of the statewide average weekly wage as defined in division (C) of section 4123.62 of the Revised Code, regardless of the average weekly wage * * *.”2 (Emphasis added.) 136 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1167.
{¶ 8} In support of her position that her weekly death benefit award should have been based upon
{¶ 9} Further, former
{¶ 10} At first glance, appellant‘s statutory arguments regarding
{¶ 11} Appellant also contends that even if we conclude that the commission‘s interpretation of
{¶ 12} In considering appellant‘s constitutional claim, we are mindful of the fundamental principle that legislative enactments are presumed constitutional. Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 360, 361, 653 N.E.2d 212, 214; State v. Gill (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 584 N.E.2d 1200, 1201; and Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 616 N.E.2d 163, 166. We are also aware that “discrimination against individuals or groups is sometimes an inevitable result of the operation of a statute. The mere fact that a statute discriminates does not mean that the statute must be unconstitutional.” Roseman v. Firemen & Policemen‘s Death Benefit Fund (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 443, 446-447, 613 N.E.2d 574, 577. See, also, Adamsky, supra, 73 Ohio St.3d at 362, 653 N.E.2d at 214. However, all laws, including legislation involving workers’ compensation, are subject to the limitations imposed by the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. See Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 120, 122, 70 O.O.2d 206, 207-208, 322 N.E.2d 880, 882, fn. 2.
{¶ 14} These constitutional guarantees require that all similarly situated individuals be treated in a similar manner. State ex rel. Doersam v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 115, 119, 543 N.E.2d 1169, 1173. In other words, laws are to operate equally upon persons who are identified in the same class.
{¶ 15} Ohio‘s system of compensating employees and their dependents is predicated upon
{¶ 16} Appellant‘s decedent was a “work-relief employee” as defined in
{¶ 17} In State ex rel. Nyitray v. Indus. Comm. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 173, 176, 2 OBR 715, 717, 443 N.E.2d 962, 965, relying on Kinney, supra, we noted that legislation could survive constitutional scrutiny if the statute at issue were “rationally related to the accomplishment of some state objective at least as important as the purpose contained in the Constitution [Section 35, Article II] and reflected in the statute.” In Doersam, 45 Ohio St.3d at 120, 543 N.E.2d at 1174, we stated that “a classification of persons will not be suspect when the law establishing the classification relates to a legitimate governmental purpose. If the means employed by the law to achieve its ends is the classification of persons who are accorded differing benefits or assessed differing burdens, the law will be tested under the equal protection guarantee. If the classification does not meet or does not have a sufficient relationship to a required governmental purpose, then the law cannot withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.” We noted further that “‘[e]qual protection of the laws requires the existence of reasonable grounds for making a distinction between those within and those outside a designated class.‘” Id., quoting Nyitray, 2 Ohio St.3d at 175, 2 OBR at 717, 443 N.E.2d at 964.
{¶ 19} The Public Works Relief Compensation Act (
{¶ 20} However, this court has previously rejected classifications in legislation to ensure the financial security of the workers’ compensation insurance fund. See Doersam, 45 Ohio St.3d at 120, 543 N.E.2d at 1174. In fact, we have specifically held that “‘conserving funds is not a viable basis for denying compensation to those entitled to it.‘” Id. at 121, 543 N.E.2d at 1174, quoting Nyitray, supra, 2 Ohio St.3d at 177, 2 OBR at 719, 443 N.E.2d at 966. Moreover, it escapes us how the classifications created by
{¶ 21} The court of appeals held that
{¶ 22}
{¶ 23} The arbitrary nature of
{¶ 24} The classification created by
“It seems to this court more in harmony with the spirit of work-relief legislation to hold the claimant to be an employee than to hold him to be a pauper or ward. A sound public policy prompts the efforts of the state to preserve the self-reliance of its citizens, even if at extra expense. It is as important to preserve the character as to preserve the lives of its citizens. ‘Ill fares the land * * * where wealth accumulates and men decay.‘”
{¶ 25} Accordingly, we hold that
{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals denying appellant‘s writ of mandamus is reversed, and the commission is ordered to determine appellant‘s benefits in accordance with this decision. Appellant is a dependent person of a decedent whose injury and subsequent death was caused by a work-related disease, and, therefore, she is entitled to the minimum benefit set forth in
Judgment reversed and writ granted.
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately.
MOYER, C.J., COOK and STRATTON, JJ., dissent.
{¶ 27} I write only to express my incredulity that this matter has reached this court. Ohio‘s welfare and workers’ compensation systems heartlessly memorialized the difficult life of Frank Patterson with a cruel epitaph: “He Shouldn‘t Have Tried.” Patterson attempted to live his life with some dignity. He did not take a handout—he was willing to work in order to receive public assistance. God knows it was not pleasant work—his on-the-job exposure to pigeon droppings caused his mortal illness. But “workfare” and its promise of improved self-esteem and self-reliance left Patterson dead and his widow with an insulting $33.11 per week. How poor off are we that this state cannot offer the families of work-relief employees killed on the job the same treatment as other workers killed on the job? Is death on work-relief jobs so prevalent that the Department of Human Services cannot afford to reimburse the workers’ compensation fund for the cost of the benefits? Did the General Assembly really intend that the widow Patterson should survive on $1,721.72 per year? Would the extra seven thousand dollars a year Mrs. Patterson requests bust Ohio‘s $16 billion budget? Or is our deficit not monetary but rather a shortfall in compassion and humanity?
Cook, J., dissenting.
{¶ 28} I respectfully dissent on the basis that the appellant has not shown an equal protection violation.
{¶ 29} In order for this court to strike down a democratically produced statute based on equal protection, we must follow a legitimate process independent
{¶ 30} The majority finds appellant has met the burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the separate compensation system for work-relief employees with broad conclusions sounding in the realm of social “rightness,” such as “inherently unfair,” “blatant disparate treatment,” “those who are less fortunate,” and this “widow should be afforded the protection that other widows * * * receive.”
{¶ 31} My personal preference about the treatment of widows falls right in line with the majority‘s. Such personal preferences necessarily aside, however, I believe the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the legislative decision to set up different systems for compensating relief-workers and wage-earning workers upon death or injury is wholly irrelevant to any state purpose. The majority outlines the origins of this separate system for relief workers and the case to which the legislature was responding. Classifying such workers differently need only bear some rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. Id. The legitimacy of the objective is judged by relevance to a state purpose—not by whether we judges personally can abide such objective.
{¶ 32} I agree with the court of appeals that the challenged statute does not offend equal protection principles. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment and deny the writ.
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
{¶ 33} I respectfully dissent and join Justice Cook‘s dissent. This was a tragic death and my sympathies are the same as those of the majority of this court. There is great temptation to award Patterson‘s widow a sum greater than $33.11 per week. It is easy to do with the stroke of a pen. But to do so requires that we invalidate an entire statutory system based solely on the definition of “employee,” without taking into account all of the other circumstances that legitimately surround that single word.
{¶ 34} Ohio‘s workers’ compensation system is designed to provide protection to the employee for work-related injuries without relation to fault. In return, the employer is protected from suits, but funds the system. Thousands of Ohio companies, large and small, contribute to provide the financial basis of workers’ compensation. The cost and risks are spread broadly throughout the system, but those who benefit from the employee‘s work shoulder the burden of its costs.
{¶ 35} The work-relief system is wholly different in character and purpose. It is a system of public works designed to supplement welfare. It is not funded by employers who benefit from such work. Instead, it is funded by the taxpayer, as is the rest of the welfare system. Although the legislature added a workfare-related compensation plan, the plan specifically related to the workfare and was an extension of welfare protection. It is distinguished by statute from the employer-funded workers’ compensation system.
{¶ 36} The majority would now discard the entire system under an equal protection argument because appellant‘s decedent was an “employee” and because cost should be no deterrent. But as Justice Cook pointed out, the equal protection argument fails because the two systems are wholly unequal in purpose, character, and basis. The beneficiary of a workfare employee who dies as a result of a work-related injury will now receive far greater benefits than the workfare employee
{¶ 37} This is a decision that should not be made by the courts under the guise of “equal protection.” There are enormous costs associated with this decision. How will these new expenses be funded? These are issues that require debate, testimony, studies, compromise—all part of the legislative process. We as a court are not equipped to play that role, as tempting and sympathetic as the facts in this case are.
{¶ 38} The reality is that a workfare recipient is a welfare recipient whereas a wage-earner is supported by the Ohio employers who fund the workers’ compensation system. These employees are not similarly situated. Equal protection does not apply. Any such massive changes in the compensation system are best left to the legislature.
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
Notes
“One who applies to a municipality for relief and is given the opportunity, and required, to work for the support which he is to receive, and who, in response to such opportunity and requirement, works in one of the municipal departments which employs labor, under the direction of a municipal foreman, at a regular daily wage, payable alternately in groceries and in cash, is in the service and is an employee of the municipality within the meaning of Section 1465-61 of the General Code; and if he sustains an injury while engaged in such work, is entitled to the benefits of Workmen‘s Compensation Law.”