THE STATE EX REL. LTV STEEL COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 98-1714
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
April 5, 2000
88 Ohio St.3d 284 | 2000-Ohio-328
Submittеd February 22, 2000. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD06-859.
Workers’ compensation—Court of appeals’ denial of writ of mandamus ordering Industrial Cоmmission to vacate its decisions that denied relator‘s motion for relief under
{¶ 1} LTV Steel Company, appellant, seeks a writ of mandamus ordering appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission“) to vacate its decisions that deny LTV Steel‘s motion for relief under
{¶ 2} Appеllee Jesse Sheppard‘s workers’ compensation claim was initially allowed for “acute cervical strain.” Later, a commission distriсt hearing officer (“DHO“) allowed other additional conditions, and LTV Steel failed to timely appeal the DHO‘s order. LTV Steel requested permissiоn to appeal out-of-time pursuant to the savings provision in
{¶ 3} On LTV Steel‘s belated appeal, a staff hearing officer (“SHO“) affirmed the additional allowances granted by the DHO. LTV Steel appealed again, but on June 20, 1995, the commission refused the appeal. LTV Steel asserts that it also did not receive timely written notice of this order and, therefore, that it could not timely appeal to common pleas court under
{¶ 4} LTV Steel applied again for
{¶ 5} LTV Steel moved for rehearing and reconsideration of the order denying
Sammon & Bolmeyer Co., L.P.A., and David J. Briggs, for appellee Sheppard.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 6}
“The employee, employer, and their respective representatives are entitled to written notice of any * * * determination, order * * * оr decision under this chapter and the administrator of workers’ compensation and his representative are entitled to like notice for * * * [
R.C. 4123.511 DHO and SHO orders] and [R.C. 4123.512 right to participate appeals]. An employee, employer, or the administrator is deemed not to have received notice until the notice is received from the industriаl commission or its district or staff hearing officers, the administrator, or the bureau of workers’ compensation by both the employee and his reрresentative of record, both the employer and his representative of record, and by both the administrator and his representative.“If any person to whom notice is mailed fails to receive the notice and the commission, upon hearing, determines that the failure was due tо cause beyond the control and without the fault or neglect of such person or his representative and that such person or his reprеsentative did not have actual knowledge of the import of the information contained in the notice, such person may take the action afforded to such person within twenty-one days after receipt of the notice of such determination of the commission. Delivery of the notice to the address of the person or his representative is prima-facie evidence of receipt of the notice by the person.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 7} LTV Steel relies on the emphasized portion in the first paragraph of
{¶ 8} Employers and their representatives are entitled to receive notice from the commission under
{¶ 9} The next question is whether LTV Steel sustained its burden of prоof. Admittedly, some evidence in this record suggests that Sheppard might have fabricated the stamped order that the commission cited as evidence of LTV Steel‘s actual knowledge prior to October 16, 1995. On the other hand, Sheppard explained that he had taken the order to his employer because LTV Steel had previously alleged a failure of notice, and the commission evidently believed his explanation.
{¶ 10} The commission is the exclusive evaluator of weight and credibility, and as long as some evidence supports the commission‘s decision, reviewing сourts must defer to its judgment. State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 376, 658 N.E.2d 1055, 1058. Here, the commission credited Sheppard‘s evidence, which is all that is necessary to sustain its decision. State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936. Accordingly, the court of appeals properly found no abuse of discretion and denied a writ of mandamus to vacate the commission‘s denial of
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.