WHALEY, APPELLANT, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, APPELLEE.
No. 00-1276
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
August 22, 2001
92 Ohio St. 3d 574 | 2001-Ohio-1287
(No. 00-1276—Submitted February 28, 2001—Decided August 22, 2001.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-570.
DOUGLAS, J.
{¶ 1} On August 12, 1997, plaintiff-appellant, Pat Whaley, a Franklin County Deputy Sheriff, filed criminal charges in the Franklin County Municipal Court against Kim Tignor. Tignor was arrested and jailed. The charges against Tignor were subsequently dismissed at arraignment.
{¶ 2} It appears that for a number of years prior to the filing of the criminal charges, Tignor and appellant’s family were friends. It also appears that the relationship between Tignor and the Whaleys had become strained due to a financial dispute.
{¶ 3} On May 14, 1998, Tignor filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County against the Franklin County Board of Commissioners, “the Franklin County Local Government,” and appellant, individually and as a Franklin County Deputy Sheriff. The complaint alleged that appellant had caused an arrest warrant to be issued and that Tignor had been improperly arrested and
{¶ 4} On July 29, 1998, appellant instituted this action pursuant to
{¶ 5} On November 16, 1998, appellant moved for summary judgment. Appellee failed to file a response to the motion. On March 31, 1999, appellee did, however, file a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Appellant submitted a timely response.
{¶ 6} On May 5, 1999, the trial court granted appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. In its entry sustaining appellee’s motion, the trial court, without discussion, also overruled appellant’s motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 7} Appellant appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County. In a decision rendered on June 8, 2000, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
{¶ 8} This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
{¶ 10}
“Except as otherwise provided in this division, a political subdivision shall provide for the defense of an employee, in any state or federal court, in any civil action or proceeding to recover damages for injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the employee in connection with a governmental or proprietary function if the act or omission occurred or is alleged to have occurred while the employee was acting in good faith and not manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities.”
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} The governing case law interpreting
{¶ 13} The parties do not dispute that Rogers is the seminal case for construing
{¶ 14} Appellant argues that the county was required to provide for his individual defense because the acts or omissions attributed to appellant in the complaint filed in the underlying Tignor lawsuit indicate that appellant was acting “not manifestly outside the scope of his employment.” Appellant contends that there are no reasonable grounds to distinguish this matter from Rogers and that the trial court and the court of appeals, in attempting to do so, misconstrued both
{¶ 15} Rogers arose out of a physical altercation between Philip B. Rogers, a Youngstown City Police Officer, and his sister. After the altercation, Rogers’s sister brought a federal lawsuit against Rogers, the city of Youngstown, and certain Youngstown city officials, alleging violations of her civil rights. The city refused to provide Rogers with legal counsel in the federal suit, concluding that Rogers’s actions surrounding the altercation with his sister were outside the scope of his employment. Rogers subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action, pursuant to
{¶ 16} In Rogers, we stated that ”
{¶ 17} Relying on evidence obtained from an internal affairs investigation of Rogers and on evidence secured during discovery in the federal civil rights lawsuit, the city of Youngstown contended that
{¶ 18} Based on the foregoing, we construe
{¶ 19} The standard for evaluating the allegations in the underlying complaint is set forth in
{¶ 20} Moreover, there is a clear distinction drawn in
{¶ 21} Accordingly, we hold that
{¶ 22} We now turn our attention to the allegations raised in the underlying complaint. The plaintiff in the underlying action, Kim Tignor, asserts in the introductory section of her complaint that “[t]his is an action for a declaratory judgment and money damages for a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights by the defendants [Franklin County Board Commissioners, Franklin County Local Government, and Deputy Pat Whaley] under
{¶ 23} After weighing the allegations contained in the underlying complaint against the appropriate standard, we conclude that the complaint filed by Kim Tignor contains sufficient allegations that appellant committed the relevant acts and/or omissions while he was acting not manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities. The complaint, judged in its entirety, avers that appellant was acting at all relevant times in his official capacity as a Franklin County Deputy. Furthermore, the essence of Tignor’s complaint alleges violations of her constitutional rights premised upon claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The allegations raised in the complaint clearly attempt to impute the acts of appellant to the county, implying, of course, that appellant was acting within the scope of his employment or, at a minimum, not manifestly outside the scope. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court and the
{¶ 24} Appellee has gone to great lengths to distinguish the instant matter from our decision in Rogers. We recognize that a determination whether a political subdivision owes a duty to defend an employee is a fact-sensitive issue. Thus, whether the duty to defend is triggered should not turn solely on a comparison in this and other cases with the allegations made in Rogers. Instead, the primary focus should be on whether the allegations raised in the pleadings of the underlying action meet the standard set forth in
{¶ 25} Contrary to appellee’s assertion, neither the personal nature of the underlying dispute between Tignor and appellant nor the perceived malicious and intentional tone of the acts alleged in the underlying complaint is enough to remove this matter from the ambit of Rogers and
{¶ 26} We also reject appellee’s contention that the use of force by Officer Rogers removes this matter from the purview of Rogers and
{¶ 27} Finally, we find it necessary to discuss the trial court’s decision to grant a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings in this action. Civ.R. 12(C) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
{¶ 28} A Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings has been characterized as a belated Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Nelson v. Pleasant (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 479, 482, 597 N.E.2d 1137, 1139, and Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co. (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 160, 163, 644 N.E.2d 731, 733. In fact, in State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 569-570, 664 N.E.2d 931, 936, this court noted the similarities between the two motions. However, we also recognized that “Civ.R. 12(C) motions are specifically for resolving questions of law.” Id. at 570, 664 N.E.2d at 936.
{¶ 29} When considering a defendant’s Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court is required to construe as true all the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party. Peterson v. Teodosio (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 165-166, 63 O.O.2d 262, 264, 297 N.E.2d 113, 117. An action brought pursuant to
{¶ 30} In reaching its decision, we find that the trial court clearly disregarded the appropriate standard required pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) and Peterson. For instance, the trial court stated that “while [the underlying Tignor complaint] alleges that Whaley was ‘employed as a deputy’ and [that] he acted ‘under color of state [law],’ this does not translate into ‘acting within the scope of employment.’ ” As can be gleaned from the foregoing, in addition to applying the wrong standard pursuant to
{¶ 31} Moreover, and in any event, this court stated in Peterson that “Civ.R. 12(C) is a continuation of the former statutory practice and presents only questions of law, and determination of the motion for judgment on the pleadings is restricted solely to the allegations in the pleadings.” Id., 34 Ohio St.2d at 166, 63 O.O.2d at 264, 297 N.E.2d at 117, citing with approval Conant v. Johnson (1964), 1 Ohio App.2d 133, 30 O.O.2d 157, 204 N.E.2d 100. Thus, despite recognizing the proper scope required for deciding a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court apparently gave no consideration at all to the allegations raised by
{¶ 32} Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to consider appellant’s motion for summary judgment consistent with Rogers v. Youngstown. Further, in the event that appellant’s motion is granted, we instruct the trial court to conduct a hearing, pursuant to Rogers, in order to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees, expenses, and costs incurred by appellant.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent.
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.
{¶ 33} The majority today holds that ”
{¶ 34} While I continue in my belief that the good faith requirement in
{¶ 35} The complaint clearly demonstrates the personal and nonemployment-related nature of Whaley’s conduct. In essence, the complaint alleges that Whaley filed criminal charges against Tignor without justification and acted maliciously, wantonly, and intentionally and with reckless disregard of her rights, that he caused her to be arrested, and that he maliciously prosecuted her. The filing of criminal charges, causing an arrest warrant to be issued, and maliciously prosecuting another were all actions of a private citizen. See
{¶ 36} However,
{¶ 37} I urge the General Assembly to amend
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
Hunter, Carnahan & Shoub, Robert R. Byard and Russell E. Carnahan, for appellant.
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, George Speaks and Harland H. Hale, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Paul Cox, urging reversal for amicus curiae Fraternal Order of Police Ohio Labor Council, Inc.
Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Municipal League and County Commissioners’ Association of Ohio.