State ex rel. Grendell v. Walder (Slip Opinion)State ex rel. Grendell v. Walder (Slip Opinion)
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Grendell v. Walder, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-211.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-211
THE STATE EX REL. GRENDELL, JUDGE, v. WALDER, AUD.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Grendell v. Walder, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-211.]
Mandamus—
(No. 2020-1070—Submitted October 5, 2021—Decided February 1, 2022.)
IN MANDAMUS.
{¶ 1} In this original action, relator, Timothy J. Grendell, judge of the Geauga County Common Pleas Court‘s juvenile and probate divisions, seeks a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Charles E. Walder, the Geauga County auditor, to issue warrants on the county treasurer to pay for court-ordered expenditures. We previously granted an alternative writ, 162 Ohio St.3d 1425, 2021-Ohio-1202, 166 N.E.3d 27, and we now grant a writ of mandamus.
I. Legal background
{¶ 2}
{¶ 3} The parties have placed two versions of
The county auditor shall issue warrants * * * on the county treasurer for all moneys payable from the county treasury, upon presentation of the proper order or voucher and evidentiary matter for the moneys * * *. The auditor shall not issue a warrant for the payment of any claim against the county, unless it is allowed by the board of county commissioners, except where the amount due is fixed by law or is allowed by an officer or tribunal * * * so authorized by law. If the auditor questions the validity of an expenditure that is within available appropriations and for which a proper order or voucher and evidentiary matter is presented, the auditor shall notify the board, officer, or tribunal who presented the voucher. If the board, officer, or tribunal determines that the expenditure is valid and the auditor continues to refuse to issue the appropriate warrant on the county treasury, a writ of mandamus may be sought. The court shall issue a writ of mandamus for issuance of the warrant if the court determines that the claim is valid.
Evidentiary matter includes original invoices, receipts, bills and checks, and legible copies of contracts.
{¶ 4} The General Assembly amended
II. Factual background
{¶ 5} Judge Grendell seeks a writ of mandamus ordering Walder to issue warrants for five categories of expenditures relating to the juvenile and probate divisions of the Geauga County Common Pleas Court (“the Geauga courts“): robocalls, newspaper advertisements, website upgrades, mileage reimbursements, and publication fees.
A. Robocalls
{¶ 6} Around the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Judge Grendell hired TRZ Business Services (“TRZ“) to provide robocall services to Geauga County residents informing them of the pandemic‘s impact on the Geauga courts’
operations. TRZ made these calls and submitted an invoice dated April 1, 2020, requesting payment in the amount of $2,450.88.
{¶ 7} On April 24, 2020, Walder sent a letter to Judge Grendell informing him that TRZ‘s invoice would not be paid, because Judge Grendell had stated in the calls that “no tax dollars were used for this call.” In Walder‘s view, Judge Grendell contradicted himself by requesting payment to TRZ from public funds.
{¶ 8} On April 28, 2020, Judge Grendell sent a letter to Walder arguing that his statement regarding the nonuse of tax dollars was accurate because he was seeking payment from the Geauga courts’ special-projects funds, which, Judge Grendell explained, were sourced from filing fees rather than tax dollars. Judge Grendell further explained that the calls were the “least expensive way” to communicate information about the courts’ operations during the pandemic. That same day, Judge Grendell issued orders directing that half of TRZ‘s invoice be paid out of the juvenile court‘s fund and that half of it be paid out of the probate court‘s fund. Judge Grendell submitted these orders to Walder, together with TRZ‘s invoice, two vouchers in the amount of $1,225.44 each, and copies of past orders establishing the Geauga courts’ special-projects funds.
{¶ 9} On April 29, 2020, Walder sent a letter to Judge Grendell stating that TRZ‘s invoice would not be paid because his requests did not constitute “valid claims against the Geauga County Treasury.”
B. Newspaper advertisements
{¶ 10} In 2013, the probate court established the “Good Deeds Program” to provide Geauga County residents with information about the recording and transferring of deeds upon death. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the probate court scheduled multiple in-person public meetings under the program that had to be cancelled due to the pandemic. During the pandemic, Judge Grendell advertised a program-related checklist and schedule of online program meetings in local weekly newspapers. Chagrin Valley Printing and Karlovec Media Group published
the advertisements and invoiced the probate court for $910 and $802, respectively, for their services.
1. Chagrin Valley Printing
{¶ 11} On April 14, 2020, Judge Grendell issued an order directing payment to Chagrin Valley Printing out of the probate court‘s special-projects fund. Judge Grendell submitted the order to Walder that same day, together with a purchase order, invoice, copy of the advertisement, and copy of a past order establishing the probate court‘s special-projects fund.
{¶ 12} On April 24, 2020, Walder sent a letter to Judge Grendell stating that Chagrin Valley Printing would not be paid, because Judge Grendell had stated in the
{¶ 13} On April 28, 2020, Judge Grendell sent a letter to Walder arguing that his statements in the advertisements were accurate because he was seeking payment from the special-projects fund, which was sourced from filing fees rather than tax dollars. Judge Grendell further explained that the advertisements saved the public time and money because the program aided people in excluding their assets from probate. Walder again refused to act on Judge Grendell‘s request, explaining that it did not constitute a “valid claim[] against the Geauga County Treasury.”
2. Karlovec Media Group
{¶ 14} Judge Grendell issued an order on April 29, 2020, directing payment to the Karlovec Media Group out of the probate court‘s special-projects fund. Judge Grendell submitted the order to Walder that same day, together with a purchase order, invoice, copy of the advertisement, and copy of a past order establishing the probate court‘s special-projects fund.
{¶ 15} On May 4, 2020, Walder sent a letter to Judge Grendell stating that Karlovec Media Group would not be paid, asserting the same reasons that he had relied on to deny payment to Chagrin Valley Printing. Judge Grendell responded to Walder by letter, justifying the content of the advertisements on the same grounds that he had relied on regarding the Chagrin Valley Printing advertisements.
C. Website upgrades
{¶ 16} On October 15, 2019, Judge Grendell issued an order directing a $7,231.50 payment to Company 119 for upgrading the juvenile court‘s website. Judge Grendell submitted the order to Walder soon thereafter, together with a purchase order and invoice. About a week later, Walder denied the payment because Judge Grendell had not submitted the court‘s contract with Company 119 with his request.
{¶ 17} On October 28, 2019, Kimberly Laurie, administrator of the Geauga courts, sent Walder the Company 119 contract and the project outline. The contract specified a total payment of $24,105, payable in four installments of 30 percent, 30 percent, 30 percent, and 10 percent of the total.
{¶ 18} On November 18, 2019, Walder again denied payment, stating that “[u]pon review of the contract as submitted, we find no Auditor‘s Certification as required by
{¶ 19} On January 3, 2020, Judge Grendell issued another order directing a $14,463.00 payment to Company 119 for additional installments under the contract. Judge Grendell submitted the order to Walder that same day, together with a purchase order and two invoices. Less than a week later, Walder denied payment for failure to submit an auditor‘s certificate.
D. Mileage reimbursements
{¶ 20} Judge Grendell seeks a warrant directing travel-related reimbursements to Laurie in the amount of $142.69. This total derives from two categories of Laurie‘s travel.
1. Reimbursement request No. 1
{¶ 21} On January 31, 2019, Judge Grendell submitted a “payment batch” to
{¶ 22} On February 5, 2019, Walder returned the payment batch without explanation. Later, Walder and a member of his staff, Kate Jacob, explained that the batch was returned because it did not present “proper order(s), or voucher(s) and evidentiary matter(s).” Walder also explained that Laurie‘s request for mileage reimbursement could not be processed because, in his view, some of the travel fell within Internal Revenue Service rules relating to deductions for travel to and from a temporary work location.
{¶ 23} On February 11, 2019, the Geauga courts resubmitted the batch for payment. In response, Ronald Leyde, the chief deputy auditor, emailed Laurie and reiterated the concerns that Walder had communicated to her about her mileage-reimbursement request. He also explained that the batch had an incorrect general-ledger date. Laurie changed the date and removed her mileage-reimbursement request so that the other items within the batch could be paid.
{¶ 24} Throughout the middle-to-latter part of February 2019, Judge Grendell and Walder exchanged emails concerning Laurie‘s mileage-reimbursement request, without resolution.
{¶ 25} On March 21, 2019, Judge Grendell issued another order directing Walder to reimburse Laurie‘s mileage.
2. Reimbursement request No. 2
{¶ 26} On March 23, 2020, Judge Grendell issued an order directing payment to Laurie for her travel to nursing homes and senior centers. Judge Grendell submitted the order to Walder that same day, together with Laurie‘s mileage-reimbursement form and a purchase order.
{¶ 27} On April 6, 2020, Jacob emailed Patricia Behrend, a member of Judge Grendell‘s staff, explaining that Laurie‘s request would not be paid, because it sought “reimbursement for transportation between multiple caroling events at area nursing homes that Judge Grendell used for campaign purposes on his personal political campaign‘s Facebook page.” Jacob asked Behrend to “provide us with Judge Grendell‘s additional explicit affirmation that said events, despite his use of them for his personal political campaign, were actually official Geauga County Juvenile Probate Court events with a public purpose beyond campaigning.” Behrend responded that “caroling is a court activity for our community outreach program.”
E. Publication fees
{¶ 28} On February 14, 2019, Judge Grendell issued an order providing that the juvenile court would pay $61.95 to 21st Century Media to publish a notice regarding a pending juvenile case, subject to reimbursement by the parties. Judge Grendell submitted the order to Walder that same day, together with a purchase order. Walder denied payment the following week, citing missing evidentiary materials as the reason for the denial.
{¶ 29} On April 4, 2019, Judge Grendell resubmitted his order to Walder, together with an amended purchase order and an invoice from 21st Century Media. A week later, Walder denied the payment, directing Judge Grendell to “submit this invoice on an encumbrance opened prior to 12/17/18 as that is the date the obligation was minimally incurred.”
F. Judge Grendell reissued his orders after the current version of R.C. 319.16 took effect
{¶ 30} In April 2021, after the current version of
III. Analysis
A. Whether this case presents a separation-of-powers problem
{¶ 31} Judge Grendell and his amici curiae argue that Walder‘s refusal to issue warrants for payment of the requested expenditures violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by impeding the Geauga courts’ operations.1 It is true that “[c]ommon pleas courts and their divisions have inherent power to order funding that is reasonable and necessary to the courts’ administration of their business.” State ex rel. Maloney v. Sherlock, 100 Ohio St.3d 77, 2003-Ohio-5058, 796 N.E.2d 897, ¶ 25. But when, as here, a statutory process exists for resolving a funding dispute, a court must abide by that process unless the process itself suffers from a constitutional defect. See State ex rel. O‘Diam v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 161 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-3503, 162 N.E.3d 740, ¶ 26 (“before getting to the question of the scope of a court‘s inherent authority, one would first have to establish that the statutory scheme is unsound“).
{¶ 32} The latter principle defeats Judge Grendell‘s separation-of-powers argument, because he has failed to identify any constitutional defect with
B. Whether the current or former version of R.C. 319.16 applies
{¶ 33} Former
{¶ 34} The current version of
{¶ 35} In support of that argument, Judge Grendell points to this court‘s decision in EPI of Cleveland, Inc. v. Limbach, 42 Ohio St.3d 103, 537 N.E.2d 651 (1989). In that case, we determined that the tax commissioner had to apply an amended sales-tax law that took effect after a hearing had been held on the taxpayer‘s petition for reassessment but before the tax commissioner issued her decision in the matter. Id. at 106-107. Observing that “‘[l]aws of a remedial nature providing rules of practice, courses of
character, which broadened the ways that a taxpayer could disprove liability by allowing for the presentation of additional evidence, id. at 106-107.
{¶ 36} Judge Grendell maintains that, like the statutory amendments at issue in EPI of Cleveland, the amendments to
{¶ 37} Walder has not presented a persuasive argument in response. He argues that former
{¶ 38} Walder also asserts that we may not consider Judge Grendell‘s April 2021 orders, because they arose after he filed his complaint. But this assertion lacks any supporting authority and is at odds with the precept that “we must ‘consider the facts and conditions at the time we determine whether to grant the writ.‘” See State
ex rel. Williams-Byers v. S. Euclid, 163 Ohio St.3d 478, 2020-Ohio-5534, 171 N.E.3d 264, ¶ 31 (considering the effect of a city council‘s appropriation that arose after the relator filed her complaint), quoting State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 90 Ohio St.3d 55, 64, 734 N.E.2d 811 (2000).
{¶ 39} In summary, we conclude that the current version of
C. The mandamus standard
{¶ 40} To be entitled to extraordinary relief in mandamus, the relator must ordinarily establish (1) a clear legal right to the relief requested, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate legal remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. But because current
1. Robocalls and newspaper advertisements
{¶ 41} Judge Grendell argues that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering Walder to issue warrants for payment regarding the phone calls and newspaper advertisements, stressing that
{¶ 42}
subject to conditions not at issue here, “shall be disbursed upon an order of the court.”
{¶ 43} The evidence establishes that Judge Grendell had TRZ place the robocalls to communicate to Geauga County residents how the pandemic had affected the courts’ operations. And he had Chagrin Valley Printing and the Karlovec Media Group place the newspaper advertisements to communicate information to the residents about the Good Deeds Program, which, because of the pandemic, could no longer offer in-person meetings. We hold that because these communications were rendered as a service to the community, prompted in response to the onset of the pandemic, they fall within the meaning of a community-service program under
{¶ 44} The question we must decide, then, is whether Walder had a clear legal duty to issue the warrants after Judge Grendell had issued his orders. Under
{¶ 45} Walder counters that Judge Grendell lacked authority to issue the contested orders and failed to establish that they were for a public purpose. These alleged defects stem from Walder‘s belief that Judge Grendell tainted the content
of the robocalls and newspaper advertisements by claiming that no tax dollars were used to pay for them. We reject these arguments.
{¶ 46} Judge Grendell‘s authority is plain from the terms of
{¶ 47} Walder‘s argument that the court‘s communications to the residents were false and misleading also falters. To begin,
{¶ 48} Further, Walder does not dispute that the special-projects fund is sourced with filing fees, not tax dollars. See State ex rel. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Comp. Bd. v. Withrow, 62 Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 579 N.E.2d 705 (1991) (“a fee is not a tax“). Nor does he dispute that Judge Grendell sought warrants to pay the vendors out of the special-projects fund rather than from a fund sourced with tax dollars. Instead, he speculates that Judge Grendell and his staff spent “hours” working on the substance of the communications in the midst of Judge Grendell‘s campaign. But he cites no evidence to support this assertion.
{¶ 49} Last, we reject Walder‘s reliance on this court‘s decisions in State ex rel. Krabach v. Ferguson, 46 Ohio St.2d 168, 346 N.E.2d 681 (1976), and State ex rel. Duffy v. Ferguson, 132 Ohio St. 524, 9 N.E.2d 290 (1937). Those cases
involved the state auditor, not a county auditor, and thus did not turn on the meaning of the current version of
{¶ 50} Judge Grendell is entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling Walder to issue warrants for payment regarding the robocalls and newspaper advertisements.
2. Website upgrades
{¶ 51} Judge Grendell argues that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering Walder to issue warrants for payment regarding the website upgrades, stressing that the upgrades were made in furtherance of computerizing the Geauga courts as authorized by
{¶ 52}
{¶ 53} There is no dispute that Company 119‘s website-design services were used to put information relating to the Geauga courts into a computer-usable format. See Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary 256 (11th Ed.2020) (“computerize” means to “put in a form that a computer can use“). It follows, then, that Judge Grendell‘s orders seeking a warrant for payment of the expenses out of the computerization funds created by
is “valid,”
make any contract or give any order involving the expenditure of money unless there is attached thereto a certificate of the fiscal officer of the subdivision that the amount required to meet the obligation or, in the case of a continuing contract to be performed in whole or in part in an ensuing fiscal year, the amount required to meet the obligation in the fiscal year in which the contract is made, has been lawfully appropriated for such purpose and is in the treasury or in process of collection to the credit of an appropriate fund free from any previous encumbrances. * * * Every such contract made without such a certificate shall be void, and no warrant shall be issued in payment of any amount due thereon.
“The purpose in requiring such certificate to be made and in prohibiting public officials entering into any such contracts unless such certificate is first made is clearly to prevent fraud and the reckless expenditure of public funds, but particularly to preclude the creation of any valid obligation against the county above or beyond the fund previously provided and at hand for such purpose.” St. Marys v. Auglaize Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 115 Ohio St.3d 387, 2007-Ohio-5026, 875 N.E.2d 561, ¶ 49, quoting State v. Kuhner, 107 Ohio St. 406, 413, 140 N.E. 344 (1923).
{¶ 55} To prevail on this argument, Walder must show that
that the Geauga courts meet the definition of a “subdivision” or a “taxing unit.” The Revised Code defines a “taxing unit” as “any subdivision or other governmental district having authority to levy taxes on the property in the district or issue bonds that constitute a charge against the property of the district, including conservancy districts, metropolitan park districts, sanitary districts, road districts, and other districts.”
{¶ 56} Walder does not identify any law that authorizes a court to levy taxes or issue bonds. And his argument that the Geauga courts constitute a taxing unit because they receive county taxes falters because the statute does not designate a recipient of county taxes as a taxing unit. Walder also points to
{¶ 57} Turning to the word “subdivision” in this context, the Revised Code defines it as
any county; municipal corporation; township; township police district; joint police district; township fire district; joint fire district; joint ambulance district; joint emergency medical services district; fire and ambulance district; joint recreation district; township waste disposal district; township road district; community college district; technical college district; detention facility
district; a district organized under section 2151.65 of the Revised Code; a combined district organized under sections 2152.41 and 2151.65 of the Revised Code; a joint-county alcohol, drug addiction, and mental
health service district; a drainage improvement district created under section 6131.52 of the Revised Code; a lake facilities authority created under Chapter 353. of the Revised Code; a union cemetery district; a county school financing district; a city, local, exempted village, cooperative education, or joint vocational school district; or a regional student education district created under section 3313.83 of the Revised Code.
{¶ 58} Walder ignores this provision altogether. Because he fails to develop an argument establishing that the Geauga courts meet the definition of a subdivision, we cannot conclude that
{¶ 59} Finally, Walder makes a passing argument that Geauga County‘s automatic data processing board would need to approve the Geauga courts’ use of Company 119‘s services. Walder fails to put forth any meaningful statutory analysis to support this argument. See Mason City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. at ¶ 38.
{¶ 60} Judge Grendell is entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling Walder to issue warrants for payment regarding the website upgrades.
3. Mileage reimbursements
{¶ 61} Judge Grendell argues that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering Walder to issue warrants for payment of the mileage reimbursements sought by Laurie. Unlike the categories of expenses addressed above, Judge
Grendell does not point to a statute authorizing him to seek reimbursement for this class of expenses. Instead, he refers us to the Geauga courts’ travel-expense-reimbursement policy. Amended in 2006, the policy provides: “Mileage reimbursement claims must be made out on the approved reimbursement form. Completed mileage reimbursement requests must be reviewed and approved by the employee‘s supervisor before they are submitted for payment.” Laurie elaborates on this policy in her affidavit, explaining that “[a]ll employees of the Court are entitled to reimbursement for mileage incurred for court-related travel so long as the reimbursement is approved by me (the Court Administrator), or in the case of my mileage, by Judge Grendell.”
{¶ 62} Walder does not dispute that the Geauga courts may adopt a travel-expense policy or that Laurie‘s reimbursement requests fall within the terms of that policy. Instead, he points to former
{¶ 63} Walder next argues that Laurie‘s reimbursement requests relating to her after-work commutes depart from “IRS standards.” Walder‘s legal analysis in support
Laurie‘s. If there is a reason for treating the one as the functional equivalent of the other, Walder has failed to say what that reason is.
{¶ 64} In summary, Judge Grendell has shown that his mileage-reimbursement orders were appropriate in light of the Geauga courts’ travel-expense-reimbursement policy, making them proper court orders under
4. Publication fees
{¶ 65} Last, Judge Grendell argues that he is entitled to a warrant for payment of $61.95 in publication fees for legal notices in a pending juvenile case. As support, Judge Grendell cites
{¶ 66} The point in contention here is quite narrow. Walder does not dispute, as a general matter, Judge Grendell‘s authority to seek warrants for this type of expense. Nor does he dispute Judge Grendell‘s assertion that this expense was necessary to adjudicate the pending juvenile case or that “there are times when the publications are initially paid for by the court and then reimbursed by case parties at a later date.”
{¶ 67} Instead, Walder alleges that Judge Grendell failed to comply with
{¶ 68} As noted above, Walder has not shown that the Geauga courts fall within the meaning of a “subdivision or taxing unit” as that phrase is used in
D. Judge Grendell‘s motion for leave to file a supplemental affidavit
{¶ 69} Judge Grendell has filed an unopposed motion for leave to file a supplemental affidavit for the purpose of clarifying that in 2013, he increased the special-projects fee for both the probate court and the juvenile court from $15 to $30 and that in 2015, he increased the special-projects fee for the probate court by $25 to $50 (depending on the filing). We grant the
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 70} For the foregoing reasons, we grant a writ of mandamus ordering Walder to issue warrants for payment of the contested expenditures, and we grant Judge Grendell‘s motion for leave to file a supplemental affidavit.
Writ granted.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Stephen W. Funk, and Emily K. Anglewicz, for relator.
Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., Frank H. Scialdone, and Todd M. Raskin, for respondent.
Linn & Grendell, and James Grendell, urging granting of the writ for amici curiae TRZ Business Services and Michael Wagner.
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., Louis E. Grube, and Paul W. Flowers, urging granting of the writ for amici curiae Ohio Association of Probate Judges and Ohio Association of Juvenile Court Judges.