STATE OF OHIO, EX REL. DEAN F. MAYNARD v. MEDINA COUNTY FACILITIES TASKFORCE SUBCOMMITTEE, et al.
Appellate Case No. 19CA0083-M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO NINTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MEDINA COUNTY
December 7, 2020
2020-Ohio-5561
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
NINTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MEDINA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, EX REL. DEAN F.
MAYNARD
Relator-Appellant
v.
MEDINA COUNTY FACILITIES
TASKFORCE SUBCOMMITTEE, et al.
Respondents-Appellees
:
:
: Appellate Case No. 19CA0083-M
:
: Trial Court Case No. 19CIV0741
:
: (Civil Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
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:
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O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 7th day of December , 2020 .
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PATRICIA F. LOWERY, Atty. Reg. No. 0042561, 50 Gunnison Court, Medina, Ohio 44256
Attorney for Relator-Appellant
GREGORY A. BECK, Atty. Reg. No. 0018260, 400 South Main Street, North Canton, Ohio 44720
Attorney for Respondents-Appellees, Judge Gary Werner; Co-counsel for Judge Kevin Dunn
MARK LANDES, Atty. Reg. No. 0027227 and MATTHEW R. AUMANN, Atty. Reg. No. 0093612, Two Miranova Place, Suite 700, Columbus, Ohio 43215
Attorneys for Respondents-Appellees, Medina County Facilities Taskforce Subcommittee, Colleen Swedyk, William Hutson, Scott Miller, Steven Bastean; Co-counsel for Judge Kevin Dunn
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Relator-appellant, Dean F. Maynard, appeals from the trial court’s judgment of November 6, 2019, in which the court entered judgment under Civ.R. 12(C) in favor of Respondents-appellees, the Medina County Facilities Taskforce Subcommittee (the “Subcommittee”); Colleen Swedyk, a member of the Medina County Board of Commissioners; Judge Kevin Dunn; Judge Gary Werner; Scott Miller, Medina County Administrator; Steven Bastean, Medina County Maintenance Superintendent; and William Hutson, a member of the Medina County Board of Commissioners. Raising four assignments of error, Maynard argues that the trial court erred by ruling on genuinely disputed issues of material fact; by relying on evidence outside the record for purposes of Civ.R. 12(C); by determining that Respondents were exempt as a matter of law from the requirements of
{¶ 2} We hold that that the trial court erred by entering judgment in favor of Respondents because the allegations in the complaint, construed as true pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C), suffice to state a claim on which relief under
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} Maynard alleges that the Medina County Board of Commissioners formed the “Medina County Facilities Taskforce [to serve] as the decision-making and investigative public body” overseeing a planned renovation of the courthouse presently
occupied by the Medina County Court of Common Pleas. See Complaint ¶ 3 and 6; see also Brief of the Subcommittee, Swedyk, Hutson, Miller, Bastean and Judge Dunn 1-2 [hereinafter Subcommittee’s Brief]; Brief of Judge Werner 1. The commissioners and their counterparts with the City of Medina intend for the renovated facility to accommodate the Medina County Court of Common Pleas and the Medina Municipal Court. See Subcommittee’s Brief 1; Judge Werner’s Brief 1.
{¶ 4} On March 27, 2018, “key leaders from [the Medina County Board of Commissioners and the City of Medina, including all of the respondents other than Hutson,] volunteered” for service on the Subcommittee. Subcommittee’s Brief 2; see Complaint ¶ 7-8. The purpose of the Subcommittee was “to assist the ‘[Medina County] Facilities Taskforce’ [with the] select[ion] [of an] architect[ural]” firm to complete “a [s]pace [s]tudy” and then to design the new facility. See Subcommittee’s Brief 2; see also Complaint ¶ 6-7; Judge Werner’s Brief 1.
{¶ 5} On July 30, 2019, Maynard filed a complaint against Respondents in which he alleged that “[o]n at least five occasions,” Respondents violated
{¶ 6} Respondents filed answers to the complaint on September 27, 2019. One of these, filed by all of the respondents other than Judge Werner, included a series of 13 exhibits; Judge Werner did not attach any exhibits to his answer. The respondents other
than Judge Werner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings at the same time as they filed their answer, and Judge Werner later filed his own motion for judgment on the pleadings on October 10, 2019.
{¶ 7} On November 6, 2019, the trial court sustained Respondents’ motions. Journal Entry with Instructions for Service 3, Nov. 6, 2019 [hereinafter Judgment Entry]. The court reasoned that, under the circumstances, the Subcommittee is not a “public body” as defined by
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} Maynard presents two related but conceptually distinct propositions bearing the label “first assignment of error.” Relator’s Brief 1 and 5. In the first, Maynard posits that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING APPELLEES’ MOTION[S] FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS WHERE THE PLEADING [sic] ALLEGES OPEN MEETINGS ACT VIOLATIONS AND THE APPELLEES ACKNOWLEDGE A MEETING OCCURRED BUT THE
PARTIES DISPUTE THE NATURE AND CONTENT OF THOSE MEETINGS AND DISCUSSIONS.
Id. at 1. And in the second, Maynard posits that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON FACTS OUTSIDE OF THE PLEADINGS AND DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT.
Id. at 5. Because these propositions are related, we review them together as Maynard’s first and second assignments of error.
{¶ 9} Maynard argues that the “[t]rial [c]ourt erred in dismissing [his] [c]omplaint without any discovery at all, particularly [because] the information before the [c]ourt clearly evidenced at least one violation of
{¶ 10} Civ. R. 12(C) provides that “after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Under the rule, entry of judgment in favor of the moving party “is appropriate where a court (1) construes the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true,” and (2) finds “beyond doubt” that the nonmoving party “could prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim [or claims] that would entitle [it] to relief.” (Citation omitted.) State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996); Lakemore v. Schell, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29387, 2020-Ohio-4453, ¶ 11, citing Pontious at 570. Judgment pursuant
to Civ.R. 12(C), in other words, “may be granted only when no material factual issues exist, and the movant is entitled to * * * judgment as a matter of law.” (Citations omitted). Burnside v. Leimbach, 71 Ohio App.3d 399, 403, 594 N.E.2d 60 (10th Dist.1991); see also State ex rel. Wengerd v. Baughman Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 13 CA 0048, 2014-Oho-4749, ¶ 14. Thus, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be “characterized as a belated Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” given that the purpose of such a motion is to resolve questions of law, rather than questions of fact. Whaley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 92 Ohio St.3d 574, 581, 752 N.E.2d 267 (2001); Pontious at 570.
{¶ 11} The record for purposes of a motion under Civ.R. 12(C) “is restricted solely to the allegations in the pleadings,” along with “documents attached and incorporated into [the] pleadings.” Riolo v. Oakwood Plaza Ltd. Partnership, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04 CA 008555, 2005-Ohio-2150, ¶ 6; see also Civ.R. 10(C) (stating that a “copy of any written instrument attached to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes”). Not every “document attached to a pleading constitutes a Civ.R. 10(C) written instrument,” however; the “ ‘term “written instrument” in Civ.R. 10(C) has primarily been interpreted to include documents that evidence the parties’ rights and obligations,’ ” such as negotiable instruments, leases, insurance policies, deeds and contracts. State ex rel. Leneghan v. Husted, 154 Ohio St.3d 60, 2018-Ohio-3361, 110 N.E.3d 1275, ¶ 17, quoting Inskeep v. Burton, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2007-CA-11, 2008-Ohio-1982, ¶ 17; Greer v. Finest Auto Wholesale, Inc., 2020-Ohio-3951, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.), citing Leneghan at ¶ 17. On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on a motion under Civ.R. 12(C) is reviewed de novo. Greer at ¶ 16.
{¶ 12} In its judgment of November 6, 2019, the trial court cited two exhibits attached to the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed on September 27, 2019, by the respondents other than Judge Werner. Judgment Entry 2. Relying on these exhibits, the court found that the Subcommittee “was created to review qualifications of the architects and vendors” competing for selection to work on the courthouse renovation project. See id. Although the exhibits cited by the court were also attached to the answer filed by the respondents other than Judge Werner on September 27, 2019, none of the exhibits is a “written instrument” under Civ.R. 10(C), and as a result, the exhibits should have been excluded from the record pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). Leneghan at ¶ 17; Greer at ¶ 16.
{¶ 13} We hold, then, that the trial court erred by sustaining Respondents’ motions for judgment on the pleadings because the court considered evidence which should have been excluded from the record. Exclusively on that basis, Maynard’s first and second assignments of error are sustained.
{¶ 14} The third assignment of error in Maynard’s brief is presented in two statements that are substantively equivalent but differently worded. Relator’s Brief 1 and 10. In the first statement, Maynard contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEES JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND DISMISSING APPELLANT’S COMPLAINT AFTER DETERMINING APPELLEES ARE NOT A FINAL DECISION-MAKING BODY AND THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT TO THE OPEN MEETINGS REQUIREMENTS OF
Id. at 1. And in the second statement, Maynard contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE FACILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE WAS NOT A FINAL DECISION-MAKING BODY AND, THEREFORE, NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH OHIO OPEN MEETINGS LAW.
Id. at 10.
{¶ 15} Maynard argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by holding that the Subcommittee, “including its members, is non sui juris” because it is not a “ ‘decision-making body.’ ” Judgment Entry 2; Relator’s Brief 10-11. In its judgment, the trial court reasoned that a “public body” under
{¶ 16} Under
“meeting” is “any prearranged discussion of the public business of [a] public body by a majority of [the body’s] members.”
{¶ 17} Interpreting the use of the term “public body” in
{¶ 18} The Subcommittee and the individual respondents argue that Maynard’s claims against them should be dismissed because they “are non sui juris.” See Judge Werner’s Brief 10-11; see also Subcommittee’s Brief 10-11. They maintain that only a decision-making body could be a “public body” subject to suit under
{¶ 19} Maynard alleged in his complaint that the “Medina County Facilities Taskforce and [the] [S]ubcommittee are both public bodies subject to the requirements of
{¶ 20} Additionally, the trial court erred as a matter of law by holding that, under the circumstances, only the Medina County Board of Commissioners could be subject to suit under
state, a state institution of higher education as defined in [
{¶ 21} Even assuming, however, that the Medina County Board of Commissioners is the decision-making “public authority” for purposes of
{¶ 22} For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court erred by entering judgment in Respondents’ favor pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). Consequently, Maynard’s third assignment of error—as denominated in this opinion—is sustained, and the trial court’s judgment of November 6, 2019, is reversed.
{¶ 23} For his final assignment of error, Maynard contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING COURT COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT, DEAN MAYNARD[,] WHERE A PORTION OF THOSE COSTS RELATED TO THE “COMPUTERIZATION FEE” FAR EXCEED[S] THE AMOUNT STATUTORILY PERMITTED TO BE ASSESSED.
{¶ 24} Maynard argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay costs in excess of those authorized by
III. Conclusion
{¶ 25} Construing the material allegations in the complaint to be true, and drawing all reasonable inferences from the balance of the Civ.R. 12(C) record in Maynard’s favor, Respondents did not meet their burden to demonstrate that Maynard could not prove any set of facts establishing his right to relief on the claims he set forth in his complaint. The trial court, in addition, erred in its determination that the Subcommittee and its members are not amenable to suit because they are not sui juris parties.
{¶ 26} Nevertheless, we do not find that Maynard has proven that the Subcommittee is a “public body,” as the term is defined by
case is remanded to the court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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HALL, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
(Hon. Michael L. Tucker, Hon. Michael T. Hall, and Hon. Jeffrey M. Welbaum, Second District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.)
Copies sent to:
Patricia F. Lowery
Gregory A. Beck
Mark Landes
Matthew R. Aumann
Hon. Richard J. McMonagle, Sitting by Assignment