State ex rel. Magsig v. Toledo (Slip Opinion)State ex rel. Magsig v. Toledo (Slip Opinion)
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Magsig v. Toledo, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3416.]
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SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-3416
THE STATE EX REL. MAGSIG v. THE CITY OF TOLEDO.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Magsig v. Toledo, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3416.]
Civil law—
(No. 2019-1526—Submitted March 3, 2020—Decided June 24, 2020.)
FRENCH, J.
{¶ 1} In this original action, relator, Susan Magsig, seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent respondent, the city of Toledo, from conducting an administrative hearing to adjudicate her liability for violating a municipal traffic ordinance. On November 15, 2019, we granted an alternative writ. 157 Ohio St.3d 1489, 2019-Ohio-4696, 134 N.E.3d 1199. We now grant a writ of prohibition.
I. Background
{¶ 2} Toledo has a civil-enforcement system for red-light and speeding-camera violations.
{¶ 3} Toledo cites such violations by sending the vehicle owner a citation called a “Notice of Liability.”
{¶ 4} On August 19, 2019, Toledo‘s automated system generated a notice of liability for a speeding offense allegedly committed by Magsig.1 The notice informed Magsig that she had until October 11 to respond. Magsig requested a hearing before the city‘s administrative-hearing officer, which the city scheduled for November 19.
{¶ 5} On November 4, however, Magsig commenced the present action for a writ of prohibition to prevent Toledo from conducting the administrative hearing on the grounds that
II. Legal analysis
{¶ 6} Three elements are necessary for a writ of prohibition to issue: the exercise of judicial (or quasi-judicial) power, the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. However, if the absence of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, a petitioner need not establish the third prong, the
{¶ 7} Toledo does not dispute that its hearing officer will be exercising quasi-judicial authority. Quasi-judicial power refers to “the power to hear and determine controversies between the public and individuals that require a hearing resembling a judicial trial.” State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 87 Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908 (1999). Magsig contends that the hearing officer patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. We agree and conclude that Toledo‘s patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction to carry out its red-light and speeding-camera civil-enforcement system is clear on the face of
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} In opposing the writ, Toledo makes three arguments, which we address below.
A. This court‘s decision in Walker v. Toledo
{¶ 10} First, Toledo argues that this court has already ruled in Walker v. Toledo, 143 Ohio St.3d 420, 2014-Ohio-5461, 39 N.E.3d 474, that
{¶ 11} The version of
B. Preemption under R.C. 1901.20(A)(1)
{¶ 12} Alternatively, Toledo argues that
{¶ 13} Toledo‘s argument runs counter to the plain language of the statute, which vests the municipal courts with exclusive jurisdiction, without limitations. Toledo‘s preferred construction of the statute requires us to add words to the text, which we are not permitted to do. In re Adoption of P.L.H., 151 Ohio St.3d 554, 2017-Ohio-5824, 91 N.E.3d 698, ¶ 27.
{¶ 14} We reject Toledo‘s argument that H.B. 62 preserved the jurisdiction of local administrative-hearing officers for noncriminal traffic-law violations.
C. Constitutionality of certain provisions enacted in H.B. 62
{¶ 15} Finally, Toledo argues that
{¶ 16} But even assuming these provisions are unconstitutional (a question we emphatically do not decide), Toledo does not claim that the exclusive-jurisdiction clause of
{¶ 17} Toledo‘s constitutional challenge to unrelated amendments that H.B. 62 made to other statutes fails to account for the authority of courts to sever unconstitutional portions of a statute without affecting other portions of the statute or related provisions. See State v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 390, 2014-Ohio-783, 7 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 15; Geiger v. Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28 (1927); see also
{¶ 18} To determine whether severance is appropriate, we consider (1) whether the constitutional and unconstitutional parts are capable of standing alone, (2) whether the unconstitutional part is so connected with the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislature if we strike it, and (3) whether we must insert words in order to effectuate the remaining constitutional portion. Romage at ¶ 15; see also Geiger at 466.
{¶ 19} The disputed provisions are easily severable (if necessary). The statutory provision making the municipal court‘s jurisdiction exclusive may still be enforced even if (hypothetically) the specific requirements for conducting those hearings would eventually be declared to be unconstitutional. For this reason, Toledo‘s constitutional challenge to portions of H.B. 62 is of no consequence to this case.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 20}
Writ granted.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DeWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur.
Mayle, L.L.C., Andrew R. Mayle, and Ronald J. Mayle, for relator.
Dale R. Emch, Toledo Law Director, Jeffrey B. Charles, Chief of Litigation, and John T. Madigan, Senior Attorney, for respondent.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, State Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor, and Halli Brownfield Watson, Assistant Attorney General, urging granting of the writ of prohibition for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.