State ex rel. Jones v. PaschkeState ex rel. Jones v. Paschke
[Until this оpinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-135.]
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SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-135
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-135.]
Prohibition—General division of сommon pleas court has jurisdiction over appellant‘s former mother-in-law‘s complaint seeking companionship and visitation with appellant‘s child under
(Submitted December 12, 2023—Decided January 18, 2024.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Geauga County, No. 22-G-0037, 2023-Ohio-1536.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jeremy J. Jones, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals against appellee, Judge Carolyn J. Paschke of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, General Division. Jones argues that Judge Paschke lacks jurisdiction over a case filed by Jones‘s former mother-in-law for grandparent companionship and visitation rights with Jones‘s child. He also argues that Judge Paschke lacks jurisdiction to appoint a guardian ad litem in the case. The Eleventh District granted Judge Paschke‘s motion for summary judgment and denied Jones‘s petition, and Jones has appealed. We affirm the Eleventh District‘s judgment denying the petition.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} The Geauga County Court of Common Pleas consists of two divisions: (1) the General Division, which hears domestic-relations cases (the general division), and (2) a combined Probate and Juvenile Division (the juvenile division). See
{¶ 3} Jeremy Jones married Molly Jones in April 2015, and in December 2015, Molly gave birth to thеir son, B.J. In 2019, Molly filed for divorce in the general division. On July 2, 2022, while the divorce proceedings were pending, Molly passed away. The divorce case was dismissed on July 6.
{¶ 4} On July 12, 2022, B.J.‘s maternal grandmother, Heidi O‘Neill, filed a complaint against Jones in the generаl division for grandparent companionship/visitation time with B.J. Jones filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the general division lacks jurisdiction over the complaint; Judge Paschke denied the motion. O‘Neill filed a motion for appointment of a guardiаn ad litem, which Judge Paschke granted.
{¶ 5} In September 2022, Jones filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Eleventh District. Jones argued that the general division lacks jurisdiction over complaints for grandparent companionship and visitatiоn rights and that O‘Neill‘s complaint should have been filed in the juvenile division. He also argued that Judge Paschke lacks jurisdiction to appoint a guardian ad litem. Judge Paschke filed a motion for summary judgment. The Eleventh District granted the motion and deniеd Jones‘s petition. Jones appeals as of right.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Legal standards
{¶ 6} We review de novo a court of appeals’ order granting summary judgment in a prohibition action. State ex rel. Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose, 156 Ohio St.3d 425, 2019-Ohio-1329, 128 N.E.3d 209, ¶ 8. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and * * * the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Ellipsis sic.) Id., quoting
{¶ 7} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Jones must show that (1) Judge Paschke exercised or is going to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ wоuld result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. Id. at ¶ 9. If Judge Paschke patently and unambiguously lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, Jones need not establish the lack of an adequate legal remedy. Schlegel v. Sweeney, 171 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-3841, 215 N.E.3d 451, ¶ 6. Here, the рarties do not dispute that Judge Paschke is exercising judicial power in the companionship-and-visitation case.
B. The general division has jurisdiction over O‘Neill‘s case
{¶ 8} Jones argues that Judge Paschke—a judge of the general division—lаcks subject-matter jurisdiction over O‘Neill‘s companionship-and-visitation case and that only the juvenile division has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. We disagree.
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} In addition,
If either the father or mother of an unmarried minor child is deceased, the court of common pleas of the county in which the minor child resides may grant thе parents and other relatives of the deceased father or mother reasonable companionship or visitation rights with respect to the minor child during the child‘s minority if the parent or other relative files a complaint requеsting reasonable companionship or visitation rights and if the court determines that the granting of the companionship or visitation rights is in the best interest of the minor child.
{¶ 11} The statute requires that the complaint be brought in the court of common pleas of the county in which the minor child resides.
{¶ 12} The general division has jurisdiction over O‘Neill‘s complaint pursuant to
{¶ 13} Jones argues that
{¶ 14} O‘Neill‘s complaint, however, seeks companionship and visitation with B.J.—not custody. Visitаtion and custody are distinct legal concepts. In re Gibson, 61 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 573 N.E.2d 1074 (1991). Custody resides in the party or parties who have the right to ultimate legal and physical control of a child. Visitation resides in a noncustodial party and encompasses that pаrty‘s right to visit the child. Id.; see also
{¶ 15} Because the general division has jurisdiction to decide complaints seeking grandparent companionship and visitation filed under
C. Jones has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to contest Judge Paschke‘s appointment of a guardian ad litem
{¶ 16} Jones also argues that Judge Paschke lacks jurisdiсtion to appoint a guardian ad litem, and he seeks a writ of prohibition precluding the appointment in O‘Neill‘s case. Jones is correct that
{¶ 17} Because Judge Paschke does not patently and unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction over O‘Neill‘s case, Jones is entitled to a writ of prohibition only if the appointment of the guardian ad litem was not authorized by law and Jones lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See Gray, 169 Ohio St.3d 424, 2022-Ohio-3937, 205 N.E.3d 494, at ¶ 9. For an alternate remedy to constitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, it must be complete, beneficial, and speedy. State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. Mayfield Hts., 119 Ohio St.3d 11, 2008-Ohio-3181, 891 N.E.2d 320, ¶ 14. Jones cites cases for the proposition that an appeal is not an adequate remedy in cases involving parenting time. See State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, 138 Ohio St.3d 84, 2013-Ohio-5477, 3 N.E.3d 1184; Kallet v. Wilgus, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2021 AP 01 0004, 2021-Ohio-1637. These cases, however, involved determinations of custody, not companionship and visitation. The danger we identified in V.K.B.—that a child could be removed from his or her parent for several years pending an appellate decision, see V.K.B. at ¶ 23—is not present here.
{¶ 18} And even if the logic of these cases apрlied to companionship and visitation cases, Jones is challenging only Judge Paschke‘s appointment of a guardian ad litem. A guardian ad litem makes recommendations to the court, see
{¶ 19} Because Jones has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to challenge Judge Paschke‘s appointment of the guardian ad litem in O‘Neill‘s case, he is not еntitled to a writ of prohibition precluding the appointment.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 20} Judge Paschke does not lack subject-matter jurisdiction over O‘Neill‘s complaint for grandparent companionship and visitation. In addition, Jones has an adequate remеdy in the ordinary course of the law to challenge Judge Paschke‘s appointment of a guardian ad litem. We therefore affirm the Eleventh District Court of Appeals’ judgment granting Judge Paschke‘s motion for summary judgment and denying Jones‘s petition for a writ of prohibition.
Judgment affirmed.
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., concur.
Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, Nicole A. Cruz, and Kelley R. Tauring, for appellant.
James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Linda M. Applebaum, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.