THE STATE EX REL. JACKSON, APPELLANT, v. MCFAUL, SHERIFF, APPELLEE.
No. 95-155
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Submitted May 23, 1995—Decided August 16, 1995.
73 Ohio St.3d 185 | 1995-Ohio-228
APPEAL from Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 68182.
{¶ 1} On March 19, 1992, following a bench trial, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas found appellant, Theodore Jackson, guilty of robbery and sentenced him to an indefinite term of from eight-to-fifteen years with eight years of actual incarceration. On June 12, 1992, Jackson‘s parole was revoked following a hearing, apparently due to his robbery conviction. On Jackson‘s Parole Board risk-assessment form, there is a handwritten notation that, in mitigation, Jackson stated that he was “not guilty of the crime” and that “his attorney did not give him good representation.”
{¶ 2} On September 14, 1994, in a prior appeal, we reversed the denial of habeas corpus relief and granted a writ of habeas corpus discharging Jackson from prison on the basis that Jackson‘s written waiver of a jury trial in his 1992 robbery case was never filed and made a part of the record in the robbery case. State ex rel. Jackson v. Dallman (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 261, 638 N.E.2d 563. The court emphasized that the common pleas court was not precluded from retrying Jackson on the robbery charge. Id., 70 Ohio St.3d at 263, 638 N.E.2d at 565. There was no evidence or argument in State ex rel. Jackson that Jackson was being held in prison due to a parole revocation in addition to his robbery conviction.
{¶ 3} On November 22, 1994, Jackson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. Jackson alleged that he was
{¶ 4} Sheriff McFaul filed a motion to dismiss based on the argument that Jackson had an adequate remedy by appeal, and Jackson filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 4, 1995, the court of appeals dismissed the petition on the basis that habeas corpus is not available to challenge the decisions of the Ohio Adult Parole Authority, citing Hattie v. Anderson (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 232, 626 N.E.2d 67.
{¶ 5} The cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.
Theodore R. Jackson, pro se.
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and John W. Monroe, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 6} The court of appeals relied on Hattie v. Anderson, supra, to hold that habeas corpus will not lie to review the actions of the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (“APA“) where the petition does not attack the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. See, also, Stahl v. Shoemaker (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 351, 4 O.O.3d 485, 364 N.E.2d 286. However, since Hattie, we have held that habeas corpus will lie in certain extraordinary circumstances where there is an unlawful restraint of a person‘s liberty, notwithstanding the fact that only nonjurisdictional issues are involved, but only where there is no adequate legal remedy, e.g., appeal or postconviction relief. State ex rel. Pirman v. Money (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 591, 593, 635 N.E.2d 26, 29.
{¶ 7} The revocation of parole implicates a liberty interest which cannot be denied without certain procedural protections. Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484; Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656. Minimum due process entitles parolees to certain rights, including the right to a hearing within a reasonable time following arrest and, under certain circumstances, the right to counsel. Morrissey and
{¶ 8} Since a parolee could be restrained solely by a parole revocation that violates the rights specified by Morrissey, Gagnon, and/or
{¶ 9} To avoid dismissal under
{¶ 10} Jackson‘s first claim in his habeas corpus petition was that he was not informed of his right to request counsel at his final parole revocation hearing. See Gagnon, supra; see, also,
{¶ 11} Jackson alleged in his second claim for habeas corpus relief that he was never advised of his minimum due process rights, as set forth in Morrissey, before or during his final parole-revocation hearing. See, also,
{¶ 12} Additionally, habeas corpus lies only if the petitioner is entitled to immediate release from confinement. Pewitt v. Lorain Correctional Inst. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 470, 472, 597 N.E.2d 92, 94;
{¶ 13} Jackson‘s final claim in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was that an unreasonable delay had indeed occurred. However, under the applicable test for unreasonable delay, prejudice receives substantial emphasis. Seebeck v. Zent (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 109, 111, 623 N.E.2d 1195, 1197. Three interests that are weighed in the prejudice determination are: (1) prevention of oppressive prehearing incarceration, (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of the alleged parole violator, and (3) limitation of the possibility that delay will impair the accused parole violator‘s defense at his final parole revocation hearing. State ex rel. Taylor v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 121, 128, 609 N.E.2d 546, 551. The “most serious” component of prejudice requiring the court‘s “primary attention” is the third, i.e., the possibility that delay impaired the accused parole violator‘s ability to defend against revocation. Flenoy v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 131, 136, 564 N.E.2d 1060, 1065.
{¶ 14} Jackson‘s petition failed to allege any prejudice in even a conclusory fashion. In addition, it is evident that most of the “delay” alleged by Jackson, i.e., December 14, 1991 until November 1994, apparently covers the time when Jackson was held on his robbery charge and subsequent conviction. Although that conviction was invalidated by this court in State ex rel. Jackson, it did not remove all factual support from the revocation. Flenoy, supra, 56 Ohio St.3d at 132, 564 N.E.2d at 1062. Jackson‘s complaint also did not indicate any request for a new parole-revocation hearing following State ex rel. Jackson.
{¶ 15} Accordingly, since Jackson‘s petition failed to state with sufficient specificity facts warranting habeas corpus relief, the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition, although that court‘s rationale was erroneous. See State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 89, 92, 637 N.E.2d 306, 309 (“[A] reviewing court is not authorized to reverse a correct judgment merely because erroneous reasons were assigned as a basis thereof.“).1
{¶ 16} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 17} I dissent from the majority‘s holding that this is not an extraordinary case which demands habeas corpus relief. On September 14, 1994, we granted Jackson a writ of habeas corpus discharging him from prison on the basis that he had been wrongly convicted of robbery. State ex rel. Jackson v. Dallman (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 261, 638 N.E.2d 563. However, Jackson remains in prison because the conviction which we determined was wrongful was used earlier in a Parole Board hearing to revoke Jackson‘s parole.
{¶ 18} Thus, the man who we determined up to the time of our decision had wrongfully served thirty months of prison time on an improper conviction continues to serve prison time based upon that same improper conviction. I consider this Kafkaesque result extraordinary, and one worthy of correction through habeas corpus relief.