Seebeck v. Zent
1993 Ohio 152
Ohio
1993
Check Treatment

SEEBECK, APPELLANT, v. ZENT, WARDEN, APPELLEE.

No. 93-1184

Supreme Court of Ohio

Submitted October 18, 1993—Decided December 29, 1993.

[Cite as Seebeck v. Zent (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 109.]

Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, Diane J. Karpinski and Cash Mischka, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants.

The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed on authority of

.

MOYER, C.J., A.W. SWEENEY, DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.

WRIGHT, J., dissents for the reasons stated in his dissent in

.

Gregg Seebeck, pro se.

Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, Donald G. Keyser, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Per Curiam. Seebeck fails to raise a jurisdictional claim in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. When the appellant does not attack the jurisdiction of the court, a writ of habeas corpus will be denied. R.C. 2725.05;

. However, even if the court considers this petition as one for a writ of mandamus, the relief must still be denied.

R.C. 2967.15 requires the authority “to make a determination of the case of the parolee alleged to be a violator of the conditions of his pardon or parole within a reasonable time” or release him on parole. (Emphasis added.) Seebeck alleges he was entitled to a parole revocation hearing within sixty days of his arrest, since he is a technical parole violator. He bases his argument on the 1974 federal district court case of

. This case has been vacated,
; a new order issued on August 19, 1975; modified upon appeal on September 9, 1976, at
; and explained upon further appeal by intervenor plaintiffs in
.

In

, the court stated that all jurisdiction in the original
case had terminated at least by 1981. With the status of the federal law unclear on the sixty-day rule, we hold that the standard to be used in Ohio is the reasonable time standard, developed in
, and modified in
, and in
.

presented a two-part test for determining whether a delay of a parole revocation hearing by the Adult Parole Authority entitles an alleged parole violator to relief. First, the court must determine whether the delay was reasonable. “This involves the consideration and balancing of three factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, and (3) the alleged parole violator‘s assertion of his right to a hearing within a reasonable period of time.”
. Second, the court must determine whether the delay somehow prejudiced the alleged parole violator. The court identified three protected interests in this context: “(1) [P]revention of oppressive prehearing incarceration, (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of the alleged parole violator, and (3) limitation of the possibility that delay will impair the accused parole violator‘s defense at his final parole revocation hearing.”

Although the

case modified the
test by placing the prejudice factor on the same plane as the reasonableness-of-time factor, we held in
that, “prejudice should ordinarily receive substantial emphasis because the remedy—outright release of a felon * * * is so drastic.”
. Seebeck has shown neither unreasonable delay nor prejudice. Moreover, there is no “60 day rule.”

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., A.W. SWEENEY, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.